

Public Meeting

Thursday, January 11, 2024 at 9:00AM



PUBLIC MEETING AGENDA Thursday, January 11, 2024 at 9:00AM Livestreaming at https://youtube.com/live/HkO7rMkS7l8?feature=share

Call to Order

Indigenous Land Acknowledgement

Declarations of Interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

Chief's Monthly Verbal Update

1. Election of the Chair and Vice-Chair

2. Confirmation of the Minutes from the regular public meeting held on December 19, 2023.

Items for Consideration

- December 12, 2023 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director
 Re: Update on the Implementation of the Board's Policy on Use of Artificial Intelligence Technology
- 4. December 19, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 - Re: Mobile Crisis Intervention Team Program Memorandum of Understanding between the Toronto Police Services Board and Partner Hospitals: Unity Health Network, Scarborough Health Network, and North York General Hospital

- December 19, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 Re: Receipt of Donation
- December 1, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 Re: Special Constable Appointments and Re-Appointments January 2024
- 7. December 21, 2023 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director
 - Re: City Council Decision Infrastructure and Environment Committee Item 7.4 Updates on Vision Zero Road Safety Initiatives - New Traffic Calming Policy, Community Safety Zone Criteria, Zebra Marking Policy, Approach to Area-Based Speed Limit Reductions and Related Council Requests
- 8. December 21, 2023 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director
 - Re: City Council Decisions MM 12.28 Hate Speech and Other Hate Activities, EX9.2: Implementation Update: Auditor General Recommendations on 9-1-1 Operations and Responses to Calls for Service by the Toronto Police Service, EX9.10: Update on the Toronto Community Crisis Service Proposed Expansion Plan

Consent Agenda

9. Chief's Administrative Investigation Reports

- 9.1 December 4, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police **Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Firearm Discharged at a Person - Complainant 2023.14**
- 9.2 November 6, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.24
- 9.3 November 6, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.30

- 9.4 November 6, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 - Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.32
- 9.5 November 6, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police **Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Alleged Sexual** Assault Complainant 2023.37
- 9.6 November 6, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.38
- 9.7 November 6, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Death of Complainant 2023.41
- 9.8 December 4, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.42
- 9.9 December 4, 2023 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police
 Re: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.44

10. Update Regarding the Request to Extend Term of 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot

Board to convene in a Confidential meeting for the purpose of considering confidential items pertaining to legal and personnel matters in accordance with Section 35(4) of the *Police Services Act*

Adjournment

Next Meeting

Regular Board Meeting

Monday, March 18, 2024 Hybrid Board Meeting – at Police Headquarters, 40 College Street or virtually via WebEx

Members of the Toronto Police Services Board

Ann Morgan, Chair Amber Morley, Deputy Mayor & Member Lily Cheng, Member & Councillor Nick Migliore, Board Member Lisa Kostakis, Vice-Chair Nadine Spencer, Board Member Jon Burnside, Member & Councillor



PUBLIC REPORT

December 12, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Dubi Kanengisser Executive Director
- Subject: Update on the Implementation of the Board's Policy on Use of Artificial Intelligence Technology

Purpose:
□ Information Purposes Only
⊠ Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

This report recommends that the Board amend its Policy on Use of Artificial Intelligence Technology as indicated in Appendix 'A'.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation(s) contained in this report. Failure to adopt the proposed change will result in a need to significant resources to review additional technologies that fall under the present definition despite being unrelated to the use of Artificial Intelligence.

Summary:

The Service, in consultation with the Board Office, has concluded the review of all technologies utilizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) currently in use, as required by the Board's Policy on the Use of Artificial Intelligence. The list, attached as Appendix 'B', includes one (1) "High Risk" technology, and four (4) "Low Risk" technologies. In completing its review, the Service identified over 25 technologies that fall under the definition used in the Policy, despite not utilizing AI as it is generally understood. In consultations with the Board Office it was determined that the definition used in the Policy should be amended as suggested in Appendix 'A'.

Discussion:

Background

At its meeting of February 28, 2022, the Board approved a new Policy on the Use of Artificial Intelligence Technology. This Policy, a first of its kind in the world, established Board governance for the consideration of the use of new or enhanced technologies using AI, and an assessment and accountability framework, to minimize and mitigate any potential negative impacts that result from the use of such technologies by the Toronto Police Service (the Service).

The Policy included the following requirements, among others:

[T]he Chief of Police:

- 16. Will initiate immediately a process to identify and conduct a risk analysis of all AI technologies currently in use by the Service, to be completed no later than December 2024, and report to the Board upon its completion with a summary of its findings;
- 17. Will post immediately on the Service's website, and maintain up to date with the most accurate available information, a list of all AI technologies currently in use by the Service that are deemed to be of High, Moderate or Low risk, including the following information:
 - a. For AI technologies deemed to be of High or Moderate risk:
 - i. Name and manufacturer/developer,
 - ii. Purpose of the technology,
 - iii. How the technology is used by the Service,
 - iv. What information is collected by the technology,
 - v. What persons or under what circumstances can the technology be expected to be used, and,
 - vi. All reports submitted by the Chief to the Board with regards to the Al technology, as required under this Policy or subsequent Board decisions;
 - b. For AI technologies deemed to be of Low risk:
 - i. Name and manufacturer/developer, and
 - ii. A brief description of the type of technology (e.g., speech-to-text);

In addition, the Policy requires the Board to "review the Policy at least once every three years to ensure that the Policy successfully achieves its identified purpose."

Al Inventory

The Service has concluded a diligent process to identify any applications in use by the Service that fall under the Policy definition of Artificial Intelligence, and conducted a risk evaluation of these applications. Five (5) applications were identified that fall under the "High Risk" (one application) or "Low Risk" categories (four applications). No "Extreme Risk" or "Moderate Risk" applications were identified. Appendix 'B' includes a list of these applications, and will be posted on the Service's website.

For the "High Risk" application, the list includes the name of the application and vendor, the purpose or intended use of the application, a list of information collected by the application, authorized users, and mitigation steps to reduce risks from the application. For the "Low Risk" applications, the inventory includes the name and manufacturer of each application, and a description of it.

Proposed Amendment to the Definition of AI Technology

In designing the Policy, the Board Office and the Service developed a definition of AI Technology that was intended to be as inclusive as possible. The definition, as included in the approved Policy reads as follows:

goods and services, including but not limited to software and electronic devices, which collect information about members of the public or their actions, including personal information as defined under the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, or make use of existing information about members of the public or their actions, and which use automated analytical problem-solving models to assist or replace Service Members in identifying, categorizing, prioritizing or otherwise making decisions pertaining to the information or the members of the public to which it pertains. Al technology includes, but is not limited to: machine learning technology, neural networks, natural language processing applications, predictive technologies, computer vision, and technologies which make predictions using algorithms trained on large data sets. Without limiting the foregoing, for the purpose of this Policy, "Al technology" will also include any goods or services whose procurement, deployment or use require that a privacy impact assessment be conducted in advance of its deployment or use. [emphasis added]

In conducting the process to identify AI applications, the Service identified over 25 applications that fall under the emphasized portion of the above definition. In evaluating these applications, it was determined that they do not fall under any conventional definition of AI, since they do not use automated analytical problem-solving models. For example, these applications include website forms that collect private information such as an online payment application. Carrying out a full risk analysis of these applications will be unnecessarily time consuming, without furthering the purpose of the Policy.

The reference to applications that require privacy impact assessments was included as a "catch-all", to reduce the likelihood that any flaws in the definition used will result in missed technologies. The findings of this comprehensive process demonstrate that all relevant applications were captured by the core of the definition, and no additional applications that can reasonably be deemed as AI were captured by the broader

definition. I therefore believe it is advisable to revise the Policy by removing the underlined portion of the definition from the Policy. The remaining definition will continue to cover all applications that can reasonably be considered as utilizing AI. A copy of the proposed revised Policy is attached as Appendix 'A'.

Conclusion:

The Service has concluded a comprehensive process to identify all applications of AI in use by the Service, and will post the inventory of all "High Risk" and "Low Risk" applications identified. In conducting this process, it was determined that utilizing the deliberately broad definition did not result in capturing any relevant applications that were not captured by the core definition of AI Technology, and it is therefore recommended that, to minimize unnecessary resource requirements, for future analyses the core definition only is used.

Respectfully submitted,

Dubi Kanengisser Executive Director

Attachments:

Appendix 'A': Draft revision to *Use of Artificial Intelligence Technology* Appendix 'B': Al Inventory

APPENDIX A

TORONTO POLICE SERVICES BOARD



USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY

DATE APPROVED	28 February 2022	P2022-0228-6.3	
DATE(S) AMENDED			
DATE REVIEWED			
REPORTING REQUIREMENT	Chief to report to Board from time to time as required by this Policy and directed by the Board.		
LEGISLATION	<i>Police Services Act,</i> R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, as amended, s. 31(1)(c).		
	Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56.		
	Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19.		
	The Canadian Charter	r of Rights and Freedoms	
	The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms		

Guiding Principles

The Toronto Police Services Board (the Board) supports the efforts of the Toronto Police Service (the Service) and its Members to provide effective and accountable policing through the prudent adoption of new technologies, while, at the same time, ensuring transparency and making certain that policing is provided in accordance with both the law and the interests of the public, and protects and promotes fundamental rights.

Novel technologies making use of artificial intelligence (AI) applications hold the promise of improving the effectiveness of policing services and increasing public safety in Toronto. At the same time, technological advancements may pose new concerns for the privacy, rights (including the rights to freedom of expression, freedoms of association and freedom of assembly), dignity and equality of the individuals affected by them. For example, there have been instances in which novel technologies were shown to incorporate and perpetuate pre-existing and systemic biases, resulting in both individually and systemically discriminating decisions. Furthermore, such unintended consequences may undermine the desired benefits to efficiency and effectiveness of policing services, as well as public trust in policing.

Under section 41(1)(a) of the *Police Services Act* (the *Act*), the Chief of Police is responsible for administering the police service and overseeing its operation, in accordance with the objectives, priorities and policies established by the Board.

The Board is the entity that is responsible for the provision of adequate and effective policing under the *Act* and its successor legislation. No current statutes or regulations fully govern the use of AI technologies in Ontario or Canada, and the Province has not yet developed comprehensive guidelines for the use of such technologies in policing. As a result of the current legal gaps and desired use of AI technologies, the Board determines it necessary to establish governance to facilitate decision-making that is in the public interest, and to enable the Chief to assess and account to the Board concerning how technology will be procured, implemented and used in the provision of policing in Toronto. In its review of proposed AI technologies, the Board will consider the need for and benefits of deploying the new technology; the potential unintended consequences to the privacy, rights, freedoms and dignity of members of the public and Service Members, and to the equitable delivery of police services to the public; and, any possible mitigating actions to eliminate any such unintended consequences. To the greatest degree possible, the Board must conduct such reviews in public.

All use of technology, including AI technology, whether approved by the Board or otherwise, must adhere to the following guiding principles:

- Legality: All technology used, and all use of technology, must comply with applicable law, including the *Police Services Act* (and its regulations, as well as successor legislation), Ontario's *Human Rights Code*, and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and be compatible with applicable due process and accountability obligations.
- **Fairness**: Use of AI technology must not result in the increase or perpetuation of bias in policing and should diminish such biases that exist.
- **Reliability**: Al technology must result in consistent outputs or recommendations and behave in a repeatable manner.
- **Justifiability**: The use of AI technology must be shown to further the purpose of law enforcement in a manner that outweighs identified risks.
- **Personal Accountability**: Service Members are accountable, through existing professional standards processes, for all the decisions they make, including those made with the assistance of AI technology or other algorithmic technologies.
- **Organizational Accountability**: All use of AI technology must be auditable and transparent, and be governed by a clear governance framework.
- **Transparency**: Where the Service uses AI technology that may have an impact on decisions that affect members of the public, the use of that technology must be made public to the greatest degree possible. Where full transparency may unduly endanger the

efficacy of investigative techniques or operations, the Service will endeavour to make publicly available as much information about the AI technology as possible, to assure the public of the reliability of the AI technology and the justifiability of its use. Where a decision assisted by AI technology may lead to the laying of criminal or other charges against an individual, the possible influence of the AI technology must be included in the disclosure provided to the Crown.

- **Privacy**: Use of AI technology must, to the greatest degree practicable, preserve the privacy of the individuals whose information it collects in line with 'privacy by design' principles.
- **Meaningful Engagement**: The adoption of specific AI technologies must be preceded by meaningful public engagement commensurate with the risks posed by the technology contemplated.

Purpose of Policy

The purpose of this Policy is to establish Board governance for the consideration of the use of new or enhanced technologies using AI, or of previously approved AI technology that is to be used for a novel purpose or in a novel circumstance, and to establish an assessment and accountability framework that addresses:

- The impact of the AI technology on the privacy, rights and dignity of individuals and communities, in accordance with the *Police Services Act* and its regulations (as well as successor legislation), Ontario's *Human Rights Code*, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and any other applicable legislation;
- The need for adoption new AI technologies to be done in a transparent manner, and contributes to equitable and effective policing services for all members of the public;
- Possible unintended consequences of the use of the AI technology in the provision of policing services in Toronto, prior to any adoption;
- A requirement for appropriate consultations to precede the procurement and deployment of new AI technologies that may have negative impacts on members of the public or the quality of policing services in Toronto;
- Mitigation strategies that seek to eliminate any identified unintended negative consequences stemming from the use of new AI technologies; and,
- A pre- and post-deployment, evidence-based evaluation and re-assessment of the AI technologies that are approved for procurement and/or use.

This Policy requires the thoughtful, evidence-based consideration of the benefits and risks of obtaining and deploying any new technology using AI, or novel uses of existing technologies, including impacts on public trust in the Service, community safety and sense of security, individual dignity, and equitable delivery of policing services. In particular, this Policy will ensure that decision-making examines and seeks to ensure that new technologies do not introduce or perpetuate biases to the greatest degree possible, including biases against vulnerable populations, including, but not limited to people with disabilities (physical and mental); children

and older persons; Indigenous, Black and racialized individuals; low-income individuals; and, members of LGBTQ2S+ communities.

Definitions

For the purpose of this Policy, the following definitions will apply:

Al Technology: goods and services, including but not limited to software and electronic devices, which collect information about members of the public or their actions, including personal information as defined under the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*, or make use of existing information about members of the public or their actions, and which use automated analytical problem-solving models to assist or replace Service Members in identifying, categorizing, prioritizing or otherwise making decisions pertaining to the information or the members of the public to which it pertains. Al technology includes, but is not limited to: machine learning technology, neural networks, natural language processing applications, predictive technologies, computer vision, and technologies which make predictions using algorithms trained on large data sets. Without limiting the foregoing, for the purpose of this Policy, "Al technology" will also include any goods or services whose procurement, deployment or use require that a privacy impact assessment be conducted in advance of its deployment or use.

New AI technology: any of: (1) AI technology never used before by the Service, (2) goods and services, including but not limited to software and electronic devices, already or previously employed by the Service which are enhanced through the application of AI in a manner that transforms the goods or services into an AI technology; (3) AI technology already or previously employed by the Service which is being considered for deployment for a novel purpose or in novel circumstances that may substantially change the data collected or used, including the content of the data, its granularity, and the purpose of data collection and use; (4) AI technology already or previously employed by the Service which is being enhanced through the use of new data that is substantially different from the data previously used, including the type of data, its granularity, or the manner in which it is obtained; and, (5) the linking of data from existing sources of information to create a new dataset for use by an AI technology.

Bias: systematically flawed output that is affected directly or indirectly by flaws in the design of the AI technology, training data, or the autonomous learning processes of the AI technology, to either misidentify certain types of subjects (individuals, objects, locations, etc.), or ascribe them with characteristics that disadvantage them based on illegitimate grounds (e.g., *Code*-protected grounds).

Data: any information collected and stored, whether locally or by a third party, which is used by the AI technology for the purpose of training, validation, testing, or generating output.

Biometrics: data on the measurements of physical and behavioural features of individuals (e.g., facial features, voice, gait) that could be used to identify the individual.

Human in the Loop: a process that ensures that any decisions or classifications made by the technology must be confirmed by a qualified human who can compare the input data with the output decision or classification, prior to any action taking place based on the output.

Explainability: Al technology is explainable when human users are able to comprehend the results created by the machine, why they were arrived at, and how changes to the input would have changed the outputs.

Training data: data provided to the AI technology for the purpose of enabling it to learn patterns and independently develop decision making algorithms.

Transactional data: data which is entered into a system which uses AI and that is used to generate output, but is not leveraged for training.

Policy of the Board

It is the policy of the Toronto Police Services Board that the Chief of Police:

Review and Assessment of New AI Technologies

- Will develop, in consultation with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, the Ministry of the Attorney General, the Anti-Racism Directorate, stakeholders, independent human rights experts, independent legal experts, independent technology experts, and affected communities, procedures and processes for the review and assessment of new AI technologies that will, at a minimum, establish:
 - (a) That Service Members may not use new AI technologies prior to receiving approval and training in accordance with the procedure(s) and process(es);
 - (b) That all Service Members must be trained to identify new AI technologies for the purpose of obtaining an approval in accordance with section 1(a);
 - (c) Risk categories for new AI technologies based on their potential to cause harm, that include, at a minimum:
 - i. Extreme Risk Technologies, which may not be considered for adoption, including:
 - Any application where there is no qualified "human-in-the-loop". A qualified human must evaluate a recommendation from an AI tool before consequential action is taken, and be accountable for any decision made based on this recommendation;

- 2. Where use of the application results in mass surveillance defined as the monitoring of a population or a significant component of a population, or the analysis of indiscriminately collected data on a population or a significant component of a population;
- Any application of AI in a life-safety situation, i.e., an application where the action of the AI technology could slow down the reaction time of the human operator, resulting in potential risk to life of members of the public or Service Members;
- Any application that is known or is likely to cause harm or have an impact on an individual's rights, despite the use of mitigation techniques, due to bias or other flaws;
- 5. Any application used to predict or assign likelihood of an individual or group of individuals to offend or reoffend;
- 6. Any application making use of data collected in accordance with the Board's *Regulated Interaction with the Community and the Collection of Identifying Information* Policy, or any Historical Contact Data as defined in that Policy; or,
- 7. Where training or transactional data is known or thought to be illegally sourced, or where it is from an unknown source;
- ii. High Risk Technologies, including:
 - Where training or transactional data is known or thought to be of poor quality, carry bias, or where the quality of such data is unknown;
 - 2. Where training data can be influenced or biased by malicious actors;
 - 3. Applications which link biometrics to personal information (e.g. facial recognition);
 - 4. Where the proposed system could be used to assist in the identification of individuals for the purpose of their arrest, detention or questioning;
 - 5. Where the process involved suggests an allocation of policing resources;
 - 6. Where a system that otherwise merits a Moderate risk assessment lacks independent validation; or,

- 7. Where a system cannot be fully explainable in its behaviour;
- iii. Moderate Risk Technologies, including:
 - 1. Where the "human-in-the-loop" may have difficulty identifying bias or other decision failures of the AI; or,
 - 2. Where training data is based on existing Service data;
- iv. Low Risk Technologies, including any AI technology that both:
 - 1. Does not fall under the categories of Extreme High Risk, High Risk, or Moderate Risk, and
 - 2. Assists Members in identifying, categorizing, prioritizing or otherwise making administrative decisions pertaining to members of the public; and,
- v. Minimal Risk Technologies, including any AI technology that does not fall under any of the preceding categories;
- (d) The minimal risk analysis and privacy impact analysis that must be carried out for each level of risk in accordance with above subsection (c), as determined by an initial risk analysis, and the appropriate tools to carry out such impact analyses; and,
- (e) The risk mitigation measures required for each level of risk (e.g., training, contingency planning);
- 2. Will make the procedures required under section 1, including a detailed risk assessment tool, available to the public on the Service's website;

Board Approval and Reporting Prior to Procurement, Utilization and Deployment

- 3. When contemplating procuring, utilizing or deploying new AI technology in its operations, will conduct a risk assessment of the AI technology, prior to the earlier of:
 - (a) Seeking funds for the new technology, including but not limited to applying for a grant, or accepting municipal, provincial or federal funds, or public or private inkind or other donations;
 - (b) Acquiring the new technology, including acquiring such technology without the exchange of monies or other consideration;
 - (c) Using or deploying existing technology:
 - i. for a novel purpose;

- ii. in novel circumstances, that may substantially change the data collected, including the content of the data, its granularity, and the purpose of data collection or use;
- iii. for a purpose or in a manner not previously approved by the Board; or
- iv. for a purpose or in a manner not practiced before the approval of this Policy; or,
- (d) Entering into agreement to acquire, share, or otherwise use such technology;
- 4. Will not procure, utilize or deploy a new AI technology deemed to be of Extreme Risk;
- 5. Will not procure, utilize or deploy any new AI technology deemed to be of High or Moderate risk before reporting to the Board and obtaining its approval;
- 6. Will inform the Board, at the earliest possible opportunity, of the decision to procure, utilize or deploy a new AI technology deemed to be of low risk, and explain why the AI technology was ascribed this risk level;
- 7. When reporting to the Board in accordance with section 35, will describe, at a minimum:
 - (a) The operational need(s) the AI technology will address, including how use of the new AI technology will improve on current practices or operations;
 - (b) How the Service intends to use the AI technology;
 - (c) The risk level ascribed to the AI technology, why the AI technology was ascribed this risk level, and the rationale for continuing with the procurement, utilization or deployment requested despite the associated risk(s);
 - (d) The legislative authority for the collection of personal information;
 - (e) How the AI technology operates, including, where applicable, the source of the training data, what information will be collected, how and where information will be stored and how it will be disposed of, retention periods for the information collected, and evidence of the validity, accuracy and security of the AI technology under consideration, based on industry standards;
 - (f) The steps the Service will take or has taken to ensure the AI technology is used only in accordance with the *Police Services Act* and its regulations (as well as successor legislation), applicable privacy laws, Ontario's *Human Rights Code*, the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and other legislative and legal requirements, including training, and applicable governance;
 - (g) An evaluation of the AI technology's vendor, including its record with regard to data security and ethical practices;

- (h) The results of any privacy impact and other assessment(s) that have been conducted;
- (i) The feedback received from consultations with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, the Ministry of the Attorney General, stakeholders and the general public, independent human rights experts, independent legal experts, independent technology experts, and affected communities;
- (j) An analysis of possible unintended consequences of the proposed use of the AI technology from legal and human rights perspectives, including the potential for disproportionate impacts on *Human Rights Code*-protected groups, and steps the Service will take to mitigate these unintended consequences;
- (k) Where applicable, a legal analysis of potential challenges to the admissibility of evidence generated or impacted by the AI technology in criminal proceedings;
- (I) The findings of any risk analyses carried out in accordance with section 1(d) above, and any additional analysis as appropriate, including any analyses required by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario;
- (m) Any reports and documentation used in the evaluation of AI technology;
- (n) A mitigation plan to:
 - Mitigate the risks posed by the implementation of the AI technology, including risks of biased policing, infringement of privacy or other rights, chilling effects on freedom of expression, and risks of abuse or unauthorized access to information, and including the mitigation of any bias or quality issues in the training data used by the AI technology;
 - ii. Ensure that any use of the AI technology will be audited to ensure adequate and lawful use, in accordance with the purposes approved by the Board, and to monitor errors; and,
 - iii. Notify the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario and/or any other applicable legal authority of any significant privacy breaches or other significant malfunctions that may result in harm to individuals, communities or Service Members, or may impact criminal proceedings;
- (o) The estimated cost of acquiring and implementing the AI technology, including the cost of adequate training in the use of the AI technology, and any additional costs or savings expected from the implementation of the AI technology; and,
- (p) Proposed indicators that will be tracked by the Chief of Police aimed at determining whether the AI technology is achieving its intended goal and

whether its deployment has had any unintended consequences, until it is determined by the Board that monitoring is no longer required;

- 8. Will develop and implement a public engagement strategy, commensurate with the risk level assigned to the new AI technology, to transparently inform the public of the use of the new AI technology that collects data about members of the public or assists Service Members in identifying, categorizing, prioritizing or otherwise making decisions pertaining to members of the public, prior to its deployment; and,
- 9. Will develop and implement a strategy to communicate to the Crown the risks of an AI technology that require judicial authorization for its application, or which may impact any criminal proceedings.

It is further the policy of the Board that:

- 10. The Board will review the reports submitted in accordance with section 5 and may:
 - (a) Request or solicit an independent review of the recommendations made by the Chief;
 - (b) Determine that additional analysis is required prior to approval of the procurement, deployment or use of the new AI technology;
 - (c) Determine that the Service may initiate a pilot process for the use of the new AI technology to better assess it, and identify the parameters of the pilot in a manner that mitigates any risks of biased decision-making by Service Members; or,
 - (d) Determine that the Service may initiate the procurement, deployment or use of the new AI technology, and identify any additional analysis, monitoring, auditing and reporting requirements beyond the ones required by this Policy that are to be imposed once use of the AI technology commences.

Monitoring and Reporting

It is the policy of the Board that the Chief of Police:

- 11. Will monitor the indicators approved by the Board under Section 7(p), from the initiation of deployment and until 12 months after full deployment of new AI technology deemed to be of Moderate risk, or until 24 months after full deployment of new AI technology deemed to be of High risk;
- 12. Will report to the Board, within 15 months of full deployment of a new AI technology deemed to be of High or Moderate risk, and again within 27 months of full deployment of a new AI technology deemed to be of high risk, with such reporting describing :

- (a) How the AI technology has generally been deployed or utilized within the first period until 12 (or 24) months from full deployment, including with respect to compliance with applicable privacy laws and other legislative and legal requirements;
- (b) The performance as measured by the indicators approved by the Board under Section 7(p) of this Policy;
- (c) What concerns the Chief of Police has seen raised by members of the public or Service Members, and how the Chief has acted to address those concerns where appropriate;
- (d) For AI technology deemed to be of High risk, the results of a post-deployment public consultation on the impacts of the deployment;
- (e) Whether the Chief intends to continue using the AI technology in the same manner or in a different manner in the future; and,
- (f) Where the Chief intends to continue using the AI technology, the key performance indicators that the Chief will continue to monitor indefinitely to ensure the continued quality of the AI technology's performance, and that no new unintended consequences emerge through its use; and,

It is also the policy of the Board that:

- The Executive Director shall create a method for members of the public to submit concerns pertaining to specific AI technologies used by the Service through the Board's website, and
 - (a) Where concerns are expressed with regard to an AI technology deemed to be of Moderate or High risk, for which the Service has not yet submitted the report required by section 12, will append a summary of the concerns to the report when it is brought before the Board; or
 - (b) Where concerns are expressed with regards to an AI technology for which the Service has already submitted the report(s) required by section 12, or with regards to an AI technology deemed to be of Low or Minimal risk, will:
 - if the Executive Director determines that the concern raised likely demonstrates that an AI technology was erroneously assessed at a lower risk level than appropriate in accordance with section 1(c), will report on the nature of the concern to the Board at the earliest possible opportunity; and,
 - ii. otherwise, report annually to the Board with a summary of the concerns raised by members of the public; and

- (c) Where a communication from a member of the public amounts to a complaint under Part V of the Act or successor legislation, will advise the individual or their right to file a complaint with the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (or successor entity), or forward the communication to the Chief of Police, as appropriate, and inform the complainant of this action;
- 14. The Board will review the reports provided in accordance with above section 12, and determine whether the Service may continue to use the AI technology in question, and whether any additional analysis, monitoring, auditing and reporting requirements are to be imposed, and in particular whether the Chief of Police must continue to monitor the indicators approved by the Board under Section 7(p); and,
- 15. All reports required by this Policy will be considered by the Board in its regular public meetings, with the exception of any information provided in the report for which confidentiality is maintained in accordance with applicable law, in which case only that information will be provided to the Board separately as a confidential attachment to the public report.

Continuous Review

It is also the policy of the Board that the Chief of Police:

- 16. Will initiate immediately a process to identify and conduct a risk analysis of all AI technologies currently in use by the Service, to be completed no later than December 2024, and report to the Board upon its completion with a summary of its findings;
- 17. Will post immediately on the Service's website, and maintain up to date with the most accurate available information, a list of all AI technologies currently in use by the Service that are deemed to be of High, Moderate or Low risk, including the following information:
 - (a) For AI technologies deemed to be of High or Moderate risk:
 - i. Name and manufacturer/developer,
 - ii. Purpose of the technology,
 - iii. How the technology is used by the Service,
 - iv. What information is collected by the technology,
 - v. What persons or under what circumstances can the technology be expected to be used, and,
 - vi. All reports submitted by the Chief to the Board with regards to the Al technology, as required under this Policy or subsequent Board decisions;
 - (b) For AI technologies deemed to be of Low risk:

- i. Name and manufacturer/developer, and
- ii. A brief description of the type of technology (e.g., speech-to-text);
- 18. Will terminate the use, immediately upon identification, of any AI technology in use by the Service prior to the adoption of this Policy, which is deemed to be of Extreme risk, and inform the Board of this action with a description of the AI technology that was identified, the reason that it was deemed to be of Extreme risk, and an assessment of potential harms that were caused to individuals, communities or Service Members, and possible impacts on criminal proceedings, as a result of its use;
- 19. Will report to the Board, as soon as it is identified, concerning any AI technology in use by the Service prior to the adoption of this Policy, which is deemed to be of High or Moderate risk, including:
 - (a) the reason that the AI technology was deemed to be of this risk level, and,
 - (b) a plan to:
 - i. pause the use of the AI technology within no longer than three months,
 - ii. evaluate the risk and any potential harms resulting from the use of the AI technology,
 - iii. develop a mitigation plan, and
 - iv. seek the approval of the Board for the continued use of this AI technology;
- 20. Will review at least once every two years in the case of an AI technology deemed to be of High risk, and at least once every five years in the case of AI technology deemed to be of Moderate risk, the continued use of any AI technology based on:
 - (a) the quality of the AI technology, its outputs, and associated key performance indicators; and,
 - (b) the continued need for the use of the AI technology; and;
- 21. Will review at least once every five years the use of any AI technology deemed to be of High, Moderate or Low risk to ensure that the AI technology has not been put to use for a novel purpose or in novel circumstances that may substantially change the data collected or used, in a manner that would constitute a new AI technology, or the risk level of the AI technology, and, where it is found that an AI technology has been put to a

new use in this manner, will report to the Board as soon as possible, in accordance with section 4.

It is also the policy of the Board that:

22. The Board will review the Policy at least once every three years to ensure that the Policy successfully achieves its identified purpose. In particular, the Board will review any instance where a report was made in accordance of section 13(b)i, to consider whether any changes are required to minimize the potential of misclassifications of risk.

High Risk Technologies

Application / Vendor	Purpose of Technology / Intended Use	What information is collected by the technology	Authorized Users	Steps towards Mitigating Risks
NeoFace Reveal by NEC	The system assists investigators by comparing an criminal suspect image captured in relation to a criminal occurrence to a database of lawfully obtained criminal record images (booking photographs) The system uses a fixed algorithm to provide images from the database that may match the captured image for further review. The potential image matches (if any) are examined and reviewed by a Facial Recognition Analyst. Potential matches are then provided to the investigator for additional review.	None. The system compares the newly acquired image to a database of known images.	Two (2) Facial Recognition Analysts members within the Forensic Identification Services Unit	Database used is a highly controlled set of images. Database is populated with lawfully obtained criminal record images. Request to use application is supported by governance and various forms and documentation Application conducts image matching through the image only and not through any other data to reduce bias. Two (2) authorized and trained users. Application designed to show possible matches and does not suggest any actions. All results are documented. Investigators must conduct own actions to continue investigation. Use of application and following investigative steps are disclosed for purposes of prosecution.

LOW RISK TECHNOLOGIES

Name and manufacturer	Description of type of technology
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)	The system assists investigators by providing the tools to compare fingerprints located at a crime scene with a database of known criminal offenders.
	The system uses a fixed algorithm to provide specially trained Fingerprint Examiners with potential candidates for manual comparison.
	Results are manually examined and compared by a Fingerprint Examiner
AutoVu by Genetec	This is an Automated Licence Plate Reader (ALPR) which is mounted on a Parking enforcement vehicle. Uses Optical Character Recognition technology to observe and identify characters on licence plates. The characters are then prepared for comparison to known reported stolen vehicle and plates with
	associated issues. Results are displayed for operator to assist in determining next actions.

AI technology currently being testing or piloted

Automated Licence Plate	The system is installed on front line police vehicles and conducts automated licence plate recognition and
Recognition by Axon	comparison to a known list of licence plates associated to stolen vehicles, missing persons and AMBER alert.
	The system will notify the user for a possible match – and user has the ability to evaluate the result
PILOT PHASE	accuracy. The user is accountable and responsible for any course of action arising from the information
	received from the system.
Risk Category: Low Risk	Licence plate reads that do not match the comparison list are not retained.
BriefCam by BriefCam Ltd.	Assists investigators in reviewing large video evidence files to identify and flag for specific objects, or
TESTING PHASE	recognize specific licence plates through optical character recognition. The application will scan throughout the video in accelerated time and flag items specified at time-marks. The investigator will then go to the
Risk Category: Low Risk	flagged time-marks to review the video and to determine next actions.



PUBLIC REPORT

December 19, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Mobile Crisis Intervention Team Program Memorandum of Understanding between the Toronto Police Services Board and Partner Hospitals: Unity Health Network, Scarborough Health Network, and North York General Hospital.

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Services Board (the Board), authorize the Chair to execute three Memorandums of Understanding (M.O.U.) between the Board and each of the following partner hospitals: Unity Health Toronto (U.H.T.), Scarborough Health Network (S.H.N.) and North York General Hospital (N.Y.G.H.,) in relation to the Mobile Crisis Intervention Team (M.C.I.T.) Program, subject to approval by the City Solicitor as to form.

Summary:

The Board, at its meeting on August 18, 2020, approved 81 recommendations on police reform (thereby becoming Directions), originating from a report by Chair Jim Hart, titled "Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety" (Min. No. P129/2020).

Direction #4 of this report "directs the Chief of Police to prioritize and create a plan to implement, as soon as feasible, an immediate expansion of the M.C.I.T. program in partnership with existing community-based crisis services...to meet current demands for mental health-related service calls..."

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A strategic plan to improve and expand the M.C.I.T. Program was executed; part of this expansion plan included updating existing M.O.U.s with local partner hospitals to reflect modernized changes in the M.C.I.T. Program, which are detailed in this report.

The Board currently holds M.O.U.s with the following partner hospitals:

Hospital	Hospital Currently Re-named To	Date M.O.U. Effective
Toronto East General Hospital	Michael Garron Hospital	November 1, 2013
St. Michael's Hospital	Unity Health Toronto	August 1, 2008
St. Joseph's Health Centre	Unity Health Toronto	December 1, 2009
Humber River Regional Hospital	Humber River Hospital	April 4, 2008
The Scarborough Hospital	Scarborough Health Network	September 1, 2009

Discussion:

Background – History of the Hospital Partnerships for the M.C.I.T. Program

The genesis of the M.C.I.T. Program stemmed from two recommendations (#21 and #43) from the Lester Donaldson Inquest (1992 to 1994), which recommended that the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) create a specialized Crisis Intervention Unit.

In November 2000, the T.P.S. commenced a pilot project with St. Michael's Hospital to partner a registered nurse, who has specialized training in forensic mental health, with a police officer for specialized response to mental health related calls for service. This project led to further expansion of the M.C.I.T. Program and new partnerships with St. Joseph's Health Centre, The Scarborough Hospital, Humber River Regional Hospital and Toronto East General Hospital.

Goals of the M.C.I.T. Program

The M.C.I.T. provides a unique perspective for mental health related calls for service and it fulfils the following functions:

- Make an immediate on-site clinical assessment of the person in crisis;
- Attempt to stabilize and defuse the crisis;
- Assist in removing the individual from serious harm to themselves or others;
- Provide supportive counselling, as needed;
- Arrange appropriate mental health treatment through referrals to an appropriate agency, or apprehension under the *Mental Health Act* (*M.H.A.*) [NOTE: only a police officer may make such an apprehension];

- Coordinate and facilitate transportation to the hospital emergency department if further psychiatric and medical assessment is required; and
- Divert persons in crisis from both the criminal justice system and the hospital emergency room, to provide an avenue for immediate crisis intervention through community referrals for ongoing support.

With the existing M.C.I.T. M.O.U.s being rather dated and receiving a request from North York General Hospital to enter into a M.C.I.T. M.O.U., Field Services worked in collaboration with the T.P.S. Community Partnership and Engagement Unit, Legal Services, T.P.S. Counsel and Counsel for the Board, to bring the M.C.I.T. M.O.U. up to date, including sections specific to M.C.I.T. as first or co-responders, body worn cameras and pandemic situations.

The M.C.I.T as First or Co-Responders

In the past, the M.C.I.T. attended mental health related calls for service as a support unit, after priority response officers had attended to ensure the situation was safe for the nurse. It was determined between the T.P.S. and the hospitals that the role of the M.C.I.T would be changed to a first or co-responder, to persons in crisis calls for service.

The updated M.O.U. reflects that the M.C.I.T. may respond to a call for service in the absence of, or prior to the arrival of, the T.P.S.'s Priority Response Unit and the M.C.I.T. shall make a threat assessment of the call based on the information available to the M.C.I.T. The M.C.I.T. will assess the overall safety of the M.C.I.T. and the overall response required from the M.C.I.T.

If the M.C.I.T.'s assessment deems a person in crisis poses a risk to the health or safety of the attending M.C.I.T. nurse, the M.C.I.T. nurse will not actively engage in the situation until the M.C.I.T. police officer has determined it is safe for the M.C.I.T. nurse to engage. Until the M.C.I.T. police officer has made the aforementioned determination, the M.C.I.T. nurse will be taken to, or asked to wait in, a safe location.

The T.P.S. developed a new M.C.I.T. operating procedure as an extension of Procedure 06-04 - Persons In Crisis. The new Procedure 06-13 - Mobile Crisis Intervention Team, identifies criteria for the M.C.I.T. to act as a first or co-responder, in certain circumstances, to mental health calls for service with appropriate police officer back up when required. The following is an excerpt from Procedure 06-13:

"MCITs may act as a first or co-responder in certain circumstances, including but not limited to the following calls for service involving:

- a person experiencing a mental, emotional, or substance use crisis
- a person attempting/threatening suicide
- a barricaded person, or other circumstances where it is known or thought to be caused by a mental, emotional or substance use crisis, in order to assess the person.
 - → Note: The MCIT officer shall conduct a threat assessment prior to attending the call; where a person in crisis is found to pose a risk or

threat to the attending MCIT nurse, the MCIT officer shall direct the nurse not to actively engage in the incident until it is determined to be safe by the attending MCIT officer.

A threat assessment of the incident (based on available information) and overall safety of the MCIT shall determine the involvement and level of the MCIT response. The Specialized Emergency Response – Emergency Task Force (ETF) shall be notified when there is information that a person in crisis is armed or may be armed with a weapon; background checks indicate that the person in crisis has a history of violence or use of weapons; the incident involves a barricaded person; and/or the incident involves a person who by their position has placed themselves or others in immediate jeopardy (i.e. person located at height on a balcony, bridge, etc.)."

The M.C.I.T and Body Worn Cameras

The M.C.I.T. police officer will be equipped with a body worn camera (B.W.C.), operated in accordance with Service Procedure 15-20 – Body Worn Camera. Where possible, when the in-car camera system (I.C.C.S.) in the M.C.I.T. vehicle and/or the B.W.C. is activated in accordance with Service Procedures 15-17 and 15-20, sections 58 and 59, the MCIT police officer will advise any persons being recorded, that their audio and visual actions are being recorded and monitored through the use of the I.C.C.S. or B.W.C.

The M.C.I.T and Pandemic Situations

In the event of a resurgence of a pandemic situation, a partner hospital will reserve the right to reassign M.C.I.T. nurses as necessary. If an M.C.I.T. nurse is reassigned, and will not be a part of the M.C.I.T., the M.C.I.T. will continue with one (1) police officer that will constitute the M.C.I.T. until a partner hospital deems it prudent to reassign M.C.I.T. nurses to the M.C.I.T.

The T.P.S. presented the updated M.C.I.T. M.O.U. to partner hospitals for review and input. Unity Health Network, Scarborough Health Network, and North York General Hospital have approved the updated M.C.I.T. M.O.U. and requested the T.P.S. proceed to obtain signatures on the M.C.I.T. M.O.U.

Each M.C.I.T. M.O.U. contains a stipulation that the Board and the partner hospital shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless the other party from and against any liabilities, claims that either party may incur as a result of the negligent acts or omissions of the other party, or for whom it is legally responsible.

The M.O.U. has been reviewed by the City Solicitor and been reviewed by TPS Counsel to ensure that the legal and operational requirements of the T.P.S. are adequately protected.

Conclusion:

The M.C.I.T. Program aligns with, and reaffirms, the T.P.S.'s commitment to our Mental Health and Addictions Strategy of zero deaths, while ensuring the well-being, safety, rights and dignity of individuals and communities. The T.P.S. is committed to learning from past interactions, and takes into account the views, expectations, and contributions of the community to guide future responses.

It is recommended that the Board authorize the Chair to execute three Memorandums of Understanding (M.O.U.) between the Board and each of the following partner hospitals: Unity Health Toronto, Scarborough Health Network and North York General Hospital, in relation to the M.C.I.T. Program.

Deputy Chief Lauren Pogue, Community Safety Command, will attend to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M. Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

December 19, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Receipt of Donation

Purpose: Information Purposes Only I Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

This report recommends that Toronto Police Services Board (Board):

Approve the acceptance of the donation being requested in this report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

As per the wishes of the donor, this financial donation is to be put toward the purchase of a new horse for the Toronto Police Service Mounted Unit (M.T.D.U.).

The ongoing veterinary care, training, and maintenance for the horse will be funded by the Service's operating budget. This funding has already been set aside as part of the current and future operating budget expenditures approved for the Mounted Unit.

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to seek the Board's approval of the donation to purchase a new horse for the M.T.D.U.

TORONTO POLICE SERVICES BOARD

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Discussion:

Background

There is one single donor who intends to make an \$11,300 donation to the Service's M.T.D.U to purchase a new horse.

This donation will allow the Service to replace retiring horses.

Actions have been taken to ensure that the reputation of the Service and the Board will not be negatively impacted by the acceptance of this donation.

Checks have been conducted on the donor from various police databases, including from Intelligence sources.

The donor has signed a required *Donor Declaration Form* indicating that he does not have any real or perceived conflicts of interest with the Toronto Police Service or the Board.

These checks and the affirmation demonstrate that accepting this donation would not impugn the reputation of the Service or the Board.

This recommendation complies with the Service's policy '18-08 Donations' governing corporate community donations.

The Mounted Unit

M.T.D.U. is a uniform support unit that is part of Emergency Management & Public Order, operating under Public Safety Operations within Specialized Operations Command.

The M.T.D.U sets a herd target of 24 to 28 healthy horses. The current population is 26 horses with one horse set to retire in 2024 and another one the year after.

The M.T.D.U has historically paid approximately \$8,500 (plus tax) per horse. The cost of each new horse suitable to the M.T.D.U has increased to the current pricing of \$10,000 (plus tax).

A donation in this amount will greatly assist the M.T.D.U in various ways:

- It will enable the M.T.D.U to purchase a new horse without having to use its 2024 operational budget. This allows savings to be used for other needs within the M.T.D.U.
- It will improve the herd strength at a time where the demands on the M.T.D.U to meet its operational needs and the challenges within our city are extraordinarily high, given the current geopolitical climate.
- The new horse to be purchased is slated to replace a current M.T.D.U. horse named "Moose"; scheduled to retire next year. Moose was purchased from funds donated by this same donor in the past. Moose is known by the citizens of Toronto for his unique uniform, which displays a Pride Flag when out in public. He has been embraced by the LGBTQ2S+ community. By purchasing a new horse upon Moose's retirement, and outfitting the new horse with Moose's Pride Flag uniform, the Toronto Police can continue to show support towards the LGBTQ2S+ community at future city events.

Donor:

The donor has contributed financially to the Toronto Police Service in the past. This donor has indicated their motivation for this donation stems from a strong civic duty as well as their desire to support the Service in its ability to provide policing services in specialized units. This donation is being made by the following individual:

1. Mr. Brian BURKE (former General Manager of the Toronto Maple Leafs and the current Executive Director of the Professional Women's Hockey League Players Association)

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.15, as amended, s. 31(1)(c). *Rule* 4.5.8 – *Donations.*

Donations from the community to the Service are a valuable form of public support. It is important that the acceptance of these donations be subject to a clear, transparent, and accountable process.

Conclusion:

As stated, the M.T.D.U is expecting two horses to retire within the near future. The M.T.D.U requires a specified number of healthy horses to meet operational demands.

This donation will ensure the continued viability of the unit, while also allowing for a donation that is purposeful and meaningful to both the Service and the donor.

This donor has previously donated a horse to the Service and wishes to do so again; to help maintain the healthy complement for the M.T.D.U and to continue the legacy of having a specified horse to represent and support the LGBTQ2S+ community.

By accepting this donation, the reputation of the Service is not going to be compromised.

On the contrary, it allows the Service to fulfil its obligation to *support safer communities* by maintaining a strong complement of active working horses that attend the high volume of demonstrations and public events in our city.

A copy of the donor declaration form is attached as an appendix.

Deputy Chief of Police, Robert Johnson (5909) Specialized Operations Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have with respect to this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M. Chief of Police Donor's Declaration Form

(To be signed at the time of donation)

INe Dring F. DWILL	, hereby solemnly declare that the donation and/or in-kind donation
amount of and/or appraised amount of \$ 11, 4	, was donated to the City of Toronto (City) and Toronto Police
Service (TPS) for community benefits which encompass	projects, money, assets or activities that provide a public good.

The Donor acknowledges that all donations and/or in-kind donations, made to the City or the TPS meet the following criteria:

- 1. the donation must be given unconditionally and voluntarily without any expectation of benefit;
- the donation cannot be used to influence the outcome of an outstanding approval, permit or license application or award of a procurement call; and
- the City shall be notified in writing if they, their organization, or company are currently involved in a planning approval or procurement process with the City or one of its agencies.

The Donor acknowledges that the donation, information about the donation and this Donor's Declaration Form are subject to the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection Act and may be disclosed in accordance with the Act.

I/We or my/our organization have no outstanding approval, permit or licenses application or award of a procurement call with the City or the TPS.

OR

application or award of a procurement call with the City or the TPS.

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are you a Registered Charity:	res 🖸 No (If Yes. Charity Registration	Number:	
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	ELUND DAVIN	AISUPTET 5053 E	(V/Whindd) CPC (Employee No)

2023/12/18

(yyyy/mm/dd)

Date:

TPS 668, 2022/05/19

Signed:

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PUBLIC REPORT

December 1, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Special Constable Appointments and Re-Appointments January 2024

Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🛛 Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) approve the agency-initiated appointment and re-appointment requests for the individuals listed in this report as special constables for the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (T.C.H.C.), and the University of Toronto (U of T), subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Solicitor General (Ministry).

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation(s) contained in this report.

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to seek the Board's approval for the agency requested appointments and re-appointments of special constables for the T.C.H.C., and U of T.

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Discussion:

Background

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

Under Section 53 of the *Police Services Act*, the Board is authorized to appoint and reappoint special constables, subject to the approval of the Ministry. Pursuant to this authority, the Board has agreements with T.C.H.C., and U of T governing the administration of special constables (Min. Nos. P153/02, and P571/94 refer).

The Service received requests from T.C.H.C., and U of T to appoint the following individuals as special constables (Appendix 'A' refers):

Agency	Name	Status Requested	Current Expiry Date
T.C.H.C.	Al-Ikhlaas Wafiq ALLY	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Dave Bhan BABOOLAL	Re-Appointment	April 29, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Tyler Jonathan BROWN	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Grant Neil BURNINGHAM	Re-Appointment	May 29, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Jay Douglas DAVIDSON	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Andrew GARCIA	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Troy LALOR	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Shamarn Jimane MORGAN	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Allan MUI	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Stephen NEWBERRY	Re-Appointment	May 1, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Ronald SAMPSON	Re-Appointment	March 5, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Ronald Bogumil SASS	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
T.C.H.C.	Lauristan Oliver SHAND	Re-Appointment	March 5, 2024
U of T St. George Campus	Edward Michael NISHI	New Appointment	N/A

Table 1. Name of Agency and Special Constable Applicant

Agency	Name	Status Requested	Current Expiry Date
U of T St. George Campus	Joshua James WATT	New Appointment	N/A

Special constables are appointed to enforce the *Criminal Code* and certain sections of the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Trespass to Property Act, Liquor Licence & Control Act* and *Mental Health Act* on their respective properties within the City of Toronto.

The agreements between the Board and each agency require that background investigations be conducted on all individuals who are being recommended for appointment and re-appointment as special constables. The Service's Talent Acquisition Unit completed background investigations on these individuals, of which the agencies are satisfied with the results. Re-appointments have been employed by their agency for at least one 5-year term, and as such, they are satisfied that the members have satisfactorily carried out their duties and, from their perspective, there is nothing that precludes re-appointment.

The agencies have advised the Service that the above individuals satisfy all of the appointment criteria as set out in their agreements with the Board. The T.C.H.C., and U of T's approved and current complements are indicated below:

Agency	Approved Complement	Current Complement
T.C.H.C.	300	176
U of T St. George Campus	50	31

Conclusion:

The Service continues to work together in partnership with the T.C.H.C., and U of T to identify individuals to be appointed and re-appointed as special constables who will contribute positively to the safety and well-being of persons engaged in activities on their respective properties within the City of Toronto.

Deputy Chief Robert Johnson, Specialized Operations Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have with respect to this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M. Chief of Police

*copy with original signature on file at Board Office

Attachments:

1. TCHC Re-Appointment Request Letter

2. U of T St. George Campus Appointment Request Letter

Toronto Community Housing Corporation 931 Yonge Street Toronto, ON M4W 2H2



December 28, 2023

Special Constable Liaison Office 40 College Street Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3

DELIVERED VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Re: Request for Toronto Police Services Board Approval for Re-Appointment of Special Constables

In accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Toronto Police Services Board and Toronto Community Housing, the Board is authorized to appoint special constables, subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

The following individuals are fully trained, meeting all Ministry requirements, and have shown they possess the required skills and ability to perform at the level required to be a special constable. These re-appointments have undergone background checks, conducted by the Toronto Police Service, and we are satisfied with the results of those checks. This candidates have been employed by Toronto Community Housing for at least one 5-year term, we are satisfied that the members have satisfactorily carried out their duties and, from our perspective, there is nothing that precludes their reappointment.

Name	Туре	Current Term Expiry
Lauristan Shand	Re-Appointment	March 5, 2024
Andrew Garcia	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
Shamarn Morgan	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
Stephen Newberry	Re-Appointment	May 1, 2024
Allan Mui	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
Ronald Sass	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
Jay Davidson	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
Tyler Brown	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
Al-Ikhlaas Ally	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
Troy Lalor	Re-Appointment	April 14, 2024
Bhan Dave Baboolal	Re-Appointment	April 29, 2024

Grant Burningham	Re-Appointment	May 29, 2024	
Ronald Sampson	Re-Appointment	March 5, 2024	

It is requested that the Board approve these submissions and put forward the applicants to the Ministry of the Solicitor General for re-appointment of a five-year term.

Should you require any further information, please contact Jacqueline Doo, Specialist-Compliance, Training & Quality Assurance at 416-268-8365.

Respectfully,

R

Allan Britton, Badge #31194 Acting Senior Director/Acting Chief Special Constable Community Safety Unit

Toronto Community Housing 931 Yonge St, Toronto, ON M4W 2H2 T: 416 981-4116 torontohousing.ca



University of Toronto CAMPUS SAFETY SPECIAL CONSTABLE SERVICE

21 Sussex Avenue, Suite 100, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1J6

Tel: (416) 978-2323 Fax: 416-946-8300

November 28, 2023

то:	Special Constable Liaison Office
From:	Michael Munroe
Subject	Request for Toronto Police Services Board approval for Appointment of Special Constable

In accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the Agreement between the Toronto Police Services Board and the University of Toronto, the Board is authorized to appoint and re-appoint special constables subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

The individuals named below are fully trained, meeting all Ministry requirements, and has shown they posses the required skills and ability to perform at the level required to be a special constable. Both new appointments and re-appointments have undergone a background check, conducted by the Toronto Police Service, and we are satisfied with the results of those checks.

Name	Туре	Current Term Expiry
Edward Michael Nishi	New Appointment	N/A
Joshua James Watt	New Appointment	N/A

It is requested that the board approve this submission and forward the applicants to the Ministry of the Solicitor General for appointment of a five-year term.

Regards

Mike Munroe

Michael Munroe - Director



PUBLIC REPORT

December 21, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Dubi Kanengisser Executive Director
- Subject: City Council Decision Infrastructure and Environment Committee Item 7.4 Updates on Vision Zero Road Safety Initiatives - New Traffic Calming Policy, Community Safety Zone Criteria, Zebra Marking Policy, Approach to Area-Based Speed Limit Reductions and Related Council Requests

Purpose:
Information Purposes Only
Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board:

- Request that the Chief of Police take Council's motion into consideration in partnership with Transportation Services to improve the safety of vulnerable road users by following the lead of Calgary and Montreal and acquiring at least 10 mobile automated license plate readers for use, as a pilot project, primarily in enforcing parking offences that adversely affect the safety of vulnerable road users, such as obstructing bike lanes and blocking visibility at intersections, and to include an evaluation of the effectiveness of this pilot project in the overall parking strategy report scheduled for 2024; and,
- 2. Forward a copy of this report to City Council through the Executive Committee.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation(s) contained in this report.

40 College Street Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3 | Phone: 416.808.8080 Fax: 416.808.8082 | www.tpsb.ca

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to provide the Board with City Council Decision – Infrastructure and Environment Committee Item 7.4 - Updates on Vision Zero Road Safety Initiatives - New Traffic Calming Policy, Community Safety Zone Criteria, Zebra Marking Policy, Approach to Area-Based Speed Limit Reductions and Related Council Requests. This report provides the Board with the decision of City Council on this matter.

Discussion:

IE 7.4 – Updates on Vision Zero Road Safety Initiatives - New Traffic Calming Policy, Community Safety Zone Criteria, Zebra Marking Policy, Approach to Area-Based Speed Limit Reductions and Related Council Requests

City Council, at its meeting on November 8 and 9, 2023, adopted item IE 7.4 - Updates on Vision Zero Road Safety Initiatives - New Traffic Calming Policy, Community Safety Zone Criteria, Zebra Marking Policy, Approach to Area-Based Speed Limit Reductions and Related Council Requests The Motion is available at the following link:

Agenda Item History - 2023.IE7.4 (toronto.ca)

In considering this matter, Council adopted, the following recommendations:

1. Toronto Police Services Board and Toronto Parking Authority in partnership with Transportation Services to improve the safety of vulnerable road users by following the lead of Calgary and Montreal and acquiring at least 10 mobile automated license plate readers for use, as a pilot project, primarily in enforcing parking offences that adversely affect the safety of vulnerable road users, such as obstructing bike lanes and blocking visibility at intersections, and to include an evaluation of the effectiveness of this pilot project in the overall parking strategy report scheduled for 2024.

Conclusion:

It is, therefore, recommended that the Board:

1. Request that the Chief of Police take Council's motion into consideration in partnership with Transportation Services to improve the safety of vulnerable road users by following the lead of Calgary and Montreal and acquiring at least 10

mobile automated license plate readers for use, as a pilot project, primarily in enforcing parking offences that adversely affect the safety of vulnerable road users, such as obstructing bike lanes and blocking visibility at intersections, and to include an evaluation of the effectiveness of this pilot project in the overall parking strategy report scheduled for 2024; and,

2. Forward a copy of this report to City Council through the Executive Committee.

Respectfully submitted,

Dubi Kanengisser Executive Director



City Clerk's Office

Secretariat Sylwia Przezdziecki Council Secretariat Support City Hall, 12th Floor, West 100 Queen Street West Toronto, Ontario M5H 2N2 John D. Elvidge City Clerk

Tel: 416-392-7032 Fax: 416-392-2980 e-mail: Sylwia.Przezdziecki@toronto.ca web: www.toronto.ca In reply please quote:

Ref.: 23-IE7.4

(Sent by Email)

December 19, 2023

Ms. Ann Morgan Chair, Toronto Police Services Board 40 College Street Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3 <u>ann.morgan@tpsb.ca</u> <u>sheri.chapman@tpsb.ca</u> <u>board@tpsb</u>

Dear Ms. Morgan:

Subject: Infrastructure and Environment Committee Item 7.4 Updates on Vision Zero Road Safety Initiatives - New Traffic Calming Policy, Community Safety Zone Criteria, Zebra Marking Policy, Approach to Area-Based Speed Limit Reductions and Related Council Requests (Ward All)

City Council on November 8 and 9, 2023, adopted <u>Item IE7.4</u>, as amended and, in so doing, has requested the Toronto Police Services Board and Toronto Parking Authority in partnership with Transportation Services to improve the safety of vulnerable road users by following the lead of Calgary and Montreal and acquiring at least 10 mobile automated licence plate readers for use, as a pilot project, primarily in enforcing parking offences that adversely affect the safety of vulnerable road users, such as obstructing bike lanes and blocking visibility at intersections, and to include an evaluation of the effectiveness of this pilot project in the overall parking strategy report scheduled for 2024.

Yours truly,

Madiechi

for City Clerk

S. Przezdziecki/wg

Attachment

- Sent to: Chair, Toronto Police Service Board Executive Director, Toronto Police Service Board President, Toronto Parking Authority
- c. City Manager

TORONTO Decisions

City Council

Infrastructure and Environment Committee - Meeting 7

IE/.4 ACTION Amended Ward: All
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Updates on Vision Zero Road Safety Initiatives - New Traffic Calming Policy, Community Safety Zone Criteria, Zebra Marking Policy, Approach to Area-Based Speed Limit Reductions and Related Council Requests

City Council Decision

City Council on November 8 and 9, 2023, adopted the following:

1. City Council adopt the updated 2023 Traffic Calming Policy as detailed in Attachment 2 to the report (October 12, 2023) from the General Manager, Transportation Services.

2. City Council amend Section 27-18.4B(9), Traffic Calming, of City of Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 27, Council Procedures, as follows:

a. by deleting from Subsection (a)[3] the phrase: "Chicanes" and inserting the phrase: "Speed cushions";

b. by deleting from Subsection (b) the phrase: "that do not have an established Toronto Transit Commission route"; and

c. by deleting Subsection (c):

"Despite Subsection B(9)(b), the authority to waive petition and polling requirements under the City's Traffic Calming Policy for traffic calming proposals."

3. City Council adopt the 'Framework and Expanded Criteria for Establishing Community Safety Zones', detailed in Attachment 3 to the report (October 12, 2023) from the General Manager, Transportation Services for creating Community Safety Zones outside of School Zones.

4. City Council rescind the Community Safety Zone designations and/or designate the Community Safety Zones and authorize the amendments to Schedule XXXIII to City of Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 950, Traffic and Parking, generally as set out in Attachment 4, as amended by Infrastructure and Environment Committee, to the report (October 12, 2023) from the General Manager, Transportation Services.

5. City Council designate the school locations as Community Safety Zones and authorize the amendments to Schedule XXXIII to City of Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 950, Traffic and Parking, generally as set out in the report (October 12, 2023) from the General Manager, Transportation Services.

6. City Council direct the General Manager, Transportation Services to present the list of new priority locations for Community Safety Zones at the next meeting of Infrastructure and Environment Committee on November 30, 2023.

7. City Council renew the previous request to the Ontario Minister of Transportation to change the maximum Blood Alcohol Concentration for all licensed motorcycle drivers to 0 percent.

8. City Council request that the Ontario Minister of Transportation create a provincial Impaired-Driving Task Force to support the prevention, awareness, enforcement and treatment of impaired driving and to generate more collaboration and consensus for effective solutions to address impaired driving across Ontario.

9. City Council amend the Zebra Crosswalk Policy to include zebra crosswalks at mid-block school crossing guard locations with active guards.

10. City Council authorize the inclusion of collector roads within designated areas with a speed limit of 30 kilometre per hour under Section 950-701 of City of Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 950, Traffic and Parking, subject to listed exclusions.

11. City Council authorize the City Solicitor to introduce the necessary bills to give effect to City Council's decision and City Council authorize the City Solicitor to make any necessary clarifications, refinements, minor modifications, technical amendments, or by-law amendments as may be identified by the City Solicitor or the General Manager, Transportation Services in order to give effect to Parts 1 through 10, above.

12. City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board and Toronto Parking Authority in partnership with Transportation Services to improve the safety of vulnerable road users by following the lead of Calgary and Montreal and acquiring at least 10 mobile automated licence plate readers for use, as a pilot project, primarily in enforcing parking offences that adversely affect the safety of vulnerable road users, such as obstructing bike lanes and blocking visibility at intersections, and to include an evaluation of the effectiveness of this pilot project in the overall parking strategy report scheduled for 2024.

13. City Council direct the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer to earmark, where feasible, the revenue from the parking tickets collected through the pilot automated licence plate reader project to the pilot project, to the extent necessary to recover the cost of the project.

14. City Council direct the General Manager, Transportation Services to report annually on:

a. progress on Toronto's air quality, climate, public health and congestion goals in relation to the Vision Zero Road Safety Plan; and

b. for every location on the public right of way where a vulnerable road user was killed by the driver of a motor vehicle, a summary of potential contributing factors that resulted in the fatality and recommendations for safety improvements in the area, as well as identification of trends and recommendations for system-wide improvements.

15. City Council direct the General Manager, Transportation Services to amend the Traffic Control Warrants used to evaluate the need for All-Way Stop Control, Pedestrian Crossovers and Traffic Control Signals so that the "Collision Hazard" warrant is satisfied if there has been at least one potentially preventable collision classified as a KSI ("Killed or Seriously Injured").

16. City Council request the General Manager, Transportation Services to report to Infrastructure and Environment Committee on the current use of textalyzer by the Toronto Police Service.

17. City Council affirm the importance of safety in construction zones whereby staff:

a. manage construction zones with priority emphasis to emergency vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists, while also ensuring worker safety;

b. ensure safe, accessible and well-marked paths of travel for pedestrians in all construction zones; and

c. maintain protected cyclist infrastructure to the greatest extent possible with well-marked signage and leveraging best practices from other jurisdictions.

Summary

The City Council adopted Vision Zero Road Safety Plan is a comprehensive action plan focused on eliminating traffic related fatalities and serious injuries on Toronto's streets. Since the inception of the Vision Zero Road Safety Plan in 2017, the City's investment in and delivery of the plan is making a difference - the number of fatalities and serious injuries have been on the decline. No loss of life as a result of traffic collisions is acceptable - Transportation Services is committed to working with City Council and the public in continuing to build on progress made to date, to eliminate all traffic fatalities and serious injuries on Toronto's roadways.

The purpose of this report is to provide an update on the Vision Zero Road Safety Plan as well as several requests made by City Council of the General Manager, Transportation Services. This report is divided into four sections, covering the following initiatives:

- 1. Overall update on the Vision Zero Road Safety Plan
- 2. Proposed update to the Traffic Calming Policy
- 3. Update on Automated Enforcement and Community Safety Zones

- Proposed framework guiding the creation of Community Safety Zones outside of school zones

- New and revised Community Safety Zone designations within school zones to support Automated Speed Enforcement

- Update on Automated Enforcement Programs
- 4. Report back on other Vision Zero Tools and related City Council requests
 - Report back on impaired driving in consultation with Toronto Police Service

- Minor update to the Zebra Marking Policy to add mid-block school crossing guard locations

- Updates on area-based speed limit reductions

- Report Back on Traffic Control Warrants and Complete and Safe Street Design Considerations

1. Overall update on the Vision Zero Road Safety Plan: The Vision Zero 2.0 Road Safety Plan adopted by Council in 2019 recommended a set of extensive, proactive and targeted initiatives, informed by data and aimed at eliminating serious injury and fatalities on Toronto's roads. This report provides an update on key accomplishments to date and a summary of recent data trends on safety outcomes.

2. Proposed update to the Traffic Calming Policy: Requests from Council to review the existing 2002 Traffic Calming Policy provided an opportunity to propose updates to the policy in alignment with the Vision Zero Road Safety Plan with the objective of delivering more traffic calming measures (speed humps and speed cushions) because they are a cost-efficient, effective, and quick tool to improve safety of neighbourhood streets, as well as to propose process changes to more effectively support other speed management measures like local road speed limit reductions.

3. Update on Automated Enforcement and Community Safety Zones: these sections all address different tools associated with Automated Enforcement as well as the establishment of Community Safety Zones

Proposed Framework Guiding the Creation of Community Safety Zones Outside of School Zones: Staff was directed to develop a framework to evaluate requests for Community Safety Zone designations in order to implement Automated Speed Enforcement outside of school zones. This report seeks approval on a framework for expanding Community Safety Zones beyond school frontages to areas across the community to enable the expansion of Automated Speed Enforcement.

New and Revised Community Safety Zone Designations within School Zones to Support Automated Speed Enforcement: Staff is recommending updates to some existing Community Safety Zones as well as adding new ones in school zones to support Automated Speed Enforcement for particular locations.

Update on Automated Enforcement Programs: This report includes an update on the City's Automated Enforcement efforts including Automated Speed Enforcement evaluation and options for possible program expansion.

4. Report back on other Vision Zero Tools and related City Council requests: these sections all address different tools to support the continued delivery of the Vision Zero Road Safety Plan, some of which are City Council-directed

Report Back on Impaired Driving in Consultation with Toronto Police Service: As directed by City Council, staff have reviewed statistics related to impaired driving as well as outlining approaches taken to address this ongoing concern to road safety.

Minor Update to the City's Zebra Marking Policy to Add Mid-block School Crossing Guard Locations: Staff have identified that mid-block locations with active school crossing guards are currently not eligible for zebra markings and propose to add these locations to improve visibility.

Updates on Area-Based Speed Limit Reductions: Staff have received feedback from Councillors and residents that, as part of the ongoing 30 kilometres per hour speed limit reductions, the exclusion of 30 kilometres per hour collector roads in speed limit areas has resulted in confusion and extra signage. This change will allow the modification of the speed limit areas to reduce the number of signs. Report Back on Traffic Control Warrants and Complete and Safe Street Design Considerations: These sections include a report back on updated warrants to evaluate all-way stop control, pedestrian crossovers and traffic control signals as well as a summary of efforts taken to date to ensure that Complete and Safe Street designs are considered for every major road rehabilitation project.

Background Information (Committee)

(October 12, 2023) Report from General Manager, Transportation Services on Update on Vision Zero Road Safety Initiatives (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-239909.pdf) Attachment 1 - Comparison of 2002 Traffic Calming Policy and 2023 Traffic Calming Policy (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-239910.pdf) Attachment 2 - 2023 Traffic Calming Policy (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-239912.pdf) Attachment 3 - Framework and Expanded Criteria for Establishing Community Safety Zones (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-239896.pdf) Attachment 4 - Community Safety Zone Amendments (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-239914.pdf) Attachment 5 - Community Safety Zone Designations (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-239915.pdf) Attachment 6 - Report on Impaired Driving (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-239918.pdf) Attachment 7 - Taking Action on Impaired Driving (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-239897.pdf) **Public Notice** (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/bgrd/backgroundfile-240090.pdf)

Communications (Committee)

(October 18, 2023) E-mail from Adam Rodgers (IE.Supp) (October 19, 2023) E-mail from George Bell (IE.Supp) (October 24, 2023) Letter from Dylan Reid, Walk Toronto (IE.Supp) (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/comm/communicationfile-173159.pdf) (October 24, 2023) E-mail from Jun Nogami (IE.Supp) (October 24, 2023) Multiple Communications from 104 Individuals (IE.Supp) (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/comm/communicationfile-173175.pdf) (October 24, 2023) Letter from Alison Stewart, Cycle Toronto (IE.Supp) (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/comm/communicationfile-173201.pdf) (October 25, 2023) Multiple Communications from 18 Individuals (IE.Supp) (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/comm/communicationfile-173195.pdf) (October 25, 2023) Letter from Jessica Spieker, Friends and Families for Safe Streets (IE.Supp) (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/comm/communicationfile-173199.pdf) (October 25, 2023) E-mail from Michael Baudisch - McCabe (IE.Supp) (October 25, 2023) Multiple Communications from 3 Individuals (IE.New) (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ie/comm/communicationfile-173217.pdf) (October 25, 2023) Submission from George Bell (IE.New)

Communications (City Council)

(October 30, 2023) E-mail from Steve Sullivan, Chief Executive Officer, MADD Canada (CC.Main)
(https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/cc/comm/communicationfile-173412.pdf)
(October 27, 2023) E-mail from Nathalie Noël (CC.Supp)
(October 26, 2023) E-mail from Christine Gebel (CC.Supp)
(October 28, 2023) E-mail from Despina Melohe (CC.Supp)
(October 25, 2023) E-mail from Francesca Colussi (CC.Supp)
(October 26, 2023) E-mail from Martina Betkova (CC.Supp)
(October 25, 2023) E-mail from Megan Bontrager (CC.Supp)

(October 30, 2023) E-mail from Paul Clarke (CC.Supp)

(October 26, 2023) E-mail from Rob Howard (CC.Supp)

(October 25, 2023) E-mail from Tanya Bruce (CC.Supp)

(October 27, 2023) E-mail from Vanessa Gentile (CC.Supp)

(October 25, 2023) E-mail from Vickram Jain (CC.Supp)

(November 7, 2023) Letter from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police, Toronto Police Service (CC.New)

(https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/cc/comm/communicationfile-173569.pdf)



PUBLIC REPORT

December 21, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Dubi Kanengisser Executive Director
- Subject: City Council Decisions MM 12.28 Hate Speech and Other Hate Activities, EX9.2: Implementation Update: Auditor General Recommendations on 9-1-1 Operations and Responses to Calls for Service by the Toronto Police Service, EX9.10: Update on the Toronto Community Crisis Service Proposed Expansion Plan

Purpose: Information Purposes Only

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive this report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation(s) contained in this report.

Summary:

The Board is in receipt of three pieces of correspondence from the City Clerk with regards to items adopted by City Council at its meeting held on November 8 and 9, 2023. The correspondence was forwarded to the Chief's Office for consideration. This report provides the Board with the decisions of City Council on these three matters.

Discussion:

MM12.28 – Hate Speech and Other Hate Activities

City Council, at its meeting on November 8 and 9, 2023, adopted item MM 12.28 – Hate speech and Other Hate Activities. The Motion is available at the following link:

https://secure.toronto.ca/council/agenda-item.do?item=2023.MM12.28

In considering this matter, Council adopted, the following:

City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Toronto Police Service and the Attorney General to consult about what steps can be taken quickly to protect the public from such hate speech, including anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, homophobia, or any other forms of hatred contrary to the Criminal Code and to consider all legal tools available to assist in taking action against these groups.

EX9.2: Implementation Update: Auditor General Recommendations on 9-1-1 Operations and Responses to Calls for Service by the Toronto Police Service

At the same meeting, City Council also adopted item EX 9.2 – Implementation Update: Auditor General Recommendations on 9-1-1 Operations and Responses to Calls for Service by the Toronto Police Service. The Motion is available at the following link:

Agenda Item History - 2023.EX9.2 (toronto.ca)

In considering this matter, Council adopted, the following:

City Council forward this Item to the Toronto Police Services Board for information.

EX9.10: Update on the Toronto Community Crisis Service Proposed Expansion Plan

At the same meeting, City Council also adopted item EX 9.10 0 – Update on the Toronto Community Crisis Service and Proposed Expansion Plan. The Motion is available at the following link:

Agenda Item History - 2023.EX9.10 (toronto.ca)

In considering this matter, Council adopted the following:

City Council forward the Item to the Toronto Police Services Board to inform continued action and next steps on the Auditor General's recommendations.

Conclusion:

The Board Office has forwarded the above correspondence to the Chief of Police for information and consideration as appropriate.

It is recommended that the Board receive this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Dubi Kanengisser Executive Director

TORONTO Decisions

City Council

Member Motions - Meeting 12

	Y		r	[]
MM12.28	ACTION	Adopted		Ward: All

Hate Speech and Other Hate Activities - by Councillor James Pasternak, seconded by Councillor Dianne Saxe

City Council Decision

City Council on November 8 and 9, 2023, adopted the following:

1. City Council express its concern related to the substantial upsurge of hate speech on city property and other public places in Toronto, and City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Toronto Police Service and the Attorney General to consult about what steps can be taken quickly to protect the public from such hate speech, including anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, homophobia, or any other forms of hatred contrary to the Criminal Code and to consider all legal tools available to assist in taking action against these groups.

Summary

There has been a substantial upsurge of hate speech on city property and other public places in Toronto. The Toronto Police Service has focussed on de-escalating risks of physical violence, but has not taken effective steps to protect the public from such hate speech.

Reason for urgency: Rapidly changing world events has resulted in an increasingly volatile situation on Toronto streets and public spaces in which protests are creating deep concern about public safety and social cohesion.

Background Information (City Council)

Member Motion MM12.28 (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/mm/bgrd/backgroundfile-240662.pdf)

City Council

Executive Committee - Meeting 9

-			
EX9.2	ACTION	Adopted	Ward: All

Implementation Update: Auditor General Recommendations on 9-1-1 Operations and Responses to Calls for Service by the Toronto Police Service

City Council Decision

City Council on November 8 and 9, 2023, adopted the following:

1. City Council forward the Item to the Toronto Police Services Board to inform continued action and next steps on the Auditor General's recommendations.

Summary

This report provides an update to City Council on recommendations made by the Auditor General's (AG) office in items AU13.5 and AU13.6.

In July 2022, City Council received two reports from the Auditor General, which presented findings from audits undertaken to improve and modernize the Toronto Police Service (TPS).

The Auditor General audits focused on two areas:

1) Enhancing the efficiency of 9-1-1 operations (2022.AU13.5)

2) Supporting more effective responses to calls for service to improve community safety and well-being (2022.AU13.6)

The Auditor General posed 51 recommendations across the two reports. Of these, 16 involved the City Manager's Office and relevant City Divisions, including Toronto Paramedic Services (PS), Toronto Fire Services (TFS), Social Development, Finance and Administration (SDFA), Municipal Licensing and Standards (MLS), Customer Experience Division (CXD, formerly 311), and others.

In July 2023, TPS presented a comprehensive update to the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB) on the status of all 51 Auditor General recommendations. Building on the July 2023 Toronto Police Service update, this report provides an update on the 16 Auditor General recommendations directed to the City Manager's Office and other City Divisions.

A detailed status update for each of the 16 Auditor General recommendations can be found in Appendix 1. As of October 2023, 14/16 (88%) of the Auditor General recommendations are actively in progress, one is implemented and ongoing, and one has not yet started. The status of these recommendations is subject to verification by the Auditor General.

Progress on the Auditor General recommendations reflects a year of positive collaboration among police and City staff to modernize the Toronto Police Service, enhance their operations, and support community safety for Toronto residents.

Key milestones include the launch and evaluation of the Toronto Community Crisis Service (TCCS) and 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion (CCD) pilots, which yielded 78% and 65% successful diversion rates for calls received, respectively. These programs represent promising alternative responses to support mental health and community safety while enabling police to refocus on emergency matters within their mandate.

The revived 9-1-1 Committee has enabled Toronto Police Service, Toronto Fire Service, and Paramedic Services to meet quarterly, with discussions focused on improving 9-1-1 operations. This partnership among the tri-services has set the stage for the successful rollout and transfer of operations to Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-1), expected no later than March 2025, which will further improve interconnectivity, data sharing, and the efficiency of call transfers.

Ongoing partnership and knowledge exchange among the tri-services has supported Toronto Fire Service and Paramedic Services to reduce call transfer times (the time it takes for police to transfer a call to Toronto Fire Service or Paramedic Services dispatchers) and maintain national standards. Toronto Fire Service Call Answering performance has consistently remained within the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) standard of 15 seconds 90% of the time. Paramedic Services has undertaken significant recruitment and training efforts to improve call transfer times, with a 53% reduction in average call transfer time in August 2023, when compared to July 2022.

Areas for action and next steps include ongoing coordination among Toronto Police Service, Customer Experience Division, and Municipal Licensing and Standards to receive and respond to non-emergency service requests, particularly noise complaints. Criteria and guidance for where to direct noise complaints need to be reinforced internally and more broadly communicated to the public. Continued partnership among Toronto Police Service, Customer Experience Division, and Municipal Licensing and Standards, alongside a new awareness campaign slated for launch mid-to-late October 2023, will help minimize confusion and ensure Torontonians can 'make the right call' when it comes to non-emergency issues like noise.

Overall, this report demonstrates a strong, collaborative foundation for the City and Toronto Police Service to continue driving Auditor General recommendations to completion. The Deputy City Manager, Community and Social Services, will continue to facilitate this collaboration and provide updates on the success of City staff and Toronto Police Service in implementing Auditor General recommendations.

The next status update on AU13.5 and AU13.6 will be provided to City Council in the first quarter of 2025, ahead of the successful rollout and transfer of operations to NG9-1-1.

Background Information (Committee)

(October 17, 2023) Report from the Deputy City Manager, Community and Social Services on Implementation Update: Auditor General Recommendations on 9-1-1 Operations and Responses to Calls for Service by the Toronto Police Service (<u>https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240079.pdf</u>) Appendix 1 - Status Update on AU13.5 and AU13.6 Recommendations (<u>https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240080.pdf</u>)

Communications (Committee)

(October 26, 2023) E-mail from Albert Venczel (EX.Supp) (October 27, 2023) Letter from Serena Nudel, Director of Community Programs, The Neighbourhood Group Community Services (EX.Supp) (<u>https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/comm/communicationfile-173291.pdf</u>) (October 27, 2023) Submission from Albert Venczel (EX.Supp)

2a Update on Auditor General Recommendations Implementation

Summary

Please find attached an extract from the draft Minutes of the Public meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board held on July 27, 2023, entitled "Update on Auditor General Recommendations Implementation."

The Board agreed that a copy of this Minutes be forwarded to you for information and to the City Clerk's Office to inform Council, as necessary.

Background Information (Committee)

(August 16, 2023) Letter from the Toronto Police Services Board on Update on Auditor General Recommendations Implementation (<u>https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240118.pdf</u>) Attachment 1 - Extract of Minutes of the Toronto Police Services Board meeting on July 27, 2023 (<u>https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240119.pdf</u>) Attachment 2 - Presentation - Auditor General Report Recommendations Implementation -Project Update

(https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240120.pdf)

TORONTO Decisions

City Council

Executive Committee - Meeting 9

EX9.10	ACTION	Adopted	Ward: All

2023 Update on the Toronto Community Crisis Service and Proposed Expansion Plan

City Council Decision

City Council on November 8 and 9, 2023, adopted the following:

1. City Council endorse the City-wide expansion of the Toronto Community Crisis Service as Toronto's fourth emergency service.

2. City Council authorize the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to negotiate, enter into, and amend any service and funding agreements with the Toronto Community Crisis Service anchor partners (namely, Gerstein Crisis Centre, TAIBU Community Health Centre, 2-Spirited People of the 1st Nations and The Canadian Mental Health Association Toronto Branch) for the provision of the Toronto Community Crisis Service until 2034 on the terms and conditions satisfactory to the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration and in a form acceptable to the City Solicitor.

3. City Council authorize the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to negotiate, enter into, and amend any service and funding agreements with Findhelp Information Services, as the intake partner for the Toronto Community Crisis Service, on the terms and conditions satisfactory to the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration and in a form acceptable to the City Solicitor.

4. City Council authorize the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to negotiate, enter into, and amend single-year and multi-year contribution agreements for not-for-profit organizations funded through the Strengthening the Community Crisis System grant, with funding recipients and grant amounts to be determined through a call for proposals, within the budget allocation for the program, and on such content, terms and conditions as deemed necessary by the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration and in a form satisfactory to the City Solicitor.

5. City Council authorize the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to negotiate, enter into, and amend single-year and multi-year agreements to support program components related to the Toronto Community Crisis Service (e.g. training, evaluation, outreach campaigns) within the budget allocation for the program, and on such manner, content, terms and conditions as deemed necessary by the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration and in a form satisfactory to the City Solicitor.

6. City Council request the Province of Ontario to fund the expansion of the Toronto Community Crisis Service, in alignment with the 75/25 cost-sharing funding model, for public

health services and to increase investments to close the service gaps in mental health services and addiction recovery programs, including detox beds and broad options for affordable and supportive housing.

7. City Council request the Mayor to consider the City-wide expansion of the Toronto Community Crisis Service in proposing the 2024 Budget for the Social Development, Finance and Administration Division, in consultation with the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer and the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration.

8. City Council forward this Item to the Toronto Police Services Board for information.

9. City Council share the Toronto Community Crisis Service One-Year Evaluation Report with the Big City Mayors' Caucus for consideration.

Summary

In March 2022, the Toronto Community Crisis Service launched a 24/7 service to provide a community-based, client centred, trauma-informed, non-police led response to people experiencing mental health crisis and wellness checks. In its first year of operations the Toronto Community Crisis Service received 6,827 calls for service, with 78 per cent of calls transferred from 911 successfully resolved without police involvement.

Data from the Toronto Community Crisis Service's one-year evaluation demonstrates that 95 per cent of clients were satisfied or very satisfied with the service they received and 90 per cent indicated that it positively impacted their perception of community safety and wellbeing. In year one, community crisis teams completed 2,936 post-crisis follow up interactions and connected 1,160 service users to ongoing case management supports.

The Toronto Community Crisis Service provides access to ground-breaking transformative care in 64 per cent of all Toronto wards. If approved by Council, the service will be expanded citywide in 2024 to become the fourth municipal emergency service in Toronto, alongside Toronto Fire Services, Toronto Paramedic Services, and the Toronto Police Service.

The expansion of the Toronto Community Crisis Service is one of the first priority actions of SafeTO: Toronto's Ten-Year Community Safety and Well-Being Plan to reduce vulnerability in Toronto through proactive mental health support strategies and community-based crisis support models.

After a successful first year of operations, and the demonstrated need for crisis response services in Toronto, Social Development, Finance and Administration is accelerating the service expansion to city-wide coverage so all Torontonians can access the support they need when they need it most before the end of 2024.

This report will provide:

 \cdot an update on the progress of the Toronto Community Crisis Service, including the first year of performance data, service achievements and challenges, public awareness building efforts, as well as the recognition the service has received nationally and internationally as a model for community-based crisis response;

 \cdot a roadmap to expand the Toronto Community Crisis Service city-wide, including a proposed approach to strengthening the dispatch and intake functions, which will ensure that dispatching is efficient, effective, and safe as the service expands;

 \cdot recommendations for qualified community anchor partners to deliver the service in expanded service areas; and,

 \cdot an overview of the additional investments provided through the Strengthening the Community Crisis System grant stream in support of expansion efforts.

Background Information (Committee)

(October 17, 2023) Report from the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration on 2023 Update on the Toronto Community Crisis Service and Proposed **Expansion** Plan (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240069.pdf) Attachment 1 - Year 1 Evaluation Report from Provincial System Support Program and Shkaabe Makwa at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240070.pdf) Attachment 2 - Toronto Community Crisis Service Infographic on Year One Data (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240071.pdf) Attachment 3 - Visual Story on Service User Experiences (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240072.pdf) Attachment 4 - Summary of Recommended Community Anchor Partners for Toronto Community Crisis Service Expansion (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240073.pdf) Attachment 5 - Map of Toronto Community Crisis Service Expanded Catchment Areas (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240074.pdf) Attachment 6 - Dispatch Operating Model Review 1 (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240075.pdf) Presentation by the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration on Toronto Community Crisis Service 2023 Update and Proposed Expansion Plan (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-240367.pdf)

Communications (Committee)

(October 26, 2023) Letter from Councillor Dianne Saxe (EX.Supp)
(https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/comm/communicationfile-173287.pdf)
(October 27, 2023) E-mail from Nicole Corrado (EX.Supp)
(October 29, 2023) E-mail from Nicole Corrado (EX.Supp)
(October 29, 2023) E-mail from Nicole Corrado (EX.Supp)
(October 30, 2023) E-mail from Rachel Bromberg (EX.Supp)
(October 31, 2023) Letter from Lynne Woolcott (EX.New)
(https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/ex/comm/communicationfile-173398.pdf)

Communications (City Council)

(November 7, 2023) Letter from Andrea Vásquez Jiménez, Director and Principal Consultant, Policing-Free Schools (CC.New) (https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2023/cc/comm/communicationfile-173594.pdf)



PUBLIC REPORT

December 4, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Firearm Discharged at a Person Complainant 2023.14

Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) forward a copy of this report to the Solicitor General as per O. Reg. 552/92 s.8.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) investigation determined the conduct of four of the twelve designated officials was not in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and relevant Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures. One of the designated witness official failed to comply with T.P.S. Procedure.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual

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assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police of the relevant police service to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) Procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act, (S.I.U.A.) 2019
- Ontario Regulation 926 (Equipment and Use of Force)
- Provincial Regulations

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion made on September 8, 2023

"The Director of the Special Investigations Unit, Joseph Martino, has reasonable grounds to believe a Toronto Police Service officer committed criminal offences in relation to a shooting in February 2023.

The SIU investigation found that on February 27, officers were called to a park in the area of Black Creek Drive and Trethewey Drive for a report of a man with a knife. Two officers discharged conducted energy weapons at the man. Another officer shot his firearm twice at the man. The man, 31, was taken to hospital with serious injuries.

As a result of the SIU investigation, Cst. Andrew Davis is facing the following charges under the Criminal Code:

- One count of aggravated assault contrary to section 268, and
- One count of discharge firearm with intent to maim, wound, disfigure or endanger life, contrary to section 244"

The link to the media release detailing the charges laid can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/siu-charges-toronto-police-officer-in-shooting-of-man-en8860

Incident Narrative

Terminology:

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person **B.W.C.** – Body-Worn Camera

On February 27, 2023, at 0758 hours, a concerned citizen attended the front desk of 12 Division to report that he had observed a male armed with a knife in the parkette across

the street from 12 Division. The citizen provided a detailed description of the male and the last location he had observed him.

The front desk staff at 12 Division notified the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) Communications Services (Communications) who dispatched numerous uniformed officers to the parkette.

At 0800 hours, four uniformed police officers from 12 Division responded to the call and arrived at the parkette at 0801 hours. The officers were joined by Police Constable Andrew Davis (66115) from 12 Division who was off duty and on his way to a paid duty assignment when he stopped en route to assist.

When the officers pulled into the parking lot of the parkette they immediately encountered the Complainant who appeared agitated and had a large knife concealed in a sheath on his belt.

When the officers saw the knife they directed the Complainant to lay on the ground. As the directions were given to the Complainant, two of the officers drew their Conducted Energy Weapons (C.E.W.) and Constable Davis drew his service issued pistol.

The Complainant did not comply with the officers directions to lay down on the ground and he started to walk backward away from the officers into the park. The officers followed him into the park from the parking lot while continuing to issue commands for him to lay on the ground. The park was empty at the time this event was unfolding.

One of the officers discharged their C.E.W., which was ineffective. A second officer then discharged his C.E.W., which was also ineffective due to the heavy clothing being worn by the Complainant.

At this time, the Complainant took the knife out of the sheath and held it in his hand. The officers ordered the Complainant to drop the knife. The Complainant continued to walk backwards away from the officers and refused to drop the knife. The Complainant raised the knife to his throat and began cutting his throat. When the Complainant raised the knife to his throat, Constable Davis discharged two rounds from his service pistol, striking the Complainant twice.

When Constable Davis discharged his firearm, he was 15 metres away from the Complainant (sourced from the S.I.U.).

After being shot, the Complainant turned away from the officers and ran as the officers pursued him on foot.

The officers caught up to the Complainant at the intersection of Black Creek Drive and Trethewey Drive.

The officers subdued and handcuffed the Complainant and immediately commenced life saving efforts.

Toronto Paramedic Services (Paramedics) arrived on scene and transported the Complainant to Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre.

The Complainant was treated for two gunshot wounds and a deep laceration to his neck.

After surgery, the Complainant was stabilized and a form 42 under the *Mental Health Act* (M.H.A.) was issued by the examining physician.

Criminal charges were not pursued against the Complainant by the Service.

The entire encounter with the Complainant was captured on the B.W.C. of all five involved officers.

The S.I.U. was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. designated Police Constable Andrew Davis (66115) of 12 Division as a subject official; eleven other officers have been designated as witness officials.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The Professional Standards Investigative Unit (P.R.S. I.N.V.) assisted by the Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – SIU Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the firearm discharge in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.R.S. I.N.V. and S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 08-03 (Injured on Duty Reporting);
- Procedure 08-04 (Members Involved in a Traumatic Critical Incident);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation));
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-03 (Service Firearms);
- Procedure 15-09 (Conducted Energy Weapon);
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System) and;

• Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The P.R.S. I.N.V. and S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019;
- Ontario Regulation 603/20 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the S.I.U.)
- Ontario Regulation 926 (Equipment and Use of Force)

Conclusion:

The P.R.S. I.N.V. and S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this firearm discharge and resulting injuries to the Complainant were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The P.R.S. I.N.V. and S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of four of the twelve designated officers was not in compliance with the applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and relevant T.P.S. procedures.

The administrative investigation identified and substantiated that a designated witness officer failed to utilize their I.C.C.S. as is directed in Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Cameras). This breach of the I.C.C.S. procedure was mitigated by the fact this officer did utilize his/her issued body-worn camera which captured the substantive event that was being investigated by the S.I.U. Misconduct was substantiated and the matter was resolved at the unit level.

The administrative investigation identified and substantiated that the first attending Sergeant failed to comply with Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit). Specifically, the Sergeant did not comply with Procedure 13-16 and their training when they mishandled the subject official's firearm. This error did not have an impact on the S.I.U.'s investigation. Misconduct was substantiated and the matter was resolved at the unit level.

The administrative investigation identified and substantiated that a designated witness officer failed to comply with Procedures 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation)) and 15-17 (In-Car Camera System). Specifically, this officer failed to utilize their I.C.C.S. as is directed in Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Cameras). This breach of the I.C.C.S. procedure was mitigated by the fact that this officer did utilize their issued bodyworn camera which captured the substantive event that was being investigated by the S.I.U. Misconduct was substantiated and the matter was resolved at the unit level.

It was also substantiated that this officer failed to sufficiently utilize de-escalation tactics as required by Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation)) and

police training. Misconduct was substantiated and the matter will be proceeding to a police tribunal hearing.

The administrative investigation identified and substantiated that Constable Andrew Davis (66115) of 12 Division failed to sufficiently utilize de-escalation tactics as required by Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation)). It was also identified and substantiated that Constable Davis used unnecessary force against the Complainant when he discharged his firearm when there was no risk of bodily harm or death to any officer or member of the public. Finally, it was identified and substantiated that Constable Davis acted in a disorderly manner or in a manner prejudicial to discipline or likely to bring discredit upon the reputation of the Police Service when he failed to utilize appropriate de-escalation tactics, discharged his firearm when it was not justified to do so and when he used excessive force on the Complainant.

This matter will be proceeding to a police tribunal hearing at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M. Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

November 6, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.24
- Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – Special Investigations Unit Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act, (S.I.U.A.) 2019

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person(s) SO – Subject Official WO – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated September 28, 2023, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *"The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject official."*

The following S.I.U. *Incident Narrative* and *Analysis and Directors Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 23-TCI-129, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors report details.php?drid=2547

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

"The evidence collected by the SIU, including interviews with the Complainant and officers present at the time of the events in question, and video footage that captured the incident in parts, gives rise to the following scenario. As was his legal right, the SO chose not to interview with the SIU or authorize the release of his notes.

In the afternoon of April 30, 2023, the Complainant was standing in an alcove south of the entrance/exit doors of a Tim Hortons restaurant, located on the west side of Victoria Street, just north of Dundas Street East. He had just provided a small item to a woman when he was approached by uniformed TPS officers.

The SO was a backseat passenger in an unmarked police vehicle being operated by WO #1. WO #2 and WO #3 were also in the vehicle. The officers were patrolling in the area of Yonge Street and Dundas Street for drug transactions. While on Victoria Street facing south towards Dundas Street East, WO #1 had observed the Complainant engaged in what he believed to be a drug transaction. He alerted his colleagues and drove to the area, bringing the vehicle to a stop curbside by the Tim Hortons, after which all four officers exited and rushed towards the Complainant.

The Complainant attempted to flee from the officers. He mounted an electric scooter he had with him and travelled north across the Tim Hortons a short distance before he was confronted by WO #2, at which point he jumped off his scooter and attempted to skirt around the officer on foot. The two grappled

momentarily, the officer losing his balance in the process, before the Complainant was tackled to the ground by WO #3.

The SO was knocked to the ground by the takedown and immediately engaged the Complainant, delivering four to five left-handed punches to the head area. Shortly thereafter, the officers were able to control the Complainant's arms and handcuff them behind the back.

The Complainant was bleeding from the face after his arrest and an ambulance was summoned to the scene. He was diagnosed at hospital with a broken right orbital bone and nasal fractures."

Analysis and Director's Decision

"The Complainant was seriously injured in the course of his arrest by TPS officers on April 30, 2023. One of the officers – the SO – was identified as the subject official in the ensuing SIU investigation of the incident. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's arrest and injuries.

Pursuant to section 25(1) of the Criminal Code, police officers are immune from criminal liability for force used in the course of their duties provided such force was reasonably necessary in the execution of an act that they were required or authorized to do by law.

WO #1 had observed what he believed was a drug transaction. Whether or not the officer's surmise was accurate, I am unable to reasonably conclude that the decision to arrest the Complainant was unlawful. The interaction had occurred in an area known for drug-trafficking, and the outward behaviour of the involved parties was apparently consistent with a drug transaction.

With respect to the force used by the SO in aid of the Complainant's arrest, I am not satisfied it was excessive. The Complainant had demonstrated he was intent on escaping apprehension when he fled from the officers – first on his scooter and then briefly on foot. Thereafter, the SO was bowled over in the course of the Complainant's grounding. Though that appears to have been the result of WO #3's tackle of the Complainant, the impact would have imparted a sense of the violence of the encounter and the need to subdue the Complainant as soon as possible. On this record, when he failed to promptly release his arms to be handcuffed, as the weight of the evidence suggests was the case, the SO was entitled to resort to a measure of force to overcome the Complainant's resistance. The four or five punches delivered in quick succession would not appear a clearly disproportionate use of force in the heat of the moment.

In the result, while I accept that one of more of the Complainant's facial injuries were likely inflicted by the punches delivered by the SO, I am not satisfied on

reasonable grounds that they any of them are attributable to unlawful conduct on the part of the officer.

The file is closed."

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation))
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019, s 31(1) Duty to Comply;
- Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019, s 20 Securing the Scene;
- Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019, s 16 (1) Notification of Incident.

Conclusion:

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner, which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of a designated official was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable T.P.S. procedures.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



PUBLIC REPORT

November 6, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.30
- Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – Special Investigations Unit Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act, (S.I.U.A.) 2019

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person(s) SO – Subject Official WO – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated September 11, 2023, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *"The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject official."*

The following S.I.U. *Incident Narrative* and *Analysis and Directors Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 23-TCI-183, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors report details.php?drid=2572

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

"The evidence collected by the SIU, including interviews with police officers who dealt with the Complainant during her time in custody and video footage that captured the incident in parts, gives rise to the following scenario. As was her legal right, the SO chose not to interview with the SIU or authorize the release of her notes.

The Complainant was arrested on the strength of outstanding warrants in the morning of May 13, 2023, in a laneway near Pape Avenue and Danforth Avenue, Toronto. Paramedics and police had been called to check on the welfare of two persons in the laneway who seemed impaired by drugs. WO #1, the lead officer on scene, handcuffed the Complainant, after which she was subjected to a pat-down search by the SO. No contraband was seized.

The Complainant was transported to 55 Division where she was subjected to a second search of her person. This one involved a somewhat more invasive search, namely, a frisk search in which the searching officer digs into a person's pockets and removes outerwear for inspection. Again, no drugs were located.

In the evening of the day in question, having spent the afternoon at 55 Division, the Complainant was taken to a detention centre in Milton. Reportedly, the Complainant appeared drowsy on her arrival and was refused admission to the facility. Paramedics attended and transported the Complainant to hospital.

The Complainant was examined at hospital and eventually placed in the ICU. A nurse attempting to insert a catheter had located and removed a small plastic

container from the Complainant's vagina with suspected drugs inside. The Complainant was subsequently discharged from hospital."

Analysis and Director's Decision

"The Complainant was was admitted to hospital on May 13, 2023, while in the custody of the TPS. The TPS notified the SIU of the Complainant's medical condition, prompting an SIU investigation in which the SO was identified as the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's stay in hospital.

The offences that arise for consideration are failure to provide the necessaries of life and criminal negligence causing bodily harm contrary to sections 215 and 221 of the Criminal Code, respectively. Both require something more than a simple want of care to give rise to liability. The former is predicated, in part, on conduct that amounts to a marked departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances.

The latter is premised on even more egregious conduct that demonstrates a wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. It is not made out unless the neglect constitutes a marked and substantial departure from a reasonable standard of care. In the instant case, the question is whether there was any want of care on the part of the SO, sufficiently serious to attract criminal sanction, that endangered the Complainant's life or contributed to her medical condition. In my view, there was not.

There are no issues raised with the lawfulness of the Complainant's arrest. She was subject to a number of warrants and WO #1 was within his rights in taking her into custody. That being the case, the police also had the authority to search the Complainant as an incident of her lawful arrest pursuant to their common law powers.

With respect to the care afforded the Complainant while in police custody, the only possible miscue would appear to be the fact that she was not dispossessed of a small plastic container of drugs. It remains unclear whether those drugs played any role in her ICU admission, but even if they did, the evidence falls short of making out any malfeasance on the part of her custodians in failing to locate them. The fact is, the Complainant was subjected to two searches, each of which appears to have been conducted with due diligence. It would be speculation to conclude that a further strip search, had it been conducted, would have discovered the plastic container. However, whether the officers had sufficient grounds to strip search the Complainant is arguable. As the governing law in this area makes clear, the police must establish reasonable and probable grounds justifying a strip search in connection with the need to discover weapons or evidence on the person searched: R v Golden, [2001] 3 SCR 679. The officers concluded that those grounds did not exist in the circumstances of this case. As the Complainant

appeared mostly coherent and physically capable while in police custody, I am unable to reasonably conclude that the officers' assessment was clearly wrong.

In the result, as there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO or any of the officers involved in the Complainant's care while in police custody transgressed the limits of care prescribed by the criminal law, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges.

The file is closed."

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation))
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System); and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019, s 31(1) Duty to Comply
- Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019, s 20 Securing the Scene
- Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019, s 16 (1) Notification of Incident.

Conclusion:

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner, which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable T.P.S. procedures.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



PUBLIC REPORT

November 6, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.32
- Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – Special Investigations Unit Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act, (S.I.U.A.) 2019

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person SO – Subject Official WO – Witness Official CW – Civilian Witness

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated September 28, 2023, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *"The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject official."*

The following S.I.U. *Incident Narrative* and *Analysis and Directors Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 23-TCI-186, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors report details.php?drid=2573

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

"The evidence collected by the SIU, including interviews with officers present at the time of the events in question and video footage that captured the incident, gives rise to the following scenario. As was his legal right, the SO did not agree an interview with the SIU. He did authorize the release of his notes.

In the evening of May 14, 2023, the SO and his partner, WO #1, were dispatched to an address near Tapscott Road and Neilson Road, Toronto. A call had come in from the CW reporting that the Complainant, present at the location in violation of a release order, had assaulted her and stolen her vehicle. The officers were stopped at a red light on Washburn Way, facing north towards Tapscott Road, when they observed the Complainant operating the stolen vehicle behind them.

The Complainant was intoxicated at the time and had left in the CW's vehicle. He failed to stop when told to do so by WO #1, who had momentarily exited his cruiser to issue the direction, and executed a U-turn to drive away from the police. He proceeded south on Washburn Way and eventually made his way westbound on Sheppard Avenue East from Gateforth Drive.

The SO followed the Hyundai on Sheppard Avenue a short distance, watching it turn left and come to a stop on the driveway of the Chinese Cultural Centre of Greater Toronto, 5183 Sheppard Avenue East, about 200 metres west of Gateforth Drive. The officer brought his cruiser to a stop behind the Hyundai, and he and WO #1 exited and approached the driver's door.

At about this time, WO #2 and WO #3 were arriving on scene in another cruiser, which they brought to a stop in front of the Hyundai. Both officers exited and also made their way to the driver's door.

The Complainant was directed to exit the vehicle but initially delayed. He held onto the steering wheel as the officers attempted to remove him from the Hyundai. When he continued to delay his exit, the SO and WO #1 grabbed hold of the Complainant and forcibly extricated him from the vehicle, depositing him on the ground.

The officers rolled the Complainant onto his left-front and handcuffed his arms behind the back.

Following his arrest, the Complainant complained of pain to his left hip. An ambulance was called and transported him to hospital where he was diagnosed with a broken left hip and two left-sided fractured ribs."

Analysis and Director's Decision

"The Complainant was seriously injured in the course of his arrest by TPS officers on May 14, 2023. One of the arresting officers – the SO – was identified as the subject official in the ensuing SIU investigation of the incident. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's arrest and injuries.

Pursuant to section 25(1) of the Criminal Code, police officers are immune from criminal liability for force used in the course of their duties provided such force was reasonably necessary in the execution of an act that they were required or authorized to do by law.

The SO and the other involved officers were within their rights in seeking to take the Complainant into custody. The officers had cause to believe that the Complainant was operating a stolen vehicle while impaired by alcohol based on the information received via the 911 call and the smell of alcohol coming from the Complainant when they opened the driver's door of the Hyundai.

With respect to the force used by the SO and the other officers, namely, their application of bodily force to wrestle the Complainant out of the car and onto the ground, I am unable to reasonably conclude that it was excessive. The officers were right to want to remove the Complainant from the Hyundai as soon as possible. The Complainant was intoxicated and there was a real risk to the safety of the Complainant, the officers, and the broader public should he have the opportunity to continue to operate the vehicle. In the circumstances, I am satisfied the officers acted reasonably when they pulled the Complainant from the vehicle after he had delayed in removing himself. That tactic, as the video makes clear, was not executed with undue force. Nor does it appear that WO #1, when he temporarily placed a knee on the Complainant's back and buttocks, acted with excess.

In the result, while I accept that one or more of the Complainant's injuries were incurred in the course of his arrest, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that any of them are attributable to unlawful conduct on the part of the SO or the other officers. As such, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges.

The file is closed."

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 05-04 (Intimate Partner Violence);
- Procedure 07-06 (Ability Impaired/80 mgs and Over Investigation);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation))
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System), and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

• Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019, SO 2019, c1, Sch 5

Conclusion:

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner, which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable T.P.S. procedures.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



PUBLIC REPORT

November 6, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation of the Alleged Sexual Assault Complainant 2023.37
- Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – Special Investigations Unit Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police, of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.), 2019

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated September 22, 2023, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *"The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges in this case"*.

The S.I.U. has not made the Directors Report public stating in part, "*pursuant to section* 34(6) of the Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019, the SIU Director may exercise a discretion, subject to prior consultation with the complainant, to not publish the report if the Director is of the opinion that the complainant's privacy interest in not having the report published clearly outweighs the public interest in having the report published."

Incident Narrative

On January 21, 2023, a uniformed police officer from 51 Division attended a building in response to a theft.

It was reported by the victim that on January 20, 2023, at 1930 hours, he had left his belongings in the loading dock area of the condominium building while he organized his moving van.

While the victim's belongings were left unattended, a female later identified as Alleged Sexual Assault Complainant 2023.37 (2023.37) stole several items including \$2100 in cash. The theft was captured on the building surveillance video system.

The officer commenced an investigation which included reviewing surveillance video. Based on this investigation, the officer with the assistance of building security, identified 2023.37 who is a resident of the same building as the suspect.

The victim of the theft did not wish to pursue any criminal charges but did want 2023.37 to return the stolen money.

The officer attended 2023.37's apartment and advised her of the theft investigation and her alleged role. 2023.37 was shown the surveillance video showing she was responsible for the theft. 2023.37 agreed to return the money to the victim in lieu of a criminal charge.

The initial investigation of the theft and the officer's conversation with 2023.37 was captured on Body-Worn Camera (B.W.C.).

The officer completed a report detailing the theft, his investigation and the purposed resolution.

On May 27, 2023, the victim of the theft contacted the officer to advise the money was never returned.

On May 27, 2023, the officer attended 2023.37's unit and charged her with Theft not Exceeding \$5000.

After leaving the unit, the officer received a call from a female who identified herself as 2023.37's mother. The caller expressed her anger that her daughter had been criminally charged and alleged the officer had made inappropriate comments toward her daughter and had touched her inappropriately during the initial investigation on January 21, 2023. The caller advised the officer she would be attending 51 Division to file a complaint.

The officer immediately attended 51 Division and reported the allegation to his superior.

The S.I.U was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. designated one officer as a subject official.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The Professional Standards – S.I.U. Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation. This investigation was reviewed by Specialized Criminal Investigations – Sex Crimes Unit in accordance to T.P.S. Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit).

This investigation examined the circumstances of the alleged sexual assault in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-08 (Criminal Code Release);
- Procedure 05-05 (Sexual Assault);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

• Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.), 2019

Conclusion:

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this alleged sexual assault were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner that provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated subject officer was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable T.P.S. procedures. The following additional comments are provided.

The S.I.U.'s investigation into this allegation which was aided by data provided to them by the Service resulted with the conclusion that there were no reasonable grounds to proceed with criminal charges.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



PUBLIC REPORT

November 6, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.38
- Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – Special Investigations Unit Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act, (S.I.U.A.) 2019

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person **SO** – Subject Official **WO** – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated October 4, 2023, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *"The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject official."*

The following S.I.U. *Incident Narrative* and *Analysis and Directors Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 23-TCI-214, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors report details.php?drid=2620

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

"In the morning of June 6, 2023, the TPS took a 911 call from the Canadian Tire store at 5 Joe Shuster Way, Toronto, about the Complainant. According to the caller, the Complainant had assaulted a store employee and damaged store property, after which she exited the premises in possession of a box-cutter. Police officers were dispatched to the area.

WO #3, who was working a paid-duty at a construction site in the vicinity of the Canadian Tire, heard of the 911 call via radio. He observed the Complainant with a box-cutter in her right hand, its blade extended, and attempted to have her drop the knife.

The Complainant was of unsound mind at the time and seemingly unable to respond to WO #3 in a meaningful way. She demanded that the officer "tase" her as he attempted to defuse the situation by engaging her in conversation. At one point, the Complainant did drop the box-cutter, only to access another one she had on her person when WO #3 approached to take her into custody. The officer immediately created distance at this time, aimed his CEW in her direction, and warned the Complainant that he would shock her if she did not drop the knife.

At the standoff between the Complainant and WO #3 continued, the SO and his partner, WO #2, on bike patrol, were approaching the scene from the north on Joe Shuster Way. Both officers dismounted their bikes and continued their approach on foot, unknown to the Complainant, who was facing south towards WO #3 at the time. As the SO neared to within two to three metres, he fired his CEW. The

probes from the weapon struck the Complainant in the back. The Complainant locked-up and fell backwards, striking her head in the process. With the Complainant on the ground, the officers removed the knife from her possession and handcuffed her behind the back.

The Complainant was transported from the scene in ambulance to hospital, where she was diagnosed with a skull fracture and subarachnoid hemorrhage."

Analysis and Director's Decision

"The Complainant was seriously injured in the course of her arrest by TPS officers on June 6, 2023. One of the arresting officers – the SO – was identified as the subject official in the ensuing SIU investigation. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's arrest injury.

Pursuant to section 25(1) of the Criminal Code, police officers are immune from criminal liability for force used in the course of their duties provided such force was reasonably necessary in the execution of an act that they were required or authorized to do by law.

By the time the SO fired his CEW at the Complainant, he and other officers responding to the scene had information that she had caused damage in the Canadian Tire, stolen and wielded a box-cutter from the store, and laid hands on a store employee. In the circumstances, the officer was within his rights in seeking to take her into custody.

With respect to the SO's use of his CEW. I am satisfied that it was legally justified. The Complainant had hold of a box-cutter in a manner that was clearly threatening to herself and those around her. Moments prior, though apparently in crisis and perhaps not in complete control of her faculties, she had behaved erratically and violently inside the Canadian Tire. On this record, the officers were right to keep their distance from the Complainant while she was still in possession of the boxcutter, an item clearly capable of inflicting serious injury or death. The SO might have considered holding back to give negotiations some more time to work. That appears to have been the course adopted by WO #3. On the other hand, events were unfolding in a downtown intersection with bystanders around and it might well have been the more prudent course to bring the situation to resolution as auickly as possible. Given these considerations. I am unable to reasonably conclude that the SO's choice was beyond the pale. Indeed, the CEW discharge did immediately result in the Complainant's immediate incapacitation from a safe distance, albeit it was highly regrettable that she sustained serious injuries in her fall to the ground.

In the result, as there are no reasonable grounds to conclude that the SO comported himself other than within the limits of the criminal law in his brief

engagement with the Complainant, there is no basis for proceeding with charges in this case.

The file is closed."

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 06-04 (Person in Crisis);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation))
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-09 (Conducted Energy Weapons); and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

• Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019, SO 2019, c1, Sch 5

Conclusion:

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner, which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable T.P.S. procedures.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



PUBLIC REPORT

November 6, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Death of Complainant 2023.41
- Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – Special Investigations Unit Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with the applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police, of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.) 2019

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person SO – Subject Official WO – Witness Official ETF – Emergency Task Force

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated October 13, 2023, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *"The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the officials."*

The following S.I.U. *Incident Narrative* and *Analysis and Directors Decision* has been copied from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 22-TCD-226, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors report details.php?drid=2634

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

"The evidence collected by the SIU, including interviews with the SO and other officers on scene, and video footage that captured the incident in parts, gives rise to the following scenario.

Shortly after 3:00 a.m. of June 15, 2023, TPS officers began arriving at the Holiday Inn Express, 111 Lombard Street, Toronto, following 911 calls of an agitated male throwing items from the window of his hotel room. Among those officers was the SO, who essentially assumed a command role among the police presence. He was stationed on the street below the room in question. The WO was another of those officers. He and other officers assembled outside the hotel room.

The male was the Complainant. The Complainant was having a mental health crisis. He yelled, kicked at the room's walls, broke a window, and threw items out onto the street below – Jarvis Street.

Officers from outside the Complainant's door and those on Jarvis Street attempted to de-escalate the situation. They tried speaking with the Complainant to calm him down, assuring him that they were there to help. Efforts to enter the room failed as the Complainant had engaged the door latch. The ETF was contacted to attend the scene. At about 3:20 a.m., the Complainant stepped outside the broken window onto a ledge, sat on the windowsill momentarily, then stood up, turned around, and jumped, falling to his death.

Cause of Death

The pathologist at autopsy was of the preliminary view that the Complainant's death was attributable to blunt impact trauma of head and torso".

Analysis and Director's Decision

"The Complainant passed away on June 15, 2023, the result of a fall from a fourth-floor hotel window. As TPS officers were present outside his hotel room and on the street below at the time, the S.I.U was notified and initiated an investigation. The SO was identified as the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's death.

The offence that arises for consideration is criminal negligence causing death contrary to section 220 of the Criminal Code. The offence is reserved for serious cases of neglect that demonstrate a wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. It is predicated, in part, on conduct that amounts to a marked and substantial departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances. In the instant case, the question is whether there was a want of care on the part of the SO, sufficiently egregious to attract criminal sanction, that caused or contributed to the Complainant's death. In my view, there was not.

The SO and the other officers who responded to the Holiday Inn Express were lawfully placed throughout their engagement with the Complainant. An officer's foremost obligation is the protection and preservation of life. Aware of the events unfolding at the hotel and the Complainant's predicament, the officers were duty bound to attend to do what they reasonably could to assist the Complainant.

With respect to his conduct at the scene, I am satisfied that the SO comported himself with due care and regard for public safety and the Complainant's welfare. In the few minutes the sergeant had to work with, he and officers under his command attempted to assuage the Complainant with words of support and care. He authorized an entry into the room when verbal exhortations were going nowhere, and it seemed as if the Complainant was away from the broken window, but then promptly and, reasonably, in my view, changed course to direct no further entry attempts when the initial foray failed and appeared to agitate the Complainant. He decided at that point that their best tactic was to wait for the ETF to deploy at the scene. That too was a prudent decision given the additional expertise and resources at the ETF's disposal to deal with these types of situations. Regrettably, the Complainant climbed outside the window and jumped before the ETF arrived or there was any further opportunity at a forced entry.

In the result, as there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO transgressed the limits of care prescribed by the criminal law in his dealings with the Complainant, there is no basis for proceeding with charges in this case.

The file is closed."

Summary of the Toronto Police Investigation:

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation was reviewed by the Specialized Criminal Investigations – Homicide and Missing Persons Unit as required by T.P.S. Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit).

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody death in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 06-04 (Persons in Crisis);
- Procedure 06-13 (Mobile Crisis Intervention Team);
- Procedure 08-03 (Injured on Duty Reporting);
- Procedure 08-04 (Members Involved in a Traumatic Critical Incident);
- Procedure 10-05 (Incidents Requiring the Emergency Task Force);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports); and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera)

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

• Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019

Conclusion:

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody death were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner, which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with the applicable provincial legislation regarding the

Standards of Conduct and applicable T.P.S. procedures. The following additional comments are provided in relation to the T.P.S. response to this event.

The T.P.S. Mobile Crisis Intervention Team (M.C.I.T.) was not available to assist with this call as they were not working at this time of day.

The officers responding to this event were equipped with Body-Worn Camera's which captured the initial attempted negotiations with the Complainant and his eventual fall. This video, coupled with interviews the involved officers provided to the S.I.U. provided an unparalleled perspective of what occurred and why, and assisted the S.I.U. in coming to their investigative findings.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



PUBLIC REPORT

December 4, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.42
- Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – Special Investigations Unit Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures and the officers' training.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act, (S.I.U.A.) 2019

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S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person **SO** – Subject Official **ETF** – Emergency Task Force **PSD** – Police Service Dog

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated October 12, 2023, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *"The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject official."*

The following S.I.U. *Incident Narrative* and *Analysis and Directors Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 23-TCI-229, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors report details.php?drid=2632

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

"The evidence collected by the SIU, including interviews with the Complainant and officers who participated in his arrest, and video footage that captured the incident in parts, gives rise to the following scenario. As was his legal right, the SO chose not to interview with the SIU or authorize the release of his notes.

In the afternoon of June 16, 2023, the SO, a police service dog handler, and his dog were dispatched to assist with a search in a ravine north of 75 Eastdale Avenue. Uniformed officers had attempted a takedown of a vehicle in the area, apprehending the driver but not the passenger – the Complainant. Minutes earlier, a 911 call had been received from a residence in the area of Kingston Road and Woodbine Avenue, Toronto, reporting that the Complainant had discharged a firearm at the building located at that address. The Complainant was last seen running into the ravine with a gun in his waistband.

Joined by another police service dog handler and a team of ETF officers, the SO deployed the PSD on a long lead into the ravine. Within seconds of the dog's entry into the bushes of the terrain, the PSD located the Complainant and bit into the area of the back of his upper right arm/shoulder. The Complainant had concealed himself supine in the bush attempting to evade apprehension.

ETF officers were quickly at the scene and eventually controlled the Complainant's arms and handcuffed them behind the back.

A firearm was subsequently located and collected by police in the vicinity of the arrest.

The Complainant was transported to hospital following his arrest and treated for lacerations and puncture wounds to the right upper extremity, back and axilla."

Analysis and Director's Decision

"The Complainant was seriously injured in the course of his arrest by TPS officers on June 16, 2023. One of the officers involved in the Complainant's arrest – the SO – was identified as the subject official in the ensuing SIU investigation of the incident. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's injuries.

The offence that arises for consideration is criminal negligence causing bodily harm contrary to section 221 of the Criminal Code. The offence is reserved for serious cases of neglect that demonstrate a wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. It is predicated, in part, on conduct that amounts to a marked and substantial departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances. In the instant case, the question is whether there was a want of care on the part of the SO, sufficiently egregious to attract criminal sanction, that caused or contributed to the Complainant's injuries. In my view, there was not.

By the time the ETF and police dog handlers convened at the ravine to search for the Complainant, they had cause to believe that he had just fired a gun indiscriminately at a building, a building at which his estranged partner resided and from which he was prohibited from being in proximity to. They were also apprised of information that the Complainant was still in possession of the gun as he fled into the ravine. On his record, I am satisfied that the police, in general, and, more specifically, the SO, were justified in deploying a police dog to assist in locating the Complainant.

I am also satisfied that the SO comported himself with due care and regard for the Complainant's health and well-being throughout the dog's deployment. Though it does not appear that the SO ever gave the police dog the order to bite and hold the Complainant, the fact that the PSD did so would not appear a marked departure from its training. The setting was a ravine consisting of dense bush, uneven terrain, and poor visibility – the sort of environment in which the dog might well have felt threatened and reacted naturally to defend itself by biting the subject. Of concern is the fact that the police dog did not promptly detach itself from the Complainant once ordered to do so by the SO. Indeed, the dog maintained the bite for an additional 15 seconds or so before the officer was able to pull the PSD free. Some allowance must be made for the fact that no police dog handler ever has complete control of a dog when it is deployed – there is always an element of unpredictability when using another sentient creature as a tool in an officer's hands. The real question is whether the SO had any reason to suspect that the PSD was not likely to respond to his release direction within a reasonable period of time. On this question, one notes that the dog's training and certifications were up to date such that there is no real question of any criminal want of care in this case.

In the result, as there are no reasonable grounds to conclude that the SO transgressed the limits of care prescribed by the criminal law in his use of the police dog against the Complainant, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges in this case.

The file is closed."

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 04-27 (Use of Police Dog Services);
- Procedure 05-21 (Firearms);
- Procedure 10-05 (Incidents Requiring the Emergency Task Force);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation))
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting); and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

• Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019

Conclusion:

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and

written in a manner, which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct, the applicable T.P.S. procedures and the officers' training.

The details of this event including the applicable Body-Worn Camera (B.W.C.) footage, officer notes and the police service dog's (P.S.D.) training record were reviewed by Detective Sergeant Michael Quinn (5169) who has nine years of experience as a T.P.S. dog handler. Detective Sergeant Quinn concluded that the P.S.D. responded in accordance with the training provided to T.P.S. P.S.D.s. Additionally, Detective Sergeant Quinn concluded the P.D.S. handler acted appropriately and in line with his training in response to this event and specifically in his efforts to detach the P.S.D. from the Complainant.

The existence B.W.C. footage which captured the arrest of the Complainant was a pivotal piece of evidence which provided the S.I.U. with an unparalleled perspective of what occurred and why, and assisted them in coming to their investigative conclusion.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,



PUBLIC REPORT

December 4, 2023

- To: Chair and Members Toronto Police Services Board
- From: Myron Demkiw Chief of Police
- Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.44
- Purpose: 🛛 Information Purposes Only 🔅 Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Professional Standards (P.R.S.) – Special Investigations Unit Liaison (S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures and the officers' training.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- Special Investigations Unit Act, (S.I.U.A.) 2019

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S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person **SO** – Subject Official **WO** – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated November 1, 2023, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *"The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject official."*

The following S.I.U. *Incident Narrative* and *Analysis and Directors Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 23-TCI-254, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors report details.php?drid=2664

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

"The evidence gathered by the SIU, including interviews with the Complainant and the SO, and video footage that captured the incident in parts, gives rise to the following scenario.

In the morning of July 4, 2023, the SO was a passenger in a police cruiser operated by his partner, the WO, travelling south on Willowdale Avenue. They were responding to a report of a break and enter in progress at a business located on Willowdale Avenue. A man had called to report a van on the premises and persons loading items from the business into it.

The Complainant was one of the persons associated with the van. As the police cruiser approached the business, he jumped into the rear cargo compartment of the van before it accelerated off the property turning right to travel south on Willowdale Avenue. The rear door had not been fastened shut before the van departed, and it opened and closed as the vehicle accelerated. Shortly after the van left the business, the Complainant stood up, lost his balance, and fell onto the roadway through the open rear door.

The WO brought his police vehicle to a stop and he and the SO exited to pursue the Complainant, who had regained his footing and was fleeing south towards the Spring Garden Avenue intersection. The SO was first to reach the Complainant. The officer pulled the Complainant to the ground and, with the assistance of the WO, handcuffed him behind the back. Later in the day, while still in the custody of the police, the Complainant was taken to hospital and diagnosed with a broken right arm."

Analysis and Director's Decision

"The Complainant was seriously injured around the time of his arrest by TPS officers on July 4, 2023. In the ensuing SIU investigation of the incident, one of the officers – the SO – was identified as the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's arrest and injury. Pursuant to section 25(1) of the Criminal Code, police officers are immune from criminal liability for force used in the course of their duties provided such force was reasonably necessary in the execution of an act that they were required or authorized to do by law. The SO was within his rights in seeking to take the Complainant into custody. Given what he knew of the 911 call and what he observed as he arrived on scene, namely, a van accelerating away from the premises, the SO had grounds to arrest the Complainant in relation to theft.

With respect to the force used by the SO in aid of the Complainant's arrest, essentially, a takedown, I am satisfied that it was legally justified. The Complainant was fleeing at the time attempting to evade apprehension. It made sense, in the circumstances, to ground the Complainant. Doing so would bring an end to his flight and place the officer in a better position to manage any continuing resistance from the Complainant. Once on the ground, there is no evidence of any strikes being brought to bear.

It remains unclear when precisely the Complainant broke his arm. In my view, it is more likely that the injury was incurred when he fell from the van onto the roadway than when he was grounded. Be that as it may, as there are no reasonable grounds to conclude that the SO comported himself other than within the limits of the criminal law in his engagement with the Complainant, there is no basis for proceeding with charges."

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

• Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);

- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation))
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System); and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

• Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A), 2019

Conclusion:

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner, which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct, the applicable T.P.S procedures and the officers' training. The following additional comments are provided.

It was identified that a non-designated member failed to comply with Service Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit). Specifically, the on duty Staff Sergeant became aware that the Complainant had sustained a threshold injury but did not make the appropriate notifications for several hours.

This breach of procedure was identified and managed at the unit level through additional training with the Unit Commander of the division.

The existence of Body-Worn Camera and In-Car Camera footage which captured the Complainants fall, attempted escape and his arrest were pivotal pieces of evidence which provided the S.I.U. with an unparalleled perspective of what occurred and why, and assisted them in coming to their investigative conclusion.

Staff Superintendent Peter Code, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Board receive this report for information.


Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Update on Call Diversion - Gerstein Crisis Centre

TPS Crisis Call Diversion Pilot - Events potentially in scope (subject to diversion criteria) Term 2 (Oct 4, 2022 - Sep 9, 2023) - Approx. 11 months of data



* Excludes co-response

Update on Call Diversion - Gerstein Crisis Centre

TPS Crisis Call Diversion Pilot - Results Term 2 (Oct 4, 2022 - Sep 9, 2023) - Approx. 11 months of data

