



Public Meeting

**Thursday,
September 12, 2024**



PUBLIC MEETING MINUTES

Thursday, September 12, 2024, at 1:00PM

Livestreamed at: <https://youtube.com/live/oPI6iuZD4Js?feature=share>

The following *draft* Minutes of the hybrid public meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board that was held on September 12, 2024, are subject to approval at its next regularly scheduled meeting.

Attendance:

The following Members were present:

Ann Morgan, Chair (virtual)
Lisa Kostakis, Vice-Chair
Chris Brillinger, Member
Lily Cheng, Councillor and Member (virtual)
Nick Migliore, Member
Amber Morley, Deputy Mayor and Member
Shelley Carroll, Councillor and Member

The following individuals were also present:

Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police, Toronto Police Service
Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director, Toronto Police Service Board
Sandy Murray, Acting Board Administrator, Toronto Police Service Board
Jane Burton, Solicitor, City of Toronto – Legal Services Division

Declarations:

There were no declarations of interest under the Code of Conduct for Members of a Police Service Board Regulation and the *Municipal Conflict of Interest Act*.

Board Member Chris Brillinger provided the following statement regarding a potential perception of conflict of interest:

Out of an abundance of caution and in aid of transparency, I would like to make the Board aware of a potential perception of conflict of interest. Family Service Toronto has a service contract with the Gerstein Centre to provide counselling/psychotherapy supports to people referred by the TCCS. The contract value is \$120,000.00 per year and represents 0.5% of our annual operating budget. In my understanding this would not constitute a conflict under the municipal conflict of interest Act, nor under sections 20, 21, & 22 of the CSPA Reg. 408. However, I thought it prudent to raise with the Board in the interests of complete transparency. Thank you.

Vice-Chair Kostakis moved the following Motion which was seconded by Councillor Cheng:

I would like to move to acknowledge Member Brillinger's disclosure and determine that no conflict of interest exists.

Board approved the Motion.

This is an Extract from the Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board that was held on September 12, 2024

P2024-0912-0.1. Remarks re Andrew Hong

Vice-Chair Kostakis made remarks regarding Andrew Hong.

I would like to take the opportunity to acknowledge that today marks two years since PC Andrew Hong tragically lost his life in the line of duty. We know his death continues to have reverberations within our police service and across all policing organizations. Our thoughts are very much with his family, loved ones and colleagues as we remember him today.

This is an Extract from the Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board that was held on September 12, 2024

P2024-0912-0.2. Welcoming Alexandra Therien, Analyst, Research & Evaluation

Executive Director Dubi Kanengisser welcomed Alexandra Therien as the new Analyst with the Board Office.

I would like to take a moment to welcome the newest member of the Board Office Staff, Alexandra Therien. In her role as part of the Board's Strategic Analysis & Evaluation Team, Alexandra will play a key role in assessing Board policies and examining their influence on Toronto's policing framework by contributing to strategic monitoring, research and evaluation initiatives and providing data-driven and

evidence-based recommendations. In addition, she supports stakeholder research and engagement initiatives that contribute to a deepened understanding of Toronto's diverse communities.

Alex has a Master's in Food Security from the University of Guelph. She has a strong background in monitoring, research, evaluation and knowledge mobilization having previously worked in the academic sector as well as for several international non-governmental organizations.

Notably, she provided support for the United Nations Population Fund's humanitarian response to the Rohingya refugee emergency in Bangladesh. She has led projects related to vulnerable and marginalized communities both locally and internationally in a wide range of thematic areas including education, child protection, gender equality, youth empowerment, health, and food security.

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P2024-0912-0.3. Motion

Vice-Chair Kostakis moved the following Motion, which was seconded by Board Member Migliore.

THAT the Board direct that the time allocated for each deputation be reduced to three minutes, in accordance with section 17.4 of the Board's Procedural By-law.

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P2024-0912-0.4. Chief's Monthly Verbal Update

Chief Demkiw, Deputy Chief Pogue, Deputy Chief Johnson and Chief Administrative Officer Dhaliwal provided updates to the Board.

For a more detailed account of these updates, see the YouTube recording starting at minute 4:34:51 here:

<https://www.youtube.com/live/oPl6iuZD4Js?si=TdrSM8H1nNxQIRxK&t=16489>

The Board received the updates.

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P2024-0912-1.0. Board Minutes

The Board approved the Minutes from the regular public meeting held on [July 31, 2024](#) and the Minutes of the Board's Budget Committee Meeting held on [August 27, 2024](#)

The Board approved the Minutes.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: S. Carroll

This is an Extract from the Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board that was held on September 12, 2024

P2024-0912-2.0. [Analytics Presentation](#)

The Board was in receipt of a presentation provided by Ian Williams, Director, Information Management. A copy of the presentation is attached to this Minute.

Deputations: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)
Nicole Corrado ([written deputation only](#))

Board Members discussed this report. For a detailed account of the discussion, see the YouTube recording starting at minute 5:24:09 here:
<https://www.youtube.com/live/oPl6iuZD4Js?si=Be84FCiaYKK3P7lu&t=19447>

The Board received the deputations and the presentation.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: N. Migliore

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P2024-0912-3.0. [IT Rationalization Presentation](#)

The Board was in receipt of a presentation provided by Information Officer, Colin Stairs. A copy of the presentation is attached to this Minute.

Deputations: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)
Nicole Corrado ([written deputation only](#))

Board Members discussed this report. For a detailed account of the discussion, see the YouTube recording starting at minute 5:56:17
<https://www.youtube.com/live/oPl6iuZD4Js?si=zq99Q5hXaGKwHfAB&t=21374>

The Board received the deputations and the presentation.

Moved by: N. Migliore
Seconded by: C. Brillinger

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P2024-0912-4.0. Multi Year Hiring Plan

P2024-0912-4.1. Multi Year Hiring Plan Presentation

The Board was in receipt of a presentation provided by Chief Administrative Officer Dhaliwal. A copy of the presentation is attached to this Minute.

P2024-0912-4.2. Toronto Police Service's Multi-Year Staffing Plan

The Board was in receipt of a report dated September 12, 2024, from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) approve this report and accompanying presentation outlining the 2025 – 2029 multi-year hiring scenarios that will inform the Toronto Police Service's (Service's) budget development process.

Deputations: Daniel Tate (in person)
Giuseppe Scoleri (virtual)
Camille Rogers (virtual)
Elliot Van Woudenberg (in person)
Sean Meagher (in person)
Dasha Koulia (virtual)
Derek Kreindler (in person)
Jessica Westhead (in person)
Marlee Wasser (in person)
Ruby LaForest (virtual)
Sebastian Decter (in person)
Miguel Avila (in person)
Michael Longfield (in person)
Helen Armstrong (virtual)
Val Yu (virtual)
Manisha (in person)
Kris Langenfeld (virtual)
Omo – Adasa Advocay (in person/[written submission included](#))
Howard Morton, *Law Union of Ontario* ([written submission only](#))
John Sewell ([written submission only](#))
Nicole Coraddo ([written submission only](#))
Jon Reid, President, TPA, ([written submission only](#))

Board Members discussed this report. For a detailed account of the discussion, see the YouTube recording starting at minute 7:39:29 here:
https://www.youtube.com/live/oPI6iuZD4Js?si=xqC5dNfTnDYPLVh_&t=27564

Councillor Carroll moved the following Motion, which was seconded by Board Member Brillinger:

That the Board replace the recommendation with the following:

Direct the Chief of Police, in consultation with the City's Chief Financial Officer, to update the Budget Committee at its October 2nd, 2024 Budget Committee meeting with a hybrid option that is guided by the principles of Adequate and Effective Policing, and also considers:

- a. information provided by the City on its ability to pay,
- b. the need to address the current Officer-to-Population ratio, and
- c. anticipated collective bargaining impacts and the strategic goals of the Service.

Board Member Migliore asked to add two points to the above Motion as an amendment:

- a) addressing adequate Priority 1 response times and
- b) the increased demand of policing services

The Board discussed the proposed amendment, and voted as follows:

The vote on the amendment by Member Migliore as follows:

Voting in favour - Chair Ann Morgan, Board Member Nick Migliore,
Voting opposed - Councillor Lily Cheng, Councillor Shelley Carroll, Deputy Mayor Amber Morley and Board Member Chris Brillinger

Motion as moved by Councillor Carroll *without* the amendment:

Voting in favour - Deputy Mayor Amber Morley, Councillor Lily Cheng and Board Member Chris Brillinger
Voting opposed - Board Member Nick Migliore, Vice-Chair Lisa Kostakis and Chair Ann Morgan

The Board received the presentation and the deputations, and approved the foregoing report as amended.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: L. Cheng

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P2024-0912-5.0. 2025-2028 Strategic Plan Update

P2024-0912-5.1. 2025-2028 Strategic Plan Update Presentation

Executive Director Kanengisser introduced this item and Ms. Anne Arthur, Senior Advisor, Strategic Analysis and Governance, provided the Board with a presentation. A copy of the presentation is attached to this Minute.

P2024-0912-5.2. 2025-2028 Strategic Plan Update

The Board was in receipt of a report dated September 5, 2024 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) direct the Executive Director to continue the strategic planning and engagement process as proposed, based on the proposed draft strategic themes.

Deputations: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)
Ramy Elitzur (virtual)
Howard Morton, Law Union of Ontario ([written submission only](#))

Board Members discussed this report. For a detailed account of the discussion, see the YouTube recording starting at Minute 9:16:13 here:

<https://www.youtube.com/live/oPl6iuZD4Js?si=zwHsYjSZ7CtbPpOZ&t=33370>

Councillor Cheng moved the following Motion, which was seconded by Deputy Morley:

THAT the Board direct the Executive Director to support ARAP & MHAAP in convening strategic planning consultation(s) with community stakeholders as part of the Phase 2 engagement process.

The Board received the presentation and the deputations, and approved the foregoing report, as amended.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: S. Carroll

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P2024-0912-6.0. 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Completion and Evaluation

The Board was in receipt of a report dated September 12, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Deputations: Nicole Corrado (virtual/[written submission included](#))
Kris Langenfeld (virtual)

Board Members discussed this report. For a detailed account of the discussion, see the YouTube recording starting at Minute 9:53:06 here:

<https://www.youtube.com/live/oPl6iuZD4Js?si=mc2VDEPrifSPjBAN&t=35643>

Board Member Brillinger moved the following Motion, which was seconded by Deputy Morley:

THAT the Board acknowledge and thank the Gerstein Crisis Centre for its willingness to step up and partner with the Toronto Police Service in the delivery of ground-breaking work to integrate non-policing responses in its efforts to modernize the role of police in response to mental health crisis events. The efforts of the Gerstein Crisis Centre in the delivery of the 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot project reflects the Centre's driving commitment to improving service delivery (community, health, and criminal justice) for people experiencing a mental health crisis.

The Board approved the Motion, and received the deputations and the foregoing report.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: S. Carroll

This is an Extract from the Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board that was held on September 12, 2024

P2024-0912-7.0. [An Update on Building a Respectful Workplace](#)

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 13, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) receive the following report updating the Board on the Toronto Police Service's (Service's) efforts in implementing recommendations made to the Service to improve workplace wellbeing and culture.

Board Members discussed this report. For a detailed account of the discussion, see the YouTube recording starting at Minute 10:10:40 here:

https://www.youtube.com/live/oPl6iuZD4Js?si=iRk7WaaC_B5zGjsA&t=36636

The Board received the foregoing report.

Moved by: S. Carroll
Seconded by: A. Morley

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P2024-0912-8.0. Request for Special Funds: Healing the Voice Within 6th Annual Fundraiser

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 25, 2024 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director.

Recommendations:

- 1) As an exception to its Special Fund Policy, the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) approve the purchase of tickets of up to 10 tickets for Board Members and Board Staff, to attend The Gatehouse's 6th annual fundraiser to be held on October 3, 2024; and,
- 2) The Board authorize the use of the Board crest by The Gatehouse for the purpose of promoting the 2024 "Healing the Voice Within" fundraiser.

The Board approved the foregoing report.

Moved by: S. Carroll
Seconded by: N. Migliore

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P2024-0912-9.0. Request for Special Funds – 32nd Annual Scholarship and Awards Gala and Scholarship Award

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 26, 2024 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director.

Recommendations:

- 1) As an exception to the Special Fund Policy, the Board approve an expenditure in an amount not to exceed \$5,000 to sponsor the Association of Black Law Enforcers 32nd Annual Scholarship Awards Gala;
- 2) As an exception to its Special Fund Policy, the Board approve an expenditure in an amount not to exceed \$3,500, towards one scholarship for the Association of Black Law Enforcers (A.B.L.E.) scholarship program; and,

- 3) The Board approve the use of its crest to appear in the event program and to be used as recognition at the event.

The Board approved the foregoing report.

Moved by: L. Cheng
Seconded by: S. Carroll

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P2024-0912-10.0. [Toronto Police Service Cyber Security Partnership with City of Toronto's Office of the Chief Information Security Officer](#)

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 20, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board approve the parameters of the Memorandum of Understanding between the City of Toronto's (City) Office of the Chief Information Security Officer listed in the discussion portion of this report.

The Board approved the foregoing report.

Moved by: S. Carroll
Seconded by: N. Migliore

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P2024-0912-11.0. [Contract Awards to Olin Canada ULC, Lloyd Libke Inc. and Rampart International Corp. for Ammunition](#)

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 7, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendations:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board):

- 1) Approve a contract award to Olin Canada ULC (Olin) for ammunition in the amount of \$611,040;
- 2) Approve a contract award to Lloyd Libke Inc. (Lloyd Libke) for ammunition in the amount of \$216,615;

- 3) Approve a contract award to Rampart International Corp. (Rampart) for ammunition in the amount of \$88,900; and
- 4) Authorize the Chair to execute all required agreements and related documents on behalf of the Board, subject to approval by the City Solicitor, as to form.

Deputation: Nicole Coraddo ([written submission only](#))

The Board received the written submission and approved the foregoing report.

Moved by: N. Migliore
Seconded by: A. Morgan

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P2024-0912-12.0. [Semi-Annual Report: Toronto Police Service Board Special Fund Unaudited Statement: January to June 2024](#)

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 27, 2024 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Board receive this report for information.

The Board received the foregoing report.

Moved by: S. Carroll
Seconded by: N. Migliore

This is an Extract from the Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board that was held on September 12, 2024

P2024-0912-13.0. Budget Variance Reports

P2024-0912-13.1. [2024 Operating Budget Variance for the Toronto Police Service, Period Ending June 30, 2024](#)

The Board was in receipt of a report dated September 12, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) forward a copy of this report to the City of Toronto (City) Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer for information and inclusion in the variance reporting to the City's Budget Committee.

P2024-0912-13.2. Capital Budget Variance Report for the Toronto Police Service, Period Ending June 30, 2024

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 14, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) approve the following changes to select projects that are net cost-neutral to the overall Toronto Police Service Capital program:

- 1) Approve a transfer of \$300 Thousand (K) from the Locker Lifecycle Replacement project to the Furniture Lifecycle Replacement project.
- 2) Approve a 2024 cashflow adjustment of \$4.2 Million (M) from the projects listed below to the Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build project in 2024 (cashflows will be returned to the original projects in 2025):
 - \$3M from the New Records Management System (R.M.S.) project;
 - 300K from the Assessment of the Communication Center 9th Floor Furniture Replacement project;
 - \$400K from the Long Term Facility Plan - 54/55 Amalgamation; New Build project;
 - \$300K from the Next Generation (N.G.) 9-1-1 project;
 - \$220K from the Transforming Corporate Support (H.R.M.S., T.R.M.S.) project.
- 3) Approve a transfer of \$260K from the Relocation of Wellness Services project to the Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build project, and accelerate \$1M in funding from year 2025 to 2024 for the Long Term Facility Plan – 41 Division; New Build project.
- 4) Forward a copy of this report to the City of Toronto's (City) Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, for inclusion in the City's overall capital variance report to the City's Budget Committee.

P2024-0912-13.3. 2024 Operating Budget Variance for the Toronto Police Service Parking Enforcement Unit, Period Ending June 30, 2024

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 15, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) forward a copy of this report to the City of Toronto (City) Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

for information and inclusion in the variance reporting to the City's Budget Committee.

P2024-0912-13.4. 2024 Operating Budget Variance Report for the Toronto Police Service Board, Period Ending June 30, 2024

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 2, 2024 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report, and forward a copy to the City of Toronto (City) Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer for information and inclusion in the variance reporting to the City's Budget Committee.

Deputation: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)

For a detailed account of the discussion on this item, see the YouTube recording starting at 10:22:28 here:

<https://www.youtube.com/live/oPI6iuZD4Js?si=RVBRv2QoCtE2LiRd&t=37345>

The Board received the deputation, and approved the foregoing reports.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: C. Brillinger

This is an Extract from the Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Service Board that was held on September 12, 2024

P2024-0912-14.0. Chief's Administrative Investigation Reports

P2024-0912-14.1. Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.77

The Board was in receipt of a report dated July 30, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) receive the following report.

P2024-0912-14.2. Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2024.05

The Board was in receipt of a report dated July 30, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) receive the following report.

P2024-0912-14.3. Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2024.08

The Board was in receipt of a report dated July 30, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) receive the following report.

P2024-0912-14.4. Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2024.09

The Board was in receipt of a report dated July 30, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) receive the following report.

P2024-0912-14.5. Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Firearm Discharge of Complainant 2023.84

The Board was in receipt of a report dated July 30, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) receive the following report.

P2024-0912-14.6. Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Vehicle Injuries to Complainant 2024.07

The Board was in receipt of a report dated July 30, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) receive the following report.

Deputation: Nicole Corrado ([written deputation only](#))

The Board received the written submission and the foregoing reports.

Moved by: N. Migliore
Seconded by: L. Cheng

This is an Extract from the Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board that was held on September 12, 2024

P2024-0912-15.0. Ombudsman Report: An Investigation into the Toronto Police Service's Communications About its Vulnerable Persons Registry

The Board was in receipt of a report dated August 28, 2024 from Dubi Kanengisser, Executive Director.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Board receive this report for information.

Deputations: Nicole Corrado ([written submission included](#)) (virtual)
John Sewell ([written submission only](#))

Ombudsman Kwame Addo provided the following remarks:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our report today and answer your questions.

As you know, this investigation into the Toronto Police Service's Communication About its Vulnerable Persons Registry represents our first investigation since Council expanded our oversight to include police. It is also our first review since the Memorandum of Understanding was reached between my office, the Board, and the Service.

I want to acknowledge the cooperation my office received from Board staff and the staff of the Toronto Police Service during this investigation. Our requests for documents related to our review were fulfilled promptly, and the staff who we wished to interview made themselves readily available to my investigators.

The Board and the Service have accepted the report's findings and have committed to implementing the 13 recommendations to address the concerns identified with the communication about the Registry and its management.

The idea for the Vulnerable Persons Registry dates back to recommendations made by former Supreme Court Justice, Frank Icaobucci in his 2014 Report, which examined Police Encounters with People in Crisis. I believe that the rationale for the registry is as relevant today as it was back in 2014, when Justice Icaboucci made his recommendation to then-Chief Bill Blair. The purpose of the registry is to provide officers with critical information about a vulnerable person quickly and effectively, reducing the risk of this information being overlooked during an emergency response. The Registry provides registrants with an opportunity to voluntarily create a personalized de-escalation strategy with the Toronto Police, thereby increasing the likelihood of a positive police interaction.

That said, my investigation found that problems with the communication about the Vulnerable Persons Registry and its overall management have impacted the Registry's success and prevented it from being as effective as it could be.

It is significant that the Service is willing and committed to doing the necessary work to improve the Registry. I strongly believe that the Board, the Service, and my office share the same goal: to ensure that the Registry is working as it was intended-- to provide officers with information that can assist them when interacting with a vulnerable person in an emergency.

The Chief of Police has committed to reporting back to the Board and my office in December with a status update on the implementation of the recommendations. We look forward to receiving the Chief's update and will continue to work with both the Board and the Service to ensure that the recommendations are implemented to the satisfaction of my office.

For a detailed account of the discussion on this item, see the YouTube recording starting at 10:30:34 here:

<https://www.youtube.com/live/oPI6iuZD4Js?si=hf9q764ILb4sCl&t=37830>

Board Member Brillinger moved the following Motion, which was seconded by Councillor Carroll:

THAT the Board direct the Chief of Police to:

- 1) Complete a Privacy Impact Assessment for the Vulnerable Person Registry;**

- 2) **Develop a roadmap for the management and maintenance of a Registry intended to enhance service delivery for vulnerable persons in emergency situations;**
- 3) **Consult MHAAP and ARAP in the development of the above plan; and**
- 4) **Present the third-party solution with timeline and budget considerations, and with recommendations on the manner and timing of transition, if appropriate.**

The Board approved the Motion, and received the deputations and the foregoing report as amended.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: N. Migliore

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P2024-0912-16.0. Professionalism and Accountability – September 2024

The Board was in receipt of a report dated July 30, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Deputations: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)
Nicole Corrado ([written submission included](#))(virtual)

The Board received the deputations and the foregoing report.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: C. Brillinger

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P2024-0912-17.0. Semi-Annual Report: Suspended Police Officers – January 1, 2024 to June 30, 2024

The Board was in receipt of a report dated July 30, 2024 from Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police. A confidential Appendix was included for Board Members' review.

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Deputation: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)

For a detailed account of the discussion on this item, see the YouTube recording starting at 10:56:57 here:

<https://www.youtube.com/live/oPl6iuZD4Js?si=qUqDy1sJTrYJMW1E&t=39415>

The Board received the deputation and the foregoing report.

Moved by: A. Morley
Seconded by: C. Brillinger

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P2024-0912-18.0. Confidential

At the beginning of the meeting Councillor Carroll moved the following Motion, which was seconded by Board Member Migliore.

MOTION

THAT the Toronto Police Service Board adjourn the public portion of its meeting to move *in camera* to discuss the following subject matters in accordance with Section 44(2) of the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019*:

- 1. Chief's Verbal Updates - Confidential operational updates**
- 2. Investigative Matters**
- 3. Operational Needs**
- 4. Board Updates on Matters under Litigation**

The Board adjourned the public portion of the meeting and reconvened *in camera* for consideration of confidential matters pursuant to Section 44 (1) of the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019* (CSPA) until 1:30PM when they returned to the public portion of the meeting.

The following Members attended the confidential meeting:

Ann Morgan, Chair (virtual)
Lisa Kostakis, Vice-Chair
Chris Brillinger, Member
Lily Cheng, Member and Councillor (virtual)
Nick Migliore, Member
Amber Morley, Deputy Mayor and Member
Shelley Carroll, Member and Councillor

Next Board Meeting

Regular Public Meeting

Date: Tuesday, October 8, 2024

Location: 40 College Street, Auditorium

Minutes Approved by:

-original signed-

Ann Morgan
Chair


Members of the Toronto Police Service Board

Ann Morgan, Chair
Amber Morley, Deputy Mayor & Member
Lily Cheng, Member & Councillor
Nick Migliore, Member

Lisa Kostakis, Vice-Chair
Chris Brillinger, Member
Shelley Carroll, Member & Councillor

Toronto Police Service


September 2024 Board Meeting



Calls for Service – Priority Types

Priority	Description	Call Type Examples
1	Hot Shot invoked, danger to life Dispatch assignment: any unit from anywhere in the city	Holdup, Person With A Gun
2	Immediate attendance, danger and/or injury is present or imminent Dispatch assignment: any unit in the zone, adjoining zone, division or if the situation warrants anywhere in the city	Emergency Run, Missing Vulnerable, Robbery

Calls for Service – Priority Types



Calls Attended (P1)



Metric	Current Value	Previous Year % Change	Previous Year Absolute Change
Calls for Service Attended	30,398	5.6%	1,623
Units Dispatched	93,671	9.6%	8,189
Avg Pending Time (Minutes)	8.3	-25.3%	-2.8
Avg Response Time (Minutes)	17.5	-19.5%	-4.2
Avg Total Time on Call (Minutes)	89.0	-1.0%	-0.9




Calls Attended (Enhanced Service Delivery Approach)

- Recruit deployments driven by data and analytics to provide improved and equitable service delivery
- Business processes adjusted to improve efficiencies
- Increased focus on repeat callers incorporating NCO's, and engaging key partners through referrals
- Continuous improvement and best practice sharing across the Service

Calls Attended Response Times (P1) Trend

Calls For Service Average Response Times Year-to-Date



Calls Attended (P1)

Pending Time **Response Time**


P1 P2 P3-P4

TPS


17.5

Last Year: 22.2 (-21.26%)

TEMPORAL TREND OF PAST YEAR



Response Time



West Field Command

East Field Command

Downtown

West

North

East

D11

15.5

Last Year: 20.1 (-23.31%)



D12

16.8

Last Year: 22.1 (-23.99%)



D13

18.2

Last Year: 20.7 (-11.82%)



D41

19.7

Last Year: 20.9 (-5.71%)



D14

13.5

Last Year: 15.6 (-13.45%)



D22

20.0

Last Year: 20.8 (-3.94%)



D32

22.9

Last Year: 22.8 (+0.37%)



D42

20.8

Last Year: 25.5 (-18.35%)



D51

13.8

Last Year: 21.1 (-34.35%)



D23

18.9

Last Year: 23.3 (-18.84%)



D33

16.8

Last Year: 27.3 (-38.55%)



D43

18.8

Last Year: 23.1 (-18.75%)



D52

14.2

Last Year: 18.8 (-24.57%)



D31

17.7

Last Year: 22.3 (-20.66%)



D53

14.1

Last Year: 34.3 (-58.86%)



D55


19.9

Last Year: 22.6 (-11.68%)




TPS 360: Analytics Framework

HOMICIDES



SHOOTINGS & FIREARM DISCHARGES



TPS 360: Analytics Framework



**Shootings &
Firearm Discharges**



322
Last Year: 218
(+47.71%)

Number of Incidents



TPS 360: Analytics Framework

AUTO THEFTS



TPS 360: Analytics Framework



Auto Theft


5,878
Last Year: 7,338
(-19.9%)

Number of Incidents



TPS 360: Analytics Framework

CARJACKINGS



TPS 360: Analytics Framework



Carjacking

Jan 01, 2024 - Aug 27, 2024

175


Last Year: 133
(+31.58%)



IT Infrastructure Rationalization and Modernization Update



September 2024



Agenda


1. Rationalization and Modernization Definition
2. Projects
3. Initiatives
4. Inputs and Impacts
5. Program Benefits
6. Financials
7. Around The Corner



Rationalization and Modernization

Technology Rationalization focuses on streamlining and optimizing our existing technology.

Technology Modernization is about bringing our technology up to date with the latest advancements.



Projects

In-Car Camera
Court Notification Tracking System
Vehicle Impound Management Program (VIP)
Data Storage Modernization
Microsoft ADSBot (RPA) 365
Records Management System (RMS)
Electronic Parking Ticket Issuance (MLEO)
Content Management System (CMS)
Community Online Reporting
Cell Phone Lifecycle

Evidence.com

SharePoint 2013 Rationalization

Global Search MCM/ViCLAS Tracker

Command Vehicle Refresh

NetMotion VPN

Modern Data Centre
Computer Assisted Scheduling of Courts

Command Parking and Traffic Modernization
Vehicle Refresh

AIMS Upgrade

TRMS Migration

Information Technology Storage Growth

Body Worn Camera



Inputs and Impacts

Culture

- Permission to fail
- Member empowerment and innovation
- Deliberate experimentation

Work Effort

- 10 FTE over 4 years
- Significant portion of IT output
- Full rebuild of data centre

Applications

- 11 Decommissioned
- 8 Modernized

Technologies

- 4 database types to 1
- Integrated Automated Compute for Data Centre
- Hyper-converged storage structure



Program Benefits

Administrative Burden

1. Reduced maintenance and support
2. Energy efficiency and reduced costs
3. Scalability allows for future growth within existing foot print
4. Lights on, high reliability, resiliency, and flexibility

Streamlined Information Flow

1. Security simplified and transparent
2. Databases that provide transparency how data is used
3. Quick response to large and small cyber security incidents
4. Simplified Administration
5. Tight Integration with Servers
6. Cloud Native

Community Engagement

1. Simplified Management
2. Hardware Agnostic
3. Automated (Less Human Effort)
4. Container Ready
5. Self Serve VM Deployments

Leverage and Agility

1. Fewer Vendors Lower Complexity
2. Simplified Zero Trust Identify and Access
3. Full Layer 7 Security Protection
4. Application Based Polices

Supporting Our People

1. Provide the high speed access to critical data
2. Provide the wireless and remote access from any device and anywhere
3. 7/24 to keep the 911 lines open and available



Accountable
Efficient
Effective

Financial

Over the last 5 years - IT maintenance costs have increased by 30%. Driven by inflation and TPS technology growth.


Rationalization attempts to lessen the impact of these increases on the TPS budget.

Cost control efforts include partnerships with Value-Added Resellers (VARs), bulk order discounts, contract negotiations, and collaborations with other agencies.

Activity	Cost Reduction	Cost Avoidance
IT Rationalization	\$1.7M	\$5M over 5 years
Evidence.com	\$0.5M	\$10M over 10 years
Modern data centre IT equipment	\$6.5M	\$15M over 5 years

Around The Corner

- Drop high cost-per-outcome contracts
- 18 Additional applications targeted
 - RMS will pay its own operating through rationalization of existing solutions
 - At least 9 systems, 6 are home grown
 - Potential for 7 more
- Secure access to cloud services
- Enhance efficiency using password-less login methods for users
- Flexible and cost-effective cloud backup and storage
- Agile server and application implementations
- Access to Cloud AI, SaaS, Post Quantum Encryption, and other technologies
- Reduced maintenance load – redirecting resources to Digital



Thank you...

- ... to the hardworking, dedicated and enthusiastic team that helped us get here
- ... for both the informal and formal leadership you have shown
- ... for adding new skills, certifications and security training
- ... for embracing a new culture of innovation, agile development, and collaboration
- ... for your sense of adventure and pushing the boundaries
- ... for taking thoughtful and calculated risks

Multi-Year Staffing Plan

Options and Discussion

Toronto Police Service Board

September 3rd, 2024



Motion for Multi-year Staffing Plan

Board motion, April 2024 TPSB meeting in response to similar motion at City Council on approval of the budget:

The Board direct the Chief, in consultation with the Executive Director, to develop and report back to the Board by the September 12, 2024 Toronto Police Service Board meeting, along with an **interim update at the July 31, 2024, Board Meeting**, with a multi-year staffing plan that considers the operational needs of the Service, and is inclusive of clear goals and associated costs, and with targets and estimates, under different probable scenarios, concerning, and not limited to, efforts to:

- a. Reduce Priority 1 response times;
- b. Increase the number of available frontline officers;
- c. Increase the number of Neighbourhood Officers;
- d. Increase diversity in recruitment including gender diversity and the recruitment of racially diverse candidates, including Black and Indigenous people; and

such a plan be used as the basis for City Council and the Toronto Police Service Board to advocate to the provincial and federal government for funding that acknowledges the Toronto Police Service's unique responsibilities to protect Canada's largest municipality.



Importance of a Multi-year Staffing Plan

Toronto Police Service is a **24/7, emergency service**, first responder organization. Current service levels do not represent **adequate and effective policing**. **Long-term funding** commitments are needed to enable continuity of the hiring pipeline.

▪ People Risks

- people costs account for 90% of the Service's operating budget
- hiring pipeline flow is critical – high % of front line have less than 5 years experience, and high current and upcoming retirement eligibility
- backfills for WSIB and LTD leaves have not historically been budgeted for
- constrained resources have reduced supervision
- competitive labour conditions on attracting and retaining members
- long uniform hiring and training process: 9 – 12 months lead time

▪ Workload Risks

- call volume and caseload are increasing faster than resourcing
- service levels are currently degraded and this could worsen if demand outpaces population growth and staffing levels
- evidence collection and legislatively required disclosure requirements placing pressure on backlog and risk of not meeting judicial timelines putting cases in jeopardy of being stayed

▪ Process and Technology Risks

- TPS continues to be reliant on people rather than process and technology. Adequate staffing must at minimum serve as a stop gap until some technology capacity creating benefits can be achieved

▪ Reputational Risks and an Intense International Media Environment

- staffing constraints, increasing workload and high people reliance increases the risks of service delivery failures and eroding of trust
- the public safety dynamics of the city radiates nationally



Considerations of Staffing Plans & Budget Decisions

These factors support the development of different staffing plan scenarios, recognizing each scenario comes with trade-offs and limitations for the Board to consider.

1. Community Safety and Policing Act **legislative requirements**
2. Service vision, direction, and strategic **priorities**
3. Impact or influence of past, current, and upcoming **modernization** and capacity creation efforts
4. **Operational context**, service levels, capacity, and workload drivers
5. Optimizing current **resource allocation**
6. **Workforce trends**, succession planning, wellbeing and retention
7. Current and future **service delivery targets** and gaps



Staffing Scenario Summary

Scenario	Impact on A&E	Community / N.C.O.	Succession and Oversight	Premium Pay vs Full Time	FIFA and Special Events	Reform and Modernization	FTE and Costs
Replacement Hires Only	<p>Service degradation</p> <p>Need to reallocate 100-150 officers, each year to address growth & critical gaps</p> <p>Response times expected to increase</p> <p>Service cuts imminent</p>	Program at risk	<p>Barriers to promotions and succession as it would deplete the frontline</p> <p>Difficult to catch up over the long-term</p> <p>Diversity objectives compromised</p>	Continued overreliance and growing premium pay	<p>FIFA training will cause temporary further service degradation</p> <p>Special events will continue to be reliant on premium pay</p>	At risk	<p>New Positions: Sworn – 0 new Civ – 0 new</p> <p>Cost: 2025: \$15.6M 2025 – 2029: \$46.8M</p>
Maintain Current Cop-to-Pop	<p>Continued pressure on response times – ‘net gain’ would need to be deployed to the frontline</p> <p>Some reallocation may be needed for critical issues</p>	NCO expansion at risk	<p>Limited succession and promotional opportunities</p> <p>Status quo pace in achieving workforce diversity</p>	Overreliance on premium pay	<p>Accommodating FIFA training would cause some temporary service degradation</p> <p>Unplanned events will continue to be reliant on premium pay</p>	<p>Status quo</p> <p>Cannot absorb new work</p>	<p>New positions: Sworn – 86/yr/avg Civ – 29/yr/avg</p> <p>Cost: 2025: \$25M 2025 – 2029: \$119M</p>
Meet Current Provincial Training Allocation	Pressures could start to be addressed over 3 – 5 years	Some expansion possible	Normative succession planning to meet objectives	<p>Premium pay pressure would exist for courts and overtime</p> <p>Call backs could be curbed</p>	Possible to create some dedicated capacity with less premium pay and core service disruption	Supports long-term sustainability and pursuit of reforms	<p>New positions: Sworn – 164/yr/avg Civ – 55/yr/avg</p> <p>Cost: 2025: \$29M 2025 – 2029: \$183M</p>
2010 Adjusted Service Levels	Long-term adequate and effective service delivery could be achieved and maintained	Expansion possible	Normative succession planning to meet objectives	Better balance between premium pay and FTE could be achieved	Dedicated capacity possible for special events and unplanned gatherings	Supports long-term sustainability and pursuit of reforms	<p>New positions: Sworn : 1300 – 1800 Civ: tbd</p> <p>Cost: tbd</p>



Staffing Scenarios


Replacement Hires Only

- Flatline staffing 2025 onwards
- Demand growing at a pace that this scenario would degrade services where there would be no prospect of delivering adequate and effective services – calls for service response time can be expected to increase
- 100-150 officers would need to be reallocated (or the equivalent work diverted) from other areas, in each year, to address anticipated growth in calls-for-service & address core service delivery gaps
- Service cuts imminent and required, will create additional risks and gaps
- NCO program at risk
- Inability to catch up in future years due to training and capacity limitations
- This scenario would not sufficiently support leadership development and succession planning objectives
- Insufficient staff to support public order training requirements for FIFA without service degradation
- Premium pay pressures and fatigue would persist
- Workforce diversity objectives compromised
- Reform and modernization efforts at risk and will not be sustainable



Staffing Scenarios

Replacement Hires Only (cont'd)



* Cop-to-pop was at 207.8 in 2010.

	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Recruits:						
March class	91	0	47	40	50	50
June class	90	13	50	40	45	50
September class	90	50	50	50	50	50
December class	90	50	50	50	64	54
Laterals	27	20	20	20	20	20
	388	133	217	200	229	224
Separations:						
	(180)	(182)	(217)	(200)	(215)	(234)

Description	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Uniform Incremental Impact	\$7.8	\$6.7	\$11.7	\$9.6	\$3.2
Impact vs 2024	\$7.8	\$14.5	\$26.2	\$35.8	\$39.0

Civilian Incremental Impact	\$7.8	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-
Impact vs 2024	\$7.8	\$7.8	\$7.8	\$7.8	\$7.8

Non-Salary Incremental Impact	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-
Impact vs 2024	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-

Budget Incremental Impact	\$15.6	\$6.7	\$11.7	\$9.6	\$3.2
Impact vs 2024	\$15.6	\$22.3	\$34.0	\$43.6	\$46.8

* Excludes COLA

The annual incremental impact relates to salary annualization of previous year hires and the lead time/cost of training prior to deployment



Staffing Scenarios


Maintain Current Cop-to-Pop

- Staffing growth in line with population growth and maintaining 168 officers per 100,000 residents; represents outlook submitted in the 2024 budget process
- Allows for 70–120 new officers per year
- Current operational pressures remain and would need to be addressed through reallocations and service reductions
- Continued pressure on call response time
- Overreliance on premium pay would continue
- The Service requires, and has planned for, the addition of 100 dedicated Public Order/Special Event/Traffic resources that are needed to support FIFA, and these resources require time for public order and motorcycle training
- In the long-term, with continued investment and service level normalization, this scenario may allow for service levels to be maintained
- NCO expansion at risk/unlikely
- Limited succession and promotional opportunities; balancing frontline strength with supervision needs
- Reform and modernization efforts status quo, long-term sustainability at risk and additional reforms cannot be absorbed



Staffing Scenarios

Maintain Current Cop-to-Pop (cont'd)



* Cop-to-pop was at 207.8 in 2010.

	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Recruits:						
March class	91	82	73	62	67	71
June class	90	50	72	62	67	71
September class	90	73	63	68	72	89
December class	90	73	63	68	71	89
Laterals	27	20	20	20	20	20
	388	298	291	280	297	340
Separations:						
	(180)	(182)	(217)	(200)	(215)	(234)

Description	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Uniform 'new' Positions	119	94	70	75	71
Uniform Incremental Impact	\$16.0	\$16.5	\$22.1	\$21.0	\$15.0
Impact vs 2024	\$16.0	\$32.5	\$54.6	\$75.6	\$90.6

Civilian 'new' Positions	40	31	23	25	24
Civilian Incremental Impact	\$8.8	\$4.2	\$2.5	\$2.4	\$2.3
Impact vs 2024	\$8.8	\$13.0	\$15.5	\$17.9	\$20.2

Non-Salary Incremental Impact	\$0.6	\$2.8	\$1.7	\$1.6	\$1.6
Impact vs 2024	\$0.6	\$3.4	\$5.1	\$6.7	\$8.3

Budget Incremental Impact	\$25.4	\$23.5	\$26.3	\$25.0	\$18.9
Impact vs 2024	\$25.4	\$48.9	\$75.2	\$100.2	\$119.1

* Excludes COLA



Staffing Scenarios


Meet Current Provincial Training Allocation

- Allows for 140–180 new officers per year
- Current operational pressures could start to be addressed over a 3–5 year period, including:
 - continued response time reduction efforts;
 - meet FIFA obligations;
 - address gaps in investigative capacity; and
 - pursue some NCO expansion
- Expected improvements may be tempered if growth in demand outpaces population growth
- Allows for normative pace of succession planning and workforce diversity objectives
- Some offsetting savings/resource optimization could occur through reduction of the call back portion of the premium pay (savings in actuals, not necessarily budget as this account is already \$30M underfunded)
- Supports long-term sustainability and continued pursuit of reform and modernization



Staffing Scenarios

Meet Current Provincial Training Allocation (cont'd)



* Cop-to-pop was at 207.8 in 2010.

	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Recruits:						
March class	91	90	90	90	90	90
June class	90	90	90	90	90	90
September class	90	90	90	90	90	90
December class	90	90	90	90	90	90
Laterals	27	20	20	20	20	20
	388	380	380	380	380	380
Separations:	(180)	(182)	(217)	(200)	(215)	(234)

Description	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Uniform 'new' Positions	167	163	180	165	146
Uniform Incremental Impact	\$19.0	\$23.6	\$34.0	\$33.0	\$25.9
Impact vs 2024	\$19.0	\$42.6	\$76.6	\$109.6	\$135.5

Civilian 'new' Positions	56	54	60	55	49
Civilian Incremental Impact	\$9.0	\$6.5	\$5.3	\$5.6	\$5.0
Impact vs 2024	\$9.0	\$15.5	\$20.8	\$26.4	\$31.4

Non-Salary Incremental Impact	\$0.8	\$4.4	\$3.5	\$3.8	\$3.3
Impact vs 2024	\$0.8	\$5.2	\$8.7	\$12.5	\$15.8

Budget Incremental Impact	\$28.8	\$34.5	\$42.8	\$42.4	\$34.2
Impact vs 2024	\$28.8	\$63.3	\$106.1	\$148.5	\$182.7

* Excludes COLA



Staffing Scenarios

2010 Adjusted Service Levels


Description	Officers per 100K Population (2010)	High Level Estimate to Match '2010' Ratio (2025)	High Level Estimate to Match '2010' Ratio (2029)
Number of Officers	208	1,434	1,821

- One measure of Adequate & Effective (per the CSPA) is to benchmark against a time when service levels were effective
- Response times in 2010 were approx. 12 minutes for P1 calls, which could be considered effective relative to other years
- Toronto Police Service Board approved standard response time target is 6 minutes
- **Estimate is a rough order of magnitude (ROM)** - Work is underway with a third party to determine optimal staffing levels, taking into consideration demand and response time. Will be available in 4Q 2024
- This scenario is challenging to quantify at this time – would require discussion on long-term training allocation and delivery model to achieve



Staffing Scenarios

Staffing Scenario Summary



	2023 Budget	2024 Budget	2024 Projected
Population	3,135,243	3,231,360	3,231,360
Number of Police Officers at Year End	5,127	5,433	5,433
Police per 100,000 population	164	168	168

Population sourced from: Ontario Ministry of Finance projections (July 19 2023) for Toronto Census Area (Population Projections for Ontario's 49 Census Divisions by Age and Sex, 2022- 2046)



1. Community Safety and Policing Act Legislative Requirements

CSPA: Adequate and Effective Service Delivery

- The Board has a statutory responsibility to ensure adequate and effective policing (s. 10(1) and 37(1)(a) of the C.S.P.A).
- Every municipality is required to provide the Board with sufficient funding to comply with the Act and the regulations, including ensuring adequate and effective policing in the city (s. 5(1)(a) of the C.S.P.A.).
- These services must include, at a minimum, crime prevention, law enforcement, assistance to victims of crime, public order maintenance and emergency response (s. 11(1) of C.S.P.A).
- Board cannot reduce the size of the service, including by way of attrition, without the approval of the Inspector General (s. 53(2) of the C.S.P.A).

Evaluation of adequate and effective as per the Generally Applicable Standard (s. 2(1) of O. Reg. 392/23 C.S.P.A.):

- Policing needs of the community
- Geographic and socio-demographic characteristics of the police service's area of responsibility
- Extent and manner in which policing function is effectively provided in similar Ontario communities
- Extent to which past provision of policing function has been effective in addressing the needs of the community
- Best practices respecting the policing function



2. Service vision, direction, and strategic priorities

Strategic Direction - Community Safety and Wellbeing

Process Reform

Improve consistency, measurability and control

- Invest in tech for process automation
- Develop new metrics – measure for outcome
- Provide more feedback to members, leaders
- Align Strategy, Change, IM, IT, and Equity

System Change

Addressing structural and systemic barriers to CSWB

- Identify true systemic breakdowns
- Build coalitions of partners around solutions
- Advocate for funding and legislative change

Public safety professionals

Stop crime and disorder

Act with compassion

Break cycles of harm

Design safety into the city

Co-Design, Co-Develop and Co-Deliver

Develop trust and partnerships

Service Design

Rethinking policing service delivery for stakeholders

- Align Org Structure to Service Lines
- Strike Service Line Advisory Groups
- Develop education materials for each Service
- Consolidate Reforms into Product Roadmaps

Partnership

Delivering service with community & by agencies

- Reform Consultation Framework
- Build Partner Management Capability
- Develop Community Immersion Program
- Develop partner management dashboards



2. Service vision, direction, and strategic priorities

Recap – Operational Priorities

Core Service Delivery, Trust, & Modernization



Frontline support to prevent further degradation of response times



Create more **investigative capacity** for timely case closure



Keep Toronto traffic moving



Improved **evidence management** and court disclosure compliance



Augment **supervision** for **increased accountability**, **minimize operational risk**



Supporting safer communities through alternative service delivery, call diversion and partnerships



Continue police reform



Workforce resilience in the face of **25% retirement eligibility** and **30% with less than 5 years experience**



Create capacity and strengthen community trust through **technology and digital enablement**




Long-term sustainable funding that supports **growth, improves service levels, supports community safety**



3. Impact of influence of past, current, and upcoming modernization and capacity creation efforts

Recap – Modernization Core Service Delivery



9-1-1 Response and Patrol	Investigations and Victim Support	Crime Prevention	Events and Protest	Traffic and Parking Enforcement	Courts and Prisoner Management
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transfer of Lifeguard and Crossing Guard programs ▪ Disbanded Priority Response Group (surge capacity) ▪ Call Diversion (TCCS + Gerstein) ▪ 911 to 211 ▪ New Shift Schedules ▪ Digital Officer ▪ AG Recommendations ▪ NG911 ▪ Workload analysis & modelling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Centralized Teams (e.g. fraud, shootings, auto theft) ▪ Pre-Charge Youth Diversion Program ▪ Military Veterans Program ▪ Victim Services divisional co-location ▪ DNA ad Genealogy ▪ Bail Enforcement ▪ Auto License Plate Reader ▪ Missing and Missed Recs. ▪ Investigative Standardization* 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams ▪ FOCUS tables ▪ Community consultative and advisory committees ▪ Neighbourhood Community Officers (56 neighbourhoods) ▪ Gang Exit Referrals ▪ Disbanded community response units and school resource officers ▪ SafeTO ▪ Online/Digital engagement ▪ Mental Health response review (CORE, Transfer of care etc.)* 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Province-wide POU partnership and national recognition ▪ Use of an assessment matrix to inform resourcing ▪ Police Liaison Team Program for events ▪ Participation in City of Toronto Special Events Working Group ▪ Use of Mobile Command Centres ▪ Expanded callback resource options (eg special constables) for certain events ▪ Mandatory incident command training for all supervisors * 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Vision Zero Enforcement Team ▪ Drug Recognition Enforcement ▪ Traffic Warden Support ▪ Connected PEO ▪ MLEO/TPS connect ▪ Online parking complaints portal ▪ Automation technology* 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Civilianization of Charge Processing ▪ Video Bail ▪ Special Constable Generalist program ▪ Central lock-up model ▪ Electronic disclosure ▪ Evidence.com



* = primarily future efforts

3. Impact of influence of past, current, and upcoming modernization and capacity creation efforts

Recap – Modernization Core Service Delivery

\$400M+ in cumulative cost avoidance since 2015

Priority response service degradation correlated with staffing reductions




* As of May 31st, 2024

** 322 positions were civilianized between 2014 - 2019



4. Operational context and workload drivers

2024 Operational Context



9-1-1 Response and Patrol	Investigations and Victim Support	Crime Prevention	Events and Protest	Traffic and Parking Enforcement	Courts and Prisoner Management
<p>CALLS FOR SERVICE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2023 - 2.1M 9-1-1 calls YTD: P1/2 5 - 6%; P3 21% ↑ Since 2019 P1 14% ↑ 65,000 9-1-1 calls for every 100,000 pop. (may not be linear & impact of NG-911 unknown) <p>CALLS ATTENDED</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2023 - 407K attended ↑ YTD: P1/2 5 - 8%; P3 21% <p>P1 RESPONSE TIME</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2023 – 23 min average ↓ YTD - 17.5 min; 21% 	<p>Y/Y IN MAJOR CRIMES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shootings 48% ↑ Hate Crimes 41% ↑ Homicide 20% ↑ Auto Theft -20% ↓ Carjacking 32% ↑ YTD Firearm Arrests: 660, 15% ↑ <p>YTD case closure rate 40% - case closure rates are decreasing, and backlog is increasing</p> <p>Every hour of the day TPS creates and collects 100 hours of video evidence.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ~70% FOCUS referrals (800+) originated from TPS (2023) 715 Gang Exit Referrals (2023) Neighbourhood Community Officer Crime severity index is at highest level since 2010 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Geo-political events such as Middle East Conflict - 1000+ protests/demos Balancing event staffing with operational needs and use of premium pay Over 2000 events and protests managed in 2023 Expanded Special Events Requirements FIFA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 684 tickets daily (2023) 870 tickets daily (2024) 67K motor vehicle collisions (2023) 38K traffic related calls for service attended annually (2023) 258K Highway Traffic Act tickets and warnings issued (2023) Traffic fatalities 12% ↑ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 17K Video Bail Appearances Amalgamation to the Ontario Court of Justice – Toronto and Toronto Regional Bail Centre Increase Court sittings (post-pandemic) Provincially downloaded & underfunded Priority court disclosure backlog



5. Optimizing current resource allocation

Current Staffing Allocation – Jan 2023 to August 2024

355 (net) officers:

#	ROLE
267	Divisions (NCO, PRU, divisional projects etc)
- 6	Traffic Enforcement
17	Emergency Response / Public Order
46	Specialized Operations / Investigations
15	Courts
12	Community Engagement
4	Corporate / HQ functions and Projects
355	TOTAL

- Point in time members on payroll – this staffing level fluctuates throughout the year with separations, internal transfers and new deployments
- One cadet class remains to be deployed in 2024 (November)
- Net = vacancies + new positions
- Includes long-term leaves <2 years, pre-retirement leaves, incidental sick, suspensions, temps
- Excludes LTD (2+ years), statutory leaves, YIPI and trainees

190 (net) civilians:

#	ROLE
26	Divisional and Emergency Response Support (includes 911 Operators)
43	Investigations (Crime Scene Technicians, Missing Persons Indexers)
19	Traffic/Parking Enforcement
23	Courts, Property, Records
2	Prevention
39	Corporate Services (people processes, Equity, Legal, Finance, Fleet)
25	Information Technology Command (Application Support and Development, Analytics)
13	Corporate Projects, Corporate Communications
190	TOTAL



5. Optimizing current resource allocation

Current Staffing Allocation

- Workforce is divided 2/3 uniform and 1/3 civilian.
- 98% of workforce are in constable, individual contributor, lead or direct supervisory roles.

Org Type/Rank	Count	%
Uniforms	5172	67%
Chief	1	0%
Deputy Chiefs	2	0%
Staff Superintendents	9	0%
Superintendents	32	1%
Inspectors	52	1%
Staff Sergeants or Detective Sergeants	213	4%
Sergeants or Detectives	715	14%
Constables	4148	80%

Org Type/Rank	Count	%
Civilians	2523	33%
-	-	-
Civilian Command Officers	2	0%
Directors	8	0%
Managers	42	2%
Assistant Managers	5	0%
Supervisors	51	2%
Coordinators/Lead Hands	135	5%
Individual Contributors	2280	90%



July 2024 actuals

- Point in time – this staffing level expected to fluctuate throughout the year with separations, internal transfers and new deployments
- Includes long-term leaves <2 years, pre-retirement leaves, incidental sick, suspensions, temps
- Excludes LTD (2+ years), statutory leaves, YIPI, trainees






5. Optimizing current resource allocation

Current Allocation by Command



5. Optimizing current resource allocation

Balance Premium Pay vs Full-time Resources



2023 Total Premium Pay
\$ 89.3M
14.3% ▲ from 2022

2022 Total Premium Pay
\$ 78.2M
41.8% ▲ from 2021

2021 Total Premium Pay
\$ 55.2M



2024 is on pace to exceed \$90M



6. Workforce trends, succession planning, wellbeing and retention

Succession Planning

A resilient pipeline and succession planning is critical to get ahead of separations.




- 0 – 5 years uniform experience – 9% - 22% uniform; 25% to 36% civilian
- 5% of the total uniform workforce can retire in 2024 – jumps to 20% in 2029
- Retirement impacts will be pronounced at leadership ranks:
 - 21% of all S.Sgt/D.Sgt rank can retire in 2024
 - By 2029 – 61% of S.Sgt/D.Sgt and 85% of all senior officers can retire**
- Increasing amount of uniform separations are occurring before retirement (**non-retirement separations - 26% in 2019 to 47% in 2023**) – introduces greater risk, unpredictability in an increasingly competitive labour landscape

6. Workforce trends, succession planning, wellbeing and retention

Disability Management

The Service has deployed a balanced disability management model that is focused on early, safe and sustainable return to work; proactive and timely access to care; mitigating the human and financial cost of illness and injury



- Impact of greater awareness, stigma reduction, Bill 163 - mental health claims rose from ~5% to 16.5% of all claims from 2013 - 2023
- Wellbeing strategy implementation – investment in staff, change in practices, greater proactive and health promotion efforts (2021 onwards)
- Claim rates have plateaued/starting to see decreases - The mental health claim rate is appearing to plateau at a range of 14% to 19% of annual claims
- 3 - 5% of total uniform workforce may be off on WSIB – this is below provincial averages
- From 2017 – 2023 - TPS average lost days per WSIB claim is 25% less than the provincial average (109 vs 145)
- While the Service is seeing reduction in new claims, WSIB related costs continue to rise due to complex and costly open (active) historical claims**

*[Supporting Ontario's First Responder Act](#), (Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) 2016, Bill 163 ("Presumptive Legislation")



7. Current and future service delivery targets and gaps

Priority Staffing Areas

Uniform (Staffing is dynamic – driven by data and trends to adapt to changing landscape and growth)

- Priority response to address calls for service and future growth in demand
- Investigative areas that have faced long-standing vacancies and significant growth in caseload
- Dedicated capacity for events, protests and FIFA readiness to reduce reliance on premium pay
- Police reform and modernization projects – build trust in the long term create capacity
- Proactive community programs – NCO expansion
- Support succession planning, retention and leadership development

Civilian

- Delivery roles to grow with demand to support policing (e.g comm operators, special constables, parking enforcement, disclosure analysis, forensic identification and crime scene analysts, fleet, etc)
- Resources and specialists to deliver modernization, reform agenda (technology roles, AG recommendations, MMIT, police reform)



Next Steps

- Confirm direction on the multi-year hiring plan
- Incorporate hiring direction into 2025 budget discussions
- Validate workload metrics and analysis currently underway
- Refinement of estimates, costing and priority areas
- Support City discussions with other levels of government on funding opportunities
- Develop and finalize budget



SUPPORTING MATERIALS



What Makes Toronto Unique?



World Ranking

Fourth largest city in North America, ranked 23 out of 270 on the 2024 World's Best Cities



Events/ Tourist Hub

2K+ events/ protests to date. Home of the only Canadian MLB and NBA teams. 27.5M visitors with 9.5M overnight and 18M day visitors annually*



Consulates

87 out of 108 consular offices in Ontario are located in Toronto



Land and Sea

In addition to the 630 sq. km of land, TPS is also responsible for 1,190 sq. km of open water on Lake Ontario



Human Trafficking

Between 2011 and 2021, Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) accounted for 22% of all reported incidents in Canada



Gun and Gang Crime

Being a large urban city and a major hub on the 401 corridor, gang activity continues to be an issue in the City of Toronto



Police Reform

Implementing and accelerating reform by addressing recommendations from independent reviews, assessments, police reform directions and government mandates




Diseconomies of Scale

Dense cities face longer emergency response times and more difficulty in locating and capturing criminals




Policing in Other Communities

Toronto has a significantly higher rate of population served per uniform officer, as compared to other large, urban police services and the European Union average.



Source: Statistics Canada: Table 35100077. Police personnel and selected crime statistics, municipal police services. Actual strength as of May 15th. Updated March 26, 2024

Non-Canadian data sources for 2023 include the use of non-government statistics taken from annual reports, new articles, and projections that may be estimates.




(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Source: Eurostat (crim_just_job)

eurostat



Policing in Other Communities




Surrounding suburban areas typically have lower ratios of officers per capita due to 'diseconomies of scale' and different policing requirements unique to urban areas

Of the 3 major urban cities in Canada, Toronto had the fewest officers per 100,000 population in 2023 (168), while Vancouver had 10% (16) and Montreal had 32% (53) *more* officers per 100,000

Source: Statistics Canada: Table 35100077. Police personnel and selected crime statistics, municipal police services. Actual strength as of May 15th. Updated March 26, 2024



Policing in Other Communities



In 2022, TPS average response time was 21.2 minutes.

The average across Police Services in Canada ranges between 6-12 minutes.

Source:

1. Statistics Canada: Table 35100077. Police personnel and selected crime statistics, municipal police services. Actual strength as of May 15th. Updated March 26, 2024
2. 2020 not available. Average of 2019 and 2021 used





PUBLIC REPORT

September 12, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Toronto Police Service's Multi-Year Staffing Plan

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) approve this report and accompanying presentation outlining the 2025 – 2029 multi-year hiring scenarios that will inform the Toronto Police Service's (Service's) budget development process.

Financial Implications:

The scenarios outlined in the presentation contain separate and distinct financial implications over a five-year period. The summary table below provides the staffing related costs (in millions) for three scenarios from 2025 to 2029.

Description	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Replacement Hires Only					
Uniform Incremental Impact	\$7.8	\$6.7	\$11.7	\$9.6	\$3.2
Impact vs 2024	\$7.8	\$14.5	\$26.2	\$35.8	\$39.0
Civilian Incremental Impact	\$7.8	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-
Impact vs 2024	\$7.8	\$7.8	\$7.8	\$7.8	\$7.8
Non Salary Incremental Impact	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-
Impact vs 2024	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-
Potential Incremental Impact	\$15.6	\$6.7	\$11.7	\$9.6	\$3.2
Impact vs 2024	\$15.6	\$22.3	\$34.0	\$43.6	\$46.8

Toronto Police Service Board

40 College Street, Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3 | Phone: 416-808-8080 Fax: 416-808-8082 | www.tpsb.ca

Description	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Maintain current cop-to-pop					
Uniform 'new' positions	119	94	70	75	71
Uniform Incremental Impact	\$16.0	\$16.5	\$22.1	\$21.0	\$15.0
Impact vs 2024	\$16.0	\$32.5	\$54.6	\$75.6	\$90.6
Civilian 'new' positions	40	31	23	25	24
Civilian Incremental Impact	\$8.8	\$4.2	\$2.5	\$2.4	\$2.3
Impact vs 2024	\$8.8	\$13.0	\$15.5	\$17.9	\$20.2
Non Salary Incremental Impact	\$0.6	\$2.8	\$1.7	\$1.6	\$1.6
Impact vs 2024	\$0.6	\$3.4	\$5.1	\$6.7	\$8.3
Potential Incremental Impact	\$25.4	\$23.5	\$26.3	\$25.0	\$18.9
Impact vs 2024	\$25.4	\$48.9	\$75.2	\$100.2	\$119.1

Description	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Meet current provincial training allocation					
Uniform 'new' positions	167	163	180	165	146
Uniform Incremental Impact	\$19.0	\$23.6	\$34.0	\$33.0	\$25.9
Impact vs 2024	\$19.0	\$42.6	\$76.6	\$109.6	\$135.5
Civilian 'new' positions	56	54	60	55	49
Civilian Incremental Impact	\$9.0	\$6.5	\$5.3	\$5.6	\$5.0
Impact vs 2024	\$9.0	\$15.5	\$20.8	\$26.4	\$31.4
Non Salary Incremental Impact	\$0.8	\$4.4	\$3.5	\$3.8	\$3.3
Impact vs 2024	\$0.8	\$5.2	\$8.7	\$12.5	\$15.8
Potential Incremental Impact	\$28.8	\$34.5	\$42.8	\$42.4	\$34.2
Impact vs 2024	\$28.8	\$63.3	\$106.1	\$148.5	\$182.7

A fourth scenario is identified in the presentation that reflects staffing requirements to achieve 2010 staffing and service levels, adjusted for population. This scenario is difficult to quantify as it would require significant training capacity increases, and possible discussion on different training delivery models over the long-term.

It is also understood that, subject to Board direction, there is likely a fifth scenario, that is a combination of different scenarios for each year, that

balances the City's financial constraints along with the need for adequate and effective service delivery.

All financial analysis excludes the impact of collectively bargained increases. The Service is in the process of developing the 2025 budget and costs for each scenario are subject to change based on updates to assumptions such as separation data, training capacity, population changes, crime trends, legislative changes, technology impacts, etc. Each year, costs are influenced by the prior year decisions. The scenarios and costs should be reconfirmed based on previous and future year decisions and assumptions.

Summary:

This report is in response to an April 2024, (Min. No. P2024-0430-11.0 refers), Board motion to create a multi-year staffing plan for the Toronto Police Service (Service).

Discussion:

A multi-year staffing plan would support long-term financial and operational planning and create an opportunity for common understanding and alignment between the Board, the City and the Service in fulfilling their shared statutory mandate to ensure there is adequate and effective policing.

As a service delivery organization, 90% of the Service's budget is people related. When factoring lead times for recruiting, hiring and training processes, it can take 9 – 12 months before a cadet is considered fully deployable. Therefore, funding commitments to support a cadet hiring plan in any given year are required well in advance of a member joining the Service.

Moreover, the Service operates in a competitive collectively bargained environment. A multi-year hiring plan will build greater certainty for members and support attraction and retention efforts.

The multi-year hiring plan is discussed in detail in the accompanying presentation.

The following four staffing scenarios are discussed:

1. Replacement hires only to 2024 approved positions;
2. Maintain current cop-to-population coverage;
3. Meet current provincial and Toronto Police College training allocations and class sizes; and
4. 2010 Adjusted Staffing Levels - Assuming training limitations were not in place, , how many cadets would be required to meet similar staffing levels experienced in 2010; the year that could be considered to have the most adequate and effective service delivery, relative to other years in the recent past.

While the plan focused on uniform hiring and class sizes, the presentation does include information about both sworn and civilian professional members.

Supporting the development of each option is information outlining the following considerations:

- Community Safety and Policing Act language requirements necessitating adequate and effective service delivery
- Service vision, direction and strategic priorities
- Impact or influence of past, current and upcoming modernization and capacity creation efforts
- Operational context, service levels, capacity and workload drivers
- Optimization of current resource allocation
- Workforce trends, succession planning and wellbeing metrics
- Current and future service delivery targets and gaps

Additional supplementary information is also provided on the unique landscape of policing in Toronto and how current staffing levels compare to other communities.

When evaluating each scenario, the Service considered the following:

- Ability to meet adequate and effective service delivery while being faced with growing demands for service and critical gaps/vacancies in investigative areas. This includes identifying if reallocations from other service areas would be required;
- Enabling expansion of the Neighbourhood Community Officer program, a key priority for the Service, Board and many City Councillors;
- Preparation for city hosted Fédération Internationale de Football Association (F.I.F.A.) events – an additional 100 officers are required to be fully trained by 2026 to support the security requirements associated with these events;
- Supporting succession planning and workforce diversity needs, considering by 2029, 61% of Staff Sergeant and 85% of senior officers will be eligible to retire; and
- Better balancing the use of full time resources and premium pay.

The staffing allocation priorities that the multi-year hiring plan is seeking to address are the following:

Uniform

- Priority response to address calls for service and future growth in demand;
- Investigative areas that have faced long-standing vacancies and significant growth in caseload;
- Dedicated capacity for events, protests and F.I.F.A. readiness to reduce reliance on premium pay;

- Police reform and modernization projects – build trust and create long-term capacity
- Proactive community programs; and
- Support succession and leadership development

Civilian

- Delivery roles to grow with demand for adequate service delivery (e.g. communication operators, parking enforcement officers, disclosure analysts, forensic identification and crime scene analysts, fleet technicians, etc.)
- Resources and specialists to deliver on strategic modernization and reform initiatives, such as the Auditor General Report on 9-1-1, Ontario Human Rights Commission report, accompanied with the Service’s equity strategy, digitization and N.G. 9-1-1

In the short-term, this plan allows for discussion and direction that inform the 2025 budget process. The staffing assumptions will also be validated through the workload analysis currently underway in a partnership with the Toronto Police Association and third party firm Environics. As well, estimates will be refined and reviewed through the budget process.

In the short and medium-term, this plan will also allow for discussions with other levels of government to explore funding options and long-term sustainability opportunities.

Background

The Toronto City Council, at its meeting held on February 14, 2024, adopted item CC15.1 – Budget Implementation Including Property Tax Rates, User Fees and Related Matters. The Council motion is available at the following link:

<https://secure.toronto.ca/council/agenda-item.do?item=2024.CC15.1>

As a result, at its meeting on April 30, 2024 (Min. No. P2024-0430-11.0 refers), the Board discussed the City Council’s motions and passed the following motion.

Motion:

“THAT the recommendations be amended as follows:

...

2. The Board direct the Chief, in consultation with the Executive Director, to develop and report back to the Board by the September 12, 2024 Toronto Police Service Board meeting, along with an interim update at the July 31, 2024, Board meeting, with a multi-year staffing plan that considers the operational needs of the Service, and is inclusive of clear goals and associated costs, and with targets and estimates, under different

probable scenarios, concerning, and not limited to, efforts to:

- a. Reduce Priority 1 response times;
- b. Increase the number of available frontline officers;
- c. Increase the number of Neighbourhood Officers;
- d. Increase diversity in recruitment including gender diversity and the recruitment of racially diverse candidates, including Black and Indigenous people; and

such a plan be used as the basis for City Council and the Toronto Police Service Board to advocate to the provincial and federal government for funding that acknowledges the Toronto Police Service's unique responsibilities to protect Canada's largest municipality.

..."

Note that the current results and efforts towards item 2d (workforce diversity) was submitted to the Board through the 2023 Annual People Report: Recruitment, Appointments and Promotions, Secondments, Secondary Activities and Cumulative Legal Costs for Labour Relations Counsel and Legal Indemnification report in June 2024 (Min. No. P2024-0624-4.0).

Conclusion:

This report includes the Service's multi-year staffing plan scenarios to inform the budget process for 2025 and support long-term operational and financial planning for the City, the Board and the Service.

Ms. Svina Dhaliwal, Chief Administrative Officer, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police

2025-2028 Strategic Plan Update

September 12, 2024



Purpose

Provide an update on strategic plan development, including:

- The planning approach and guiding principles;
- Progress to date;
- Engagement plan and next steps



Legislative Context

- The Community Safety and Policing Act (Act) requires the Toronto Police Service Board (Board), in consultation with the Chief of Police, determine the objectives and priorities of police services.
- Under the Act, the Board is required to prepare and adopt a strategic plan at least once every four years.
- In developing the strategic plan, the Board is required to consult with municipal councils, band councils, diverse community groups, school boards, community organizations, businesses and members of the public.



Guiding Principles




Humans Rights and Equity Centered

Use best practice, anti-racist and anti-oppressive approaches to respond to community needs



Upstream Approaches to Community Safety and Well-being

Integrate a social determinants lens to inform governance, policy development, and planning



Evidence-Based

Use data and information from diverse range of sources, including community feedback, to promote continuous improvement



Transparency and Accountability

Enable the public and communities to meaningfully participate in decision-making, and publicly measure and report on performance



Planning Approach

Research & Analysis

- Literature review, jurisdictional and environmental scan
- Data from sources including:
 - Statistics Canada Census
 - Annual Statistical Reports
 - Community Surveys
 - Community Agency Surveys
 - Service Member surveys

Monitor & Evaluate

- Monitor, evaluate and report on progress against KPIs
- Identify areas for continuous improvement



Engagement

- Public engagement survey
- Community discussions
- Strategic planning sessions with Service leadership
- Design workshops with the Service


Development

- Develop, validate, and refine strategic priorities, monitoring framework, and logic model



Engagement Plan

Three phases of engagement to gather feedback



Progress to Date

Draft vision, strategic themes and actions identified through engagement efforts in 2023:



Community Engagement

73 community members from Community Police Liaison Committees, justice partners, community partners through 10 focus group sessions



Public Engagement

- 93 respondents to public survey
- Input from the Toronto Public School Board and Toronto Catholic School Board



City Councillors

All Councillors invited to share feedback; two (2) were interviewed



Internal Engagement

- 77 members across senior officers, front-line, and civilian staff
- Member survey, received 200 responses



DRAFT VISION:

Be a Trusted Partner to Improve Community Safety and Well-being for All Toronto Communities



Safer
Communities



Investing in our People



Collaborative
Partnerships



Accelerating Police Reform



Board Governance & Accountability

Next Steps and Timelines



Thank you!

Toronto Police Service Board Strategic Plan Webpage

<https://tpsb.ca/strategicplan>

Contact

Anne Arthur, Senior Advisor, Toronto Police Service Board

Email: Anne.Arthur@tpsb.ca





PUBLIC REPORT

September 5, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Subject: 2025-2028 Strategic Plan Update

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) direct the Executive Director to continue the strategic planning and engagement process as proposed, based on the proposed draft strategic themes.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

This report provides an update on the development of the Toronto Police Service Board's (Board) 2025–2028 Strategic Plan (Strategic Plan), including the proposed planning and engagement approach, developed in compliance with the [Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019 \(Act\)](#) and the Board's [Strategic Plan Policy](#).

Discussion:

Background

The *Act* came into effect on April 1, 2024 and replaces the *Police Services Act*. The *Act*, as reflected in the Board's Strategic Plan Policy, requires that the Board prepare and adopt a strategic plan for the provision of policing in Toronto, which will be reviewed, and if appropriate, revised, at least once every four years. The strategic plan must address at minimum: how the Board will ensure adequate and effective policing; the objectives, priorities, and core functions for the Toronto Police Service (Service); and quantitative and qualitative performance measures. In preparing or revising the strategic plan, the Board must consult the Chief of Police, Toronto City Council, groups representing the

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diverse communities of Toronto, school boards, community organizations, businesses, and members of the public in Toronto.

Decision History

The proposed strategic planning process builds on a solid foundation of previous work and decision-making by the Board and the Service that emphasize accountability, transparency, and a commitment to equity, diversity, and inclusion. Key reports include:

- Report from the Chief of Police, [The Way Forward – The Transformational Task Force's Final Report](#) (January 26, 2017), which established the initial framework for transformational change in the Service;
- Report from the Toronto Police Services Board, [Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety](#) (August 18, 2020), which included 81 recommendations to address systemic racism and explored alternative community safety models;
- Report from the Chief of Police, [Missing and Missed - The Report of the Independent Civilian Review: Implementation Update](#) (December 13, 2021), which focused on enhancing police response to missing persons investigations;
- Report from the Auditor General, [Toronto Police Service - Audit of 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Operations Better Support for Staff, Improved Information Management and Outcomes](#) (June 14, 2022), which highlighted the need for improved staff support, information management, and infrastructure and technology;
- Report from the Toronto Police Services Board, [An Update on Building a Respectful and Inclusive Workplace: Deloitte Canada Report, Forum Research Survey, and Bernardi White Paper](#) (June 22, 2022), which highlighted the need to create a culture of belonging, mutual respect, and equity across all levels of the Toronto Police Service; and
- Report from Toronto Police Service Board, [2023 Annual Report](#) (July 31, 2024), which is the first annual report per the requirements of the Act.

Together, these foundational reports have informed development of the strategic planning process, ensuring that Board and the Service's past learnings and future aspirations are incorporated.

Guiding Principles

The proposed strategic planning process has been informed by key guiding principles:

- *Human rights and equity centred*: Using best practice anti-racist and anti-oppression approaches to respond to community needs;
- *Upstream approaches to community safety and well-being*: Integrating a social determinants lens to address the root causes of crime through governance, policy, and partnerships;
- *Evidence-based*: Using data and information from a variety of sources, including community feedback to promote continuous improvement; and
- *Transparency and Accountability*: Ensure the public, communities, and relevant stakeholders can meaningfully participate in decision-making, and publicly measure and report on progress.

Strategic Planning Process

The proposed strategic planning process is designed to be iterative, collaborative, and data-driven. The following phased approach will be undertaken to ensure comprehensive engagement:

Phase 1: Initial Consultations and Analysis (Q1 2023 – Q2 2024)

In anticipation of the *Act* coming into force, Board Office staff conducted an initial phase of engagement, soliciting feedback to develop a draft vision and themes. External engagement included a public survey (93 respondents), 10 focus groups attended by 73 community members and justice partners, input from the Toronto District School Board and Toronto Catholic School Board, and engagement of City Councillors (two respondents). Internal engagement included discussion with the Service's Command Team, 77 members across senior officers, front-line staff, and civilian personnel, and a member survey. Findings from the initial consultations were analyzed and used to develop the draft vision and themes included in this report.

Phase 2: Engagement and Analysis (Q3-Q4 2024)

Building on the work in Phase 1, Board Office staff will conduct additional engagement through a public survey, re-engagement with communities and City Councillors, and discussions with the Service. Engagement findings will be analyzed to validate and refine the draft vision, priorities, and actions. Comprehensive research and analysis will also be conducted, including literature reviews, a jurisdictional scan, and data analysis of various sources such as the most recent cycles of three annual surveys conducted by the Service: Community, Community Agency, and Service Members. It is anticipated that a public report with strategic priorities and actions will be presented to the Board in January 2025 for approval.

Phase 3: Co-design of Key Performance Measures and Monitoring Plan (Q1 2025)

Pending Board approval of the strategic priorities and actions developed in Phase 2, the final phase will include targeted engagement across the Service to develop key performance indicators (KPIs) and measures, and a monitoring plan. This phase of work will ensure robust evaluation and accountability mechanisms. There will also be opportunities for further engagement to ensure stakeholder and community feedback are adequately reflected in the Strategic Plan. A final report to the Board on the Strategic Plan is anticipated in the second quarter of 2025, with benchmarking against KPIs to be reported with the Board's 2024 Annual Report, scheduled for June 2025.

Draft Vision and Strategic Themes

Based on the work to date, the draft vision for the 2025-2028 Strategic Plan is to **"Be a Trusted Partner to Improve Community Safety and Well-being for All Toronto Communities."** This vision underscores the Board and Service's commitment to being a trusted and collaborative partner in fostering safe and thriving communities across Toronto, through equitable and responsive policing. This draft vision, along with the following draft themes, will be validated and refined through the next iteration of engagement. The draft actions below are preliminary examples to illustrate possible actions that will fall under each of the draft strategic themes.

1. Board Governance and Accountability

An overarching framework that ensures all actions align with the Act and the guiding principles of transparency, accountability, human rights and equity centred, fiscally responsible, and ensuring the use of upstream and evidence-based approaches.

- Promote inclusivity, equity, and fairness in all decisions
- Create evidence-based and effective policies
- Improve how we measure, track, and publicly share data and information
- Effectively engage with Toronto's diverse communities
- Ensure responsible financial management
- Equip Board Members with the best knowledge
- Manage risks proactively
- Work closely with independent oversight bodies

2. Accelerating Police Reform

A continuation of the work that is essential for building public trust and ensuring accountability through transparent, equitable, and community-centered policing practices.

- Promote inclusivity, equity, and fairness in all practices
- Increase transparency and accountability
- Support non-police responses for people in crisis
- Work with communities to create better services
- Build stronger community relationships through neighbourhood policing
- Improve training for all Service Members
- Update technology and infrastructure
- Continuously innovate and improve services

3. Safer Communities

Promoting proactive and responsive measures to reduce crime and enhance the sense of safety across all neighbourhoods.

- Implement evidence-based approaches to crime prevention and response
- Promote community-led crime prevention initiatives
- Improve service efficiency and effectiveness
- Improve road safety
- Enhance emergency preparedness
- Ensure the right level of police presence
- Work together for community safety

4. Investing in Our People

Committing to the development, well-being, and diversity of police personnel to deliver high quality, community-focused policing.

- Promote positive change and continuous improvement across the Service through human resource management initiatives
- Build a respectful, inclusive, and equitable workplace

- Support wellness for all members
- Plan for future hiring needs
- Ensure fair hiring and promotion practices
- Develop future leaders
- Strengthen skills development for all Service Members

5. Collaborative Partnerships

Strengthening relationships with community organizations, government agencies, and local stakeholders to improve public safety and community well-being.

- Actively participate in City-wide community safety initiatives
- Build strong partnerships to advance community safety and share the results
- Maintain and develop partnerships to support victims of crime

Next Steps

- *January 2025*: Presentation of final strategic priorities and actions to the Board for consideration and approval.
- *June 2025*: Presentation of the final 2025-2028 Strategic Plan to the Board for consideration. The Strategic Plan will be accompanied by the 202 Annual Report, which will include a current state assessment and benchmarks to measure impact.

Conclusion

Therefore, it is recommended that the Board endorse the proposed strategic planning process and planning activities as outlined in this report. This endorsement will support the development of the 2025–2028 Strategic Plan - a comprehensive, community-driven plan that aligns with the requirements of the *Act* and the Board’s Strategic Plan Policy.

Respectfully submitted,

Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Contact

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Toronto Police Service Board
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Attachments:

Attachment 1: 2025–2028 Strategic Plan Update Presentation



PUBLIC REPORT

September 12, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Completion and Evaluation

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

The 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot project (911C.C.D.) commenced in August 2021, and as of December 31, 2023 spending totalled approximately \$1,100,000, which has been absorbed within the Toronto Police Service (Service) operating budget.

Expenditures (August 1, 2021 - December 31, 2023)	Approved Budget (\$000's)	Actual Costs (\$000's)
Crisis Intervention Worker (4.4 FTEs)	1,041.1	748.5
Project Coordinator (1 FTE)	176.4	213.7
Administrative Fee	30.7	41.1
Training	62.1	32.0
Telecom, Equipment & Furniture	91.7	43.6

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TOTAL costs incurred by GCC, reimbursed by TPS	1,402.0	1,078.9
Costs Paid Directly by TPS:		
Telecom, Equipment & Furniture	107.3	4.9
Legal	15.0	-
TOTAL costs paid directly by TPS	122.3	4.9
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS	1,524.3	1,083.8

Expenditures were approximately \$441,000 less than budgeted which reflects:

- Lower expenditures for staffing when the crisis desk was closed due to crisis worker absences in year 2 and 3 of the pilot. Crisis worker absences increased from 3% in 2021 to 17% in 2023.
- In the second year of the pilot, the projected budget included an additional \$365,000 to institute a 2nd crisis worker during peak hours of operations when the pilot was expanded to city-wide and 24 hours; this costing included related telecommunication and furniture expenses as well. In practice however, non-emergency call volumes directed to the 911C.C.D. did not necessitate a 2nd crisis worker, likely due to the prevalence of a second non-police diversion program, the Toronto Community Crisis Service (T.C.C.S.), which was also drawing on the same non-emergency call volume for diversion from the 9-1-1 pathway.

In line with the terms of the existing Memorandum of Understanding, Gerstein Crisis Centre (G.C.C.) continued to invoice the Service quarterly based on actual costs incurred over the term of the pilot project.

Cost Per Call Diverted

Between October 4, 2021 and December 31, 2023, the 911C.C.D pilot diverted 1,951 non-emergency calls from the 9-1-1 pathway without the need for police attendance; there were 72 calls per month on average successfully diverted. Over the 27 month evaluation period, the Service spent \$555 per successfully diverted call. Repeat callers accounted for more than half (1,170) of the total calls that were diverted. Two individuals, who were the most prolific repeat callers, engaged the 911C.C.D. pilot for diversion collectively 386 times. When removing the calls from these two individuals, the average monthly diverted call volume and cost per successfully diverted call is 58 calls and \$693 per call.

Summary:

The 911C.C.D. pilot offers 9-1-1 callers the opportunity to be connected to a crisis line, operated by a Gerstein crisis worker, rather than police attending their location and responding to the situation. 9-1-1 Communication Operators evaluate incoming calls for diversion based on specific, non-imminent risk criteria and then transfer non-emergency

callers, with consent, to a crisis worker who is co-located in the Communications Services Call Centre.

Collaboration in this pilot demonstrates the commitment of the Service to work with our community health partners to provide an alternate crisis response service and to modernize the role of police in mental health crisis events in a way that ensures police are no longer the only or default service provider.

Launching the 911C.C.D. in partnership with G.C.C. was the right path forward for the Service to embark on addressing Police Reform Recommendations that directed the development of non-police crisis response options of non-emergency calls from the 9-1-1 pathway.

The 911C.C.D. pilot began at a time when the Toronto Community Crisis Service (T.C.C.S.), now the largest and fastest growing alternate crisis response service led by the City of Toronto, was still in development stage. The 911C.C.D. pilot continued to provide over-the-phone crisis service delivery citywide throughout the T.C.C.S. phased expansion, which until recently was only available in certain catchment areas of the city.

On July 10, 2024, the T.C.C.S. was expanded citywide and can provide the same services and functions as the 911C.C.D. with the added capability of providing a non-police mobile (at-scene) crisis response in partnership with four anchor partners embedded in the community.

Given the growth, success and greater capabilities of the T.C.C.S., the 911C.C.D. pilot will conclude on September 30, 2024 and the Service will focus streaming all diversion efforts of non-emergency crisis calls to the T.C.C.S.

Lessons have been learned from the 911C.C.D. pilot; in particular, that a consent-based model for crisis call diversion from the 9-1-1 pathway is cumbersome and creates unintended strain on Communications Service's operation of the 9-1-1 emergency line. The Service, as a custodian of the 9-1-1 caller's personal and health information, is prohibited by privacy legislation from sharing this information with the Gerstein crisis worker without the caller's consent (*Ontario Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act and the Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act*). Because the Gerstein crisis workers are co-located at T.P.S. Communications Services and are provided access to callers' personal information through the Computer Aided Dispatch system (C.A.D.) when calls are transferred to them, consent of the caller must be obtained. Moving forward, a streamlined "cold transfer" to the T.C.C.S. will be a more operationally efficient workflow process for call-diversion.

A model based on an immediate "cold transfer" eliminates the need for callers to provide consent to be transferred to an alternate crisis response service and to share personal and health information. The caller can be transferred without consent and none of the caller's personal and health information would be provided to the crisis agency by the Communications Operator. This will provide a streamlined process, eliminating the often lengthy explanation surrounding consent, and will ensure callers are able to obtain the crisis support they require more quickly. Should the T.C.C.S. call-taker deem it necessary to return a caller to 9-1-1 as a result of receiving additional information, this transfer can be made quickly.

The Service engaged the Provincial Support Systems Program (P.S.S.P.) at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health to evaluate the 911C.C.D. (see Appendix B – P.S.S.P. Evaluation for their full report). The P.S.S.P. evaluated the pilot over a 27-month period (October 4, 2021 – December 31, 2023) and made several recommendations, one of which is to “Explore whether an improved iteration of the program, or a substitute, could help achieve the program goals.”

While implementing the 911C.C.D. pilot was an important first step in exploring alternatives to a police response for non-emergent mental health crises, committing fully to the now city-wide T.C.C.S. diversion service represents the next step in the Service’s commitment to alternative service delivery. The T.C.C.S. will afford a more streamlined diversion process for Communications Operators, offer an extensive suite of support services to persons experiencing non-emergency mental health crises, and unlike the 911C.C.D. pilot, offer an at-scene non-police response to all areas of the city.

The purpose of this report is to provide the Board with an evaluation of the pilot, lessons learned, and best practises moving forward for call diversion of non-emergency calls from the 9-1-1 pathway to community based crisis support services.

Discussion:

Background

The 911C.C.D pilot project supports directions made by the Board relative to Police Reform and the City of Toronto Auditor General to provide alternative non-police models of community safety response for persons in crisis.

Direction 1(b) contained in the report of then-Chair Jim Hart, titled “Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety,” adopted by the Board at its meeting on August 18, 2020, (Min. No. P129/20 refers) directs the Service to work with the City Manager and community based mental health and addictions service providers, to develop new alternative models of community safety response, including mobile mental health and addictions crisis intervention.

The 911C.C.D pilot is also well-aligned with the recommendations made in the Auditor General of Toronto report “Review of Toronto Police Service – Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service, A Journey of Change: Improving Community Safety and Well-Being Outcomes” which directs the Service to:

“Work with other agencies, to assess the feasibility of developing adequately resourced, non-time restrictive, alternative non-police responses to events; and define the level of acceptable risk and liability in relation to criteria for calls suitable for diversion.”

At its meeting of June 24, 2021, the Board authorized the entering into a Memorandum of Understanding between the Board and G.C.C. to establish the 911C.C.D. pilot project in 14 Division, 51 Division, and 52 Division, 20 hours a day, and seven days a week (Min. No P2021-0624-2.1). The pilot became operational on October 4, 2021.

Subsequently, at its meeting of July 27, 2022, the Board received a mid-term evaluation of the 911C.C.D. in relation to the results of the pilot over the first six months. The mid-term evaluation reported the pilot project having diverted 117 events from a police response between October 4, 2021 and April 4, 2022 (Min. No P2022-0727-3.1).

At its meeting of September 13, 2022, the Board approved expansion of the pilot catchment area citywide with hours of operation extending to 24 hours each day and an extension of the term of the pilot from October 1, 2022 to September 30, 2023 (Min. No P2022-0913-2.0).

A second extension of the 911C.C.D. pilot approved by the Board at its meeting on September 14, 2023, extended the pilot one further year until September 30, 2024 to facilitate an independent evaluation of the program by the P.S.S.P. (Min No P2023-0914-4.0).

The Toronto Police Communications Services & Diversion Process to the 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot

In the 1980's, Toronto Police Communications Services became the provider of the Public Safety Answering Point, the call centre that answers 9-1-1 emergency calls and dispatches all emergency services in Toronto.

Communications Services is the first point of contact for the public requesting emergency help through 9-1-1. Communication Operators answer the 9-1-1 line and immediately provide the caller with three (3) options by asking "Emergency – Police, Fire or Ambulance?"

Communication Operators are skilled in crisis or violent event call management and trained to ask questions to determine whether an event is an emergency or a non-emergency, gain as accurate an understanding of the event as possible in real-time, and determine, based on the available information, the appropriate response option for each caller. Communication Operators receive 280 hours of 'in-class' call-taker training, as well as 400 hours of 'on-desk' training with an instructor.

Information-gathering and response initiation begins the moment a caller reaches the 9-1-1 Communication Operator, providing immediate access to police, ambulance, fire services and now, non-police crisis response options. Communication Operators ask a series of questions to obtain information such as:

- Caller's name and location;
- Name and/or description of the person(s) they are calling about;
- Overview of what is happening; and
- Presence of any weapons, safety concerns or injuries for the individual or the public.

Many times, an emergency response is initiated before the caller is even finished speaking to the Communication Operator, due to the nature of the emergency. Highly skilled Communication Operators perform tactical multitasking; often working under acutely stressful circumstances surrounding these emergencies for 9-1-1 callers that are often in states of panic and crisis. Under these conditions, Communication

Operators assign each unique incident a 'call type' (such as "person in crisis" or "threaten suicide" etc.), assign a numeric response priority based on the gravity of the emergency and, when necessary, transfer callers to response partners such as ambulance or fire.

With the 911C.C.D. pilot, Communication Operators offer 9-1-1 callers the option to speak with a Gerstein crisis worker in lieu of a police response for non-emergency crisis events that meet specific, agreed upon criteria for diversion (see Appendix A – Crisis Call Diversion Criteria). 9-1-1 calls that involve an imminent threat to life or property, violence, threat of violence, violent tendencies, weapons, a criminal offence, attempt suicide, drug overdose, required medical attention, involved a person under 16 years, public lewdness, domestic violence or incident, or a 9-1-1 call received from a crisis hot line, hospital, or emergency clinic are not suitable for diversion.

As required for the 911C.C.D. Communication Operators spend time with each caller to explain what a crisis response can offer and recite a two-part consent script required to connect the caller with the service. The consent piece includes consent to accept a non-police response and to share the caller's personal and health information with the Gerstein crisis worker.

If the caller provides consent, the caller is transferred to the crisis worker for a non-police over-the-phone crisis response. The crisis worker, utilizing an independent and confidential telephone system (separate from 9-1-1), works to de-escalate the callers in crisis, assess for risk, provide intervention and referrals for support, shelter, short-term crisis beds, and/or connections to community mental health programs and other follow-up services. The discussion between a caller and a crisis worker in this project remain protected under the Personal Health Information Protection Act and are not recorded by the Service.

If the crisis worker is unable to divert the caller from police resources, or if new information arises during the call, which escalates the priority of the call and demands an emergency response, the crisis worker is capable of returning the caller back to the Communication Operator for a police response.

The 911C.C.D. has a co-response option available, where the police and the crisis worker can both respond to emergency events that are not within scope for diversion, but require police action and can benefit from over-the-phone support services offered by the crisis worker. In this function, after police have been dispatched, the Communication Operator can transfer an emergency call to the crisis line, so a crisis worker can attempt to de-escalate the caller while the police are on their way. When police arrive on scene, the crisis worker disconnects from the caller and can later attempt follow-up services.

***Non-Emergency Calls Diverted from the 9-1-1 Pathway / Police Response:
October 4, 2021 – December 31, 2023***

Between October 4, 2021 and December 31, 2023, the Service received 4,483,551 calls for service citywide at the 9-1-1 Call Centre; 73,515 calls were mental health related which police responded to in-person. A large portion of the mental health related calls

that police attended could not be sent to the 911C.C.D. pilot, because they did not meet the specific risk criteria required for diversion.

During this same time period, Communication Operators offered the services of the pilot during 3,850 crisis calls that were non-emergency in nature and met the criteria for diversion, as depicted in Figure 1 below. Callers consented to being transferred to the pilot in lieu of a police response in 78% (3,003) of these calls; the remaining 22% (847) of callers declined consent and requested a police response.

The number of callers transferred to the 911C.C.D. crisis desk (3,003), does not represent the total number of calls successfully diverted from a police response, as police were still required to attend a significant portion (1,052) of these calls. A “diversion” outcome occurs when the Gerstein crisis worker resolves a call for service originating from the 9-1-1 pathway, and police are not required to attend.


Callers who were transferred to the 911C.C.D. crisis desk, and were subsequently transferred back to the Communication Operator for a police response (1,052 calls¹) were driven by the following circumstances:

- In 178 calls, the caller, after speaking with the Gerstein crisis worker declined diversion and requested a police response;
- In 391 calls, the caller was unreachable by phone when the crisis worker attempted to contact them; and
- In 414 calls, the caller provided information to the Gerstein crisis worker who deemed the situation not suitable for diversion. In some of these cases, the caller revealed new information, which placed the event out of scope for the pilot, or in some events where the caller was in acute crisis, the Gerstein crisis worker was unable to safety plan with the caller and resolve the crisis.

Ultimately, the 911C.C.D pilot diverted 1,951 non-emergency calls from the 9-1-1 pathway without the need for police attendance between October 4, 2021 and December 31, 2023 (2 years and 3 months).

Figure 1.

¹ Within this group of calls, 69 calls were cancelled (by the complainant or the dispatcher), after transfer to the crisis desk.



Non-emergency Calls Diverted From Repeat Callers

The group of 1,951 non-emergency calls that were diverted by the 911C.C.D. pilot originated from 870 unique individuals. Repeat callers² accounted for 60% (1,170) of calls that were diverted. Two individuals, who were the most prolific repeat callers, engaged the 911C.C.D. pilot for diversion collectively 386 times.

Non-emergency Calls Diverted by Division and Call-Type Classification

The highest occurrences of diversion are located around the downtown core in 11, 14, 51 and 53 Divisions. The majority of diverted calls were classified as the call-type “Person in Crisis.” See Table 1. below for a breakdown of the diverted calls by Division and call-type classification.

Table 1.

1,951 Non-Emergency Calls Diverted By Division		1,951 Non-Emergency Calls Diverted By Call-Type Classifications	
11 Division	295	Person in Crisis	1,438
12 Division	45	Check Well-being	246
13 Division	133	Threaten Suicide	102
14 Division	142	Advised	77
22 Division	97	Check Address	36
23 Division	43	See Ambulance	10
31 Division	83	Dispute	9
32 Division	104	Landlord & Tenant Dispute	4
33 Division	90	Threatening	4
41 Division	102	Unknown Trouble	4

² “Repeat callers” means a unique individual who has utilized the services of the 911C.C.D. and been diverted by the Gerstein crisis worker from a police response in the past.

42 Division	51	Harassment	3
43 Division	68	211 Referral	2
51 Division	243	Medical Complaint	2
52 Division	74	Other call-types with only 1 count	14
53 Division	198		
54 Division	104		
55 Division	55		
Outside Toronto or Location not indicated	24		

Lessons Learned About the Crisis Diversion Workflow Model – Best Practices Moving Forward

As recommended by the Auditor General of Toronto, non-police crisis response models should be non-time restrictive. However, the consent-based nature of the 911C.C.D. pilot workflow process is burdensome and consumes time on an emergency 9-1-1 line for non-emergency events thereby restricting Communication Operators’ availability to answer emergency calls. When a Communication Operator is occupied attempting to divert a caller with a non-emergency event to the 911C.C.D., it reduces their ability to quickly answer other emergency callers who are waiting in a queue.

The consumption of time by the call diversion workflow process impacts the ability of Communications Services to meet industry standards for answering 9-1-1 calls. The National Emergency Number Association (N.E.N.A.) provides standard operating procedures for the handling and processing of 9-1-1 calls received by Public Safety Answering Points (P.S.A.P.). This industry standard dictates that 90% of all 9-1-1 calls arriving at the P.S.A.P. shall be answered within (≤) 15 seconds; and that 95% of all 9-1-1 calls should be answered within (≤) 20 seconds.

“Talk-Time” is defined as the duration of time a Communication Operator spends on an emergency line with a 9-1-1 caller, from the moment the call is answered to the moment it is disconnected. The call diversion work flow process to the 911C.C.D. pilot adds a significant amount of time to Communication Operator “talk-time,” as the call diversion process commences the moment the Communication Operator recognizes that the event is not an emergency and in scope for the 911C.C.D. pilot. Communications Operator “talk time” is extended when they are required to educate the caller about pilot services upon offering diversion to callers and explaining the two-part consent piece required for diversion.

The Service, as a custodian of the 9-1-1 caller’s personal and health information, is prohibited by privacy legislation from sharing this information with the Gerstein crisis worker without the caller’s consent (Ontario Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act and the Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act).

Communication Operators must relate the following to each caller:

Part 1. “The 911C.C.D. can offer you additional support. Do you consent to speak with them instead of a police response?”

Part 2. “I need your consent to provide them with the personal and health information you gave me today. Do you consent?”

The consent piece can understandably elicit further questions by callers who are not familiar with the services offered by Gerstein or what that response would be.

Consuming time on the emergency 9-1-1 line with non-emergency events at the expense of emergency callers is not sustainable and does not align with the Auditor General of Toronto’s recommendation that non-police response models developed be non-time restricting. A lesson gleaned from the 911C.C.D. pilot is that a consent based model for crisis call diversion from the 9-1-1 pathway creates unintended delays on Communications Services operation of the 9-1-1 emergency line.

A model based on an immediate “cold transfer” of the caller, would be considered a best practise moving forward for diversion of non-emergency crisis calls from the 9-1-1 pathway. Under this model, for calls that meet the diversion criteria, the Communications Operator would advise the caller that a police response is not required and a non-police crisis agency response is the appropriate response for the situation presented. The caller would be transferred without consent and none of the caller’s personal and health information would be provided to the crisis agency by the Communications Operator.

The consent piece in the 911C.C.D. model, however, is a mandatory step in the workflow process since the Gerstein crisis worker is co-located in the 9-1-1 call centre with access to the Service’s Computer Aided Dispatch system (C.A.D.) containing the caller’s personal and health information as provided to the Communications Operator. While access to the C.A.D. is facilitated by co-locating the crisis worker in the 9-1-1 call centre, acquiring that information and co-location is not a necessity for the crisis worker to perform their role successfully.

PSSP Evaluation

The Service engaged the Provincial Support Systems Program (P.S.S.P.) at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health to evaluate the 911C.C.D. As the third party evaluator of the T.C.C.S. program, the P.S.S.P. is uniquely positioned to provide an independent evaluation of the 911C.C.D. pilot. Both pilots are non-police crisis response models that involve overlapping catchment areas and community service providers, underscoring the need and benefits of utilizing the same independent evaluator.

The P.S.S.P. was tasked with evaluating the pilot over a 27-month period (October 4, 2021 – December 31, 2023). The evaluators utilized questionnaires, the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory and focus groups with Communication Operators, Gerstein crisis workers, frontline police officers, pilot leadership and 911C.C.D. service users.

The P.S.S.P. evaluation of the 911C.C.D. provides 3 Key Takeaways:

1. “The Program is meeting an established need in new ways.” In this section evaluators conclude:

- The 911C.C.D. pilot has been increasingly successful at diverting events sent to the crisis desk, with downward trends of declined diversion or incomplete diversion (calls transferred to the crisis desk that were sent back to the Communications Operator for a police response).
 - The 911C.C.D. “has made a meaningful yet comparatively small quantitative impact.”
 - Service users were satisfied with their experience and support they received.
 - “Diversion offers have grown modestly despite expansion of the program and an overall high volume of mental health calls.”
 - “The overall expectations about alleviating the use of police resources for non-emergent mental health-related needs are yet to be achieved.”
 - Repeat callers account for more than half of the diversion offers.
 - “The partners do not seem to be working from a place of shared understanding and prioritization of equity that emphasizes the need for specific activities, outcomes and indicators to address equity in a consistent, program-wide manner.”
2. “Key operations are not connected despite expectations and some positive collaboration experiences.” In this section evaluators indicate:
- There were positive expectations and collaborative experiences amongst the members involved in the pilot.
 - There is a lack of integrated operations in screening, diversion and sharing of information.
 - The consent piece and caller education impacts the pilot workflow.
 - Crisis worker absences increased from 3% in 2021 to 17% in 2023 and impacted service availability and delivery.
 - The pilot has low visibility among the public and uniformed officers.
3. “There are partnership challenges.” In this section evaluators indicate:
- There is a lack of trust between the Service and Gerstein teams “which manifests itself in specific perceptions of skills and competence shared by members of both communications and crisis teams.”
 - An uncertainty of the future of the pilot amongst all partners.

The Toronto Community Crisis Service – Overlapping Crisis Response Model

The 911C.C.D. is no longer the sole alternate crisis response model diverting callers from the 9-1-1 pathway to community-based support services. On March 31, 2022, the City of Toronto launched a similar diversion model with the added capability of providing a non-police mobile (at-scene) crisis response. Multi-disciplinary crisis support specialists staff the T.C.C.S. mobile teams. The public can access the T.C.C.S. directly by dialing 2-1-1.

The T.C.C.S. is delivered in partnership with four community based anchor partners, which includes Taibu Community Health Centre, Canadian Mental Health Association of Toronto, 2-Spirited People of the First Nations, and Gerstein Crisis Centre (in addition to the 9-1-1 G.C.C. pilot, Gerstein also operates as one of T.C.C.S.’s anchor support agencies).

Initially launched as a pilot, in a phased approach within specific catchment areas, the T.C.C.S. has been adopted permanently. This service has grown substantially and was recently expanded citywide in July 2024.

As a partner in the T.C.C.S., Communication Operators at the 9-1-1 call centre triage non-emergency crisis calls in the exact same fashion as the 911C.C.D. The criteria for diversion is the same, with the only differences found in the capabilities of the pilot. The T.C.C.S. has greater capabilities over the 911C.C.D., given that the T.C.C.S. can accept callers from the 9-1-1 pathway that require a non-police in-person response. In addition, frontline officers can request a T.C.C.S. mobile team to attend and take over their crisis call, if they deem the circumstances to be non-emergency.

While the initial expectation was that the two pilots would complement each other, it has become apparent that the pilots are competing for the same volume of non-emergency crisis calls from the 9-1-1 pathway and Communications Operators appear to be defaulting to the T.C.C.S. over the 911C.C.D; possibly due to greater response capabilities by the T.C.C.S. Between March 31, 2022 and December 31, 2023 (21 months) Communication Operators offered diversion to the T.C.C.S. during 9,408³ non-emergency crisis calls. This is in stark contrast to the 3,850 times the 911C.C.D. pilot was offered to callers within a greater time-period: October 4, 2021 – December 31, 2023 (27 months).

The co-response option for emergency calls in the 911C.C.D. is also available through the T.C.C.S. with greater capabilities to be connected to a much larger group of crisis lines servicing specific needs in Toronto that can assist in de-escalating the caller while police are enroute. Table 2. below provides a list of crisis lines that the T.C.C.S. can connect callers to that service the Toronto area.

Table 2.

Crisis Lines Servicing Toronto Accessible Through The Toronto Community Crisis Service	
2-Spirited People of the 1st Nations	988 Suicide Crisis Helpline
Assaulted Women's Helpline	Bullying Canada
Canada. Health Canada	Canada National Defence
Canada. Veterans Affairs Canada [Toronto area]	Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking
Carefirst Seniors and Community Services Association	Covenant House Toronto
Distress and Crisis Ontario	Distress Centres of Greater Toronto
Dr Roz's Healing Place	Elder Abuse Prevention Ontario
Embrave: Agency to End Violence	Ernestine's Women's Shelter

³ The total number of diversion offers from the 9-1-1 pathway to the T.C.C.S. is approximate as this data is still in the process of being verified with the T.C.C.S. team.

Fem'aide - Ligne de soutien pour les femmes touchées par la violence	First Nations and Inuit Hope for Wellness Helpline
For You Telecare Family Service	Gamblers Anonymous
Gerstein Crisis Centre	Grenfell Ministries
Homeward Family Shelter	Interligne
Interval House	Kids Help Phone
Lesbian Gay Bi Trans Youth Line	Lumenus Community Services
Margaret's Housing and Community Support Services	Métis Nation of Ontario
National Overdose Response Service	Ontario Network of Sexual Assault / Domestic Violence Treatment Centres
Ontario. Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services. Support Services for Male Survivors of Sexual Abuse Program	Parents' Lifelines of Eastern Ontario (PLEO)
Scarborough Health Network	Talk4Healing
The Redwood...for Women and Children Fleeing Abuse	Toronto Military Family Resource Centre
Toronto Rape Crisis Centre / Multicultural Women Against Rape	Toronto Seniors Helpline
Victim Services Toronto	Women's Habitat of Etobicoke
Yellow Brick House	Yorktown Family Services
Youthdale Treatment Centres	YWCA Toronto - Shelter and Supports

Conclusion:

The Service is committed to better outcomes for persons in crisis, which can be achieved in part by alternative service delivery options or in some cases co-response with the police. The Service is fully engaged in this effort by our own desire to modernize and are guided by the Board's Police Reform Recommendations and the Auditor General recommendations to provide alternative non-police models of community safety response for persons in crisis.

Given the growth, success and greater capabilities of the T.C.C.S., the 911C.C.D. pilot will conclude on September 30, 2024 and the Service will focus streaming all diversion efforts of non-emergency crisis calls to the T.C.C.S.

Deputy Chief Lauren Pogue, Community Safety Command will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police

Appendix A – Crisis Call Diversion Criteria

A G.C.C. Crisis worker may action mental health related calls for service that meet any of the following criteria:

- A person in mental health crisis who is not actively attempting suicide or being physically violent;
- A person involved in a verbal dispute or disturbance with a mental health component, wherein a crisis call worker can attempt to resolve with intervention and where there is no perceived or real risk of violence;
- A non-violent person requesting police due to psychosis or an altered mental state;
- A non-violent repeat caller with a known mental health history;
- A non-violent person in mental health crisis requesting M.C.I.T. (Service Communications Operators will not provide the option of M.C.I.T.; Communications Operators will transfer the caller to the G.C.C. crisis call worker);
- Second party callers concerned about the welfare of a non-violent person suffering a mental health crisis.

9-1-1 calls that involve an imminent threat to life or property, violence, threat of violence, violent tendencies, weapons, a criminal offence, attempt suicide, drug overdose, medical attention, a person under 16 years, public lewdness, domestic violence or incident, or a 9-1-1 call received from a crisis hot line, hospital, or emergency clinic are not suitable for diversion.

Attachments:

Appendix A – Crisis Call Diversion Criteria
Appendix B – P.S.S.P. Evaluation

Sections of this report have been redacted to protect the anonymity of the focus group participants.

Meeting Non-Emergent Mental Health-Related Crisis Needs through Alternative Responses

Findings from an evaluation of the 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Program



camh

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Prepared by the Provincial System Support Program

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Executive Summary

Background and Methods

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Program (911 CCDPP). This program was developed by the Toronto Police Service (TPS) and the Gerstein Crisis Centre (GCC). It aims to divert non-emergent mental health-related calls from a police response by offering eligible callers the option to be transferred to a crisis worker co-located at the 911 Communications Services Call Centre. The GCC crisis worker can provide de-escalation interventions, follow-up, referrals to community-based services, or de-escalation support while police are en route. The 911 CCDPP was also conceived with the aim to alleviate the strain these calls can cause on TPS resourcing, in particular, response times to all incoming 911 calls and overall resourcing for on-site responses.

This program was first introduced in 2021 and later expanded to a 24/7 city-wide operation in 2022. The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) was engaged by TPS to conduct an evaluation. The evaluation findings will be used to decide whether the program should continue, and if it does, how it could be improved. Therefore, this evaluation was built upon the Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE) framework, including approaches and practices to ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders, along with equity principles throughout the evaluation design. By adopting the UFE framework, this evaluation aimed to enhance uptake of its findings and recommendations. Furthermore, it was also necessary to adopt multiple methodological approaches to investigate the logic and assumptions (program theory) underlying the 911 CCDPP, its achieved and yet-to-be-achieved outcomes, relevant factors explaining the program's successes and challenges, and potential future improvements.

This evaluation analyzed multiple sources of data including: TPS administrative data from the first 27 months of program operations; program planning documents; questionnaire data; focus groups; interviews; and a validated tool assessing collaboration with members of frontline teams, management, and leadership from both organizations. Quantitative data were analyzed descriptively and qualitative data were analyzed using a modified version of Iterative Thematic Inquiry. A brief program-level assessment of equity and accessibility was also conducted.

Results

Our findings were grouped into three key takeaways, described below:

Key Takeaway 1: The program is meeting an established need in new ways

We found that the program does meet an established need for callers who may not have access to, or awareness of, other relevant services or supports during mental health-related crisis situations. Notably, service user participants who were referred by the 911 CCDPP to community-based supports reported being satisfied with such process and the overall service experience. The program has also become increasingly successful at diverting non-emergent mental health-related crises from police resources with 51% (n=1951) of eligible calls being successfully diverted. This was observed along with downward trends of declined diversions and incomplete diversions of eligible calls. However, the volume of all mental-health related events TPS responded to remained substantial. Although not every single mental-health related event can be considered eligible for diversion, these contrasts shed light on how the 911 CCDPP has made a meaningful yet comparatively small quantitative impact, and how there may be untapped potential for increased diversion opportunities.

Key Takeaway 2: Key operations are not connected despite expectations and some positive collaboration experiences

Despite initial expectations and evidence of positive collaboration experiences, the key operations of the program—crisis call screening, diversion, and co-response—lack integration. This lack of integration was described by stakeholders as a contributing factor associated with inconsistent numbers of calls transferred by TPS communications operators (COs) to the GCC crisis workers, and variable involvement of crisis workers in co-response events. The program's service delivery flow was also found to be negatively impacted by caller education and consent discussions, which must be completed by COs before an eligible call is transferred to a crisis worker. Staffing of the crisis desk was also identified as a factor contributing to inconsistent service availability and delivery. All these aspects were identified in a context where the 911 CCDPP, its aims, people, and outcomes, were perceived as having only modest internal and external visibility.

Executive Summary

Key Takeaway 3: There are partnership challenges

We found that underlying the challenges faced by the program is a lack of trust between the partner organizations. This lack of trust is illustrated by perceptions of low skill and competence between members of the TPS communications team and the GCC crisis team, and in divergent perceptions of commitment shared by members of both TPS and GCC leadership teams. The future of the program was perceived as uncertain, which further underscored the highly contrasting experiences lived by the stakeholders involved with the implementation of the 911 CCDPP.

Recommendations

The 911 CCDPP can benefit from strengthening the engagement between partner teams during critical processes such as planning, staff onboarding, quality monitoring, and others. Collaboratively revisiting and agreeing upon the program's assumptions and its overall conceptualization, together with the establishment of clear, standardized processes for call screening, diversion, co-response, and data collection and analysis, are all crucial steps for creating improvement opportunities. Further strengthening of equity and accessibility within the program design and implementation can also contribute to a better response to the needs of Toronto's diverse population. Lastly, as the program is immersed in broader mental health and social service systems, it can also benefit from developing and/or strengthening any awareness and advocacy endeavors aimed at decreasing barriers and improving system-level investments to ensure that individuals and communities across Toronto can equitably access and benefit from mental health supports when most in need. These recommendations are summarized below:

1. Strengthen the partnership by implementing opportunities for ongoing inter-partner engagement
2. Collaboratively review the program theory and objectives to develop attainable and well-defined goals, key operations, resources, and outcomes
3. Improve operational challenges by establishing clear, standardized processes for call screening, intake, co-response, and data collection and analysis processes
4. Encourage diversion by developing public education and awareness campaigns on available community-based crisis supports and their intended uses
5. Encourage diversion by continuing to advocate for increased investment into the broader mental health and social service systems

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Abbreviations

911 CCDPP: 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot program

CAMH: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health

CO: Communications Operator from TPS Communication Services

GCC: Gerstein Crisis Centre

MCIT: Toronto Police Service Mobile Crisis Intervention Team

MHAAP: Toronto Police Service Mental Health and Addictions Advisory Panel

PSSP: Provincial System Support Program

TCCS: Toronto Community Crisis Service

TPS: Toronto Police Service

UO: Uniformed Officer from the TPS Primary Response Unit

UOEA: Unintended Outcomes Evaluation Approach

Background and Context

In Ontario, over 80% of mental health-related 911 calls are non-violent in nature (Bromberg, n.d.), yet institutions, such as police services, have become the default first responders for people in mental health-related crisis (Balfour, 2021; Romeo-Beehler, 2022). In Toronto, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) annually handles approximately 33,000 mental health-related calls, a number that has grown by approximately 30% in recent years (Murray, 2021). However, academic researchers and mental health advocates have called for alternatives to the traditional police response to mental health crises. It has been argued that this is particularly important for historically marginalized communities who experience disproportionate use of force, invasive searches, and criminal legal system interactions (Marcus & Stergiopoulos, 2022; Murray, 2021). By design, the immediate intervention by police, or the short-term medical attention that people in mental health-related crisis receive in hospital emergency departments, is not enough to prevent repeated crisis incidents. Moreover, police-led responses to mental health-related calls also diverts police resources away from responding to crime (Romeo-Beehler, 2022).

In alignment with the TPS Board's 81 recommendations on police reform (Hart, 2020) and TPS's 2019 Mental Health and Addictions Strategy (Toronto Police Service, 2019), TPS developed the 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Program (911 CCDPP) in collaboration with the Gerstein Crisis Centre (GCC). It was envisioned as an alternative, innovative, and collaborative model of mental health crisis response. This program was designed to achieve the following objectives:

1. divert mental and behavioural health crisis calls received by TPS communications operators (COs) to GCC crisis workers, reducing both demand on TPS COs and the need for a subsequent police response;
2. improve stakeholder and community experiences of crisis response; and
3. improve service users' connection to community-based follow-up support services.

Launched as a one-year pilot in October 2021, the program initially provided service 20 hours a day, seven days a week in TPS Divisions 14, 51, and 52 (GCC's

service area). After a 6-month internal evaluation report (Carter, 2022) demonstrated preliminary success, the pilot was extended for another year in October 2022 as a 24/7, city-wide service. The extension of the program also offered an opportunity for conducting a more fulsome evaluation. The pilot has since received a second extension, set to end on September 30, 2024. During this pilot period, the City of Toronto also piloted and expanded the Toronto Community Crisis Service (TCCS), a separate non-police-led, community-based initiative to provide response services in mental health- and substance use-related crisis situations (City of Toronto, 2023).¹ Similar to the 911 CCDPP, TCCS can also be pathway to divert service users away from a police-led response when the initial contact is made through 911. In light of the evolution of the 911 CCDPP and the changing landscape of community-based supports for non-emergent mental health-related crises, TPS contracted the Provincial System Support Program (PSSP) at CAMH to evaluate the 911 CCDPP and gather information to inform decisions on the program's future.

Program Description

As described by Carter (2022), the 911 CCDPP provides a new response option for non-emergent mental and behavioral health-related 911 calls. This program aims to connect people in crisis, where there is no imminent risk, with community-based supports rather than a police response by identifying and diverting appropriate calls to trained GCC crisis workers co-located in the 911 Communications Services Call Centre.

TPS communications operators (COs) screen incoming calls based on specific risk criteria, and then offer eligible callers the opportunity to speak to a crisis worker, instead of police attending their location to respond to the situation; this response pathway is referred to as “**diversion.**” With consent from the caller, the TPS CO then transfers the call to a GCC crisis worker.

Through an independent and confidential telephone system, the GCC crisis worker assesses callers for risk and provides immediate crisis support and de-escalation services. The discussions between a caller and a crisis worker are protected under the *Personal Health Information Protection Act (2004)* and are not recorded by TPS.

¹ The TCCS began operations in March 2022, with staggered launch dates across four geographical pilot regions in Toronto. It is set to expand city-wide by the end of 2024 (City of Toronto, 2023).

Background and Context

After the crisis worker determines that there are no imminent risks, they use empathy, respect, collaborative problem-solving and work from an equity-based approach to support the caller in developing a foundation of safety and strength referred to as a “Safety Plan” (Gerstein Crisis Centre, n.d.). The Safety Plan includes:

- identifying coping strategies;
- involving individuals who are a source of support in their lives;
- safeguarding the service user’s environment by removing suicide means and other risk factors;
- highlighting the service user’s reasons for living and what helps them stay safe;
- facilitating the creation of a safer environment (e.g., making agreements where callers agree to do certain things that maintain their safety, such as spending the day with a friend or family, or accepting a crisis, detox or shelter bed);
- identifying future supports, including scheduling follow-up calls, connecting with existing community supports or accepting linkages to new community supports; and/or
- planning ahead in case the service user experiences intense thoughts and feelings or is in imminent danger.

Crisis workers also provide crisis management and follow-up services for those who consent to receive further contact following the initial crisis. The role of crisis management and follow-up is to provide additional support and connection to services relevant to the needs expressed by the caller. As a whole, these additional supports and services could help identify, control, and reduce the factors that are likely to cause people to experience a future crisis (Gerstein Crisis Centre, n.d.), and may include:

- short-term supportive counselling;
- short-term service navigation;
- reconnection to existing supports; and
- connection to crisis services as an alternative to calling 911.

The 911 CCDPP also offers a “**co-response**” pathway for crisis calls that are not suitable for diversion from the police but could still benefit from de-escalation support provided by a crisis worker. In the co-response pathway, the crisis worker stays on the line with the caller until Uniformed Officers (UOs) arrive on scene. The crisis

worker provides immediate crisis intervention and de-escalation to support the caller until the police arrive. The crisis worker also works collaboratively with caller to manage any expectations about police interactions; this aims to reduce harm and achieve safer outcomes (Carter, 2022). Callers who are supported through a co-response can also access crisis management and follow-up services after the initial call.

Program Eligibility Criteria

Calls are considered eligible for diversion through the 911 CCDPP if they meet any of the following criteria:

1. a person in mental health crisis who is not actively attempting suicide or being physically violent
2. a person involved in a verbal dispute or disturbance with a mental health component, wherein a crisis worker can attempt to resolve with intervention and where there is no perceived or real risk of violence
3. a non-violent person requesting police presence due to psychosis or an altered mental state
4. a non-violent repeat caller with a known mental health history
5. a non-violent person in mental health crisis requesting TPS’s Mobile Crisis Intervention Team (MCIT)
6. second-party callers concerned about the welfare of a non-violent person suffering a mental health crisis

Calls that are not suitable for diversion but may be eligible for co-response include those that involve:

- an imminent threat to life or property;
- violence or the threat of violence;
- violent tendencies;
- weapons;
- a criminal offence;
- attempted suicide;
- drug overdose;
- medical attention;
- a person under 16 years;
- public lewdness;
- domestic violence or incident; or
- a 911 call received from a crisis line, hospital, or emergency clinic.

Evaluation Purpose, Objectives, and Scope

The overall purpose of this evaluation was to inform a decision of whether the program should continue, and if it is decided that the program should continue, what changes should be adopted moving forward. This decision cannot be made without knowing what the program has achieved during its operation, what it is yet to achieve, what factors explain the program's successes and challenges, and what the future could look like. As such, the overall objectives of this evaluation were to:

1. understand the degree to which the program's objectives have been met and what outcomes – expected and unexpected – have been achieved to date;
2. describe contributing factors to the program's realized and unrealized (desired) outcomes; and
3. describe options for the program's future beyond the pilot period.

To ensure feasibility, this evaluation was limited to investigating calls that occurred within the first 27 months of program operation (i.e., October 4, 2021 to December 31, 2023), which comprised the origins of the program and its city-wide expansion. Service users, and staff from frontline, management, and leadership teams directly involved in the 911 CCDPP participated in this evaluation, as they were the most relevant stakeholders who represented both the program's implementation team and the program's target users.

Lastly, the need to decide on the program's future made it necessary to ensure that this evaluation, and its findings, can be used by all stakeholders. This required grounding the evaluation on a framework to ensure its utilization, together with the adoption of multiple methodologies tailored to capture an in-depth understanding of the program's resources, rhythms, and relationships. These approaches are described in more detail in the sections, [Guiding the Evaluation: Co-Design, Equity and Engagement](#) and [Evaluation Approaches](#).

Evaluation Questions

In line with the evaluation purpose and objectives described above, this evaluation sought to answer three key questions and sub-questions:

1. **How successfully has the program met its objectives?**
 - a. To what extent, and how, were mental and behavioral health crisis calls responded to by the 911 CCDPP?
 - b. To what extent, and how, were direct crisis supports provided and connections made to appropriate community-based follow-up supports through the 911 CCDPP?
 - c. How did stakeholders experience the 911 CCDPP, and how did access, experiences, and/or outcomes vary within and across groups?
 - d. What unintended outcomes have emerged, if any?
2. **What factors of the 911 CCDPP are contributing to the program's realized and unrealized outcomes, as well as to accessibility and equity?**
 - a. How is the program design affecting program delivery and outcomes?
 - b. How are the financial, human, systemic, and/or physical (e.g., infrastructure, technology, etc.) factors facilitating or impeding the program in reaching its objectives?
 - c. In what ways has the partnership between TPS and GCC affected the program outcomes?
3. **What are the opportunities for the future of the program?**
 - a. What are the strengths and challenges with the current iteration of the program?
 - b. What are opportunities and potential strategies for improvement?

Guiding the Evaluation: Co-Design, Equity and Engagement

This evaluation was guided by Patton’s (2011) utilization-focused evaluation (UFE) framework. This framework emphasizes that evaluations should be designed and conducted with real-world use and learning in mind. Findings should be relevant and useful to their intended users (Patton, 2011). In line with the UFE framework, the intended primary users of the evaluation were identified as TPS and GCC. These partners were engaged from the onset of the project to understand their needs and expectations from the evaluation, including how they intended to use the evaluation process and its products (Patton, 2011).

In alignment with PSSP’s approach, this evaluation also incorporated the following equity and engagement principles and practices:

- 1. Inquiry:** Equity-centered language was embedded in the evaluation questions, objectives, and tools.
- 2. Engagement:** A Project Committee consisting of individuals with the relevant “bundle of knowledge and skills”² needed to inform evaluation planning and reporting was convened for ongoing engagement with the evaluation team. Balance was sought to ensure representation from both TPS and GCC. Consultation was also sought from TPS’s Mental Health and Addictions Advisory Panel (MHAAP), which includes individuals with “lived experience of mental health and addictions issues” (Toronto Police Service Board, 2024).
- 3. Accessibility:** Accommodations were actively offered to participate in the evaluation, and multiple methods of participation were offered (e.g., verbally or in writing).
- 4. Analysis:** A brief program-level equity analysis was conducted.

This evaluation uses the following definitions:

Equity: “Equity understands, acknowledges and removes barriers that prevent the participation of any individual or group, making fair treatment, access, opportunity, advancement and outcomes possible for all individuals.” (City of Toronto, 2020)

Inequity: “[...] [I]nequities refer to unfair and avoidable differences in service access, experiences, impacts and outcomes.” (City of Toronto, 2020)

This evaluation was co-designed to be useful, feasible, participatory, and grounded in evidence. Evaluation planning was facilitated by the PSSP evaluation team together with a consultation and co-design phase with project partners to ensure the evaluation was relevant and feasible to its intended users. The evaluation team also developed the preliminary evaluation matrix, methodology, and tools for partner review, refinement, and final approval. [Appendix A](#) contains more details on the evaluation governance structure, including the co-design and collaboration process behind this evaluation.

² The “bundle of knowledge and skills” included, but was not limited to: knowledge and experience developing and delivering mental health services to one or more priority populations; experience receiving crisis response services; lived experience of mental health and/or addictions challenges; lived experience of racism and other intersectional forms of oppression; knowledge of the 911 CCDPP from a service delivery and leadership perspective; experience providing leadership in the area of health equity; expertise in monitoring and evaluating equity-focused initiatives; expertise in information and telecommunications technology; and expertise in data and analytics.

Evaluation Approaches

As mentioned in the previous section, this evaluation was grounded on a UFE framework. This framework focuses on how evaluations and findings can be used; this is done by emphasizing principles, procedures and practices to bring all relevant 911 CCDPP stakeholders together around common evaluation goals, activities, and uptake of findings and corresponding recommendations.

We also adopted approaches to guide our methodological decisions regarding specific aspects of the program to be explored and the best ways for doing so. For this purpose, we adopted three approaches as follows:

1. theory-driven evaluation
2. unintended outcomes evaluation approach (UOEA)
3. mixed methods inquiry

Theory-driven evaluations (Chen, 1990) are guided by a “program theory”, which outlines how the program works to achieve its intended outcomes. This is done by identifying assumptions and mechanisms that link together the program resources, activities, products, and outcomes. By focusing on program theory, the evaluation can test its validity and lead to an in-depth understanding of the program and the reasons for its effectiveness, if any.

Additionally, UOEA helped us explore whether the 911 CCDPP has produced any unintended outcomes, either extra benefits or negative impacts, in certain contexts (Jabeen, 2017). With UOEA, relevant findings can be used to capitalize on the positive unintended outcomes and reduce or remove any negative unintended outcomes. It follows a three-step process to study unintended outcomes:

- 1. Outlining program intentions:** We used program documents, existing evidence, and stakeholder consultations to clarify what outcomes the program hopes to achieve.
- 2. Anticipating likely unintended outcomes:** We reviewed existing evidence and consulted with stakeholders to identify unintended outcomes that may arise from the program’s activities.
- 3. Mapping the anticipated and understanding the unanticipated:** We collected data to identify and map any unintended outcomes that occurred, and used relevant literature to help explain the findings.

Finally, this evaluation adopted a mixed methods inquiry approach (Greene, 2005) to gather different data that responded to issues of concern not only to stakeholders with decision authority, but also to those who were part of the program frontlines. This required the simultaneous collection, analysis, and interpretation of quantitative and qualitative data representing quantifiable outcomes situated in a context rich in experiences, perspectives and meanings that, when taken together, shed light on how the program works and how it has responded to the needs voiced by its service users.

Methods

Informed by the evaluation approaches described in the previous section, this evaluation followed three iterative stages:

1. developing initial program theory.
2. exploring program delivery, experiences, and outcomes; and
3. exploring opportunities for improvement.

The following subsections will describe each stage and its methods for data collection, participant recruitment, and data analysis. As previously mentioned, we employed a variety of qualitative and quantitative data sources (primary and secondary) to capture robust, diverse perspectives from relevant stakeholder groups. The evaluation matrix in [Appendix B](#) summarizes the evaluation questions and data sources used to answer each.

Stage 1: Developing Initial Program Theory

The purpose of Stage 1 was to develop the initial program theory, which we depicted in a preliminary logic model ([Appendix C](#)). A logic model is a visual representation of the resources, activities, outputs, and outcomes of the program. The logic model presented was informed by three sources of data:

1. a review of key program documents provided by partners (e.g., pilot proposal, 6-month evaluation report, board reports, others);
2. routine consultations with the Project Committee; and
3. a review of existing evidence on crisis call diversion models (to foresee any unintended outcomes or program risks).

The evaluation team developed a preliminary logic model based on the resources then available. It was later reviewed and approved by the Project Committee. This stage took place from January to March 2024.

Stage 2: Exploring Program Delivery, Experiences, and Outcomes

Once the logic model was established, we collected data to “test the theory”, determining whether and how the program is achieving its intended outcomes, and whether

any unintended outcomes have occurred. Primary data collection tools also offered space for participants to share views and experiences that could help identify potentially unintended outcomes. This stage took place from April to June 2024 and included a variety of data sources from diverse stakeholders.

Data Sources

Quantitative data on 911 CCDPP outputs and outcomes—such as the volumes and types of calls received, how they were resolved, and what immediate and post-crisis supports were provided—were obtained from administrative records of TPS and GCC. Data was inclusive of the date of the first call received by the 911 CCDPP on October 4, 2021, to December 31, 2023.

Primary data collection was cross-sectional and took place between April and May 2024. We administered a questionnaire to service users in May 2024, exploring 911 CCDPP delivery, their experiences of the program, and potential outcomes. The questionnaire included Likert-type questions and open-text boxes to provide both quantitative and qualitative data about service users’ experiences.

We conducted qualitative focus groups with frontline staff and managers from TPS and GCC to explore their experiences and perceived outcomes of the 911 CCDPP. We conducted interviews with members of each organization’s executive leadership team. Focus groups and interviews took place from April to May 2024.

In addition, TPS and GCC staff members involved in the program could complete the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory (Wilder Inventory; Mattessich et al., 2001) from April to May 2024 to explore their perceptions of the partnership between the two organizations. The Wilder Inventory is a validated tool that measures factors of collaboration such as mutual respect, shared vision, and social climate (Mattessich et al., 2001). This inventory has 44 items grouped into 22 factors associated with successful collaboration. Unfortunately, due to a technological error, the source of the Inventory provided only half of the Inventory questions. As a result, we only measured 11 of the 22 factors. Participants from both organizations used a 5-point Likert-type scale to score each item.

Data sources and their frequency and timing are summarized in the evaluation matrix ([Appendix B](#)).

Methods

Participants and Recruitment

Two main participant groups were included in the evaluation: service users and service providers. Service user participants were individuals who called 911 and spoke to a GCC crisis worker as part of the 911 CCDPP. Crisis workers from GCC identified potential service user participants and invited them to complete an online questionnaire or connect with a CAMH evaluator to do the survey over the phone. We collected data from service users from May 14 to May 31, 2024.

Service providers included: (1) staff in leadership roles, including management, supervisors, and/or senior or executive leadership; and (2) frontline staff who are involved in providing services directly to 911 CCDPP users. Relevant frontline staff at TPS included COs and UOs. Frontline staff at GCC included co-located crisis workers. Eligible frontline staff that were directly involved with the program (as identified by the main contacts at each organization) were invited via email to attend a focus group. In total, five focus groups were offered, one for GCC crisis workers, one for GCC management, one for TPS COs, one for TPS UOs, and one for TPS management. After the first focus group for GCC crisis workers, we added a question to the focus group guide, soliciting opinions about the future of the program. Participants from that first focus group were then invited to an additional 30-minute discussion to gather data

for this new question. Each focus group only included participants working in the same team, and at the same organizational level, to ensure that they could share candid thoughts.

The evaluation team endeavoured to provide a recruitment process and participation environment that was low-barrier, non-stigmatizing, and voluntary for participants. The evaluation team co-developed intentional engagement methods with the Project Committee, including offering multiple options for participation (e.g., completing the service user questionnaire online or over the phone), some accommodations for disability (e.g., text-to-speech or screen magnifiers for the online survey), abiding by informed consent practices, providing honoraria, and providing materials in advance. Sample sizes for each participant group and data collection method are summarized in Table 1.

Data Analysis and Interpretation

Quantitative data from administrative records and questionnaires were cleaned and organized in Microsoft Excel. We performed descriptive statistical analyses including frequencies, measures of central tendency, and proportions. Where possible and relevant, data was disaggregated by time period, event type, program function, and/or organization.

Table 1. Service users and staff from the Toronto Police Service (TPS) and Gerstein Crisis Centre (GCC) participated in this evaluation

Participant group	Organization	Participant level	Sample size*			
			Questionnaire	Wilder Inventory	Focus group	Total
Service users	N/A	N/A	13			13
Service providers	Toronto Police Service	Leadership		11	6	55
		Frontline staff (COs and UOs)		25	13	
	Gerstein Crisis Centre	Leadership		3	3	12
		Frontline staff (crisis workers)		3	3	

* These numbers may not represent the number of *unique* participants, as service providers were able to participate in both the Wilder Inventory and focus group/interview.

Methods

For the Wilder Inventory, we calculated the average for all items representing each collaboration factor. Factor scores were also calculated for each organization (i.e., TPS and GCC) and compared against each other to identify organizational differences. The maximum score for each factor is 5.0. According to the Wilder Inventory developers, factors with average scores of 2.9 or lower reveal a concern and should be addressed; factors scoring between 3.0 and 3.9 are borderline and should be discussed by the group to see if they deserve attention; and factors scoring 4.0 or higher show a strength and likely do not need special attention (Mattessich & Johnson, 2016).

Interviews and focus groups were recorded and transcribed using Webex. We analyzed the transcripts using a modified version of Iterative Thematic Inquiry (ITI; Morgan & Nica, 2020). This deductive and reflexivity-centered approach systematically encourages analysts to identify the assumptions or preconceptions that they may develop during data collection activities. The analysts then openly conceptualize and describe their assumptions and use them as preliminary themes. Afterwards, evaluators iteratively code each data source and identify evidence for and against each preliminary theme. All themes are progressively refined until a cohesive narrative is obtained.

For the modified version of ITI (Morgan & Nica, 2020), three evaluators, actively involved during data collection activities, gathered to identify and describe a set of shared initial perceptions of the program that were used as preliminary themes. Afterwards, two evaluators coded each transcript, gathering evidence for and against each preliminary theme. They also discussed any insights or thematic refinements as they arose. Unlike the original ITI approach, the evaluators also proposed preliminary recommendations based on the analysis of each individual transcript. Once all transcripts were coded, the entire evaluation team (including the project lead and the health equity specialist) gathered and discussed a proposed narrative structure, encompassing qualitative and quantitative findings, that was used to organize the Results section. As previously mentioned, this structure was developed to ensure that no data was interpreted in isolation from the context of the program, its transformations over time, and the experiences of those involved.

In addition, program planning documents (e.g., pilot proposal and 6-month evaluation report), transcripts and audio recordings of focus groups and interviews, service user questionnaires and sociodemographic data practices were analyzed for a brief program-level assessment of equity and accessibility. To fill gaps in information, a short, focused discussion was facilitated with the Project Committee in June. The analysis included a search for equity and accessibility-related needs, program activities or functions, experiences, outcomes, expectations, strengths or challenges, and/or mention of priority populations. The assessment of sociodemographic data collection compiled 911 CCDPP's sociodemographic indicators, response rates compared to response rates when best practice is implemented, and any relevant qualitative data about the process.

Stage 3: Exploring Improvement Opportunities

The final stage aimed to answer evaluation question 3b, identifying areas and/or strategies for program improvement based on the findings from the first two stages using a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis (Appendix D). A SWOT analysis is an approach that maps internal (strengths and weaknesses) and external factors (opportunities and threats) that may help or harm the program, which can be used to develop strategies for improvement (Renault, 2017). The SWOT analysis was conducted by the PSSP evaluation team, with additional support from a Senior Health Policy Analyst and a Senior Innovation Specialist from PSSP in June 2024. The SWOT analysis, along with preliminary evaluation findings, were subsequently reviewed by the Project Committee, with the aim to improve the quality of data interpretation, have a clearer view of the context surrounding specific findings, facilitate dialogue across diverse perspectives, and build support for the use of the findings (Rogers, n.d.). Data from this stage informed the evaluation recommendations.

Ethical Considerations

This evaluation was guided by the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 2022), although we did not conduct an external ethics review.

Privacy, Consent, and Compensation

Taking part in this evaluation was voluntary and informed consent was secured from all participants. All information received from participants was kept confidential and any documents containing evaluation data were de-identified. All data was stored in CAMH password-protected servers, accessible only to internal evaluation team members.

Each participant joining any facilitated evaluation activity received an information package detailing the evaluation aims, as well as the data collection process, purposes, risks, and benefits. Evaluators reviewed this information during each focus group, ensured comprehension, answered any questions, and acquired verbal consent prior to commencing the focus group and audio recording the session. To ensure that both the participating individuals and the space of connection were safe, inclusive, and respectful, evaluators created continuous opportunities for checking-in, moments of reflection, and a reciprocal dialogue.

Online questionnaire participants received a link to a REDCap survey, which required them to review the same information package—including all details and the privacy considerations described above —shared with other participants and provided their informed consent before completing the questionnaire. Service users were offered an honorarium of \$30, in the form of a choice of gift card, electronic funds transfer, or cheque, to show appreciation for their time and contribution to this evaluation. Frontline staff (UOs and COs) from TPS were compensated for their time by their employer following their own internal procedures and guidelines.

Results

The results of this evaluation are presented in the form of key takeaways, summarized in Figure 1, with supporting data provided below in detail. As mentioned in a previous section, qualitative data is essential to understand how the program has been experienced by different stakeholders, but also to contextualize metrics obtained from administrative data. We are mindful that narratives describing the experience of the program

can be extensive and may have an impact on the overall readability of this report. For this reason, we are presenting only a limited number of direct quotations from evaluation participants to illustrate each takeaway, but more perspectives can be found in [Appendix E](#). All illustrative quotes, including those in the appendix, have informed the evaluative findings and recommendations presented throughout this report.




Figure 1. Summary of key takeaways

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Key Takeaway 1: The program is meeting an established need in new ways

1.1 The program provides a new voice and new connections

As described in the [Background and Context](#) section, people in non-emergent mental health-related crisis frequently choose to call 911, yet 911 was not originally conceived to meet the specific needs of these types of calls. As such, the 911 CCDPP was commended by many evaluation participants for its contributions towards a “paradigm shift”, where the primary response is based on community resources. The 911 CCDPP was perceived to be bridging a gap in the current crisis response system, particularly for its ability to leverage a “huge access point we have at 911, to really make sure that it’s strongly supported to be connected to mental health services” (██████████). Service providers from both GCC and TPS acknowledged that this program can provide immediate support to people in crisis who do not necessarily need urgent in-person support or apprehensions, but may not know resources other than 911. This was thought to include populations such as immigrants or refugees, international students, seniors, and those who may not have access to means other than the phone. As shared (██████████):

“There’s always been a frustration for the events [...] where an individual obviously needed support, but we recognize that the police were not the appropriate response. So the rollout of this program was, in my view, like an exciting opportunity for us to offer more appropriate supports to people away from the law enforcement system, and I think that it’s a great program.” (██████████)

As an alternative model that provides a “health and social response and move[s] away from a criminal justice response” (██████████), the 911 CCDPP was thought to improve experiences of receiving crisis support. Members of the (██████████) team highlighted the benefits of having a program grounded in empathy, empowerment, and collaborative decision-making, which a traditional police response may not always be able to offer:

“It takes the power away as well, you know, not somebody coming to tell me what to do. It’s non-coercive [...] for [callers] to choose what’s best for them and offer that support, as opposed to the power over, ‘This is what you’re doing.’ [...] So, we find it was beneficial to kind of have that [alternative].” (██████████)

Co-located GCC crisis workers were praised for their ability to use a comprehensive, intersectional lens to support people in crisis with the various factors that may be contributing to crisis. Data from the service user questionnaire supported this finding, as participants indicated that the program supported them with various health and well-being dimensions, including overall mental health; social connectedness; healthy behaviors; coping skills; living conditions; suicidal thoughts/ideation; and well-being related to their unique culture and identity.

As previously described, the 911 CCDPP also provides callers with post-crisis follow-up and referrals to internal and external community-based supports, with the aim of reducing factors that are likely to cause a future crisis. This was perceived to be beneficial in comparison to a traditional 911 response, as:

“[I]t just gives that opportunity to get connected, whereas [if] you call 911 or non-emergency, [callers] [may not] get a call back; there is no follow-up from that. So, it gives an opportunity [...] to be able to have that one extra phone call to make sure they get connected” (██████████).

(██████████) emphasized how their organization’s existing expertise and network are assets to ensure that the caller can stay connected post-crisis, with (██████████) explaining how:

“[GCC crisis workers] have quite a few tools [...] at their fingertips to be able to help connect people to services [...] And then of course, just regularly, the crisis workers are really knowledgeable about what’s available within the system - systems knowledge.” (██████████)

Between October 4, 2021, and December 31, 2023, GCC crisis workers offered a total of 3,840 referrals to GCC’s internal crisis supports. Most commonly, service users were referred to GCC’s direct crisis phone line (n=1994; 52%) which serves as an alternative to calling 911 for future crises, thereby contributing to efforts to divert non-emergent mental health-related calls from a police

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response and alleviate strain on police resources. Other common referrals included crisis management and follow-up (n=679; 18%), a mobile crisis visit by GCC's own mobile crisis team (n=467; 13%), and GCC's substance use crisis team (n=360; 9%). Table 2, shown below, provides a breakdown of the internal referrals provided. In addition, GCC has a strong network of external community-based agencies to which they can refer 911 CCDPP service users for support following their initial crisis. [Appendix F](#) provides a list of external organizations to which service users are commonly referred. This list is not comprehensive but illustrates the holistic nature of the service provided by the 911 CCDPP.

Table 2. The 911 CCDPP provided 3,840 internal referrals between October 4, 2021, and December 31, 2023

Internal support service	Total # of times provided	% (n=3840)
Crisis phone support	1994	52
Crisis management & follow-up	679	18
Mobile team visit	467	12
Substance use crisis team	350	9
Toronto Community Crisis Service (TCCS; internal)	190	5
Crisis bed	143	4
Finding Recovery Through Exercise Skills and Hope (F.R.E.S.H.)	16	0
DBT distress tolerance	1	0
Total	3,840	100

Data from the service user questionnaire indicate that 100% (n=5) of participants who were referred to community-based supports were either 'very satisfied' or 'satisfied' with the referral process. Additionally, 39% (n=5) of all service user participants felt that their access to community-based supports increased because of the 911 CCDPP. One survey participant shared that:

"They stayed connected to me. They provided me with immediate help as well as kept working with me on my long-term goals. The incident happened a year ago and they still check up on me time-to-time." ()

These findings indicate that the 911 CCDPP can not only address immediate crisis needs using a more person-centered approach, but also facilitate connections with longer-term support and utilization of appropriate mental health-related resources. As () service providers noted, "the only hiccups really have to do with just all the things we can't control: waitlists and wait times and how long it takes to get connected" (). Therefore, continued success of this aspect of the program may depend on external factors, such as any changes in system-level healthcare investments that can make referrals accessible and sustainable over time.

The 911 CCDPP was also praised by evaluation participants for its co-response service, which was offered a total of 874 times in the first 27 months. This innovation illustrates how the integration of both organizations' expertise can improve the way in which a crisis response occurs. Service providers from TPS and GCC provided examples of how this service pathway contributes to a more efficient management of incoming calls, such as:

"[I]t's helpful to have [a crisis worker] available in those moments because it allows you to continue with whatever is pending, but you're aware that [callers are] still getting the support they need to bring them down a little bit while officers are on their way so that the situation doesn't escalate further, especially for those people that are triggered by police or they are already concerned and worried that emergency services are coming." ()

Evaluation participants also highlighted how the GCC crisis workers are able to improve the efficacy and safety of an in-person police response, by preparing and de-escalating the caller. For example, () shared how a GCC crisis worker:

"started to prime [the caller] to get them ready that the police are responding. Again, it was a rare instance but a great one. It was collecting information for us while de-escalating at the same time, with the specialty that a crisis worker has as opposed to just a dispatcher; sort of like a team effort." ()

() shared how service users have similarly shared positive feedback regarding the co-response service:

"Clients as well, you know, talk about the benefits of this [co-response] [...] Sometimes, when we do follow-up,

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[service users will say], ‘Hey, you know, the response I received from the police was different this time.’ And it was different because we have that connection [...] So, [callers] find that the response is different; it’s more respectful, feeling pretty unified, so it’s beneficial for them.” (██████████)

Lastly, in partnering with a community-based leader in crisis response and offering a more person-centered response, some evaluation participants perceived that the 911 CCDPP may have broader community-level impacts, including improving the relationship and trust between police and the community. As shared by (██████████) :

“I think it’s the people in the community saying, ‘Wow, Toronto Police might actually be thinking forward, thinking ahead and understanding that we’re not the answer to everything and that there are other organizations they’re willing to pay, they’re willing to partner [with], they’re willing to train there to be in the space.’ So, I think for public trust, increasing public trust with the community.” (██████████)

However, it is important to note that, due to feasibility, gathering data from the broader community (e.g., Toronto residents who did not access the service) and measurement of community-level outcomes were out of scope for this evaluation. Future evaluations could focus on these aspects.

1.2 Service users appear to be satisfied overall with their experience receiving support from the 911 CCDPP

The benefits of the 911 CCDPP were also reported by many service user participants as well. Data from the service user questionnaire showed that 77% (n=10) of participants were “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with the support received from the GCC crisis worker. Table 3 shows a high level of agreement—taken as the summed percentage of the survey responses “strongly agree” and “agree”—on various statements related to receiving empathetic and person-centered support from the co-located crisis worker.

Additionally, service users shared mostly positive experiences with the 911 CCDPP overall, with an overall satisfaction (e.g., “very satisfied” or “satisfied”) rate of 77%. When asked to reflect on their experiences with the program and/or the impact it has had on their lives, some service users shared positive testimonials.

“Getting connected to [the] Gerstein crisis worker changed my life for good that day, they went above and beyond to help me and to make sure I was safe. I will always be grateful to [redacted names of two GCC crisis workers].” (██████████)

“I was in a crisis and didn’t even realize how it was effecting [sic] my mental health. They helped me identify the severity of the situation and also helped me overcome my anxiety, provided me all the referrals and resources I needed. They inspire me to do more for community like what they did for me.” (██████████)

Table 3. Service user participants were satisfied with the support received from a co-located crisis worker through the 911 CCDPP

Statement	% of participants that agreed with each statement (n=13)
I found the crisis worker understood and empathized with my needs when I was feeling stressed or overwhelmed	85%
I was able to share about my life and my needs on my own terms	92%
The crisis worker acknowledged my unique identity, personal strengths, and life experiences	85%
I found the crisis worker to be knowledgeable about supporting mental health needs and the resources available to me	69%
I got to decide what types of supports I wanted	85%
Overall, I didn’t feel judged by the crisis worker and was treated with dignity and respect	85%

However, there were also negative experiences shared by some participants, including:

“I think they need to be educated on how to deal with people with mental health issues and how to talk to people with issues.” (██████████)

“Feel like talking to a psychologist who is just billing hours. Doesn’t feel like they care. Ended up going private

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with care. I feel like there [sic] more concerned about checking billable hours. They're just watching a clock that we've been on the phone for a while and wants to move on." [REDACTED]

"Some of the crisis workers minimize problems. Hate talking to certain crisis workers. [It] [d]epends on which crisis worker you get. Answer depends on which time. Gerstein needs to improve their service because people are in crisis. [It] [f]eels like they're giving resources that are not appropriate." [REDACTED]

1.3 The 911 CCDPP is becoming increasingly successful at diverting non-emergent mental health-related crisis call away from police resources, albeit with a comparatively small quantitative impact

During the first 27 months of pilot operations, the 911 CCDPP offered services to 1,722 unique individuals, accounting for 4,724 events.³ This included 3,850 offers for diversion (81%) and 874 offers for co-response (19%). Figure 2 provides an overview of the outcomes of 911 events received during this time period.




Figure 2. The 911 CCDPP supported 2,825 events during the pilot period and there were 28,216 events that may include more opportunities for diversion

³ This section uses the term "event" in accordance with the data provided by TPS. An event number is created when an incident is reported to 911. In instances where multiple people call 911 regarding the same event, their information will be added to the same event number. As such, an event represents a unique incident regardless of how many phone calls from the public are received regarding it. Analysis of the data showed that, for this program, each caller was assigned a unique event number, suggesting a 1:1 ratio for calls and events. Therefore, these terms are used interchangeably in other sections of this report.

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1.3.1 Completed diversions

Of the 3,850 eligible events offered diversion, a total of 1,951 were successfully diverted from a police response, resulting in a “completion rate” of 51%. As illustrated in Figure 3 below, the completion rate has been increasing over time, suggesting that, while the program may not be increasing the number of diversion offers to 911 callers, it is becoming more effective at diverting the events they do receive. This finding could be attributed to various factors, including increased acceptance by callers which, in turn, could lead to future direct requests for diversion, an improved ability of 911 CCDPP service providers to correctly identify eligible events, or an improved ability of crisis workers to resolve diverted events.

1.3.2 Incomplete diversion events: Diversion declined

Events that were offered diversion were considered to be incomplete if the caller declined the offer or if the event had to be sent back to TPS after being transferred to the GCC crisis worker. Unlike other 911 offerings such as police, fire, and ambulance, callers must voluntarily consent to receive 911 CCDPP services, and are thus entitled to decline the offer and receive a traditional police response instead.

Approximately one-fifth (n=847; 22%) of callers declined diversion when offered. [REDACTED] who

participated in the evaluation suggested various reasons that a caller may decline diversion. One participant reflected on implicit assumptions among communities, or within society, that may lead people to believe that a crisis situation can only be handled by the police, offering that callers in crisis “are just so upset or just believe that the only people that can respond appropriately are the police. Even when you explain about the GCC or Toronto Community Crisis Service (TCCS) response, the response is still, ‘No, I want the police.’” [REDACTED]. Another participant suggested that family members who may be calling on behalf of someone in crisis:

“want the options removed. They want basically an action taken on how to address this matter [...] When you provide [the option of] somebody who’s not in a position to take somebody with or without force, it still lays options on the table to prolong the situation. Whereas when a police officer’s there, you know that if they meet the criteria and need to go to the hospital, they’re going.” [REDACTED]

Finally, [REDACTED] explained how some callers may not recognize they are in crisis, “so when the idea of a mental health crisis worker to talk to [gets offered], they don’t think they’re having a mental health crisis, so they take offence to it, and they say ‘No’. There’s nothing else we can do about it.” [REDACTED]




Figure 3. The program completion rate has increased over time (October 4, 2021, to December 31, 2023)

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


Figure 4. The proportion of calls declining diversion has **decreased over time** (October 4, 2021, to December 31, 2023)

Notably, the dotted trend line shows that the proportion of events that declined diversion has been trending downward over time (Figure 4), despite increases in recent months. This suggests a potential increase in program buy-in among 911 callers. It is also reasonable to expect some continued level of service refusal by callers. Further monitoring of diversion refusals will allow program staff to gauge an appropriate benchmark.

1.3.3 Incomplete events: Diverted events sent back to TPS

The remaining incomplete events are those that were initially diverted to the 911 CCDPP but had to be sent back to TPS. This occurred in 1,052 events (35% of events sent to the 911 CCDPP for diversion), as illustrated below in Figure 5. There were various reasons for sending

an event back to TPS, including:

- the event later being deemed unsuitable for diversion by the GCC crisis worker after they received more information (n=414; 39%);
- the caller being unreachable when the crisis worker attempted to contact them (n=391; 37%);
- the caller later declining diversion (n=178; 17%); and
- the diversion event being cancelled.

Similarly to diversion refusals, the proportion of events that are sent back to TPS has been trending downward over time. This finding provides evidence in favour of the effectiveness of the program’s diversion efforts. It is important to ensure continued monitoring of incomplete events until a benchmark can be estimated.




Figure 5. The proportion of events sent back to TPS has **decreased moderately over time** (October 4, 2021, to December 31, 2023)

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1.4 However, overall expectations about alleviating the use of police resources for non-emergent mental health-related needs are yet to be achieved

As described in the [Background and Context](#) section, one desired objective of the 911 CCDPP was to divert police resources from responding to non-emergent mental health-related events, thus alleviating some of the strain on overall TPS resourcing. As shown in Figure 2 above, the 911 CCDPP successfully diverted 1,951 events from a police response, yet TPS still responded to 73,515 “Mental Health Related” events in 27 months. This suggests that the program is currently making a small, yet meaningful, impact on the number of events attended by TPS. Although the 911 CCDPP appears to be relatively small from a purely quantitative lens, the evaluation data shed light on various factors that may be contributing to the overall volume of mental health-related events responded to by 911.

1.4.1 A wave of mental health-related needs in the city of Toronto

Firstly, ██████████ reflected on the general increase in mental health-related events received by TPS, with participants perceiving that:

“I feel like [call volume] stayed the same, but I don’t know if that’s because we’re just getting more calls in general. We’re just always slammed; it’s never-ending. So, it’s really hard to measure that.” ██████████

“For every one step that we take forward, I think we’re taking two steps back just with the increased number of calls we have.” ██████████

1.4.2 Possible reinforcement of calling 911

The 911 CCDPP was designed with the intention of helping callers connect with non-police resources. It was presumed that, should they experience a similar situation again, they would use these other resources instead of calling 911. During the first stages of data collection for this evaluation, this presumption was perceived to have materialized to some extent, as voiced by ██████████:

“The crisis workers have been able to take on some of those regular callers and, in some cases, even reduce how many times they’re calling, which is also, I think, huge in terms of diversion because it creates the space

for people not to be calling 911 and getting their services in more appropriate places.” ██████████)

We also heard a complementary perspective, from ██████████ emphasizing how diverting mental health-related events can also help redirect police resources to respond to events where they are most needed:

“There were chronic callers [...] where we would have to send like four officers and a sergeant or something. Now, because those [repeat] calls are being diverted to the [911 CCDPP] [...] those [police] units can be used for other active or criminal calls instead of a wellbeing check or a mental health check.” ██████████)

However, other ██████████ perceived that the program is not decreasing the number of repeat calls to 911, but rather reinforcing callers to use 911 for non-emergent mental health-related needs. They offered hypotheses for why individuals may use the program multiple times, the first of which is the immediacy of getting connected to a crisis worker through the 911 CCDPP. ██████████ explained how calling 911 facilitates more rapid access to mental health support in comparison to other community-based crisis resources that operate within a mental health system that is stretched thin by high demand and under-resourcing and may have longer wait times as a result:

“█████████ regular callers aren’t learning how to get their resources without calling 911 [...] They’re learning [that], if they call 911, they get the [crisis worker] immediately. If you call Gerstein[’s direct crisis line] right now, you are going to wait 45 minutes to an hour and a half to speak to a crisis counselor. So, they’re learning it’s faster to come through 911.” ██████████)

Another ██████████ shared how “there are callers that are phoning 911 and immediately asking for, by name, the crisis worker”, suggesting that callers may be reinforced to call 911 after developing a rapport with the co-located crisis workers. Furthermore, when asked what they would do if they experienced a similar situation again, ██████████ participant indicated that they would “call 911 but ask for crisis worker. [I] [t]hink that’s what I’m supposed to do.” These experiences and early data points might be suggestive of the need for enhanced public awareness and education on the various crisis services and access gateways available and their intended uses.

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After having engaged with different members of GCC and TPS teams, we proceeded to analyse administrative data to better understand this potential outcome of the 911 CCDPP. Data were not available to determine whether the overall number of calls to 911 has changed as a result of the 911 CCDPP. However, the available data showed preliminary evidence of repetitive program usage. Despite accounting for only 18% (n=316) of overall unique service users, repeat callers accounted for more than half (53%) of the diversion offers in the first 27 months pilot operations. Figure 6 provides a breakdown of the number of additional diversion offers to unique repeat callers, demonstrating that 80% of repeat callers re-called the service four or fewer times.

While the diversion completion rate for repeat callers has been improving over time, indicating that the program is becoming more effective at diverting their calls, the findings suggest that the 911 CCDPP is increasingly supporting a subset of repeat callers. A more fulsome investigation into repeat caller data, both within the

context of the 911 CCDPP and 911 more broadly, is warranted to better understand the implications of these partial findings.

1.4.3 Diversion offers have grown modestly despite expansion of the program and an overall high volume of mental health-related calls

It is also important to acknowledge the context of the 73,515 mental health-related events attended by TPS. Of these events, 45,299 were deemed out of scope for diversion, for reasons such as a Section 17 apprehension; a “form” type of apprehension; or the event was classified as any of the following TPS call types that do not meet the criteria for diversion: Attempt Suicide, Overdose, Elopee, and Fall from Height. There remains 28,216 mental health related events which may involve critical factors like threat of violence, weapons, or a need for a criminal investigation. This does not necessarily mean that these events met diversion criteria, as all events were triaged by TPS COs to assess if they were appropriate for diversion,




Figure 6. 80% of repeat callers made four or fewer additional calls to 911

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nor does it mean that the most appropriate response pathway was the 911 CCDPP. However, due to a lack of standardized monitoring of diversion offers and our limited ability to analyze 911 data due to the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA)*, it was not possible to confirm whether any of these events were “missed opportunities” for diversion.

Considering that increases in the number of diversion offers do not appear to be sustained (Figure 7),⁴ and that there remains a stark contrast between the number of events offered diversion (n=3,850) and not offered diversion through the 911 CCDPP (n=28,216),⁵ more investigation into these events should be done to learn more about how the diversion criteria are being applied and/or could be revised to maximize utilization of the program. The findings within [section 2.2](#) provide additional details on operational challenges that may be contributing to this contrast.

Ultimately, diversion is perceived as a favourable outcome that speaks to the effectiveness of the program but, most importantly, of callers being connected with more appropriate supports during a crisis situation. In this regard, we heard from ██████████ that “whenever that [diversion] happens, even if it’s five times a year or a thousand times a year, those are a thousand people who got the best response that they needed when they were in crisis.” Another ██████████ shared that, from their perspective:

“Successful outcomes for me are someone getting the right type of services. It’s not about saving police money because it’s kind of negligible. If you look at the numbers of calls we attend and get, and the numbers that are diverted, it’s negligible. So, it’s not really a cost-savings or time-savings for police. It’s just—the successful outcome is knowing that someone’s getting that right call [crisis response].” ██████████




Figure 7. The number of events offered diversion through the 911 CCDPP program has **grown modestly over time** (October 4, 2021 to December 31, 2023)

⁴ There were two temporary peaks in diversion offerings. A first peak occurred around March 2022. This coincided with the launch of the City of Toronto’s TCCS, a parallel crisis response pilot offering in-person mobile crisis visits. A second peak occurred beginning in October 2022, which coincided with the expansion of the 911 CCDPP to a 24/7, city-wide service. It is possible that the staffing initiatives (e.g., training, hiring, call monitoring) and public awareness campaigns in preparation for these launches resulted in temporary increases in calls offered diversion. However, these increases do not appear to have been sustained.

⁵ This number may include events that were offered diversion through the 911 CCDPP but were refused or sent back to TPS, or routed through other pathways, including competing programs (e.g., TCCS); however, this could not be confirmed due to the completeness and availability of data.

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1.5 There are opportunities to strengthen equity and accessibility in the 911 CCDPP

Equity is inherent in the 911 CCDPP, in that it supports people experiencing mental health-related crises and offers an alternative to police response, which is of particular significance for historically marginalized communities who experience disproportionate use of force, invasive searches, and criminal legal system interactions (Marcus & Stergiopoulos, 2022; Murray, 2021). In addition, staff from both TPS and GCC described general organizational elements that may support the 911 CCDPP to provide accessible and inclusive crisis support. Some examples include, but are not limited to:

- the ability to provide empathetic and well-trained support through providing staff training on topics such as anti-racism, Indigenous cultural safety, trauma-informed care, accessibility, and gender diversity;
- the ability to provide service in the caller's language of choice due to the availability of interpretation services;
- the ability to provide 911 CCDPP service users with referrals to GCC's network of community partners that specialize in supporting diverse needs and identities (see [Appendix F](#)); and
- the inherent accessibility of 911 (e.g., 24/7 free calling services, text-to-911 service for the deaf or hearing impaired).

However, we identified some examples of program-level equity-related challenges. First, partners do not appear to be working from a place of shared understanding and prioritization of equity that emphasizes the need for specific activities, outcomes, and indicators to address equity in a consistent, program-wide manner. Second, many evaluation participants acknowledged that sociodemographic data cannot be easily captured during the regular provision of service due to the nature of crisis situations. Therefore, this type of data can only be collected during follow-up, which accounts for only a small fraction of all service users. However, even at the time of follow-up, some service users may still be in crisis, therefore making data collection not clinically appropriate, or they may not be comfortable with voluntarily disclosing this information, which may be particularly relevant for equity-deserving populations. These factors, compounded with inconsistent internal practices, such as different indicators being used by each partner organization and unclear plans on whether and how this data would inform program planning, create

significant barriers to inform equity planning. Last, although Project Committee members reported that hiring practices at GCC aim to reflect the diversity and intersectionality of the community it serves, including hiring people with lived experience of mental health challenges, Project Committee members ██████ reported that similar considerations are not currently part of the hiring practices for the role of TPS CO; they also described how the inclusion of criteria such as having lived experience could further reduce the pool of successful applicants. In turn, this would exacerbate the existing challenges the organization already faces when fulfilling this critical role.

Program planning is another area that could benefit from the adoption of an equity-informed lens. Initial planning for the 911 CCDPP included the following expectations for GCC crisis workers: providing crisis intervention that is equity based, working within an anti-Black racism, anti-Indigenous racism and anti-oppressive framework; utilizing a trauma informed and harm reduction framework; and providing a community based, non-coercive approach to crisis response. However, it is not known whether the use of these approaches has been tracked or evaluated. Still, findings from the ██████ focus group demonstrated that they are encountering situations in which both program staff and service users would benefit from more intentional program-level equity planning. In addition to reiterating the challenges of collecting sociodemographic data often enough from service users to understand the profile of clients accessing the program, ██████ spoke of various needs and challenges they had identified related to equity, such as racialized staff having difficult experiences of integration at the 911 Communications Services Call Centre; challenges conducting assessment and follow up with callers who are unable to read or write; and not having a clear sense of whether the public, and specific individuals and communities, are aware of the 911 CCDPP which, in turn, has implications for equitable access to its services.

“[P]eople who are of the BIPOC [Black, Indigenous, People of Colour] community have difficult experiences of integration being at the call center for 911.” ██████)

“Yeah, [equity]’s difficult to assess as well because again, our crisis piece, we don’t always check for demographic stats. So that’s difficult. It’s, it’s a little easier to assess when you’re standing in front of someone or when you’re on the phone.” ██████)

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Accommodation, acceptability, and inclusion are also untapped areas for potential improvement. There were mixed results from service user participants:

- Six out of nine (67%) service users agreed that their disability-related needs (e.g. mobility, hearing, vision, learning etc.) were recognized and accommodated by 911 CCDPP staff, two service users disagreed, and one person selected 'I don't know/Prefer not to answer'.
- Seven of 11 (64%) service users agreed that the crisis worker provided them with options for supports that were relevant to their culture and identity (e.g. ethnic background, race, gender expression, sexual orientation, religion etc.), 3 (33%) service users disagreed, and 1 selected 'I don't know/Prefer not to answer'.
- One service user reported experiencing discrimination on multiple grounds of their identity while accessing the program, with two others selecting 'I don't know/Prefer not to answer'.

These findings should be interpreted with caution, as people who are the most marginalized experience greater barriers to participating in research and evaluation and are typically under-represented in evaluation findings (Feldman et al., 2014; Shea et al., 2022). As a result, these findings may overestimate accommodation for disabilities and underestimate experiences of discrimination. These considerations are further described in the [Limitations](#) section.

Overall, due to limitations in sociodemographic data collection, and significantly lower response rates than best practice, the evaluation was unable to conduct meaningful equity-related sub-analyses for service users. Thus, our ability to comprehensively understand if and how the program is meeting the needs of the full diversity of the community it serves, and the experiences of the diverse populations that the 911 CCDPP aims to serve, was limited. This aspect should be considered when interpreting the findings presented herein and making decisions for the program's future.

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Key Takeaway 2: Key operations are not connected despite expectations and some positive collaboration experiences

2.1 Positive expectations and collaboration experiences speak of the perceived potential of the program

The results from the Wilder Inventory ([Appendix G](#)) indicated high scores in areas such as “History of Collaboration”, “Legitimacy”, and “Favorable Political and Social Climate”, which are foundations for an effective collaboration. Notably, GCC and its management team were consistently highly rated in historical collaboration and legitimacy, suggesting they have built strong community ties and are recognized leaders in their field.

We heard from members of ██████████ that the early stages of the program were characterized by positive expectations related to partnership and the co-location of the crisis workers.

“[TPS] didn't just go ahead and hire themselves a crisis worker. There was a real desire for collaboration. That was another part of what was kind of the concept behind doing this kind of diversion. [It] wasn't [the] police on their own, but actually working in partnership with [the] community.” ██████████

“In the beginning, it was really advantageous. It allowed both sides to learn with the other and to create trust and, you know, to figure out what was possible between the two services.” ██████████

██████████ and ██████████ have seen how some of the initial expectations materialized and led to positive changes, as described by ██████████:

“[...] A couple of ██████████ have said ‘I say things that you say now.’ [...] If they're open, if they're open in the slightest bit, they will give you that feedback, like ‘oh, yeah, yeah, I tried that.’ Right? And I think that that is one of the benefits, at least to helping to change a bit of the culture.” ██████████

Similarly, ██████████ noted that:

“Just talking like one-on-one with the [crisis] workers, and just kind of seeing what they're doing and, you know,

their follow-up and things like that. I think it's a lot more encouraging all around. So, I'm definitely happy that this came into place for.” ██████████

Co-location was also seen as an opportunity for providing an almost immediate response, setting the 911 CCDPP apart from other competing initiatives such as the TCCS. Members of both organizations also anticipated drawbacks without co-location.

“If we were off-site, then there would be no personal kind of growth on [COs'] part of getting to know who we are and what we do and see how we work. I think – them seeing how we work, how we are with people.” ██████████

“They understand our systems. They're using our systems. It's easy to transfer back and forth. There's no loss of information. So, I think that is a huge benefit.” ██████████

Lastly, an effective collaboration between the communications team and the crisis team was described as having the potential to alleviate some of the work burden, something that was perceived during the initial stages of the program as shared by ██████████:

“[W]hen [crisis workers] could do [call screening], the GCC would type in there ‘we'll try calling complainant; diversion possible.’ They would use their judgment based on what they can do in their policy to see if they could actually help us out. And then they diverted a couple of calls, so I think it makes an impact.” ██████████

An unintended positive outcome was also identified: the program led to the provision of mental health support to ██████████ experiencing mental health concerns due to the nature of their work. In the voice of ██████████:

“[T]he crisis worker that was working was able to get connected to that ██████████ and support them in a way that was very quick, and in such a way that prevented them from having further mental health issues.” ██████████

In summary, the Wilder Inventory, enriched with some experiences and perspectives of multiple members of TPS and GCC shared in focus groups, indicated that the partnership was established under favorable external conditions and perceived as being in the best interest of all parties involved. Members from different teams have

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also had favorable experiences at different moments throughout the life of the program, as demonstrated by their first-hand accounts of successful collaborations that highlighted the overall positive potential of the 911 CCDPP.

2.2 There is a lack of fully integrated operations

As the program evolves, some of its key operations appear to be lacking in integration, which has resulted in challenges described by multiple members of both teams, at all organizational levels. Some challenges can be pinpointed, for example, impediments to call screening capabilities were discovered in the early stages of the 911 CCDPP due to privacy-related reasons; this required the introduction of changes to the program operations. However, not all challenges the program has faced can be situated in isolated moments of time, or attributed to any one particular internal or external cause. They represent an amalgamation of factors developed throughout the program's life that stakeholders can perceive and incorporate as part of their experience of the 911 CCDPP, and use them to inform their individual views on the program's improvement opportunities and future outlook.

Specifically, one of the challenges identified in this evaluation is an underlying lack of integration is impacting key program operations, namely, call screening and diversion, and co-response.

2.2.1 Call screening and diversion

Members ██████████ described the contrasts they experienced over time in their call viewing and screening capabilities.

“At the beginning of the project, for the first 4 months of the project [...] at least we were able to see all of the calls that came into the Toronto police.” ██████████

This change was also acknowledged by some ██████████ who noted that those previous capabilities were positive, making it difficult to understand.

“[W]hen they could do that, the GCC would say— they would type in there ‘we'll try calling complainant; diversion possible.’ They would use their judgment based on what they can do in their policy to see if they could actually help us out. And then they diverted a couple of calls, so I think it makes an impact.” ██████████

Communications operators are currently solely responsible for connecting with each individual caller and navigating their requests for emergency support. They have described using a combination of procedural criteria, safety judgements, and overall individual experience, to decide on transferring a call to a crisis worker. ██████████

██████████ offered that:

“[M]y own standard is, basically: if the caller, if anyone could potentially get hurt, whether it's self-inflicted on their end, or whether it's to responders, if somebody can get hurt, I don't make the referral [to a crisis worker]. I've sent police, ambulance, [and] fire, for over a decade. So, if there's potential for any physical harm on anybody's part, I don't make the referral.” ██████████

██████████ described their preference for being able to connect eligible callers with a different service that can offer an in-person response:

“I would way rather provide somebody in-person supports. Then, I think that they'd get that validation, that extra piece that they're not just talking to someone over the phone [...]” ██████████

The immediate availability of crisis workers was also highlighted by ██████████ as a factor impacting their decision-making:

“I log on, take a call that fits the criteria to a ‘T’ and then I see the [crisis worker's desk] light's red, but I don't know what for. I don't know why it's red. So, I have to kind of figure that out during the call with the person [in the emergency situation]” ██████████

Staffing of the crisis desk was repeatedly discussed by both TPS COs and crisis workers as it was perceived as impacting TPS COs' decision-making, as well as crisis workers' capabilities to consult on complex cases, do follow-ups, and decompress. Staffing challenges are discussed in detail in [section 2.4](#).

The current status of call transfers illustrates how a lack of integration between teams and operations affect the overall performance of the 911 CCDPP, leading to an inconsistent number of calls transferred to the crisis team.

“I don't even know if there is a screening process anymore [...] Maybe there is, but it doesn't seem that way and it hasn't for a long time” ██████████

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"I think that now we're stuck with very minimum of calls. I think that we [REDACTED] dropped the number that a) we were giving them and b) we're able to give them, right? Again, it comes back to the whole thing that, because we're not collaborative, because we're not, like, sitting together. Um, there's that link. There's that bridge that's missing [...]" [REDACTED]

As highlighted in [section 1.4](#), 28,216 calls were not immediately out of scope for diversion but were not diverted through the 911 CCDPP, as COs must consider factors such as potential for violence and weapons, the need for a criminal investigation, as well as other alternative response pathways (e.g., TCCS) that may be appropriate. This stands in sharp contrast with the total 3,850 calls for which diversion was offered. The number of calls not offered diversion does not necessarily represent calls that met diversion criteria, nor calls for which the most appropriate response pathway was only the 911 CCDPP. However, the administrative data that is currently available does not shed light on the potential reasons that could explain these metrics. Potential hypotheses, based on the experiences and perspectives we learned about throughout this evaluation, point to the role of each TPS CO's judgement and its underlying factors. It can also be hypothesized that initiating a police response could be perceived as the most appropriate response in most scenarios. Given that the current design of the 911 CCDPP places TPS COs in the role of being the only staff responsible for screening all incoming calls, these hypotheses require further investigation.

2.2.2 Co-response

Examining the implementation of the co-response also evidences an underlying lack of integration in terms of data generation and sharing, as well as decision-making. [REDACTED] noted that for on-site responses, there is no information regarding prior diversion attempts and outcomes. They also highlighted the value of having access to background data about the involvement of the crisis team, along with outcome data from each event. These data capabilities could contribute to fulfill a communication gap perceived between the GCC team and TPS [REDACTED]

"Rarely do I hear 'this call's being passed over to PRU (Primary Response Unit), [crisis worker] has done what they could, therefore – and the person on the line is saying they have access to a knife or whatnot, and

can't de-escalate any further, therefore PRU needs to respond.' I don't hear the results of that interaction with [the crisis worker] and that person on the phone [...]" [REDACTED]

In turn, [REDACTED] described that their assessment of the need for an on-site police response is not always taken into consideration. However, a counterpoint was offered by another member of the [REDACTED], along with a reflection on how each crisis worker can be experiencing the program in a very different way.

"Sometimes they will actually type in to just say, 'oh, we know this person, we'll just go.' So, it's kind of 'okay,' you know? There's no reason for us to be part of it if they're just automatically going to go cause they know them." [REDACTED]

"That's interesting, cause I haven't found that to be my experience, and this is what tells me about—we're so separate, right? Like, in some ways I have had them [the police] attend before, and there were situations that I could put [the police response] away, right?" [REDACTED]

2.3. Caller education and consent discussions impact the program's service delivery flow

Navigating the callers' preconceptions on mental health services, incorporating their preferences for a police response despite the reported nature of the crisis situation, and guiding them through a consent discussion, are some of the unexpected obstacles encountered by TPS COs, which impact the 911 CDDPP service delivery.

As previously described, the 911 CCDPP is a consent-based service and therefore TPS COs must be successful in fulfilling the implicit responsibilities of educating callers about the appropriateness of the program and obtaining consent. However, in a high-volume, time-sensitive environment, achieving the goal of educating callers and gaining consent can lead to negative impacts to service delivery. This process, as perceived by [REDACTED] members, "is a significant amount of time to add to the workload." [REDACTED] had similar perceptions of an increased workload.

"Calls are coming in at the same time, while you're stuck trying to explain to this person, 'okay, these are the resources available.' And explaining a whole background

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to it, while the queue is going up because there is a big event in the city. Yeah, I think what it does is, that 911 aspect [of the 911 CCDPP], we get stuck as educating them, explaining the need for them to use [911 CCDPP], all of that.' [REDACTED]

The caller may also interpret some part of the consent and transfer processes negatively or decline the diversion altogether. [REDACTED]:

"[I]f the [caller is] in crisis and they don't really accept it, or they don't understand it, they're worked up, then it's very hard to actually get the consent. Because the consent becomes more of 'you're attacking me,' or 'you're trying to find out information,' or 'you're trying to find out this information and use it against me,' kind of situation." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also described that the scope of their work revolves around responding to life-or-death emergency situations, and thus raised concerns about navigating 911 CCDPP mental health-related calls [that may not be life-or-death]. [REDACTED] shared that:

"I don't mind being a gateway, but I don't think we have the resources, the time, the numbers. And I think the role that we're playing in it right now, I think people could die as a result, because people are waiting on 911 with a baby not breathing, and they're waiting three minutes because we're dealing with this [education and consent piece]." [REDACTED]

An analysis of the amount of time spent in each step taken when responding to a mental health-related crisis call can shed light on this issue and its impact on the overall emergency response times. Although this has not yet been done for the 911 CCDPP, data obtained from a relevant program, the TCCS, evidenced that during its first five months of operations, the call diversion process added an average of 7 minutes 36 seconds of 911 "talk time" (Demkiw, 2023). Similar analyses of 911 CCDPP calls can lead to a better understanding of the burden introduced by the additional tasks noted above, together with relevant impacts to the program's overall effectiveness.

2.4. Limited staffing of the crisis desk contributes to inconsistent service availability and delivery

In addition to the challenges that [REDACTED] described facing during the screening and transfer operations, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] providers have also experienced challenges of their own which they described in relation to staffing of the crisis operation, as the program is currently limited to one crisis worker per shift. They spoke of the challenges they encounter when they need to consult with a colleague, during working hours, regarding a complex case. They also described some of the difficulties finding coverage for unplanned absences. The risk of vicarious trauma was also identified as a challenge.

"[I]f I'm reaching out to someone [for consultation], it's on their off time, so it really isn't fair to my coworker who's at home and trying to decompress to be like, 'hey, you know, I have this emergency situation and I don't know who to talk to.' So, that can be a drawback as well. Also, too, if we get sick or we're feeling unwell, or if I feel unwell partway throughout my shift, it's difficult to have someone else move from a different location, and then come here or split up the day. Or, if I do have to leave early or I can't make it into my shift that day, and they can't find anyone else to replace my position, then the [crisis desk] is empty." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also described the desire for staffing more than one crisis worker at a time, to ensure a consistent service delivery.

"We need more than just one [crisis] staff cover the floor, whether it be, you know—they're humans, they have emergencies of their own, they get sick, all of that happens, but we need more, better coverage." [REDACTED]

Follow-up opportunities were also described as being impacted by having only one crisis worker at a time, which can result in difficulties reaching out to callers after the initial crisis situation.

"[I]t's hard to do both [crisis calls and follow-ups]. Right? So, I'm on days right now. And so I'll try to focus. However, I've been moved around—we get moved around a bunch [...] Other issue is that if you're on a follow-up call, and then you're watching calls on the board, right? And then you get a call on the board, so then you're like 'I got to go now,' [...] Hanging up on somebody and that's another call. Now we're calling them back again." [REDACTED]

Staffing has been identified as a factor impacting multiple program operations. Figure 8 illustrates the percentage of unfilled hours from Q4 2021 to Q4 2023. Initially, the

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percentage of unfilled hours remained relatively low and stable, around 3% throughout 2021 and early 2022. However, starting in Q4 of 2022, which coincided with the 24/7, city-wide expansion of the program, the percentage rose to 6%. This upward trend continued into 2023, with the proportion of unfilled hours reaching 10% in Q1 and peaking at 17% in Q4 2023.

This sharp rise in unstaffed hours highlights a growing issue that may be attributed to factors such as overall shortages of qualified staff, or inefficiencies in scheduling and resource allocation, including the availability of relief staff. Addressing this issue is crucial to ensuring that staffing needs are met and service delivery is not compromised.

Notably, despite the similarities among frontline staff's perceptions shown above, the [REDACTED] we spoke to do not agree with their counterparts from the other organization.

"[T]wo [crisis workers] would be too many. We don't have the space for them and the call volume I don't believe is enough to keep two of them." [REDACTED]

"We're hearing that we are not seeing the numbers too for that to happen, but where are the numbers coming from? The numbers are not from us [REDACTED], the numbers are from them [REDACTED], they are controlling the numbers." [REDACTED]




Figure 8. The proportion of unfilled staff hours of 911 CCDPP is increasing over time

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2.5 The program's internal and external visibility is limited

Members of TPS and GCC frontline teams, including crisis workers, COs, and UOs, shared that the program's internal and external visibility is not optimal. [REDACTED] described how they learned about the program years ago, in its very early stages through mass emails, especially if they were connected to the program's pilot.

"I have heard about this 911 diversion pilot project. I think it was done through a mass mailing, maybe what we call an e-update, maybe about a year or two years ago." [REDACTED]

Another [REDACTED] shared how the program background, including how GCC was chosen as the best partner, were aspects unknown to them.

"I think it was an e-blast. Yes, it was an e-blast, but not an in-person training session about it [the 911 CCDPP]. Or, even giving the background how we got here, why GCC was selected, why they're the best option, and what they can do to provide the frontlines with." [REDACTED]

The common sentiment among [REDACTED] that they don't receive any critical information about the 911 CCDPP limits their ability to appreciate how the program has evolved and what it is achieving.

"If something works well, officers will tend to go towards it, if it works well. It's just that we're not informed of it [the 911 CCDPP] and we don't know how well it's working." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] emphasized the need for increased program visibility and offered suggestions and ideal scenarios describing the level of visibility they would like to see of co-located GCC crisis workers. They highlighted how not knowing about the program can be interpreted negatively, as it could convey that the program is not active, or ineffective despite being active, hence the need to share outcome data.

"I'd like to see the GCC person have a call sign so they're on the dispatch board if like—almost as an additional person, so the rest can see that those calls are happening and have an idea that all this stuff is happening in the background. I think it would add to general credibility, the officers would feel like, 'oh, we're not going to these six person-in-crisis calls. They're

happening, but we don't have to go to them,' which I think, right now, those could be happening and we just don't know about it. So then, of course, there's negative [perception], in the sense of 'it's not happening' or 'it's not effective'." [REDACTED]

Internal visibility challenges, related to outcome data and program updates, were also perceived by [REDACTED]. However, they noted that competing programs (e.g., TCCS) also compound the visibility challenges faced by the 911 CCDPP.

"On parades we're read so many TCCS success stories – that they went and did this. But we never once have I heard [911 CCDPP]'s success stories and I'm sure there are multiple of them. They have spoken to our chronic callers so many times, but that hasn't been brought forward and is not really a knowledge that's been shared. So, even if it's working, we don't know about it because we don't have stats." [REDACTED]

Lastly, members of the [REDACTED] described external visibility challenges regarding advertisement, public communications, and the internal strategies put into place to increase awareness of the 911 CCDPP.

"I also don't think that [REDACTED]'re so mindful about cutting us 155%. However, we had all call viewing ability that then slowly got taken away. Then, we watched our call volume go down. We watch no advertisement for us. They were literally like, 'we will give you candy bars if you will give [calls] to TCCS, we need to get our numbers up' and I would say to them, 'hey, could you shout out about [911 CCDPP]?' Right? If you're going to do this with TCCS, you might as well shout out with [911 CCDPP] and I've been met with 'oh, no, I can't say that.'" [REDACTED]

The point raised by the members of the [REDACTED] was also voiced among [REDACTED] as follows:

"[W]here's the CP24 ad? Where's the TTC ads? I think such a small aspect of the budget, as an advertisement, could make such a vast impact to our ability to connect with people and do public education and not having the burden fall to us as call takers [...]" [REDACTED]

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Key Takeaway 3: There are partnership challenges

The challenges faced by the program cannot be analyzed in isolation or attributed to any one particular cause. They reflect progressive transformations over time. Consequently, the wide array of views on the program, the partnership, and the future, illustrate how differently the program has been experienced by each party involved. Taken together, the following challenges describe how trust has been compromised across organizational levels.

3.1 There is a lack of trust between frontline TPS and GCC teams

Underlying the operational, staffing, and visibility challenges described above is a lack of trust between the partner organizations, which manifests itself in specific perceptions of skills and competence shared by members of both communications and crisis teams. Previous interactions or observations were also described as factors that could reinforce or dispel some perceptions. [REDACTED] highlighted how all these factors can contribute to deciding against transferring a call to a crisis worker. They noted that:

"[...] [I]f we [REDACTED] don't really know, or have talked to [crisis workers], or know that they're there, we might not feel as comfortable as well, either diverting calls to them. Maybe that's not the right thing, but that's how I feel personally." [REDACTED]

"If [REDACTED] officers are going and now I've transferred the call over [the 911 CCDPP] to calm [callers] down, what happens when that situation changes? [Crisis workers] are not trained like us, they have no idea what kind of questions we ask, what are we putting into the call, because they never sat with us, right?" [REDACTED]

Similarly, members of the [REDACTED] also voiced perceptions regarding [REDACTED] competence and skillset, and their perceived role in the stagnating volume of call transfers.

"I actually don't believe that [REDACTED] have the skillset to actually identify when to offer us." [REDACTED]

"[W]e're also hearing [...] certain [REDACTED] being incredibly contemptuous to callers, and in some ways – and then, we don't even get to the proper identification

process. So this is where it's like it. That's where it eats me a little bit. Right? It's sort of like we're just here for show." [REDACTED]

3.2 There is a lack of trust between leadership teams

The results from the Wilder Inventory ([Appendix G](#)) align with perspectives from different team members who emphasized the need for improving collaboration between teams and harmonizing key program processes. Lower scores were reported by participants from GCC and TPS in areas such as "Mutual Respect" and "Appropriate Cross-section of Members". Scores are also indicative of challenges in "Flexibility" and "Multiple Layers of Participation". Partnership challenges were voiced by members of TPS and GCC [REDACTED] teams, with a caveat offered by [REDACTED] who added that "[...] from a higher level, organizationally, [and] corporate level, [the partnership] works well." [REDACTED]. This perception of the partnership at a high organizational level was contrasted by the following leadership voices, who noted that:

"As I said, it's more like a one-sided partnership where it's—that's how it feels where everything is, you know, it's what [REDACTED] recommends or what they're doing." [REDACTED]

"I saw a better partnership in the first year, and then once TCCS sort of developed, I saw our partnership—[911 CCDPP] was deprioritized and TCCS seemed to me like it was the priority [REDACTED]." [REDACTED]

These findings suggest a need for enhanced efforts to improve the partnership and the relationship between TPS and GCC as organizations. By addressing these areas, both organizations can work towards more effective and sustainable collaborative efforts, as summarized by one perspective offered by a member of the [REDACTED]:

"The idea of really building those environments where people can begin to build strong trusting relationships that allow them to maybe take a little more risk than they might otherwise. And then when that happens, people have this great opportunity to get more." [REDACTED]

3.3 An uncertain future

We heard contrasting views on the future of the program, particularly among COs and members of TPS leadership

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team. Among [REDACTED] it was noted that the program has potential for improvement, with emphasis on improving relationships and collaboration. However, an overlap with competing programs was acknowledged, along with hesitancy regarding a continued involvement in mental health-related crisis situations.

“I think it's a good program. I think, you know, there's a lot of positives to it and getting people help is the greatest benefit. I just think [the 911 CCDPP]'s not a 911 service. 911 is [inaudible], someone's stabbed, someone's shot, life or death. It's not 'I need to talk.' Like I said earlier, ideally, we get removed from the equation as much as possible.” ([REDACTED])

“I hesitate to use the word redundant, but [TCCS and the 911 CCDPP]'re very similar.” ([REDACTED])

“I'd like to see more integration too, where [crisis workers] are there, and they're involved, and they know our procedures, and we meet them and all that, but they have more autonomy where they can look through calls to see if maybe we didn't divert something we could have, without us having to go through the referral. And them being able to call back without a consent piece – so that's just expected.” ([REDACTED])

Highly contrasting views were offered by members of each organization's leadership team. The perception that the program should continue is not a shared and firm understanding, particularly, in light of the upcoming city-wide expansion of the TCCS.

“We'll do it with [REDACTED] if they want to do it with us, but we'll have to see.” ([REDACTED])

“[...] [I]t's so obvious [911 CCDPP]'s a service already offered by the Toronto Community Crisis Service (TCCS). There's no way to better the current model to keep it because the ways in which you would better it, you'd be duplicating the TCCS model.” ([REDACTED])

[REDACTED] shared views aligned with the continuation of the program, with emphasis on building and sharing outcome data as a critical input to informing perceptions on the program.

“I agree that the program should continue, it's just—I think more than not, we need data just to kind of support how much has it been assisting us in diverting calls [...]” ([REDACTED])

“But for sure the program should continue. If it took five calls away from us in a day, that's a lot because those are very time-consuming calls.” ([REDACTED])

In turn, members of the [REDACTED] emphasized the need to improve relationships and collaboration as a way to revitalize and realign the program's operations.

“I think it would be lovely if we could be on the same page for how the tiered responses work, or how we respond to things.” ([REDACTED])

“I would love to see more harmony and us understanding what each other does, why we make the response, or why we choose the responses that we do.” ([REDACTED])

Nonetheless, the multiplicity of perspectives across multiple levels of the partner organizations conveyed an overall sense of uncertainty regarding the future of the program that was succinctly summarized by [REDACTED] who noted:

“At this point, is [CCDPP] still a pilot, or are we just like on a day-to-day basis? Some days I'm like, I don't even know if we're going to walk in one day and not going to have a [crisis] worker. We don't really know anything about that either.” ([REDACTED])

Discussion: The program needs a unified path forward

Altogether, evidence from administrative data, the Wilder Inventory, the service user questionnaire, and focus groups and interviews with members of TPS and GCC, suggests that the program is making strides towards improving stakeholder and community experiences of crisis response and improving service users' connection to community-based follow-up support services. The program has an identifiable and evidence-supported value for service users, primarily characterized by a quick connection to person-centered, non-coercive crisis support; access to referrals; and access to de-escalation support from a crisis worker when police are en route to an emergency call.

However, the program is not operating in a way that can directly lead to its main objective of reducing the operational demand on TPS COs and the subsequent need for a police response for non-emergent mental health-related crisis calls. We have highlighted both internal and external factors that might be impacting the program's efficiency, utilization, and equity. Internally, while there were identified benefits of the TPS-GCC partnership and the co-located nature of the program, we heard varying perspectives across teams within each organization that pointed to an overall disconnect between partners and key operations. Our findings also highlighted that stakeholders are experiencing the program in vastly different ways and have differing views regarding the focus of the program, its implementation, its understanding of necessary equity considerations, and its differentiating factors from competing or overlapping programs. This disconnect may have contributed to the operational challenges identified in relation to call screening and diversion, co-response, staffing, program visibility, data collection and analysis, and a lack of trust between partners. In turn, these challenges may be leading to an underutilization of the program, ultimately limiting opportunities for effective diversion on a larger scale. Taken together, all these factors may explain the highly contrasting views on the ideal future of the program and its position within the broader crisis response system in Toronto.

Additionally, from an external point of view, the embedded nature of the 911 CCDPP with all other 911 emergency services could be leading to a paradoxical increased use of 911. However, other external factors (e.g., health and social service system capacity gaps, the multifaceted

nature of crisis situations, and the incidence and complexity of mental health challenges among the general population) can also be impacting the overall call volume and related demand for 911 services in non-emergent mental health-related situations. Given this combination of local, contextual, and systemic factors, it may be unlikely for some callers with mental health-related needs to shift away from 911 as their main source of support in crisis situations in the short term.

It remains essential to ensure that people in crisis can access other types of emergency crisis supports not led solely by uniformed police officers. This is especially crucial for the safety and dignity of people who face intersectional forms of discrimination and mistreatment. Regardless of the continuation of the 911 CCDPP in its current form, or in any other form, there is a need for a unified path forward that will not reintroduce gaps in crisis resources. For the most efficient and effective use of organizational resources and to best meet the need of people in crisis, program partners should reconcile this disconnection and reach a shared understanding of the resources, responsibilities, processes, outcomes, equity, and supporting data that should be in place, as well as revisit the theory of the program and its underlying assumptions.

Limitations

There were certain limitations to the evaluation which must be acknowledged, including engagement of service users in evaluation design, participant recruitment, and data quality and completeness.

The evaluation included a limited amount of meaningful integration of diverse perspectives of service users. Best practices consider it essential to involve those most affected or impacted by any particular issue, need, or intervention of interest. Involving service users can ensure that any planned solutions are relevant, appropriate, achievable and sustainable (Ontario Centre of Excellence in Child and Youth Mental Health, 2016), and that equity is infused throughout all stages of program development, including evaluation. The evaluation design did not include fulsome input from 911 CCDPP service users. However, we sought consultations with the TPS Board's MHAAP, which includes "people with lived experience of mental health and addictions issues" (Toronto Police Service Board, 2024). These consultation sessions were held to gather insights and reflect on potential unintended outcomes of the program, our service user recruitment strategies, and the service user questionnaire. Similarly, the preliminary evaluation results were shared with the Project Committee, which also included members with lived experience of mental health challenges. During this meeting, members of the Project Committee had the opportunity to offer any additional insights to help refine our understanding of the experiences, perspectives, and metrics we gathered for this evaluation.

There were limitations to participant recruitment for both service users and service providers. Due to the nature of the service offered by the 911 CCDPP, and time constraints due to a short project timeline, service user recruitment was limited and cautious. Engaging in evaluation activities with people who have experienced mental health-related crises requires considerations of clinical appropriateness to participate, in addition to the individuals' willingness, capacity, and availability (Dixon et al., 2016). As a result, we had a small sample size of 13 service user participants. We acknowledge that we were unable to capture the experiences of those who may have benefitted from the program but refused service or follow-up, and those who did not have the capacity or willingness to engage in this evaluation. These service users may include populations who have historically experienced the greatest degrees of marginalization, coercion, and biased practices. Although our findings are an insightful preliminary understanding of the 911 CCDPP service user experience, caution should be taken when interpreting and drawing conclusions. Further

exploration into the experiences of a wide, diverse sample of service users is warranted to strengthen this knowledge base and make program improvements accordingly.

Service provider recruitment and participation was also limited primarily due to time constraints. These constraints narrowed the stakeholder groups that could be included in the evaluation. It narrowed our ability to do a more widespread recruitment of eligible participants and shortened the window for individuals to express their interest and complete data collection activities. It also limited our ability to offer additional participation opportunities to more members of TPS and GCC, along with different participation methods (e.g., survey or an interview) to accommodate for participant preferences for sharing the same type of information.

As such, we are mindful that the perspectives presented here may not be wholly representative of all groups and this is an aspect that must be taken into consideration when interpreting the findings reported herein. We are mindful that ensuring the inclusion of different experiences and views, through accessible forms of participation, is not a static goal but a continuous process. Time is only one of other key elements that are needed to ensure that relationships are genuinely built, and service users' and other equity-deserving stakeholders' needs are properly accommodated.

We also experienced limitations related to data quality and completeness. First, our analysis of administrative data was performed retrospectively based upon existing data collection practices, data completion, and data definitions from TPS and GCC. There were therefore limitations due to the availability of data as well as organizational-level differences in how each partner defines, documents, reports, and interprets indicators. Collaborative refinement of data documentation, validation, and reconciliation processes across TPS and GCC may be helpful at improving the quality of administrative data.

Finally, due to unforeseen technical problems with the source of the instrument, we were only able to collect half of the Wilder Inventory. As a result, our assessment was limited to 11 of the 22 factors that the Wilder Inventory is designed to measure. This partial data collection may have impacted the comprehensiveness of our analysis, potentially omitting critical insights into the collaborative dynamics we intended to evaluate. However, we were able to collect further insight and data on collaboration through the focus groups and interviews with TPS and GCC team members across all organizational levels.

Recommendations

Our recommendations provide actionable suggestions for a unified path forward. These recommendations were designed to address the challenges currently experienced by the program and create opportunities to strengthen its potential to support people in mental health-related crisis. All recommendations are meant to be collaboratively enacted by TPS leadership and GCC leadership, with active inclusion and participation from frontline teams and service users. Including perspectives from all relevant stakeholders is key to ensuring a shared and balanced vision.

Recommendation 1: Strengthen the partnership (e.g., trust, visibility, and capacity) by implementing opportunities for ongoing inter-partner engagement

Multiple members from both organizations voiced their candid perceptions and concerns regarding partner staff training, competence, and overall commitment to the program implementation and success. As mentioned previously, these issues cannot be properly understood without considering all the other challenges described throughout this report. We therefore recommend the adoption of collaborative practices to bring frontline and leadership teams, from both organizations, together. These practices are particularly relevant during critical stages such as program planning, onboarding, training, monitoring and feedback, and dissemination of program outcome data. In addition to strengthening collaboration, this approach can also help increase the visibility the program has within TPS, foster trust between teams, and nurture buy-in among all groups of stakeholders.

Recommendation 2: Collaboratively review the program theory and objectives to develop attainable and well-defined goals, key operations, resources, and outcomes

As previously described, various internal and external factors threaten the 911 CCDPP's ability to efficiently and sustainably achieve its intended objectives. There is a need for partners to come together and develop a unanimous, well-defined vision for the program's future: one that maximizes the use of its resources to fill a gap in Toronto's crisis response system, proactively plans for equity, and incorporates the perspectives of diverse service users. Program components, or the program itself, could then be redesigned to ensure it fulfills this shared vision, and that processes are integrated and driven by evidence.

Multiple paths can be followed to refine the program theory. For example, one option could be to move away from the overarching goal of diverting mental health-related calls from police resources, and instead leverage the "no wrong door" principle. The program could then be envisioned as an improvement to the overall 911 crisis response experience, including in-person police response, for those choosing this point of entry. This pathway would focus on maximizing the evidence-based positive outcomes identified throughout this evaluation and adopting indicators focused on the service user experience of crisis response services.

Another example of a refined program theory could involve reaffirming the goal to divert all mental health-related non-emergent calls from police resources and exploring whether an improved iteration of the program, or a substitute, could help achieve this goal. New, or supplementary, and wide-reaching initiatives aimed at educating the public on using non-911 alternatives will be needed as well, with particular attention to not aggravating gaps in or strains on existing crisis resources that may occur if the program changes or becomes unavailable.

Regardless of the path chosen for the refined program theory, we recommend that it includes specific activities, outcomes, and indicators that address equity as it represents an opportunity for the program to help respond to the mental health needs of populations for whom police involvement in mental health crisis response could cause additional harm (Marcus & Stergiopoulos, 2022; Murray, 2021). The inclusion of the components mentioned above as part of the program theory can help define what success could look like for the 911 CCDPP and how to best direct the investment of its resources.

Recommendations

Recommendation 3: Improve operational challenges by establishing clear, standardized processes for call screening, intake, co-response and data collection and analysis processes

Call Screening

As the number of calls offered diversion has only modestly grown throughout the life of the program, despite its expansion in coverage and operating hours, it is important to review current call screening processes. We first recommend performing a systematic retrospective review of calls that were both offered and not offered diversion, to strengthen the understanding of how the diversion criteria have been applied by TPS COs. This knowledge, combined with the perspectives of frontline staff described in this report, could then be used to identify more opportunities for diversion. A revision of call diversion criteria can also be useful to improve clarity and reduce overlap with other services. Other improvements can include iterative, joint training on call screening, and a revision of each role's responsibilities, scope of decision-making, and access to relevant data. Ongoing auditing of calls can also be adopted with continuous quality improvement purposes.

Intake

Communications operators from TPS described how educating callers about the appropriateness of the 911 CCDPP and obtaining informed consent can negatively impact workload and 911 service delivery for other emergency calls. Although TPS has noted impediments to call screening capabilities due to privacy issues, we recommend reviewing the consent process to identify potential opportunities for improved efficiency, including consultations with diverse service users to improve the accessibility, relevance, and clarity of the consent process and its language for people who are experiencing a crisis. Alternatively, as suggested by some evaluation participants, avenues for adopting a service approach based on implied consent can be explored. In this case, 911 callers could be offered a fourth emergency service option (e.g., police, fire, ambulance, or mental health), and callers that indicate a need for mental health-related services would be providing implied consent to be transferred to a relevant responder.

Co-response

Uniformed officers and members of the GCC crisis team described the value of the co-response operation, emphasizing how co-response can result in safer police operations for 911 callers and on-site responders alike. The need for seamless, data-driven communication was highlighted by TPS UOs, along with other strategies aimed at incorporating the expertise of crisis workers in the creation of resources to be consulted during mental health-related on-site operations. These suggested innovations and collaboration opportunities may contribute to further development and consolidation of the co-response as an additional service path available to callers in emergency situations with mental health-related components.

Data Collection and Analysis Processes

A review of data collection and analysis processes will strengthen the consistency and completion of data sets in both partner organizations. An inventory of all current data collected by the 911 CCDPP should be assessed to ensure the data captured are related to the revised program theory and facilitate future evaluation of that theory. With respect to equity, the inclusion of sociodemographic data remains critical to understand who the program's service users are and if any identifiable subgroups require adaptations and/or additional supports to access the 911 CCDPP, receive high quality services, and achieve positive outcomes.

We heard from [REDACTED] that this can be best accomplished with service users who access follow-up supports. Therefore, we recommend ensuring that this process is aligned with best practices (e.g., content guidelines for sociodemographic questions) and supported by standardized training and materials (e.g., scripts to be used by all staff collecting equity-centred data). Special emphasis should be given to the adoption of plain language rationales for data collection to increase response rates, self-reporting from clients, and an ongoing use of equity data to continuously inform and strengthen program planning (Alliance for Healthier Communities, 2022; City of Toronto, 2020; Health Commons Solutions Lab, 2020; Tri-Hospital + Toronto Public Health, 2017).

Recommendations

Recommendation 4: Encourage diversion by developing public education and awareness campaigns on available community-based crisis supports and their intended uses

The evaluation data suggest that there is still an overall lack of public awareness of alternative crisis support services, which contributes to the inappropriate use of 911 as well as added workload burden on TPS COs, including increased process complexity (e.g., education and consent) and strain on TPS operational resourcing. Partners can therefore consider developing widespread public campaigns to build awareness of the available services (e.g., 911, 911 CCDPP, TCCS, 988) and their appropriate use. This should include intentional planning, informed by evidence and lived experiences, on how to reach diverse populations within Toronto who may experience greater barriers to accessing services and relevant information. Tailored education on the significance of diversion for historically marginalized communities who experience disproportionate use of force, invasive searches, and criminal legal system interactions should also be part of the strategy. Information can be offered in a variety of ways and using accessible language. Examples of campaign methods include social media posts, news releases, and posters in public settings (e.g., TTC stations, healthcare settings, social service settings).

Recommendation 5: Encourage diversion by continuing to advocate for increased investment into the broader mental health and social service systems

As previously described, the 911 CCDPP is currently operating within the context of an overall strained mental healthcare and social service system, which impedes the program's objective of diverting non-emergent mental health-related crises away from a police response. System-level investments, from all levels of government, are necessary to help reduce the need to call 911 by:

- strengthening other community-based crisis services;
- strengthening the 911 CCDPP's ability to reduce service users' risk of future crises by providing rapid connections to community-based short- and long-term follow-up resources; and
- promoting upstream crisis prevention by improving socio-economic conditions linked to the well-being of the population at-large.

Conclusion

This report presented findings from a complex dataset exploring the experiences and outcomes of 911 CCDPP service users and service providers. Our findings suggest that, as an innovative model for crisis response, the 911 CCDPP is meeting an established need for mental health crisis support in new ways. Furthermore, although the program has exhibited modest growth, stakeholder groups perceive that change is meaningful. Multiple relevant challenges have also been identified, including the lack of a unifying program view, operational inefficiencies, and partnership challenges, all of which, when taken together, threaten the success of the 911 CCDPP. Uptake of the recommendations provided in this report will be essential to inform decisions about the future of the program and help ensure that individuals and communities across the city of Toronto will be able to access timely and appropriate mental health supports when most in need.

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Appendix A: Project Governance

During the evaluation planning, a governance model was co-created by PSSP, TPS, and GCC leadership (Figure A). This model identified three levels of stakeholder collaboration with PSSP, which are described below:

- **Consulting:** PSSP engaged with subject matter experts, including TPS’s MHAAP, on specific questions as needed.
- **Collaborating:** PSSP regularly engaged with the Project Committee in the development and review of the evaluation plan and key deliverables.
- **Confirming:** PSSP engaged with identified leaders from TPS and GCC, who provided final approval of major processes and deliverables to be submitted to the TPS Command.

Both partners (e.g., TPS and GCC) agreed to have equal input into decisions regarding the evaluation activities and products, with decisions made by consensus, where possible. Consensus was defined as the ability of each party to “live with” and actively support the decision going forward, even if they do not believe it is the “right” or “best” decision. If consensus could not be reached, it was determined that, as the funder, TPS retained the right to decide the format and scope of the final deliverables, as well as budget and allocation of funds and unanticipated expenses.




Figure A. Governance model

Appendix B: Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation question	Evaluation sub-question	Examples of data measures	Data sources	Timing
1. How successfully has the program met its objectives?	a. To what extent, and how, were mental and behavioural health crisis calls responded to by the 911 CCDPP?	Description of calls along call pathway (e.g., call volumes, dispositions, times)	TPS/GCC administrative data	Stage 2 Retrospective from October 4, 2021 - December 31, 2023
	b. To what extent, and how, were direct crisis supports provided and connections made to appropriate community-based follow-up supports through the 911 CCDPP?	Description of supports provided, referrals made	TPS/GCC administrative data	Stage 2 Retrospective from October 4, 2021 - December 31, 2023
	c. How did stakeholders experience the 911 CCDPP, and how did access, experiences, and/or outcomes vary within and across groups?	Description of service users (e.g., number of unique callers, demographics of follow-up users) Experiences receiving/providing care (access/entry to services, crisis supports provided) Satisfaction with experience Impact on service user health and well-being	TPS/GCC administrative data Service user questionnaire Service provider focus groups	Stage 2 Cross-sectional; April - May 2024
	d. What unintended outcomes have emerged, if any?	N/A	Document review Service user questionnaire Service provider focus groups	Stage 2 Cross-sectional; April - May 2024
2. What factors of the 911 CCDPP are contributing to the program's realized and unrealized outcomes, as well as to accessibility and equity?	a. How is the program design affecting program delivery and outcomes?	Experiences with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Call pathway/flow • Consent process • Wait times/transfer times 	Service user questionnaire Service provider focus groups	Stage 2 Cross-sectional; April - May 2024
	b. How are the financial, human, organizational, and physical (e.g., infrastructure, technology, etc.) factors facilitating or impeding the program in reaching its objectives?	Experiences with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confidence/preparedness in decision making • Capacity/resourcing • Infrastructure 	Service user questionnaire Service provider focus groups	Stage 2 Cross-sectional; April - May 2024
	c. In what ways has the partnership between TPS and GCC affected program outcomes?	Success factors for collaboration (e.g., favourable political and social climate; mutual respect, understanding, and trust; ability to compromise, etc.)	Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory Service user questionnaire Service provider focus groups	Stage 2 Cross-sectional; April - May 2024

Appendix B: Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation question	Evaluation sub-question	Examples of data measures	Data sources	Timing
3. What are the opportunities for the future of the program?	a. What are the strengths and challenges with the current iteration of the program?	Summary of findings from evaluation questions 1 and 2	TPS/GCC administrative data Service user questionnaire Service provider focus groups Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory	Stage 2 Cross-sectional; April – May 2024
	b. What are opportunities and potential strategies for improvement?	Program challenges and successes; suggested opportunities	SWOT analysis	Stage 3 Cross-sectional; June 2024

Appendix C: Preliminary Logic Model

Inputs		Outputs	Outcomes		
Stakeholders	Resources	Activities	Short-term	Medium-term	Long-term
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Toronto Police Service (TPS) Gerstein Crisis Centre (GCC) 	<p>Tangible resources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutional infrastructure Funding Staffing Information technology Monitoring data Crisis Worker Cheat Sheet <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eligibility criteria Script Text entries for CAD system Crisis response decision criteria (TCCS vs. 911 CCD program) <p>Intangible resources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partnerships Expertise Leadership Data and evaluation literacy Policies, standards, and regulations Time 	<p>Trained and representative staff</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Core and ongoing trainings <p>Call intake</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Triage and assessment Transfer to GCC Crisis Workers for diversion or co-response <p>Phone-based crisis response</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> De-escalation and crisis intervention Safety plan development Information and referrals Transfer to mobile response (TPS or TCCS) <p>Post-call crisis management and follow-up</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Short-term/long-term supportive counselling Short-term/long-term service navigation Reconnection to existing supports Facilitate connection to community-based services 	<p>Provider-level outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased knowledge and skills in providing person-centered crisis care <p>Service user- and community-level outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> More service users' immediate needs are met Improved experience of crisis response for individuals experiencing mental and behavioural health crises Improved access to crisis management and follow-up Improved access to appropriate community-based follow-up supports/referrals <p>System-level outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> More eligible service users receive the most appropriate crisis intervention for their needs Increased access points to the mental health and substance use sector Proof-of-concept for a crisis call diversion model Proof-of-concept for collaboration between police services and community-based organizations 	<p>Provider-level outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased staff empowerment Improved staff satisfaction <p>Service user outcomes/ Community-level outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved community experience of mental health crisis response Improved connection to community-based supports <p>System-level outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduced use of police resources for mental and behavioural health crises 	<p>Service user outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved service user well-being and quality of life <p>Community-level outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased community safety and well-being <p>System-level outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduced calls to 911 for mental and behavioural health crises Improved intervention sustainability Improved service integration for the mental health and substance use sector
Assumptions					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is an assumed baseline level of organizational readiness to change across stakeholder groups, including a demonstrated commitment to police reform by TPS Partnerships are assumed to generate the collaborative capacity to deliver the intervention effectively and in a manner consistent with its key values Partners are assumed to have the organizational capacity to successfully deliver care that best meets the needs of the communities they serve Community-based referral networks are assumed to have the capacity to meet the needs of new service users in a resource-strained health and social service sector 					
External factors and potential risks					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Time Capacity vs. rising demand Organizational cultures and readiness to change Political climate Community buy-in and trust 					

Appendix D: Summarized SWOT Analysis

After analyzing all qualitative and quantitative data, the evaluators, together with a Senior Innovation Specialist and Senior Policy Analyst from PSSP, identified the internal (strengths, weaknesses), and external (opportunities, threats) factors influencing the program's current and future success. The following lists describe those factors.

Strengths

- Co-location – benefits of proximity
- Meeting a need
- Indications of positive experiences of service users

Weaknesses

- Operational challenges leading to stagnant utilization of the program
- Under-theorization of the program, including issues of inclusion and access
- Lack of trust between organizations

Opportunities

- City-wide expansion of the TCCS
- Ongoing desire for a better response to mental health-related crises
- Ubiquity of 911

Threats

- “Competing” programs (e.g., TCCS, 988)
- Implicit assumptions to use 911 rather than community-based resources
- Fragmentation and low capacity of mental health and social service systems

Note: Due to the complexity and nuance of the program, we acknowledge that these categorizations are not static (e.g., a strength may have weaknesses components).

Appendix E. Additional Illustrative Quotations

Key takeaway and section	Quotation
1: The program is meeting an established need in new ways	
1.1 The program is providing a new voice and new connections	<p>“In the past, if there's intimate threat, we're always going to be sending police out and whatever resources we need. But I have, in the past, had it where somebody was threatening suicide, and they were actively wanting to do it – [REDACTED]”</p> <p>[REDACTED] And, I've seen that be very beneficial, especially because a lot of these GCC workers, they've got tools, courses, different things that we don't have.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“But absolutely it [911 CCDPP]'s a better quality service [than traditional police responses for mental health-related calls]. They're getting the right person that can, can take care of their needs and address their needs. The person who's best qualified to deal with it is, is, is the person receiving those calls, for sure.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“We've done really, really excellent work. We fill a gap within service there. It isn't always the case that folks need in-person support and so for us to be able to offer this phone support really quickly and efficiently to those folks that get connected with us is incredibly important and important to the community.” [REDACTED]</p>
1.2 Service users appear to be satisfied overall with their experience receiving support from the 911 CCDPP	<p>“They were respectful of my headspace and space. They gave me all available options to use should I ever face a problem. They were extremely patient.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“It was a very helpful experience and they [TPS COs] used their resources efficiently to provide me speedy assistance. They were calm and compassionate.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“I felt more supported in the moment. There was someone to talk to about the situation. It was less difficult to navigate my problems alone.” [REDACTED]</p>
1.5 There are opportunities to strengthen equity & accessibility	<p>“...making sure that we are partnering with culturally competent or culturally specific service providers as well as part of our network of partners...” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“ anyone should be able to call 911 from anywhere, right? It's free from a paid phone. It's free from your cell phone if you don't have minutes [...] So I think we've tried to make that the most accessible phone number, right? So I think that increases access to everybody” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“... we also hire for people who've got lived experience [...] of mental health, lived experience of refugee or newcomer to Canada [...] lived in, in poverty or on assistance, you know, those kinds of backgrounds so that there's people who, who work at center who not only, you know, have empathy for people but really have deep empathy because they have lived that themselves. And then on top of that, we also hire for multiple languages and for people who look like the people we serve, trying to make sure that we have Black, Indigenous, racialized folks throughout the organization...” [REDACTED]</p>

Appendix E. Additional Illustrative Quotations

Key takeaway and section	Quotation
2: Key operations are not connected despite expectations and some positive collaboration experiences	
2.1 Positive expectations and collaboration experiences speak of the perceived potential of the program	<p>“We wouldn’t be able to work as collaboratively and there wouldn’t be the same type of security that I think both the crisis worker and the call takers and dispatchers feel because everything’s happening in real time. There’s no gap in service because, again, we’re able to update what’s going on for that person that we’re on the line with and they can see everything that’s happening.” (██████████)</p>
2.2 There is a lack of fully integrated operations: Call screening and diversion.	<p>“[...] they ██████ literally took the calls away from us. The viewing of the calls. [...] That was a huge piece and the rationale we were given for it didn’t really make sense.” (██████████)</p> <p>“The ██████ told me they don’t have the capability of reviewing calls in the city anymore, so they can’t do that anymore. Yeah, they used to, but then they said ‘because of privacy’ or something, which, that doesn’t really make any sense considering they’re taking calls. We’re giving them anyway.” (██████████)</p> <p>“It can be a bit arduous, especially, if I’m not sure if the call can go to ██████, because I find I’d have to call them, ask them if they’d be willing to take this. And I don’t—and they may be on a call already, or they may be marked unavailable for paperwork or something, so, I don’t know—if they’re on a bathroom break.” (██████████)</p> <p>“Um, there’s times when we could take call after call at night, but we can actually sit there all day. Not received 1 call. And there’s all sorts of calls happening that day ██████ I really think that needs to be reviewed on the ██████, on what they sent over to us, or – what they just try to decide and to deal with them themselves, ██████ because it’s easier.” (██████████)</p>
2.2 There is a lack of fully integrated operations: Co-response.	<p>“If that diversion ██████ could put something in the call text, just so the frontlines who are going know what they’ve done already, but that’s not done.” (██████████)</p> <p>“Sometimes, we’ll say the situation doesn’t need an officer and, sometimes, an officer will come by.” (██████████)</p> <p>“[T]he calls that come across our board, we don’t know if there was an [diversion] attempt made or if it wasn’t successful. ██████</p>
2.3 Caller education and consent discussions impact the program’s service delivery flow	<p>“That [explanation about being diverted to a crisis worker] throws [callers] off, and it takes definitely some explaining to them and then convincing them that ‘you are going through a crisis, I’m identifying certain things where you might benefit more [from].’” (██████████)</p>

Appendix E. Additional Illustrative Quotations

Key takeaway and section	Quotation
<p>2.4. Limited staffing of the crisis desk contributes to inconsistent service availability and delivery</p>	<p>“I have always wondered why there wasn't more efforts to have more of like a swing shift within it, not just one worker, because then it leaves a gap when they're not there.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“ [REDACTED]] can be hit or miss. If you have a busy [day] then it's difficult to do [REDACTED] and then if you're not having a busy day, you're able to make some calls.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“Gerstein can't staff one desk. They would never be able to staff two. Yeah. Like it just wouldn't happen.”</p> <p>“They say the numbers don't support more than one [crisis worker working per shift], but then, you know when [...] don't have enough for it to really get flowing, so then the numbers won't support it. But, then, you get the right amount of resource in place and, you know, things can happen differently.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“We are exposed to a lot of vicarious trauma and we don't really have a lot of the supports that the other folks who are in this space do.” [REDACTED]</p>
<p>2.5 The program's internal and external visibility is limited</p>	<p>“I think it was when the pilot project was in its early stages, the first divisions that it was introduced in those areas, I think they had more knowledge about it because, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and they would be telling me about GCC and we hadn't heard about it.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“I think the [911 CCDPP's] efforts go unappreciated when we don't know how many calls are being diverted away, [or] when all we see is the work before us on the board versus what's being taken before we even get the chance to get on the board.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“Personally, I would say a quarterly update by division [is needed] just to show how many calls are being taken, how many calls are being diverted away, just so that we can get a relative idea as to where and how effective it's been in a particular division over others.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“It seems like the program is kind of stagnant now. Because now we have the new fancy TCCS thing, so I think—it feels like our focus is moving towards that, with the success stories, with the stats, those are being brought up [REDACTED] Those are being delivered to us.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“Also to it, [911 CCDPP]'s not like another crisis service where it's really advertised, right? I mean, the police service doesn't need to advertise that you need the police. So it's difficult to say.” [REDACTED]</p> <p>“[I]magine this, when I go to a call I'm gonna [REDACTED]. I'm gonna read [REDACTED] to get a background of what mental health problem they have and whatnot. [inaudible] [REDACTED] or something, saying 'the subject had called TPS twelve times to the 911 CCDPP, and been de-escalated all twelve times,' but this is the only one now that was completed. That would be informative for sure.” [REDACTED]</p>

Appendix E. Additional Illustrative Quotations

Key takeaway and section	Quotation
3: There are partnership challenges	
3.1 There is a lack of trust between the TPS communications and GCC crisis teams	<p>“[...] things get hairy all of a sudden, they’re asking questions, [...] don’t have the best full control necessarily and they don’t know what they should be asking—foreseeing safety, or like what direction it’s about to be faced, that kind of thing. They wouldn’t necessarily ask that question.”</p>
3.2 There is a lack of trust between leadership teams	<p>“In our first year, whenever there was any changes to the pilot, we usually discussed them all together, GCC and TPS. And, in year two, there just, out of nowhere, came changes from the [...] that actually has process impacts for stuff, with zero involvement or discussion with any of our [...] managers at all.”</p> <p>“[It’s] all about them [...] and what’s convenient to them. It, doesn’t feel collaborative and it feels more like a power over. That’s how I’m feeling it.”</p>
3.3 An uncertain future	<p>“[I]f we [...] work more collaboratively, it’ll be more beneficial. Whether it’s going to be with them either plugging in [for shadowing], or as new people come sit with them or versus—whatever the case might be. If there is an onboarding going on, if there’s a training piece, send a [...], send [...], to have this conversation with [...] to say, ‘let them know what we do, so we can learn what they do.’”</p> <p>“I think the growth of the program and having a secondary crisis worker for contingency planning and ensuring adequate service would be the best case scenario moving forward for the future.”</p> <p>“Right now it—we [...] [are] the only real ones that can do it. So, until the other organizations, until every—all levels of government step up and step in, I think it might remain with us until someone says ‘I can do this.’”</p> <p>“Frankly, we can’t say whether or not the [911 CCDPP] program has taken an adequate measure towards diverting calls only because the calls [...], we don’t know if there was an attempt made or if it wasn’t successful.”</p> <p>“I think that something that we can look to improve on is creating that harmonious relationship of a tiered response and working together. And trusting each other [...]”</p>

Appendix F. External Community-Based Organizations Commonly Referred to by the 911 CCDPP

- Assaulted Women's Helpline
- Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic
- Bereaved Families of Ontario
- Black Legal Action Centre
- Breakaway Community Services
- Central Intake
- Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH)
- Canadian Mental Health Association
- Community Living Toronto
- COSTI Immigrant Services
- COTA Health
- Crisis Outreach Service for Seniors (COSS)
- Distress Centres of Greater Toronto
- Hassle Free Clinic
- Homes First Society
- Hong Fook Mental Health Association
- Humber River Hospital
- Landlord and Tenant Board
- Legal Aid Ontario
- LOFT Community Services
- Lumenus
- Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee
- Ombudsman Ontario
- Ontario Disability Support Program
- Ontario Student Assistance Program
- Ontario Works
- Parkdale Queen West Community Health Centre
- Partners for Access and Identification (PAID)
- Rainbow Health Network
- Rapid Access Addiction Medicine (RAAM) Clinics
- Reconnect Community Health Services
- Safe Bed Registry
- Sherbourne Health Centre
- Surrey Place
- The 519
- The Access Point
- Toronto Rape Crisis Centre
- Toronto Street to Homes Assessment and Referral Centre (129 Peter St)
- Toronto Withdrawal Management Services
- VHA Home HealthCare
- Victim Services Toronto
- Women's College Hospital
- WoodGreen Community Services
- YMCA of Greater Toronto
- 2-Spirited People of the 1st Nations

Appendix G. Results from the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory

The maximum score for each factor is 5.0. According to the inventory developers, factors with average scores of 2.9 or lower reveal a **concern** and should be addressed, factors scoring between 3.0 and 3.9 are **borderline** and should be discussed by the group to see if they deserve attention and, lastly, factors scoring 4.0 or higher show a **strength** and probably don't need special attention (Mattessich & Johnson, 2016).

Collaboration Factor	GCC Mean Score (/5) (n=6)	TPS Mean Score (/5) (n=36)	Overall Mean Score (/5) (N=42)
Members see collaboration as in their self-interest	4.2	3.8	4.3
Favourable political and social climate	4.8	4.1	4.2
Mutual respect, understanding, and trust	3.4	3.7	3.7
Collaborative group seen as a legitimate leader in the community	4.3	3.6	3.7
History of collaboration or cooperation the community	4.3	3.4	3.6
Appropriate cross-section of members	3.5	3.5	3.5
Ability to compromise	3.2	3.4	3.4
Members share a stake in both process and outcome	3.0	3.5	3.4
Flexibility	2.5	3.1	3.0
Development of clear roles and policy guidelines	3.3	3.1	3.1
Multiple layers of participation	2.9	2.7	2.8

camh

July 2024

Prepared by the Provincial System Support Program



PUBLIC REPORT

August 13, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: An Update on Building a Respectful Workplace

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) receive the following report updating the Board on the Toronto Police Service's (Service's) efforts in implementing recommendations made to the Service to improve workplace wellbeing and culture.

Financial Implications:

There are no immediate financial implications arising from this report.

Summary:

The Board and the Service have been steadfast in their commitment to improve the Service's workplace culture and to create an environment that is safe and inclusive for all members. To this end, the Service has partnered with third parties with relevant expertise to conduct reviews, surveys, and provide expert insights to guide the building of a respectful, safe, and inclusive workplace culture, free from discrimination and harassment. While there is work still to be done, some of the successes to date have placed the Service as a sector leader in this journey.

Background:

At the June, 2022 Board meeting, Min. No. P2022-0622-5.0 refers, the Service submitted the following third party reports to the Board:

1. the findings by Deloitte Canada (Deloitte) following its *Workplace Wellbeing, Harassment and Discrimination Review*;
2. a summary of the results of the 2021 Equity and Inclusion survey conducted by Forum Research; and
3. a white paper drafted by the Bernardi Centre entitled “*Transforming Workplace Culture in the Police Service*” that summarizes province-wide discussions that have taken place.

Deloitte Workplace Wellbeing, Harassment and Discrimination Review:

In 2019, the Service and the Board engaged Deloitte to conduct a Workplace Wellbeing, Harassment, and Discrimination Review (Deloitte Review) of the Service. This review assessed the then current environment at the Service, taking into consideration the perceptions and experience of Service members with regard to workplace harassment and discrimination.

Forum Research Equity and Inclusion Survey:

In the summer of 2021, the Service contracted Forum Research, to conduct a survey that focused on the members experience and perception on the culture and climate in the Service. We took great care to ensure that members felt safe to participate and to respond candidly and were successful in increasing the survey uptake amongst members to double the usual response rate.

Bernardi Centre’s White Paper: Transforming Workplace Culture in the Police Service:

In late 2021, the Service and the Ontario Provincial Police (O.P.P.) organized a working group with over a dozen other police services across the province, as well as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Facilitated by The Bernardi Centre, this group discussed the issues contributing to workplace harassment and discrimination, and shared ideas on how best to work collaboratively on sector-wide solutions. A paper was then prepared that distilled the key policing-specific challenges Ontario services face in this area and provided a set of recommendations for change.

Key Findings:

The findings in each report complement one another and the themes are summarized as follows:

- Perception that some of the Service’s leaders do not lead by example and lack of diversity in the leadership ranks.

- Disparity of the employee experience between sworn and civilian members at the Service such as differences in treatment in the disciplinary process, exclusionary behaviour and limited career progression opportunities.
- There are varying amounts of gender-based discrimination ranging from stereotypes, toxic work environment and in the most exceptional cases, sexual assault.
- Belief that stigma exists surrounding mental health issues leading to harassment, discrimination, exclusion from peer groups and negative career impacts.
- Mistrust of the complaints and investigation process that is perceived to be unclear and inconsistent, along with concerns around confidentiality, fear of retaliation and accountability.

The Forum Research survey provides additional insight that a member's experience and perception can differ based on their socio demographic background. The majority of members expressed that the Service does offer an inclusive environment. Almost half of respondents believe that there have been positive changes at the Service in the five years leading up to the survey being conducted (2017 – 2021).

Recommendations:

The recommendations made in the reports centre around the following themes:

1. acknowledgement of the findings;
2. implementation of more robust human resource programming;
3. update of policies and procedures;
4. enhanced communications;
5. greater profiling and career pathing for civilians;
6. improved complaint intake, triage, investigation and resolution processes;
7. more training;
8. greater workforce diversity;
9. tracking of data; and
10. opportunities.

Discussion:

In parallel to conducting the reviews referenced above, the Service started introducing a number of changes and programs, aimed at proactively addressing barriers known to have existed in the Service.

The changes included more training, new processes, and adjustments to existing programs, new pilot solutions, and additional qualified resources.

A summary of changes made to date, and outcomes where available, by recommendation theme is outlined below:

Acknowledgement of the findings

The Service acknowledged the findings of these reports. While many are troublesome, they echo findings received from other reviews, engagement sessions and feedback received over the years. It is also acknowledged that some of the root causes of the issues highlighted in the reports stem from competing legislation, institutionalized police culture, and the need for alignment with generally accepted industry practices and procedures.

To address these systemic issues in policing, the Service and the Ontario Provincial Police (O.P.P.) have led a province-wide commitment to tackling these issues through the creation of the Working Group on Respectful Workplaces in Policing with nearly 30 other Services across Ontario and beyond. This working group is comprised of internal and external subject matter experts working across five sub-committees in the areas of complaint intake/triage, investigations, resolutions, education/prevention, and accountability.

Endorsed by the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (O.A.C.P.), the Working Group has continued to build awareness and buy-in through presentations at several conferences across the province and ongoing consultation with various stakeholders, including police associations, O.A.C.P. committees and other provincial stakeholders, and senior leaders. The working group was recently highlighted in the O.A.C.P. summer H.Q. magazine.

The working group is finalizing a set of tools and best practices for police services to consider, to modernize practices and processes in addressing workplace harassment and discrimination matters and to support inclusive, respectful workplaces. This is a promising next step in promoting this important work and collaboration across the sector. Furthermore, these best practices are already informing the Service's own approach, strategies and pathways towards workplace complaints, investigations and resolutions processes as described in further detail below.

Part of the acknowledgment of these report findings include the Service's commitment to develop action plans to operationalize the spirit of the recommendations. Action plans have been developed as part of the Service's Equity Strategy to ensure Service-wide accountability in implementation.

Implementation of more robust human resource programming

The People and Culture Pillar (P.&C.) has been overhauling various aspects of its programs since 2017. This work continues to evolve and mature, and includes:

- the introduction of new core values;
- improvements to performance management processes;
- continued review of its hiring and promotional processes;

- the introduction of exit interviews;
- collection of member socio demographic data;
- a professional development program with the Senior Officer Organization; and
- the launch of a new member onboarding website to ensure a positive and consistent experience for all new hires.

Two reports were recently submitted to the Board that reflect some of the most significant efforts taken to reform the Service's people processes.

1. 2023 Annual People Report: Recruitment, Appointments and Promotions, Secondments, Secondary Activities and Cumulative Legal Costs for Labour Relations Counsel and Legal Indemnification (Min. No. P2024-0624-4.0 refers).
2. Evaluation of the 2023 Promotional Processes (Min. No. P2024-0624-3.0 refers).

The Service has also developed a comprehensive Member Wellbeing Strategy and Framework to guide and inform member support programs. A key tactic in the Member Wellbeing Strategy is a focus on health promotion and harm prevention and to expand the ecosystem of supports for members both internally and externally. In direct relation to this, the Wellness Unit has created a dedicated Mental Health and Wellbeing Section that is focused on bringing support programs to members, normalizing discussions about mental health, and reducing stigma. Examples of the work being done by this section include:

- roll out of a nationally recognized Before Operational Stress (B.O.S.) training program;
- the launch of a scalable Therapy Dog program; and
- monthly health promotion initiatives.

Additional work is also being done to augment the Service's Peer Support Program and diversify Wellness Supports through the Extended Health Benefits plan.

In recognition of its commitment to enhancing member wellbeing, promoting mental and physical health, and cultivating an environment that prioritizes overall community wellbeing, the Service has been shortlisted for the 2024 TELUS Health Wellbeing Awards.

Updated policies and procedures

As human resource, wellness and equity programs and initiatives are implemented, complementary processes and procedures are also being reviewed and updated.

Examples of recent changes include:

- Panel based selection for cadets, uniform promotions and civilian roles is now in place with diversity of perspectives (e.g. constable selection committee is comprised of Talent Acquisition, Equity, Inclusion and Human Rights (E.I.H.R.), Divisional Leaders and College representatives);

- Interview questions at all levels have been revised to ensure transparent and bias-free recruitment and to promote a healthy workplace, inclusion and diversity;
- Cadet recruitment processes have been updated with the goal of eliminating unintended barriers;
- As a matter of process, all Specialized Operation Command uniform jobs and some third party training opportunities are now posted for transparency and broad consideration; and
- A permanent Governance Equity Review Committee, comprised of members of diverse roles and perspectives, ensures that any updates to Service procedures are reviewed with an equity/anti-black racism lens.

A newly-formed Professionalism Committee will bring greater consistency to accountability measures for police misconduct. The Committee, comprised of a core group of Professional Standards (P.R.S.), Legal Services, E.I.H.R. and Labour Relations representatives will apply objective criteria to determine fair and appropriate disciplinary and/or remedial measures for substantiated findings of misconduct under the Community Safety and Policing Act (C.S.P.A.).

Enhanced communications

In 2022 when the reports referenced in this update were first made public, the Service undertook a comprehensive communication strategy that included engaging the Internal Support Networks, the associations and Service leadership. A Service-wide video and presentation was disseminated summarizing the results and recommendations contained in the reports.

Through Corporate Communications publications and videos from the Chief, as well as the P.&C. newsletter (P.&C. Connection), efforts are continuously made to communicate to all members, highlight positive outcomes and amplify members' voices.

Corporate Communications is working to modernize the Service's communication products, channels, and approach to:

- Deliver timely, accessible, and simplified information to members;
- Improve corporate messaging with modern, measurable and transparent communications, and ultimately;
- Build community and strengthen the workplace culture by creating forums for open communications that better engage and motivate members.

In addition, external facing campaigns such as "This is T.P.S." and "Why T.P.S." generate millions of impressions, thousands of clicks and views and are intended to create a positive and unifying brand and organizational pride in the work members are doing everyday.

Greater profiling and career pathing for civilians

The Service continues to civilianize roles, with a focus on *'the right people, with the right skills, for the work required'*. Civilian talent is amplified through various communication channels, awards and training opportunities.

The pandemic resulted in the need for the organization to look at how work is being done and, to that end, the Service put in place an ongoing hybrid work model that supports retention of talent, work-life balance, and modernized practices.

There has also been a focus around ensuring greater training opportunities for civilians, including developing tailored micro credentialing for specific skills to enhance mobility within the Service. Unit specific development programs have been created offering opportunities for civilian members while ensuring business continuity for specialized positions. This approach increases employee engagement and decreases time to fill key positions. Additionally, a corporate mentoring program aimed at supporting professional and career development will be piloted with civilians in Q4, 2024.

Practices around civilian conduct and investigations have also evolved. For example, procedures and decision-making regarding interim administrative action taken during the course of misconduct investigations are tailored to account for the civilian disciplinary and labour regime as distinct from uniform member processes under the C.S.P.A. As outlined further below, the Service is also adopting a new modern approach to workplace investigations, consistent with leading practices, including ensuring that civilian misconduct investigations are conducted by civilian or external workplace investigators, where appropriate.

Improved complaint intake, triage, investigation and resolution processes

Over the past several years, the Service has taken a number of steps to enhance fairness, consistency, transparency and accountability at each stage in the complaint, investigation and resolution process with respect to workplace matters. In 2019, the Chief relayed to all members that the E.I.H.R. unit is available as a resource to support those who are dealing with issues in the workplace, which provides an additional path for members to raise concerns.

The Service hired Workplace Resolution Specialists to provide dedicated support to units, members and supervisors in order to proactively address and get ahead of workplace conflicts and problematic team dynamics.

The Service has been making use of alternative resolutions to address workplace issues, supported by the mandates of both the P.R.S. and E.I.H.R. units. To date, over 100 resolutions have been achieved through alternative means, and there have been hundreds of proactive conversations and coaching with members, supervisors and leaders to assist in resolving issues before they escalate. These resolutions also help enhance accountability for unprofessional behaviours, improve member wellbeing by implementing remedies that are aimed at real behavioural change, and address toxic work environments.

Investigations involving matters pertaining to workplace harassment and discrimination are distinct from other types of internal misconduct investigations, and must be treated with a member-centred and trauma-informed approach, in a manner which is consistent with all of the Service's obligations under the C.S.P.A. and its obligations as an employer under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (O.H.S.A.) and the Human Rights Code (the Code). As such, the Service is applying greater scrutiny towards investigations of these types of matters, making improvements as needed and guided by the best practices formulated by the cross-province working group as discussed above.

Regular meetings are held between senior staff from Professionalism & Accountability, P&C, and E.I.H.R. units to ensure that potential complaints or investigations are case conferenced early and often. Frequent communication across units is consistent to continue to break down silos, encourage nuanced approaches to complex or sensitive matters and to consider the need for third-party investigations where appropriate. All P.R.S. investigators and Unit Complaint Coordinators receive a three-day course on how to conduct workplace harassment and discrimination investigations. E.I.H.R. provides ongoing consultative advice and support to P.R.S. investigators on the investigation of complaints that allege workplace harassment and/or discrimination. Recently, the Service also hired its first civilian workplace investigator within the E.I.H.R. unit, reflecting greater capacity to conduct workplace investigations through both an employment and C.S.P.A. lens.

More training

Beginning in 2021, the Service required anti-harassment training for all front-line supervisors and leaders. This training is now incorporated into each new Sergeant onboarding process. The Service is one of the first police services in Canada to undertake training of this nature – in terms of the depth and breadth of the subject matter, and its reach across all levels of leadership.

The Service has also invested in leadership development, with training programs delivered by Global Knowledge and the Schulich School of Business. These programs focus on the means in which to demonstrate, promote and inspire respect, professionalism, integrity, equity, collaboration, inclusion and community-focus. These programs are part of the onboarding of new leaders across the Service.

The Service has also expanded its E.I.H.R. related training, including mandatory, scenario-based interactive courses for new recruits, coach officers, and newly-promoted Sergeants to provide practical learnings grounded in real-life examples to ensure all members understand their rights and responsibilities.

More recent training additions include the introduction of a five day Fair and Unbiased Policing course, which is currently included in the onboarding of cadets, Special Constables, Communications Operators and Parking Enforcement Officers. This course includes a 90 minute lesson on Workplace Harassment, Violence and Peer Intervention and a three hour lesson on Active Bystandership & Peer Intervention.

Master Difficult Conversations is also a new course offering, co-facilitated by Senior Officers in People, Strategy and Performance (P.S.&P.) and Labour Relations. The purpose is to provide a model that participants may use when initiating difficult conversations with direct reports, peers and superiors. The program is highly practical, well-attended, and well-received. In addition, enhanced promotion and integration of online mental health and wellbeing courses and resources ensures increased awareness and access to training for members when needed.

Throughout 2023, frontline Police Officers (including supervisors) and Special Constables received an in-class training module titled *Peer Intervention*. This training was also completed by both Uniform and Civilian Senior Officers. The training provided members with the knowledge and skills to intervene on a colleague to prevent mistakes, prevent misconduct, and to support member wellbeing with a dedicated focus on interventions to stop/prevent workplace harassment and sexual harassment. An evaluation of this course was conducted by the Toronto Police College and positive feedback was received, reporting that the training was relevant, valuable, and actively utilized by members in the field. Among other outcomes, the data collected from members one year after completing the training indicated:

- *73% of respondents believe that there are organizational policies and procedures in place to monitor, promote, and support the application of the intervention techniques covered in the Peer Intervention module.*
- *67% of respondents believe that this training has positively contributed to the organizational culture within their unit/division.*

The Service will continue to improve and refine training syllabi annually at minimum to address specific issues or trends as they emerge.

Greater workforce diversity

Detailed reporting on the Service's workforce diversity efforts were provided in the 2023 Annual People Report: Recruitment, Appointments and Promotions, Secondments, Secondary Activities and Cumulative Legal Costs for Labour Relations Counsel and Legal Indemnification (Min. No. P2024-0624-4.0 refers). Key highlights include:

- The Service continues to attract, hire and promote an increasingly diverse workforce at all levels. Consistently 35 – 38% of all external applicants (cadets and civilian roles) self-identify as having a racialized background.
- Year over year, the Service hired racialized and female cadets at higher proportions than their presence in the applicant pool. Since 2020 cadet classes have increased in racial diversity by 33 per cent. The Service has also experienced an increase in female civilian hires across all roles (41.5% in 2022 vs 46% in 2023).
- From a leadership standpoint, female candidates were more likely to be successful in both Sergeant and Staff Sergeant promotional processes. Racialized candidates were more likely to be successful in the

Sergeant process. However the data has identified that there remains gaps and disproportionalities at the ranks of Staff Sergeant and above.

- Of approximately 80 uniform Senior Officers (including the Deputy Chiefs),
 - 48% belong to at least one historically underrepresented group, compared to 29% in 2018 (according to the Deloitte report);
 - 23% of Senior Officers are racialized (of which 11% are Black); this compares to 16% in 2018;
 - 28% of uniform Senior Officers are women, up from 13% in 2018.

Notably, the Executive Management Team (Chief, Command team, Directors and Staff Superintendents) are 56% female, 22% racialized and 44% civilian. There is not another leadership team as diverse as this in the sector.

Recruitment initiatives such as Motivational Mondays, the expansion of the Women's Only Mentoring Program and a Fitness Boot camp have been designed to increase the success rate among female applicants, which the Service has prioritized. This program has already seen some success in 2023. Two participants have been hired in Class 24-01, and five are currently in the process of being hired for Class 24-02. There was an overall increase of 21.2% of total women hired from 2022 to 2023.

Additionally, in 2023 an Indigenous Candidate program was started to improve access for Indigenous community members from across the province. The Talent Acquisition team created a partnership with the Aboriginal Peacekeeping Unit (A.P.U.) and together they have attended several local and out of town events including the Metis Nation of Ontario Job Fair in North Bay to promote the Service as an employer of choice.

Lastly, the Service is planning to pursue a "top employer" award. This will enhance recruitment and retention of top talent while positioning the Service as an employer of choice, helping attract an even larger diverse candidate pool.

Tracking of data

Measuring progress through proper monitoring, collecting and tracking of relevant data supports the Service's goals towards more equitable policing as outlined in the Equity Strategy and ensures Service accountability for continuous organizational improvements.

The Service has been collecting and reporting on a number of data points to support insights on its culture and workplace. Metrics include, but are not limited to:

- Sociodemographic data collection across its hiring and promotional processes
- Separation data and exit interviews
- Annual employee engagement surveys
- Internal and external complaints, case tracking and outcomes
- Attendance, accommodation and disability management metrics

To understand the current state, the Service recently launched a workforce census in order to capture a complete picture of its demographics. This information will support tailored programming, better meet member needs, and understand if the make up of the Service reflects the city.

The Professionalism Committee referenced earlier will also allow for the ability to conduct comparative disciplinary analyses to ensure fairness, consistency and greater oversight in holding members accountable for misconduct. Further, the Professionalism Committee will play a key role in identifying and assessing trends, risks and operational gaps, and developing strategies to mitigate risks to the Service.

Opportunities

While the service continues to make great strides in improving workplace culture, there remains opportunities to be pursued.

Improved process intersection and data reporting is needed between wellness, conduct and intervention. This would allow the Service to more comprehensively capture the breadth of actions taken, or required, in response to daily stressors/trauma faced by members, and complaints that are raised.

While the Service has experienced demonstrable positive results in hiring and promotional trends in recent years, workforce diversity insights suggest that more attention is needed upstream in the process, focusing on training and development opportunities, in order to build a resilient and diverse workforce at all ranks of the organization. There also needs to be a continued focus on female cadet recruitment.

Moreover, although some progress has been made, there continue to be additional opportunities to introduce and consistently reinforce leading practices in the area of respectful workplace complaints and investigations and ensuring that the Board and Service are concurrently meeting their statutory obligations under Occupational Health and Safety Act (O.H.S.A.), the Human Rights Code, and the C.S.P.A. The best practices coming out of the Working Group on Respectful Workplaces in Policing will continue to help to drive Service reform in this respect. The Service hopes to create a dedicated Respectful Workplace unit, focused on conducting workplace investigations, mediation and other alternative resolution options. This unit is proposed to report into the Professionalism and Accountability Pillar for more seamless workflow and consistency in decision-making and practices.

Overall, much of the work accomplished to date has been done with minimal incremental investment. Meaningful investment, some formalized committee governance and updated procedures are required to solidify and mature processes so that they are sustainable and repeatable over the long-term.

The long-term impact and outcomes of these efforts remain to be seen in terms of creating a more accountable, positive and equitable workplace. The Service is seeing

encouraging signs that the efforts taken are having an impact. Results of a member feedback survey indicated that:

- 79% of members like working at the Service
- 78% of non-uniform civilians said they would recommend the Service to family and friends as a great place to work
- 64% of respondents felt the Service provides resources that promote a workplace free of harassment and discrimination

Members are bringing forward complaints and raising issues, including historical events, suggesting greater trust in the Service and its ability to deal with workplace matters effectively.

Conclusion:

The Board and the Service have been steadfast in their efforts to improve the Service's workplace culture and to create an environment that is safe and inclusive.

The above efforts are a subset of a broader set of initiatives and work underway as part of 'Cultivating a Respectful Workplace' action plan that is detailed in the Service's Equity Strategy: The Road to Creating an Inclusive Workplace and Fairness in Community Safety.

The Service is appreciative of all members who have and continue to provide their perspectives and experiences as well as to the many members and leaders who are part of developing and implementing solutions to build equitable, supportive and inclusive spaces. The Board will be kept apprised of progress on the implementation of this important work.

Ms. Svina Dhaliwal, Chief Administrative Officer, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

August 25, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Subject: Request for Special Funds: Healing the Voice Within 6th Annual Fundraiser

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

It is recommend that:

1. as an exception to its Special Fund Policy, the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) approve the purchase of tickets of up to 10 tickets for Board Members and Board Staff, to attend The Gatehouse's 6th annual fundraiser to be held on October 3, 2024; and,
2. the Board authorize the use of the Board crest by The Gatehouse for the purpose of promoting the 2024 "Healing the Voice Within" fundraiser.

Financial Implications:

If recommendation number one is approved, the Board's Special Fund will be reduced in an amount not to exceed \$1,000. The current balance of the Special Fund as at August 26, 2024, is approximately \$485,634.

Toronto Police Service Board

40 College Street, Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3 | Phone: 416-808-8080 Fax: 416-808-8082 | www.tpsb.ca

Summary:

This report seeks the Board's approval to support The Gatehouse's 6th Annual Fundraiser through ticket purchases and authorization to use the Board crest for promotional purposes. The Gatehouse is a critical community resource offering support to victims of childhood sexual abuse and relies heavily on fundraising for its operations.

Discussion:

Background

The Gatehouse is a unique community-based centre that provides support, resources and advocacy on behalf of those impacted by childhood sexual abuse. The Gatehouse offers services and programs to children/youth, families, investigating officers and child welfare personnel to support the investigation of child sexual abuse cases. The Gatehouse provides both a safe place for children to disclose abuse to police and child welfare personnel, as well as support services and programs for adults whose lives have been affected by childhood sexual abuse. It has been designated by police services as a best practice site for conducting investigations related to childhood sexual abuse.

Discussion:

The Gatehouse, established in June 1998, supports individuals impacted by childhood sexual abuse through a range of services, including advocacy, support programs, and resources. It serves children, youth, families, and child welfare personnel, providing a safe space for disclosures and ongoing support for survivors. The organization is recognized as a best practice site by police services for investigating child sexual abuse cases.

Since its inception, The Gatehouse has assisted over 20,000 individuals. It collaborates with various police services, including Peel, Halton, and O.P.P., and has been a valuable resource at the Toronto Police College, offering presentations on the impact of childhood sexual abuse. Despite its significant contributions, The Gatehouse faces ongoing challenges in securing sustainable funding, relying primarily on fundraising and in-kind support.

The Fundraiser

Miss Maria Barcelos, The Gatehouse, Executive Director, has requested the Board's support for the annual 'Healing the Voice Within' art exhibit and fundraiser. The event is a one of a kind art exhibit being held to give voice to sexual abuse survivors, promote awareness about the important work of The Gatehouse and raise much needed funds for its programs and services. The exhibit will be held on the evening of October 3, 2024, at The Liberty Grand, Toronto.

Conclusion:

In recognition of The Gatehouse's vital role in the community and the Board's commitment to supporting community initiatives, it is recommended that the Board purchase tickets for interested Members and Staff to attend the fundraiser and authorize the use of the Board crest for event promotion.

Respectfully submitted,

Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Contact

Sheri Chapman
Executive Assistant to the Chair
Toronto Police Service Board
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PUBLIC REPORT

August 26, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Subject: Request for Special Funds – 32nd Annual Scholarship and Awards Gala and Scholarship Award

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

This report recommends that:

- 1) As an exception to the Special Fund Policy, the Board approve an expenditure in an amount not to exceed \$5,000 to sponsor the Association of Black Law Enforcers 32nd Annual Scholarship Awards Gala;
- 2) As an exception to its Special Fund Policy, the Board approve an expenditure in an amount not to exceed \$3,500, towards one scholarship for the Association of Black Law Enforcers (A.B.L.E.) scholarship program; and,
- 3) The Board approve the use of its crest to appear in the event program and to be used as recognition at the event.

Financial Implications:

If the Board approves recommendations number one and two in this report, the Special Fund will be reduced in the amount of \$8,500. The current balance of the Special Fund is approximately \$485,634.

Toronto Police Service Board

40 College Street, Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3 | Phone: 416-808-8080 Fax: 416-808-8082 | www.tpsb.ca

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to seek the Board's approval to support A.B.L.E.'s 32nd Annual Scholarship and Awards Gala from its Special Fund.

Discussion:

Background

A.B.L.E is a not-for-profit organization that aims to address the needs and concerns of Black and other racial minorities in law enforcement and the community. Formed in 1992, A.B.L.E. provides support and advocates on behalf of Black and other racialized law enforcement professionals and members of the community at large. A.B.L.E.'s mission has been to improve the image of law enforcement in the community by supporting outreach, youth initiatives, and promoting racial harmony through cultural pride and diversity.

The Scholarship

A.B.L.E. created its Scholarship Program to commemorate the contributions of Rose Fortune (1774-1864) and Peter C. Butler III (1859- 1943) – the first Black police officers in Canada. By awarding scholarships, A.B.L.E. assists Black and visible minority students in achieving their educational and career aspirations. A.B.L.E. is committed to ensuring that the justice sector is reflective of all Canadians. It also wants to ensure that youth have opportunities to serve, protect, and correct. In the spirit of opportunity, A.B.L.E. contributes funds to support recipients' post-secondary education in the following areas of study:

- law enforcement
- police foundations
- community and justice services (Correctional Worker Program)
- criminology / criminal justice
- law
- social work

The Gala

The Scholarship Awards Gala, A.B.L.E.'s premier event, is attended by over 600 guests from law enforcement and the broader community, from Chiefs of Police across Canada to front-line law enforcement officers and community advocates. Law enforcement officers from across the United States and the United Kingdom are also in attendance. This organization provides scholarships to Black and other racialized students pursuing post-secondary education in Law Enforcement, Corrections, Criminology, and Law. By awarding these scholarships, A.B.L.E. assists youth to achieve their education goals in the justice sector while making a positive contribution to society.

The theme of this year's Gala is "**Passion, Purpose & Persistence – Celebrating Excellence**", and it will take place on **Saturday, November 16, 2024** at Casino Rama

Resort, Orillia. The event will feature the presentation of ten scholarships valued at \$3,500 each.

Sponsorship

This report recommends that the Board purchase the Gratitude Sponsor package which includes one table of ten, plus an additional table of ten for community members, logo recognition during the event and recognition in the event program. In addition, it is recommended that the Board fund one scholarship.

Conclusion:

Given the Board's important relationship with A.B.L.E. and its ongoing commitment to community outreach, I am recommending that:

- 1) as an exception to the Special Fund Policy, the Board approve an expenditure in an amount not to exceed \$5,000 to sponsor the Association of Black Law Enforcers 32nd Annual Scholarship Awards Gala;
- 2) as an exception to its Special Fund Policy, the Board approve an expenditure in an amount not to exceed \$3,500, towards one scholarship for the Association of Black Law Enforcers (A.B.L.E.) scholarship program.; and,
- 3) The Board approve the use of its crest to appear in the event program and to be used as recognition at the event.

Respectfully submitted,

Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Contact

Sheri Chapman
Executive Assistant to Chair
Email: Sheri.Chapman@tpsb.ca



PUBLIC REPORT

August 20, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

**Subject: Toronto Police Service Cyber Security Partnership with
City of Toronto's Office of the Chief Information Security
Officer**

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board approve the parameters of the Memorandum of Understanding between the City of Toronto's (City) Office of the Chief Information Security Officer listed in the discussion portion of this report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendations contained in this report.

Summary:

At its meeting on July 31, 2024, the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) approved a recommendation from the Executive Director to the Board, directing the Chief to work with the City of Toronto's (City) Chief Information Security Officer to formulate organizational cyber security frameworks (Min. No. P2024-0731-15.0 refers).

Toronto Police Service Board

40 College Street, Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3 | Phone: 416-808-8080 Fax: 416-808-8082 | www.tpsb.ca

Discussion:

Background

Item EX14.3 – Extending the Mandate of the City’s Chief Information Security Officer (C.I.S.O.) adopted by City Council on May 23, 2024.

[Agenda Item History - 2024.EX14.3 \(toronto.ca\)](#)

Cyber security is a vital component of public safety organizations, mitigating the risk of disruption to systems that support operations, including data breaches and loss of information.

A memorandum of understanding (M.O.U.) to designate the scope, responsibilities and span of control between the Service and the City C.I.S.O. is being drafted; however, the technical aspects of this partnership are complex in nature and require the creation of processes formulated with best practices to ensure the confidentiality and security of the Service’s systems and information. The M.O.U. will include:

- The ability for the Service to leverage the capabilities of the Office of the City C.I.S.O.
- The Service’s cyber security posture will be available to the City C.I.S.O.
- The Service’s data will not be transmitted out of the Service’s environment
- Any management actions recommended by the CISO must be endorsed by the Board before being actionable by the Chief and Service.
- That the Service may make use of cybersecurity services provided by or through the office of the CISO.

Conclusion:

As cyber threats and attacks increase and become increasingly complex, partnerships such as this provide the opportunity to pool resources, frameworks and technology to supplement the strength and resiliency of the Service’s critical systems; however, any agreement between the City and the Service must ensure the confidentiality and security of the Service’s systems and information. In addition, recommendations from the City must be endorsed by the Board prior to any action on the part of the Service.

Mr. Colin Stairs, Chief Information Officer, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

August 7, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Contract Awards to Olin Canada ULC, Lloyd Libke Inc. and Rampart International Corp. for Ammunition

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendations:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board):

1. approve a contract award to Olin Canada ULC (Olin) for ammunition in the amount of \$611,040;
2. approve a contract award to Lloyd Libke Inc. (Lloyd Libke) for ammunition in the amount of \$216,615;
3. approve a contract award to Rampart International Corp. (Rampart) for ammunition in the amount of \$88,900; and
4. authorize the Chair to execute all required agreements and related documents on behalf of the Board, subject to approval by the City Solicitor, as to form.

Financial Implications:

Funding for the recommended contract awards is included in the Toronto Police Service's (Service's) 2024 operating budget (Min. No. P2023-0302-8.0. refers).

Toronto Police Service Board

40 College Street, Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3 | Phone: 416-808-8080 Fax: 416-808-8082 | www.tpsb.ca

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to request the Board's approval for contract awards to Olin (operating as Winchester Ammunition), Lloyd Libke (operating as Federal Ammunition) and Rampart for a total amount of \$916,555 for ammunition.

Discussion:

Background

The purchase of ammunition is required in order for the Service to meet mandatory training requirements and for legislatively mandated operational purposes governed by the Community Safety and Policing Act (C.S.P.A).

The Toronto Police College (T.P.C.) is responsible for maintaining inventory and purchasing ammunition on behalf of the Service. The T.P.C. strives to maintain enough ammunition inventory to sustain training and operational demands for the current year.

The Service, like all police services in Ontario, experienced supply issues with ammunition since the pandemic. Prior to the pandemic, the Service and other police services would typically receive delivery of ammunition within 60-90 days of ordering. Over the past five years, the Service has encountered supply chain issues that have severely impacted timely delivery of ammunition. For example, the Service is still awaiting the delivery of an ammunition order from early 2023; notably this is more than a 12-month delay in order fulfillment. As a result, it is critical for the Service to "get in the queue" with ammunition manufacturers well in advance of required delivery dates. Acknowledging these current delivery challenges, the Service has adopted a practice to order ammunition a year in advance to ensure delivery by the required dates in order to avoid any interruption in training, requalification and other operational needs.

To provide some perspective with regards to usage:

- In Service Training (I.S.T.) generally consists of a class of 90 sworn members. The members spend three days at the T.P.C. each year to, among other things, requalify on all aspects of the Use of Force, including firearms. During this training a total of approximately 10,000 rounds of ammunition are discharged over the three day period. There are 110 I.S.T. courses running annually. This does not include Senior Officer Use of Force Training, remedial courses, post-incident training, and other necessary firearms training;
- Further, the Service's recruit development program requires each Cadet to discharge approximately 3,500 rounds over the twelve-week training program at the T.P.C. to meet the Service's standards. This translates to a minimum of 315,000 rounds currently used for each intake of 90 recruits.

Typically, the Service has purchased ammunition through a joint procurement process with the Police Co-operative Purchasing Group (P.C.P.G.), which includes all police services in the Province of Ontario.

- In December 2020, the O.P.P. initiated a procurement process to establish a new contract for ammunition starting January 1, 2022 by posting a Request for Bids (R.F.B.) # 1335 through an open competitive procurement process on the Ontario Tenders Portal (O.T.P.). The R.F.B. closed on May 31, 2021, and two bids were received, both of which were disqualified due to mandatory requirements not having been submitted.
- The O.P.P. then (re-)posted R.F.B. # 1523 on August 12, 2021, which closed on October 29, 2021. Two bids were received and the O.P.P. cancelled the procurement because the bidders refused to extend the irrevocable period and hold their submitted pricing for the entire contract term. The two bidders were contacted to ask why they were not willing to hold their pricing for the entire contract term, and both bidders cited supply chain disruptions and price fluctuations from their suppliers. On November 16, 2022, the O.P.P. communicated the cancellation of the procurement for ammunition through the P.C.P.G. website.
- As a result of the above, the P.C.P.G. contracts for ammunition expired on December 31, 2021, without replacement contracts having been established. Since that time, all P.C.P.G. agencies have been purchasing ammunition on a non-competitive basis annually until such time as the O.P.P. is able to establish a new contract for P.C.P.G.
- At the end of 2023, the O.P.P. started a new procurement process for ammunition and is planning to post an R.F.B. in September 2024, with the anticipated start date for the resulting agreement beginning in January 2025.

In the meantime it is critical for ammunition to be purchased through other means to ensure training and operational needs are neither interrupted nor jeopardized.

For 2024, the Service has secured delivery commitments for ammunition from Olin, Lloyd Libke and Rampart, who were Vendors of Record (V.O.R.) under recent P.C.P.G. contracts and have historically been the major V.O.R.s for the different types of ammunition purchased by the Service and P.C.P.G. partners.

The planned procurement for ammunition in 2024 is as follows:

Vendor	Amount
Olin	\$611,040
Lloyd Libke	\$216,615
Rampart	\$88,900
Total	\$916,555

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

The Board's Purchasing Bylaw No. 163 includes the following allowable non-competitive procurement exception:

“15.1(h) An attempt to procure the required Goods or Services by soliciting competitive submissions has been made in good faith, but has failed to identify a compliant submission or qualified supplier, or where the submissions received have been collusive”.

Conclusion:

For the reasons outlined above, it is recommended that the Board approve contract awards for ammunition to Olin, Lloyd Libke and Rampart for a combined amount of \$916,555.

Due to supply chain and procurement disruptions as well as long delivery timelines, it is critical to order ammunition at least one-year ahead.

If the Board does not approve the recommended purchase of ammunition, there is a strong likelihood that the Service may deplete its ammunition inventory prematurely, and will not be able to provide provincially mandatory training by the required timelines.

Ms. Svina Dhaliwal, Chief Administrative Officer, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

August 27, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

**Subject: Semi-Annual Report: Toronto Police Service Board
Special Fund Unaudited Statement: January to June 2024**

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Summary:

The Toronto Police Service Board (Board) remains committed to promoting transparency and accountability in the area of finance. As required by the Board's Special Fund Policy (Board Minute #P2022-0502-8.0), expenditures for the Special Fund shall be reported to the Board on a semi-annual basis. This semi-annual report is provided in accordance with such directive.

As at June 30, 2024, the balance of the Special Fund was \$540,530, representing a net increase of \$80,468 against the December 31, 2023 fund balance of \$460,062.

Discussion:

Enclosed is the un-audited statement of receipts and disbursements with respect to the Board's Special Fund for the period January 01 to June 30, 2024.

As at June 30, 2024, the balance of the Special Fund was \$540,530. During the first half of the year, the Special Fund recorded receipts of \$242,783 and disbursements of \$162,315. There has been a net increase of \$80,468 against the December 31, 2023 fund balance of \$460,062.

Auction proceeds have been estimated for the months of May and June 2024, as the actual deposit have not yet been made.

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For the first half of 2024, the Board approved and disbursed the following sponsorships:

Sponsorship	Total Amount
Asian Heritage Month	\$2,800
Auxiliary Graduation Ceremonies	\$3,200
Black History Month	\$3,000
Board & Chief's Pride Reception	\$2,600
Canada Beyond the Blue	\$5,000
Canadian Jewish Heritage Month and Hanukkah Celebrations	\$2,800
Caribbean Carnival Kick-off Event & Float	\$5,000
Chief's Fundraising Gala/Victim Services Toronto	\$2,000
Community Consultative Groups	\$29,000
Community-Police Consultative Conference	\$6,000
Day of Pink	\$400
International Francophone Day	\$2,000
Islamic Heritage Month	\$2,800
LGBTQ2S+ Youth Justice Bursary Award	\$2,000
National Indigenous Peoples Day	\$4,600
National Victims of Crime Awareness Week	\$1,000
Police Officer Excellence Awards	\$15,000
Pride Month Celebrations	\$2,300
Torch Run / Special Olympics	\$2,500
Toronto Crime Stoppers / Annual Chief of Police Dinner	\$5,000
United Way Campaign	\$5,000
Victim Services Toronto	\$25,000
Volunteer Appreciation Event	\$8,936
Youth in Policing Initiative Luncheons (Y.I.P.I.)	\$6,000

In addition, the Board approved and disbursed the following:

Disbursed Funds	Total Amount
Canadian Association of Police Governance (C.A.P.G)	\$5,000
Ontario Association of Police Services Board (O.A.P.S.B.)	\$5,000
Recognition of Service Members	\$3,951
Toronto Police Amateur Athletic Association	\$3,200
Recognition of Community Members	\$701

Conclusion:

It is, therefore, recommended that the Board receive the report on the Toronto Police Service Board's Special Fund unaudited statement for the period of January to June 2024.

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

*copy with original signature on file at the Board Office

Contact

Sheri Chapman
Executive Assistant to the Chair
Toronto Police Service Board
Email: sheri.chapman@tpsb.ca

Attachments:

Appendix A - 2024 1H Special Fund Results with Initial Projection

Appendix A

The Toronto Police Services Board Special Fund					
2024 First Half Year Result with Initial Projections					
Particulars	Initial Projection FY2024	January 01 to June 30, 2024	July 01 to December 31, 2024	Year-to-date 2024	January 01 to December 31, 2023
Balance Forward	460,062	460,062	-	460,062	390,913
Revenue					
Proceeds from Auctions	233,551	205,779	-	205,779	308,063
Less Overhead Cost	(116,776)	(99,210)	-	(99,210)	(149,460)
Unclaimed Money	155,439	120,710	-	120,710	159,826
Less Return of Unclaimed Money	(12,280)	-	-	-	(8,150)
Interest	24,000	15,307	-	15,307	22,603
Others	394	197	-	197	514
Total Revenue	284,329	242,783	-	242,783	333,395
Balance Forward Before Expenses	744,390	702,844	-	702,844	724,308
Disbursements					
Police Community Sponsorships - Toronto Police Services					
Community Partnerships and Engagement Unit Events	50,000	50,000	-	50,000	45,000
Community Consultative Groups	29,000	29,000	-	29,000	29,000
Volunteer Appreciation Event	8,936	8,936	-	8,936	2,915
Youth in Policing Initiative (Y.I.P.I.)	6,000	6,000	-	6,000	6,000
Canada Beyond the Blue Gala	5,000	5,000	-	5,000	5,000
Toronto Police Cricket Club	5,000	-	-	-	5,000
Occupational Health and Safety Awareness Day	4,000	-	-	-	4,000
Police Community Sponsorships - Community					
Midaynta Community Services	-	-	-	-	25,000
Victim Services Toronto	25,000	25,000	-	25,000	25,000
Police Officer Excellence Awards	15,000	15,000	-	15,000	15,000
Association of Black Law Enforcers (ABLE)	8,500	-	-	-	5,000
Toronto Crime Stoppers	5,000	5,000	-	5,000	-
Funds Returned on Sponsorships					
Asian Heritage Month	-	-	-	-	(499)
Black History Month	-	-	-	-	(6)
Board & Chief's Pride Reception	-	-	-	-	(210)
Canadian Jewish Heritage Month and Hanukkah Celebrations	-	-	-	-	(1,445)
Community Consultative Groups	-	-	-	-	(8,666)
Community Police Consultative Conference	-	-	-	-	(595)
Day of Pink	-	-	-	-	(285)
Islamic Heritage Month	-	-	-	-	(2,300)
National Victims Crime Awareness Month	-	-	-	-	(1,000)
National Indigenous Peoples Day	-	-	-	-	(80)
Pride Month Celebrations	-	-	-	-	(516)
Toronto Caribbean Carnival	-	-	-	-	(31)
United Way	-	-	-	-	(474)
Youth in Policing Initiative (Y.I.P.I.)	-	-	-	-	(137)
Toronto Police Amateur Athletic Association Assistance	32,000	3,200	-	3,200	32,000
Recognition of Service Members					
Awards	110,000	3,539	-	3,539	46,029
Catering	40,000	412	-	412	35,137
Recognition of Community Members					
Awards	8,000	214	-	214	8,599
Catering	1,000	487	-	487	120
Recognition of Board Members and Staff					
Awards	1,000	-	-	-	-
Catering	2,000	-	-	-	89
Conferences					
Canadian Association of Police Governance (C.A.P.G)	5,000	5,000	-	5,000	5,000
Ontario Association of Police Services Board (O.A.P.S.B.)	5,000	5,000	-	5,000	5,000
Donations/Flowers in Memoriam					
Toronto Police Services Board (T.P.S.B.) and Toronto Police Association (T.P.A.)	500	-	-	-	200
Retirement Dinner	10,000	-	-	-	-
Report on Specified Auditing Procedures - KPMG	12,211	-	-	-	11,702
Other Expenses					
Bank Service Charges	1,200	527	-	527	(30,299)
Total Disbursements	389,347	162,314	-	162,314	264,247
Special Fund Balance	355,043	540,530	-	540,530	460,062



PUBLIC REPORT

September 12, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: 2024 Operating Budget Variance for the Toronto Police Service, Period Ending June 30, 2024

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendations:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) forward a copy of this report to the City of Toronto (City) Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer for information and inclusion in the variance reporting to the City's Budget Committee.

Financial Implications:

The Toronto Police Service's (Service) 2024 approved net operating budget is \$1,173.9 Million (M). As at June 30, 2024, the Service is projecting a \$22.4M unfavourable variance. The Service will pursue opportunities for expenditure reduction and/or increasing revenue throughout the year in order to mitigate year-end deficits to the extent possible. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the projected variance, by feature category.

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to provide the Board with the Service's 2024 projected year-end variance as at June 30, 2024. The Service's projected total net expenditures are \$1,196.3M, resulting in a projected \$22.4M unfavourable 2024 year-end variance.

Table 1 provides a high-level summary of variances and explanations by feature category. Year to date and projection figures are shown in the Appendix 1 at the end of this report.

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Table 1 – 2024 Variance by Feature Category (\$Ms)

Category	2024 Budget	2024 Projection	Variance Fav (UnFav)	Explanation
Salaries	\$896.3	\$892.7	\$3.6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uniform separations are projected to be 180 compared to a budget of 160 for 2024, resulting in a projected favourable variance. - The cadet hiring plan of four classes of 90 remains on track and lateral hires are currently eight ahead of the plan. The projected year end strength is expected to be 5,402 officers, 31 fewer than budgeted (5,433 officers). This is attributed to higher than expected 2023 separations, resulting in a lower staffing level at the start of the year than originally planned.
Premium Pay	\$58.9	\$99.5	(\$40.6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussed below.
Benefits	\$277.4	\$281.0	(\$3.6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Service is experiencing pressures in medical/dental and Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (W.S.I.B.) costs. - While the number of new W.S.I.B. claims have decreased to pre-pandemic levels, 90% of the current cost pressure is attributable to active and complex mental health claims.
Non Salary	\$110.1	\$113.5	(\$3.4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unfavourable variances are projected in various accounts such as training and equipment. - These expenses are funded by outside agencies as stated in the Revenue section below.
Contributions to / (Draws from) Reserves	(\$47.9)	(\$47.9)	\$0.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discussed below.

Category	2024 Budget	2024 Projection	Variance Fav (UnFav)	Explanation
Revenue	(\$120.9)	(\$126.8)	\$5.9	- The Service is anticipating higher than planned recoveries from the provincial and city initiatives in the following areas: - \$3.4M for non-salary purchases. - \$3.3M for premium pay recoveries. - Important to note that the budget for the provincial uploading of courts remains historically underfunded from the Province. The 2024 projection is \$3.4M less than budgeted due to lower than anticipated recoverable costs. - Favourable variance of \$2.6M is projected in fees (e.g. paid duty administration, vulnerable sector screening).
Net Impact of Grants	\$0.0	(\$2.4)	\$2.4	- Grant funding generally results in a net zero variance, as funds are provided for specific expenditures to achieve grant objectives. A net favourable variance is projected in this category because a number of permanent funded positions are assigned to provincially supported programs, covered by the grant, and not all these positions were backfilled.
Total Preliminary Net	\$1,173.9	\$1,209.6	(\$35.7)	
Potential Reductions		(\$13.3)	\$13.3	- Discussed below.
Total Net	\$1,173.9	\$1,196.3	(\$22.4)	

Discussion:

Background

At its December 19, 2023 meeting, the Board approved the Service’s budget request at \$1,186.5M Net and \$1,361.5M Gross (Min. No. P2023-1219-2.2 refers). Subsequently, City Council, at its February 14, 2024 meeting, approved the Service’s 2024 operating

budget at \$1,173.9M Net, a reduction of \$12.6M from the Board approved budget. The net budget reduction was then reallocated back to the Service by a Council approved motion by allocating the funding from the Budget Bridging & Balancing Reserve. This resulted in the same available gross funding as the Board approved budget.

As at June 30, 2024, the Service is projecting a year-end unfavourable variance of \$22.4M. This represents an increased shortfall of \$1.8M compared to the variance reported for March 31, 2024.

In response, the Service is committed to implementing proactive and strategic measures to mitigate the projected shortfall, which are discussed below.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

This report is in compliance with the Board’s Budget Transparency Policy, approved on July 29, 2021 (Min. No. P2021-0729-3.0. refers).

Pressures and Opportunities:

Premium Pay:

The most significant pressure on the budget remains premium pay. The total premium pay budget is \$58.9M with a projected gross spending of \$99.5M resulting in an unfavourable variance of \$40.6M in this category, before applicable recoveries. Year-to-date spending on premium pay is \$4.5M higher in 2024 than in the same period in 2023.

Expenditure Category	2023 Budget (\$M’s)	2023 Actuals (\$M’s)	2024 Budget (\$M’s)	2024 Projection (\$M’s)	Fav / (Unfav) (\$M’s)
Uniform Officers	53.3	75.0	53.3	82.4	(29.1)
Civilians	5.6	14.3	5.6	17.1	(11.5)
Total Premium Pay	58.9	89.3	58.9	99.5	(40.6)
Recoveries offset	-	-	-	(13.3)	13.3
Net Premium Pay	58.9	89.3	58.9	86.2	(27.3)

There is a base level of uniform premium pay inherent to policing. Premium pay is incurred for:

- extended tours of duty (e.g., when officers are involved in an arrest at the time their shift ends);
- court attendance scheduled for when the officer is off-duty; and
- call-backs (e.g., when an officer is required to work additional shifts to ensure appropriate staffing levels are maintained or for specific initiatives).

The premium pay budget has historically been underfunded. The 2023 premium pay budget was \$58.9M with actual spending of \$89.3M, resulting in an unfavourable premium pay variance (year-end actuals) of \$30.4M. Despite this, the 2024 premium pay budget remained flatlined at \$58.9M to balance the Service’s overall budget increase with affordability considerations. The City also set aside a \$10M reserve to

support the recovery of costs associated with planned special events and an additional \$3.3M recovery anticipated from other partners.

Three factors contribute to the current pace of premium pay. Unplanned events including Project Resolute, ongoing vacancies, and high workload within investigative units including off duty court requirements.

The redeployment of the Community Response Units to the Neighbourhood Community Officer Program during 2022 has reduced the capacity for the Service to respond to unplanned events with on duty resources. As a result, the Service has had to rely on off duty resources by way of call-backs in order to provide the surge capacity required for major unplanned events (e.g. demonstrations, emergency events, and homicide / missing person investigations). Maintaining public order is part of core service delivery and provincial adequacy standards, and the Service is projected to attend over 2,000 unplanned events in 2024.

More than half of the unplanned events relate to Project Resolute which encompasses both proactive enhanced presence within Jewish/Muslim communities, as well as public order requirements for unplanned events and demonstrations. As of June 30, 2024, Project Resolute costs are \$10.1M which includes direct premium pay costs of \$4M. The premium pay is projected to reach \$9M by year end. In addition, the Service has allocated significant on-duty resources towards this project and is therefore incurring premium pay in units facing cascading impacts (staffing shortages) as a result of this reallocation.

Staffing levels and workload pressures (open cases) are placing strain on investigative units. As a result, existing officers are often required to work extended hours to maintain the quality of investigations, maintain public safety and ensure timely case resolution.

Additionally, as the number of court cases continues to rise, the demand for police officers to attend court proceedings to support justice outcomes increases. While attending court during their shifts puts additional strain on policing resources, the increase in off-duty court time contributes to premium pay costs as well as the strain caused by the duty to disclose.

While hiring additional officers has the potential to reduce overtime costs through improved efficiency and workload distribution, its impact is being offset due to growth in demand.

As a result, premium pay is projected to be overspent by \$27.3M, when including \$13.3M of cost recovery from outside agencies and the City's special events reserve.

Reserves:

The Service contributes to a number of reserves through provisions in the operating budget. All reserves are established by the City of Toronto. The City manages the

Sick Pay Gratuity Reserve (S.P.G.), while the Service manages the Vehicle & Equipment (V.&E.), Legal, Central Sick Bank, Healthcare Spending, and Modernization reserves. Generally, reserve contributions are evaluated and budgeted for based on forecasted future activities in these reserves, and taking into consideration long-term sustainability.

In order to minimize the Service's 2024 budget request, most reserve contributions were maintained (flatlined) at 2023 levels. In the interest of affordability and adoption of bridging strategies through the City's long-term financial planning exercise, the 2024 budget included a \$10M contribution decrease to the Vehicle and Equipment reserve. This reserve is projected to have an unfavourable balance of \$6M by the end of 2024. The Service is actively identifying options to manage the pressures and exploring the immediate and long-term sustainability of this reserve.

Potential Reductions

Before exploring savings or cost avoidance opportunities, the preliminary year-end projections are trending \$35.7M unfavourable. The Service has identified \$13.3M in cost offsets resulting in a projected unfavourable variance of \$22.4M after potential expenditure reductions. It must be noted that projections are based on estimates and the Service is actively striving to come within its approved budget. Currently, the Service is exploring various actions and mitigations which include the following:

- Ongoing review of the timing and pace of hiring and associated impacts to the Service's workforce;
- Re-examining the use, nature, and time dedicated to premium pay with the objective of curbing this cost to keep expenditures to an absolute minimum;
- A re-assessment of non-salary expenditures and deferral or reallocation of budgets where possible and sustainable;
- A re-evaluation of liabilities and bringing into income where justified and in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (G.A.A.P.);
- Maximizing grant funding opportunities and seeking cost recovery opportunities; and
- Subject to protecting future funding viability, reassessing contribution strategies with a view to deferring reserve contributions where warranted and prudent.

The Service has identified potential net expenditure reductions of \$13.3M to date, including \$2.9M in additional cost recoveries, \$6.9M from re-evaluated liabilities, and \$3.5M in other non-salary expenditure reductions.

In addition to identifying cost avoidance measures, the Service will also explore curbing budget pressures associated with growing demand, impacts of Project Resolute, and other unanticipated costs.

The new Community Safety and Policing Act (C.S.P.A.), which replaced the Police Services Act effective April 1st 2024, has mandated new equipment and training standards. Funding to come into compliance with the new Act has not yet been identified. The Service is currently assessing the financial implications of these new standards and once the projected impact is determined, the Service will explore funding sources with the City and the Province to meet the requirements.

Conclusion:

As at June 30, 2024, the Service is projecting a \$22.4M unfavourable variance. The Service will continue to pursue opportunities for expenditure reduction and/or increasing revenue throughout the year in order to mitigate year-end deficits to the extent possible.

Ms. Svina Dhaliwal, Chief Administrative Officer, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police

Appendix:

Appendix 1 Toronto Police Service First Quarter Variance Summary

Appendix 1

Category	Budget (\$Ms)	Actual to June 30/24 (\$Ms)	Projected Year-End Actual (\$Ms)	Variance Fav (UnFav)
Salaries	\$896.3	\$449.7	\$892.7	\$3.6
Premium Pay	\$58.9	\$42.0	\$99.5	(\$40.6)
Benefits	\$277.4	\$140.0	\$281.0	(\$3.6)
Non Salary	\$110.1	\$56.2	\$113.5	(\$3.4)
Contributions to / (Draws from) Reserves	(\$47.9)	\$0.0	(\$47.9)	\$0.0
Revenue	(\$120.9)	(\$46.8)	(\$126.8)	\$5.9
Net Impact of Grants	\$0.0	\$0.0	(\$2.4)	2.4
Total Preliminary Net	\$1,173.9	\$641.1	\$1,209.6	(\$35.7)
Expenditure Reductions			(\$13.3)	\$13.3
Total Net	\$1,173.9	\$641.1	\$1,196.3	(\$22.4)

It is important to note that expenditures do not all follow a linear pattern and therefore year-to-date expenditures cannot be simply extrapolated to year-end. Rather, the projection of expenditures to year-end is done through an analysis of all accounts, taking into consideration factors such as expenditures to date, future commitments expected and spending patterns.



PUBLIC REPORT

August 12, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Services Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Capital Budget Variance Report for the Toronto Police Service, Period Ending June 30, 2024

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board):

- (1) approve a transfer of \$300 Thousand (K) from the Locker Lifecycle Replacement project to the Furniture Lifecycle Replacement project.
- (2) approve a 2024 cashflow adjustment of \$4.2 Million (M) from the projects listed below to the Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build project in 2024 (cashflows will be returned to the original projects in 2025):
 - \$3M from the New Records Management System (R.M.S.) project;
 - \$300K from the Assessment of the Communication Center 9th Floor Furniture Replacement project;
 - \$400K from the Long Term Facility Plan - 54/55 Amalgamation; New Build project;
 - \$300K from the Next Generation (N.G.) 9-1-1 project;
 - \$220K from the Transforming Corporate Support (H.R.M.S., T.R.M.S.) project.
- (3) approve a transfer of \$260K from the Relocation of Wellness Services project to the Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build project, and

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accelerate \$1M in funding from year 2025 to 2024 for the Long Term Facility Plan – 41 Division; New Build project.

- (4) forward a copy of this report to the City of Toronto's (City) Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, for inclusion in the City's overall capital variance report to the City's Budget Committee.

Financial Implications:

At its December 19, 2023 meeting, the Board approved the Toronto Police Service's (Service) 2024-2033 capital program at \$88.0M gross and \$33.2M net (debt-funded) for 2024 (excluding carry forwards from 2023), and \$827.7M gross (\$269.6M net) for the 10-year period 2024-2033. This was subsequently approved by City Council at its February 14, 2024 meeting.

At its June 24, 2024 meeting, the Board approved amendments to the 2024-2033 approved Capital Budget and Plan (P2024-0624-14.2 refers), based on more up-to-date information regarding spending requirements. The revised 2024-2033 capital program is currently \$93.2M gross, with net debt funding of \$36.1M for 2024 (excluding carry forwards from 2023), and the 10-year total is \$830M gross, with net debt funding of \$269.6M. Attachment A provides the 2024-2033 Capital Program as approved by the Board on June 24, 2024.

As capital projects progress, new information regularly emerges regarding the timing and amount of funding required. For instance, delays might postpone funding requirements to future years, while other circumstances may necessitate bringing forward funds into the current year. The recommendations outlined in this report identify projects requiring additional or expedited funding in 2024. Moreover, they propose the source of funding without compromising the financial needs of other projects in 2024. This strategic reallocation ensures that current requirements, such as emerging challenges or escalating costs, are promptly addressed, while preventing funds from being unnecessarily held up in delayed projects. Repurposing funds from other projects has no financial impact on the overall capital program. Specific details about the recommended funding changes as well as the status of projects are provided in this report.

Table 1 provides a summary of the approved capital funding in 2024, adjusted funded requirements as recommended in this report, and projected expenditures. Of the adjusted gross funding of \$114.3M in 2024, \$107.6M is projected to be utilized, with a spending rate of 94.2%. The entire under-expenditure, currently projected at \$6.7M, is anticipated to be carried forward to 2025. This high spending rate projection is due to the implementation or construction phases of many projects being well underway.

Table 1 – Summary of 2024 Budget and Expenditures (\$Ms)

Category	2024 Gross Expenditures (M)	2024 Debt-Funded Expenditures (M)
2024 capital program, as approved by the Board on June 24, 2024	\$93.2	\$38.4
Cashflows carried forward from previous years	\$20.1	\$9.1
Adjustments recommended in this report	\$1.0	\$1.0
Total 2024 available funding, as recommended in this report	\$114.3	\$48.5
2024 projected expenditure	\$107.6	\$43.8
<i>Projected surplus / (deficit)*</i>	\$6.7	\$4.7
<i>Spending rate</i>	94.2%	90.2%

*This surplus is anticipated to be carried forward to 2025.
 Note: Due to rounding, numbers presented may not add up precisely.

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to provide the Board with the status of the Service’s capital projects as at June 30, 2024. Attachment A provides the detailed 10-year capital program as approved by the Board on June 24, 2024. Attachment B provides the Service’s capital variance report as at June 30, 2024, taking into consideration the recommendations in this report. Attachment B also includes spending rates and project health status. The body of this report includes project updates for key on-going projects and high-level project descriptions and updates for projects within the 2024-2033 program.

Discussion:

Background

The 2024 capital program is designed to align with the Service’s objectives and optimize project performance despite changing circumstances. The Service’s primary goal is to ensure capital projects are completed on budget and on schedule. This includes the need to ensure any required changes are identified as quickly and transparently as possible.

As part of its project management framework, the Service tracks project risks and issues to determine the status and health (i.e., Green, Yellow, and Red) of capital projects. The overall health of each capital project is based on budget, schedule and scope considerations. The colour codes are defined as follows:

- Green - on target to meet project goals (scope/functionality), on budget and on schedule and no corrective action is required; spending rate of 70% or more of the budget.
- Yellow - at risk of not meeting certain goals, some scope, budget and/or schedule issues, and minimal corrective action is required; spending rate is 50% to 70% of budget.
- Red - high risk of not meeting goals, significant scope, budget and/or schedule issues, and extensive corrective action is required; spending rate is less than 50% of budget.

Capital projects fall under the following four main categories:

- Facility projects;
- Information Technology modernization projects;
- Replacements, maintenance, and equipment projects; and
- Lifecycle projects.

Each year as part of the budgeting process, capital projects are re-baselined with updated project planning and cost assumptions, based on changes in scope, schedule, resources or other factors, to ensure cash flows are aligned with requirements.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

This report is in compliance with the Board's Budget Transparency Policy, approved on July 29, 2021 (Min. No. P2021-0729-3.0. refers).

Capital Program Variances

Table 2 provides a high-level summary of available funding, projected spending and overall project health for each capital project. The remainder of this report discusses each key capital project in detail.

For additional information on these projects please refer to Attachment B – 2024 Capital Budget Variance Report as at June 30, 2024. Both Table 2 and Attachment B reflect changes as recommended in this report.

Table 2 – 2024 Capital Budget Variance Report as at June 30, 2024 (\$000s)

Project Name	Carry Forward from 2022 & 2023	2024 Cash Flow			Variance (Over/ Under)	Spending Rate	Life to Date		Overall Project Health	Comments
		Adjusted Budget	Total Available Funding	Projected Actuals to year-end			On Budget	On Time		
Facility Projects:										
Long Term Facility Plan - 54/55 Amalgamation; New Build	614.1	(400.0)	214.1	154.0	60.1	71.9%	Green	Red	Yellow	Project on hold while alternative options are evaluated.
Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build	(2,183.9)	26,683.9	24,500.0	24,500.0	0.0	100.0%	Green	Green	Green	Project progress accelerated
Long Term Facility Plan - Facility and Process Improvement	505.9	(505.9)	0.0	0.0	0.0		Green		Green	Project completed; in-year budget transfer to utilize remaining budgets to support other projects
Relocation of Wellness Services	1,449.8	140.0	1,589.8	1,492.0	97.8	93.8%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
Long Term Facility Plan - Consulting	314.7	0.0	314.7	278.3	36.4	88.4%	Green	Red	Yellow	On budget. Project is delayed due to consultant issues.
Communication Center 9th Floor Furniture Replacement	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		Green	Red	Yellow	On budget. Project deferred due to consultant constraints.
Information Technology Modernization Projects:										
Transforming Corporate Support (HRMS, TRMS)	329.1	(220.0)	109.1	100.0	9.1	91.7%	Green	Red	Yellow	On budget but there is a delay in sourcing the vendor.
ANCOE (Global Search)	155.5	0.0	155.5	155.5	0.0	100.0%	Green	Red	Yellow	On budget. Project was delayed due to resource constraints.
Body Worn Camera - Phase II	475.8	0.0	475.8	200.0	275.8	42.0%	Red	Green	Yellow	On time. Unspent funding will be carried forward to 2025.
Next Generation (N.G.) 9-1-1	2,486.0	4,009.0	6,495.0	6,308.1	186.9	97.1%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
Replacements/ Maintenance/ Equipment Projects:										
State-of-Good-Repair - Police	4,041.4	3,400.0	7,441.4	5,252.5	2,188.9	70.6%	Yellow	Green	Green	On time and on budget
Radio Replacement	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (A.F.I.S.) Replacement	869.6	0.0	869.6	790.4	79.2	90.9%	Green	Yellow	Green	On budget. Project is delayed due to vendor issues.
Mobile Command Centre	896.7	(169.9)	726.8	726.8	0.0	100.0%	Green	Red	Yellow	On budget. Project was delayed due to procurement issues.
Information Technology Storage Growth	39.0	1,966.9	2,005.8	2,005.8	0.0	100.0%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
New Records Management System (RMS)	0.0	6,000.0	6,000.0	6,000.0	0.0	100.0%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
Uninterrupted Power Supply (U.P.S.) Lifecycle Replacement	46.4	752.0	798.4	798.4	0.0	100.0%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
Property & Evidence Warehouse Racking	0.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	100.0%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
Vehicle and Equipment for Additional Capacity	0.0	4,900.0	4,900.0	4,600.0	300.0	93.9%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
FIFA Requirement - Motorcycles	0.0	600.0	600.0	600.0	0.0	100.0%	Green	Green	Green	On time and on budget
Lifecycle Projects:										
Vehicle Replacement	637.3	11,560.0	12,197.3	11,404.0	793.3	93.5%				On time and on budget
IT- Related Replacements	5,928.5	28,793.9	34,722.4	34,485.4	237.0	99.3%				On time and on budget
Other Equipment	3,474.9	6,541.1	10,016.0	7,600.3	2,415.7	75.9%				\$1.7M positive variance due to vendor issues of the wireless parking system
Total Capital Expenditures	20,080.8	94,201.0	114,281.8	107,601.6	6,680.2	94.2%				
Funding from Developmental Charges	(1,280.0)	(13,308.0)	(14,588.0)	(13,788.9)	(799.1)	94.5%				
Vehicle & Equipment Reserve	(9,713.9)	(39,628.0)	(49,341.9)	(48,195.8)	(3,446.1)	97.7%				
Other (Provincial and Federal Funding)	0.0	(1,860.0)	(1,860.0)	(1,860.0)	0.0	100.0%				
Debt	9,087.0	39,405.0	48,491.9	43,756.8	2,435.1	90.2%				

Facility Projects:

A long-term facility plan is being developed with the objective of enhancing operational flexibility, improving aging facility infrastructure, optimizing resources, and, where possible, reducing the Service's facilities footprint. Once developed, the facility-related capital program will be updated in future years. Details on the development of this plan are included under the Long Term Facility Plan – Consulting project.

The Service is committed to including 'green' components to new builds and to maintaining existing facilities where possible. The implementation of L.E.D. lighting has already resulted in hydro savings, and the Service will continue to convert to L.E.D. in all of its new facilities. The Service is committed to Toronto's Net Zero Emission Objectives by 2040 initiative, and the new 41 Division building design reflects this objective. The goal is for all future new builds to meet Toronto's Green Standards related to climate change mitigation or adaptation, energy or water efficiency, renewable or alternative energy, air quality, green infrastructure, or other efforts related to environment, climate, and energy planning.

Long Term Facility Plan - 54/55 Amalgamation; New Build (Yellow)

This project provides for the amalgamation of 54 and 55 Divisions (built in 1951 and 1972 respectively) into one consolidated facility (as recommended by the Transformational Task Force) at a single site.

- Originally, the former Toronto Transit Commission's (T.T.C.) Danforth Garage site located at 1627 Danforth Avenue was identified as the recommended site for the new Division. However, the estimated cost of construction increased considerably due to increased labour and materials costs, as well as other factors such as the high cost of constructing a very deep waterproof underground parking structure in a location with a high water table. Moreover, the footprint of land available to the Service on the Danforth site was reduced by Create.T.O. to accommodate additional uses for the land. This created the requirement for an increased number of parking levels underground, and resulting in a significant increase to the estimated cost.
- The project was put on hold in 2022 Q2 to allow staff to evaluate alternative options so that the Command could make an informed decision on how to proceed in a fiscally responsible way that meets operational requirements of a growing city. The Service has been working with Create.T.O. to identify a viable alternative location for a new facility. This has proven challenging, with limited suitable options available for the size and location required, and those that are suitable are currently burdened by existing occupants. Single site and two-site models have been considered.
- The Service is currently looking at a two-site (de-amalgamated) model, razing and redeveloping the existing 41 Cranfield and the 101 Coxwell sites in turn, and

is investigating the feasibility of relocating members to work out of nearby stations for the construction period.

- The health status of this project is Yellow (Red for time since this project is currently on hold; Green for budget). Of the available funding of \$214K for 2024 (amount after the proposed in-year adjustment of \$400K to Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build), \$154K will be utilized in 2024. The remaining amount of \$60K will be carried forward to 2025. The budget and project will be re-baselined once the site selection decision has been made in 2024.

Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build (Green)

The current 41 Division facility is approximately 60 years old, and there are several building deficiencies due to its aging infrastructure and poor operational configuration. An assessment of the building confirmed it is not economically feasible to address the building deficiencies through renovations or to retrofit the existing 41 Division to accommodate the current needs of the Service, and a new build is proceeding. The phased construction and demolition approach for a new building on the existing 41 Division site provides the Service with a new facility with ample area for future expansion. The new division will provide a modern, efficient workspace for the Service, serving the community for decades to come.

- This new divisional building is being constructed in phases. Operations are continuing on site during construction.
- The new 41 Division will be the first Net Zero Emission building in the Service's asset base and the first of its kind in Ontario.
- Working drawings are complete. The last bid package (for landscaping) is out for tender and is anticipated to be closed and awarded by 2024 Q3, following Value Engineering efforts to reduce costs.
- The building is weather and water tight. Green roof installation is underway, and metal siding is anticipated to be completed by 2024 Q3.
- All mechanical and electrical equipment rough-ins are complete. Finish installation is underway, followed by device/trim installations (i.e., lighting). Phase 1 Occupancy has been slightly delayed to November 2024 and Phase 2 Occupancy is anticipated for September 2026.
- The Service is coordinating commissioning and handover procedures, and Preventative Maintenance of Phase 1 equipment/systems, with City staff. The Architect and Contractor have been engaged in meetings with City staff.
- The 2024 capital budget was based on cash flow projections received from the 41 Division Construction Manager at year-end 2023. All efforts were made to

accommodate both the Construction Manager's cash flow projection and the City's request to reduce capital funding requirements wherever possible.

- In July 2024, the Construction Manager provided a revised cash flow projection that was higher than the projection submitted late 2023. The justification for the revised cash flow is based largely on the fact that a considerable amount of work was accelerated to meet the target occupancy date for Phase 1 of the project. After careful analysis of the 2024 budget requirements, the Service proposes an in-year transfer of \$260K from other projects and an acceleration of \$1M in funding from 2025 to 2024. The Service also proposes an adjustment of \$4.2M from other projects in 2024; this amount will be returned to the original projects in 2025. The total increased cashflow of \$5.5M will be sufficient for 2024 and the project is expected to stay within its overall project budget.
- The health status of this project is Green (both on budget and on time). Of the available funding of \$24.5M (amount reflects recommendations in this report), it is anticipated 100% of the available funding will be spent in 2024.

Relocation of Wellness Services (Green)

This project is to undertake renovations required to relocate portions of the Service's Wellness Unit from Toronto Police Headquarters to two additional, more accessible locations, one in the west end of the city (at the Toronto Police College), and the other in the east end of the city (leased space at 2075 Kennedy Road). Once completed, the new decentralized delivery model will allow members to access wellness services from central, east and west locations. The anticipated benefits are increased access to care and improved service to members, creating a more supportive work environment for members to seek support.

- The East location, a 2,709 square foot leased space at 2075 Kennedy Road, became operational on August 29, 2023.
- The renovation work at the Toronto Police College (West location) was awarded to BDA Inc. through a competitive tender. The Service and the general contractor have both executed the construction agreement. The construction commencement date was established as May 17, 2024, and the general contractor has 26 weeks available from this date to attain substantial completion of the project. The general contractor has commenced construction, mobilizing on the site on June 10, 2024. The Toronto Police College work is on schedule toward completion by December 2024.
- Facilities Management continues to finalize office furniture requirements for the renovated Toronto Police College space.
- The health status of this project is Green (both on budget and on time). Of the available funding of \$1.6M in 2024 (amount after the proposed in-year transfer of

\$260K to Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build), it is expected that \$1.5M will be spent by year-end, and the remaining amount of \$98K will be carried forward to 2025.

Long-Term Facility Plan – Consulting Services (Yellow)

The Service is the largest municipal police service in Canada and has a portfolio of over 52 buildings throughout Toronto. Some of these buildings range between 35 and 50 years old and are in need of replacement or major renovation to meet current and projected staffing and operational needs. External expertise has been retained to develop a long-term Strategic Building Program based on the assessment of current space utilization, short and long-term requirements of the Service, and the condition of the existing buildings.

- The Service hired Stantec Architecture Limited through a competitive Request for Proposal process to provide architectural consulting services to develop a Strategic Building Program. The review will assess the condition of existing buildings, locations, cost to renovate versus building new, and/or cost to relocate in order to meet current and future operational requirements of the Service. As well, it will explore best practices with respect to the current building portfolio, office space standards, staffing needs, and the ability to provide services in a growing city.
- Assessment objectives are to enhance operational flexibility, improve aging facility infrastructure, optimize resources, and where possible, reduce the Service's facilities footprint.
- The consultant has submitted all Building Condition Assessment reports in draft format, and has completed all of the strategic interviews of staff at each building.
- The consultant has developed a work plan describing the approach to the analytical portion of the study, with input from Facilities Management, Strategy Management and Finance & Business Management Units, to ensure the Service's study goals are met. Additional analytical work and preparation of the formal report is anticipated to be completed in 2024.
- The health status of this project is Yellow (Red for time since there has been a delay from the original schedule; Green for budget). Of the available funding of \$314K in 2024, it is expected that \$278K will be spent by year-end. The remaining amount of \$36K will be carried forward to 2025.

Information Technology Modernization Projects:

In the last decade, there have been many important developments with respect to information technology in public safety that the Service has embraced. New technology

aims to improve efficiencies that eliminate costly and manual processes, increase accessibility, improve transparency, enhance analysis and augment existing and new capabilities. These systems also improve overall information management and expand opportunities for enhanced community engagement, and modernize data storage to manage costs (through cost avoidance) and create value-added capabilities to the Service's data storage infrastructure.

Analytics Centre of Excellence (A.N.C.O.E.) program; Enterprise Business Intelligence (E.B.I.) and Global Search (Yellow)

A.N.C.O.E. is a business-led analytics and innovation program, which oversees and drives analytics and information management activities for the Service. This project includes E.B.I. as well as Global Search. The program focuses on improving the analytical reporting environments with new and enhanced Power B.I. and geospatial and reporting technologies. The program will deliver streamlined service processes that will make data and analytics products available to front-line members, management, and the public.

- The E.B.I. portion of the project has been completed along with the Service's Geographic Information System (G.I.S.) platform implementation.
- The Service continues to increase the use of Power B.I. and G.I.S. technologies for monitoring and reporting on operational and strategic initiatives, enabling the Service to effectively share information in the forms of maps, applications and interactive dashboards internally, with the public and other agencies.
- Work on the Global Search portion of the project continues, with search functionality being migrated to a new search platform, Elasticsearch, and the inclusion of additional datasets.
- The health status of this project is Yellow (Red for time since there have been delays in transitioning to the new Elasticsearch due to resourcing constraints; Green for budget). It is expected the available funding of \$155K in 2024 will be 100% spent.

Next Generation (N.G.) 9-1-1 (Green)

Current 9-1-1 systems are voice-centric and were originally designed for landlines. Per the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications (C.R.T.C.) mandate, Canadian telecommunications service providers will be upgrading their infrastructure for N.G. 9-1-1 to an Internet Protocol (I.P.) based platform technology capable of carrying voice, text and other data components. The system is designed to improve the way people request emergency services and how emergency responders communicate with

each other. The system will also provide more accurate location information, which will help emergency responders reach people more quickly and efficiently.

The first phase of this project includes the implementation of the new technology provided by Solacom, as well as the renovation of the training room, training room furniture and the retrofitting of other floors at the current Communications Centre building, which serves as the Primary Site. In addition, the project includes integration of existing systems such as Computer Aided Dispatch (C.A.D.) and Voice Logging Services (V.L.S.) with the Solacom solution, as well as more robust reporting capabilities.

The second phase of the project will be focused on transitioning to the I.P. protocol and improvements to 9-1-1 capabilities including the way the public requests 9-1-1 services and how emergency responders communicate with each other.

- The design of the technological architecture which isolates the Solacom solution from the rest of the Service's network is being reviewed to ensure necessary provisions have been made.
- To assist with the creation of appropriate Privacy Impact Assessments (P.I.A.s.) for the second phase of N.G. 9-1-1, external expertise has been acquired and is working closely with the Information Privacy and Security Office. Work is underway and current state assessments are being performed to understand the work and processes associated with the Communications Team, Information Technology Teams, and privacy legislation. Recommendations and considerations for the Service and the associated evolution of N.G. 9-1-1 are expected by year-end 2024.
- Phase 1 of the project was completed in 2024 Q3, and Phase 2 is anticipated to be completed in 2024 Q4.
- Collaboration meetings with the secondary Public Safety Answering Point (Toronto Paramedic Services and Toronto Fire) on the N.G. 9-1-1 platform are ongoing. Additionally, collaboration meetings with other Primary Safety Answering Points have been initiated and have fallen into a regular cadence.
- The health status of this project is Green (both on budget and on time). Of the \$6.5M available to spend (after the proposed in-year adjustment of \$300K to Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build), it is projected that \$6.3M will be spent by year-end. The remaining \$0.2M will be carried forward to 2025.

Replacements/ Maintenance/ Equipment Projects:

Projects in this category are for the replacement and maintenance of equipment, and maintenance of facilities.

State of Good Repair (S.O.G.R.) (Green)

S.O.G.R. funds are used to maintain the general condition, overall safety and requirements of existing Service buildings.

- The ongoing demand for upkeep at many of the Service's facilities continue at a high volume, particularly in those facilities that have been in the Service's portfolio for several years and require small and large-scale renovations. Some examples of work are hardware replacement (locking mechanisms), repairs or replacement of overhead door and gate equipment, flooring replacement, painting, replacement of security equipment, repairs to the range at the Toronto Police College and renovations to the Mounted unit riding ring.
- This project also includes technology upgrades to optimize service delivery and increase efficiencies.
- The health status of this project is Green (both on budget and on time). Of the \$7.4M available to spend, it is expected that \$5.3M will be spent by year-end. The remaining amount of \$2.1M will be carried forward to 2025.

Radio Lifecycle Replacement (Green)

The Service's Telecommunications Services Unit (T.S.U.) maintains 4,913 mobile, portable and desktop radio units. The replacement lifecycle of the radios was extended from seven years to ten years a number of years ago, in order to reduce the replacement cost of these important and expensive assets.

- A consultant is anticipated to be engaged by 2024 Q3 to review and identify areas for improvement, efficiencies, technology and savings that can be incorporated into the next lifecycle plan in 2027.
- The health status of this project is Green (both on budget and on time). It is expected the available funding of \$100K will be 100% spent by year-end.

Automated Fingerprint Identification System Replacement (A.F.I.S.) (Green)

The current A.F.I.S. is a 2011 model that was first deployed in January 2013, and reached end of life as at December 31, 2020. A.F.I.S. is based on a biometric identification methodology that uses digital imaging technology to obtain, store and analyze fingerprint data. A.F.I.S. allows for compatibility with external systems in other agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, communicating electronically for real-time identification, fingerprint submissions, searches and criminal record updates. This system is integrated with IntelliBook, a prisoner booking system, and communicates electronically to provide real-time confirmation of prisoner identity for Booking Officers. It is also integrated with Livescan systems at Talent Acquisition and

Records Release to process requests for background clearance, police reference checks and clearance letter services where fingerprints are required for confirmation of criminal record history. The project has been delayed due to issues with the vendor.

- The contract award to IDEMIA was approved in April 2020 and contract negotiations were completed in December 2020. The Planning phase was completed and the project plan was delivered in August 2021. The design phase was completed in October 2023.
- Current work includes completing the shipment of remaining hardware, ongoing installation and network configuration, and acceptance testing. Migration activities are continuing in tandem with these events.
- The vendor is continuing to show improvements in aligning their resources with the demands of the project. However, there are still risks involved in maintaining the current A.F.I.S. system while implementing the new solution and utilizing the same staffing in both areas. Steps are being taken to manage this risk with regular review of resources, enhanced support from the vendor, and securing global resources to assist with events and timeline requirements.
- The Shipment and Factory Acceptance milestones are underway and expected to be completed and paid in 2024 Q3. The final two milestones, Acceptance and Implementation-to-Operational, are expected to be completed and paid in 2024 Q4 and 2025 Q1 respectively.
- The health status of this project is Green (Yellow for time due to vendor issues; Green for budget). Of the \$870K available to spend, it is expected that \$790K will be spent by year-end. The remaining amount of \$79K will be carried forward to 2025.

Mobile Command Centre (Yellow)

The Service is in the final stages for the build of a new Mobile Command Vehicle. This vehicle will support the unique challenges of providing public safety services in a large urban city. The vehicle will play an essential role in fulfilling the need to readily support any and all operations and occurrences within the city. The design of this vehicle will allow for the flexibility to cover emergencies and non-emergency events such as extreme event response, major sporting events, searches and investigative operations.

The vehicle will incorporate all necessary capabilities to support and integrate with other emergency services, as well as municipal, provincial and federal agencies. Moreover, the vehicle's design will remain adaptable to accommodate future technological advancements, guaranteeing its relevance and efficient functioning within the Command, Control and Communications (C3) environment.

- P.K. Van Welding and Fabrication, the selected bidder, has commenced the construction of the vehicle, and progress is underway. The Service remains committed to closely monitoring and implementing the identified technical requirements. This ongoing development and implementation ensures that the vehicle is equipped with state-of-the-art technology solutions that align with the Service's vision of a safer, more secure community.
- The structure of the vehicle has been built and the interior design and building is ongoing. New technology solutions have been identified and tested to ensure suitability to work in any operating environment.
- It is anticipated that the Mobile Command Vehicle will be functional to respond to operational requirements by late 2024.
- Original timelines for delivery of the vehicle were continually delayed due to supply chain challenges which affects the timely delivery of various products. The vehicle went through final inspection and acceptance on July 25, 2024 with all relevant stakeholders at which time it will be moved to Jane Street Garage for the application of decals and subsequent training for key members.
- The project will be closed by August 31, 2024 at which time the vehicle will move in to training and operation phases.
- The health status of this project is Yellow (Red for time due to delay in delivery; Green for budget). Of the available funding of \$727K in 2024, it is expected that 100% will be spent by year-end.

New Records Management System (R.M.S.) (Green)

This project is for the replacement of the existing R.M.S., a core business operating system of the Service. A review of the Service's existing system has highlighted technological weaknesses, as usability and functional gaps continue to create operational challenges and hinder the progression to a digital environment. This misalignment with the Service's strategy for digital enablement limits its ability to improve the flow of information through the organization from front-line to investigative and analytical/intelligence functions.

- The new system is expected to improve the ability to make connections between related pieces of information and increase the interaction and openness to the public of the Service's information and processes. It is expected to generate some tangible savings and cost avoidance, reduce risk, increase transparency and improve other operational processes to deliver public safety services effectively and efficiently.
- The contract award was approved at the April 28, 2023 Board meeting (Min. No. P2023-0428-7.0 refers). Negotiations on contract terms have been completed.

Contract format was being adjusted by the vendor to align with the City of Toronto's preferred contract template.

- The Project Charter has been completed. Some scope decisions are pending further discovery and will be revisited with iterative updates to the Project Charter.
- The Service has resourced a project team with 19 civilian members, 12 external contractors, and seconded 11 uniform members on a full time basis. There are also subject matter experts from within the Service providing ongoing support to the program on a part time basis. The team officially kicked off the program in February 2024.
- The entire project team completed 5 weeks of training on NicheRMS to prepare for the system design and build phase. Training occurred in March and April 2024.
- The project team developed the initial iteration of a Service version of NicheRMS, with limited scope (single occurrence – Break and Enter) but with comprehensive functionality coverage (call to courts processes included). The system is in development with the upcoming milestones of system demonstrations to the organization beginning in September 2024.
- System builds will continue in an incremental approach over the upcoming 12 months.
- The biggest project risk is the retention of resources critical to execute the project and the reliance on internal Subject Matter Experts (S.M.E.s.), particularly uniform members that are often redeployed based on other Service requirements. Lack of consistency and reliance on internal S.M.E.s. has the potential to expand timeline and costs of the project. The go-live approach and schedule is also being reviewed as the timeline may overlap with FIFA events.
- The health status of this project is Green (both on budget and on time). Of the available funding of \$6M (amount after the proposed in-year adjustment of \$3M to Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build), it is expected that 100% will be spent by year-end.

Lifecycle Projects:

Projects listed in this category are primarily funded from the Vehicle and Equipment Reserve (Reserve). The Reserve is in turn funded through annual contributions from the Service and Parking Enforcement Unit's operating budgets. As table 3 shows, Lifecycle Projects include the regular replacement of vehicles, information technology equipment and other equipment.

Table 3 – Summary of Vehicle and Equipment Lifecycle Projects (\$000s)

Project Name	Carry Forward from previous years	2024 Budget	Available to Spend	Year End Projection	YE Variance (Over)/ Under	Carry Forward to 2025	Return to Reserve
Vehicle Replacement	637.3	11,560.0	12,197.3	11,404.0	793.3	793.3	0.0
IT- Related Replacements	5,928.5	28,793.9	34,722.4	34,485.4	237.0	237.0	0.0
Other Equipment	3,474.9	6,541.1	10,016.0	7,600.3	2,415.7	2,415.7	0.0
Total Lifecycle Projects	10,040.7	46,895.0	56,935.7	53,489.7	3,446.0	3,446.0	0.0

It is important to note that as the Service modernizes, new systems have been implemented over the years (e.g., In-Car Camera program, data and analytics initiatives) and on-premise storage requirements have increased (e.g., to accommodate video). While the Service has taken steps to create efficiencies, the amount of equipment that must be replaced continues to increase as a result of these new systems and storage requirements. These increased requirements place significant pressure on the Reserve, which in turn puts pressure on the operating budget, as increased annual contributions are required to ensure the Reserve can adequately meet the Service’s vehicle and equipment requirements. The Service continues to review planned expenditures for all projects to address future pressures, including additional reserve contributions that may be required. The Service is also exploring other options (e.g., utilization of the cloud) for more efficient and potentially less costly data storage.

Of the available funding of \$56.9M, it is expected that \$53.5M will be spent by year-end and \$3.4M will be carried forward to 2025.

Conclusion:

The Service’s 2024 gross spending rate is estimated at 94.2%. The anticipated under-expenditure of \$6.7M will be carried forward to 2025.

The Board will continue to be kept apprised of project progress through the quarterly variance report, including any major issues as projects progress, and any proposed capital program changes.

Ms. Svina Dhaliwal, Chief Administrative Officer, will attend to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police

Attachments:

Attachment A – 2024-2033 Capital Program as approved by the Board on June 24, 2024

Attachment B – 2024 Capital Budget Variance Report as at June 30, 2024

2024-2033 Capital Program as approved by the Board on June 24, 2024 (\$000s)

Attachment A

Project Name	Category	Budget to end of 2023	Carry forward 2022 & 2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	Total 2024-2033	Total Project Cost
Projects in Progress															
State-of-Good-Repair - Police	Facility Projects		4,041	3,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	43,000	43,000
Long Term Facility Plan - 54 and 55 Division	Facility Projects	2,238	614	0	1,847	1,847	14,898	20,339	43,644	15,187	0	0	0	97,762	100,000
Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build	Facility Projects	28,364	(2,184)	21,184	15,373	20,819	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	57,376	85,740
Radio Replacement	Life cycle Replacement Projects	38,051	0	100	0	0	15,328	5,030	6,429	4,867	6,116	0	0	37,870	75,921
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (A.F.I.S.) Replacement	Life cycle Replacement Projects	4,285	870	0	0	0	0	1,285	2,304	0	0	0	0	3,589	7,874
Next Generation (N.G.) 9-1-1	Information Technology Projects	10,042	2,486	4,309	1,900	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,209	16,251
Uninterrupted Power Supply (U.P.S.) Lifecycle Replacement	Life cycle Replacement Projects	850	46	752	848	800	800	450	800	800	0	0	450	5,700	6,550
Information Technology Storage Growth	Information Technology Projects	500	39	1,967	539	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	6,506	7,006
New Records Management System (RMS)	Information Technology Projects	10,000	0	9,000	11,598	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20,598	30,598
Relocation of Wellness Services	Facility Projects	1,700	1,450	400	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	400	2,100
Transforming Corporate Support (HRMS, TRMS)	Information Technology Projects	8,435	329	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8,435
ANCOE (Global Search)	Information Technology Projects	12,528	155	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,528
Body Worn Camera - Phase II	Information Technology Projects	5,887	476	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,887
Long Term Facility Plan - Consulting	Facility Projects	878	315	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	878
Mobile Command Centre	Equipment	1,735	897	(170)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(170)	1,565
Total, Projects In Progress		125,493	9,534	40,942	36,505	28,366	35,926	32,004	58,077	25,754	11,016	4,900	5,350	278,840	404,333
Upcoming Projects															
Long Term Facility Plan - 13,53 Division	Facility Projects	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	8,661	23,303	24,553	0	56,817	56,817
Long Term Facility Plan - 51 Division; Major Expansion	Facility Projects	0	0	0	0	0	8,761	9,120	7,729	0	0	0	0	25,610	25,610
Property & Evidence Warehouse Racking	Facility Projects	30	0	50	950	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,000	1,030
Communication Center Furniture Replacement - Design	Facility Projects	0	0	300	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	300
Forensic Identification Services (FIS) Facility Replacement - Feasibility Study	Facility Projects	0	0	0	400	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	400	400
Vehicle and Equipment for Additional Capacity	Equipment	0	0	4,900	2,465	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,365	7,365
FIFA Requirement - Motorcycles	Equipment	0	0	600	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	600	600
Total, Upcoming Projects:		30	0	5,850	3,815	0	8,761	9,120	8,029	8,661	23,303	24,553	0	92,092	92,122
Completed Projects															
Long-Term Facility Plan - Facility and Process Improvement	Facility Projects	3,508	506	(506)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(506)	3,002
Total Completed Projects:		3,508	506	(506)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(506)	3,002
Total, Vehicle and Equipment Lifecycle Replacement Projects		363,673	10,041	46,895	53,626	42,419	43,133	41,366	35,431	58,726	49,682	44,402	43,896	459,576	820,949
Total Capital Request		492,704	20,081	93,181	93,946	70,785	87,820	82,490	101,537	93,141	84,001	73,855	49,246	830,002	1,320,406
Funding Sources:															
Vehicle and Equipment Reserve		(359,578)	(9,714)	(41,928)	(53,226)	(42,227)	(43,133)	(41,366)	(35,431)	(58,726)	(49,682)	(44,402)	(43,896)	(454,017)	(811,295)
Recoverable Debt - Net Zero Emission		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Source of Funding (Federal and Provincial Grants)		0	0	(1,860)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1,860)	(1,860)
Development Charges Funding		(6,715)	(1,280)	(13,308)	(3,736)	(2,539)	(29,933)	(30,463)	(8,369)	(5,808)	(6,972)	(3,394)	0	(104,522)	(111,237)
Net Debt-Funded Projects		126,411	9,087	36,085	36,984	26,019	14,754	10,661	57,737	28,607	27,347	26,059	5,350	269,603	396,014

2024 Capital Budget Variance Report as at June 30, 2024 (\$000s)

Attachment B

Project Name	2024 Cashflow					Variance (Over)/ Under	Spending Rate	Start Date	End Date		Life to Date		Overall Project Health	Comments
	Carry Forward from 2022 & 2023	Adjusted 2024 Budget	Total Available Funding	Actuals as of Jun 30, 2024	Projected Actuals to year-end				Planned	Revised	On Budget	On Time		
Facility Projects:														
Long Term Facility Plan - 54/55 Amalgamation; New Build	614.1	(400.0)	214.1	0.0	154.0	60.1	71.9%	Jan-17	Dec-28	TBD	Green	Red	Yellow	Please refer to the body of the report
Long Term Facility Plan - 41 Division; New Build	(2,183.9)	26,683.9	24,500.0	13,563.5	24,500.0	0.0	100.0%	Jan-18	Dec-26	Dec-26	Green	Green	Green	Please refer to the body of the report
Long Term Facility Plan - Facility and Process Improvement	505.9	(505.9)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		Jan-18	Dec-23	Dec-23	Green		Green	
Relocation of Wellness Services	1,449.8	140.0	1,589.8	3.5	1,492.0	97.8	93.8%	Jan-23	Jan-25	Jan-25	Green	Green	Green	Please refer to the body of the report
Long Term Facility Plan - Consulting	314.7	0.0	314.7	0.0	278.3	36.4	88.4%	Jan-21	Dec-23	Jan-25	Green	Red	Yellow	Please refer to the body of the report
Communication Center 9th Floor Furniture Replacement	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		Jan-24	Dec-24	Dec-25	Green	Red	Yellow	
Information Technology Modernization Projects:														
Transforming Corporate Support (HRMS, TRMS)	329.1	(220.0)	109.1	0.0	100.0	9.1	91.7%	Jan-14	Dec-24	Dec-26	Green	Red	Yellow	
ANCOE (Global Search)	155.5	0.0	155.5	0.0	155.5	0.0	100.0%	Jan-15	Dec-23	Jan-25	Green	Red	Yellow	Please refer to the body of the report
Body Worn Camera - Phase II	475.8	0.0	475.8	82.5	200.0	275.8	42.0%	Jan-17	Jan-25	Jan-25	Red	Green	Yellow	
Next Generation (N.G.) 9-1-1	2,486.0	4,009.0	6,495.0	1,539.4	6,308.1	186.9	97.1%	Jan-19	Dec-25	Dec-25	Green	Green	Green	Please refer to the body of the report
Replacements/ Maintenance/ Equipment Projects:														
State-of-Good-Repair - Police	4,041.4	3,400.0	7,441.4	2,663.3	5,252.5	2,188.9	70.6%	on-going	on-going	on-going	Yellow	Green	Green	Please refer to the body of the report
Radio Replacement	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0%	Jan-16	on-going	on-going	Green	Green	Green	Please refer to the body of the report
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (A.F.I.S.) Replacement	869.6	0.0	869.6	0.0	790.4	79.2	90.9%	Jan-19	Dec-24	Mar-25	Green	Yellow	Green	Please refer to the body of the report
Mobile Command Centre	896.7	(169.9)	726.8	157.3	726.8	0.0	100.0%	Feb-21	Jun-23	Dec-24	Green	Red	Yellow	Please refer to the body of the report
Information Technology Storage Growth	39.0	1,966.9	2,005.8	0.0	2,005.8	0.0	100.0%	Jan-23	on-going	on-going	Green	Green	Green	
New Records Management System (RMS)	0.0	6,000.0	6,000.0	1,116.6	6,000.0	0.0	100.0%	Jan-23	Dec-27	Dec-27	Green	Green	Green	Please refer to the body of the report
Uninterrupted Power Supply (U.P.S.) Lifecycle Replacement	46.4	752.0	798.4	460.5	798.4	0.0	100.0%	Feb-21	Dec-24	Dec-24	Green	Green	Green	
Property & Evidence Warehouse Racking	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	100.0%	Apr-24	Dec-25	Dec-25	Green	Green	Green	
Vehicle and Equipment for Additional Capacity	0.0	4,900.0	4,900.0	522.4	4,600.0	300.0	93.9%	Jan-24	Dec-25	Dec-25	Green	Green	Green	
FIFA Requirement - Motorcycles	0.0	600.0	600.0	544.8	600.0	0.0	100.0%	Jan-24	Dec-24	Dec-24	Green	Green	Green	
Lifecycle Projects:														
Vehicle Replacement	637.3	11,560.0	12,197.3	4,616.5	11,404.0	793.3	93.5%							
IT-Related Replacements	5,928.5	28,793.9	34,722.4	23,332.8	34,485.4	237.0	99.3%							
Other Equipment	3,474.9	6,541.1	10,016.0	4,155.0	7,600.3	2,415.7	75.9%							
Total Capital Expenditures	20,080.8	94,201.0	114,281.8	52,758.0	107,601.6	6,680.2	94.2%							
Funding from Developmental Charges	(1,280.0)	(13,308.0)	(14,588.0)	(21,280.9)	(13,788.9)	(799.1)	94.5%							
Funding from Vehicle and Equipment Reserve	(9,713.9)	(39,628.0)	(49,341.9)	(27,506.9)	(48,195.8)	(3,446.1)	97.7%							
Other (Provincial and Federal Funding)	0.0	(1,860.0)	(1,860.0)	(1,539.4)	(1,860.0)	0.0	100.0%							
Debt	9,087.0	39,405.0	48,491.9	2,430.8	43,756.8	2,435.1	90.2%							



PUBLIC REPORT

August 15, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: 2024 Operating Budget Variance for the Toronto Police Service Parking Enforcement Unit, Period Ending June 30, 2024

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) forward a copy of this report to the City of Toronto (City) Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer for information and inclusion in the variance reporting to the City's Budget Committee.

Financial Implications:

The Toronto Police Service Parking Enforcement Unit's (P.E.U.) 2024 approved net operating budget is \$51.3 Million (M). The P.E.U. is anticipating no year-end variance on its 2024 operating budget.

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to provide the Board with information on the P.E.U.'s 2024 projected year-end variance as at June 30, 2024. The P.E.U. is not projecting any year-end variance on its 2024 operating budget. Anticipated savings in salaries will be offset by non-salary budget pressures.

Table 1 provides a high-level summary of variances by feature category. Year to date and projection figures are shown in Appendix 1 at the end of this report.

Toronto Police Service Board

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Table 1 – 2024 Variance by Feature Category (\$Ms)

Category	2024 Budget (\$Ms)	2024 Projection	Variance Fav (UnFav)	Explanation
Salaries	\$33.3	\$33.3	\$0.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A class of 25 Parking Enforcement Officers (P.E.O.s) was hired in June, resulting in the overall staffing complement being slightly higher than budgeted. The initial increase in salary costs is expected to be offset by continued separations throughout the year due to retirements and transitions to other roles at the Service.
Premium Pay	\$1.9	\$1.9	\$0.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nearly all premium pay in the P.E.U. is related to special events or directed enforcement activities. Some of this cost is offset by recoveries included as revenue below.
Benefits	\$9.4	\$9.4	\$0.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The P.E.U.'s benefits mirror those of the Service, with costs being applied at year-end as a percentage of the Service's costs. It is estimated that approximately 3-5% of the Service's Workplace Safety Insurance Board (W.S.I.B.) related costs are attributed to P.E.U. This will be reconciled and allocated at year-end.
Materials & Equipment	\$2.0	\$2.2	(\$0.2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Significant items in this category include parking tags, uniforms, gasoline, vehicle parts and batteries for handheld parking devices. On April 17, 2024, City Council adopted a proposal to amend Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 610 to reflect new penalty amounts for parking violations. As a result, there is an

Category	2024 Budget (\$Ms)	2024 Projection	Variance Fav (UnFav)	Explanation
				unanticipated cost of approximately \$0.2M to replace the P.E.U.'s stock of parking tags to reflect the new amounts.
Services	\$6.2	\$6.2	\$0.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Significant items in this category include interdepartmental chargebacks, contributions to reserves, rental of property and maintenance, and support costs for the handheld parking devices. No variance is anticipated at this time.
Revenue (e.g. T.T.C., towing recoveries)	(\$1.5)	(\$1.7)	\$0.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revenues include towing recoveries, draws from reserves, and recoveries from the Toronto Transit Commission (T.T.C.). The T.T.C. recoveries are for premium pay expenditures that are incurred to enforce parking by-laws on T.T.C. right of ways, necessitated by the ongoing weekend subway closures for signal replacements maintenance. Additionally, revenue of \$0.2M is expected in support of the City's Traffic Direction Pilot Program.
Total Net	\$51.3	\$51.3	\$0.0	

Discussion:

Background

At its December 19, 2023 meeting, the Board approved the Toronto Police Service's Parking Enforcement Unit (P.E.U.) operating budget request at \$51.3 Million (M) (Min. No. P2023-1219-2.4 refers), a 0% increase over the 2023 approved budget. Subsequently, City Council, at its February 14, 2024 meeting, approved the P.E.U.'s 2024 operating budget at the same amount.

The P.E.U. is managed by the Service; however, the P.E.U.'s operating budget is separate from the Toronto Police Service (Service) budget, and is maintained in the City's non-program budget. In addition, revenues from the collection of parking tags issued accrue to the City, not the Service.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

This report is in compliance with the Board's Budget Transparency Policy, approved on July 29, 2021 (Min. No. P2021-0729-3.0. refers).

Pressures and Opportunities

The P.E.U.'s budget pressures stem from non-salary costs. There is an unanticipated cost of \$0.2M to replace the P.E.U.'s stock of parking tags due to the newly adopted changes to Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 610. In addition, the Service and the P.E.U. are in the planning stages of additional Traffic and Modernization projects, originally set to begin this year. Examples of these projects include: automated licence plate recognition (in progress), vehicle impound management, and e-ticketing software/hardware. Funding for some of these projects has not yet been identified within the 2024 budget process. Discussions are in progress with the City as these projects would be jointly led with Transportation Services.

Offsetting the budget pressures are projected increases to revenues arising from the City's Traffic Direction Pilot Program.

The hiring of Special Constables and Cadets impacts staffing levels within the P.E.U., given the historical trend of some Parking Enforcement Officers (P.E.O.) transitioning to those roles. While predicting the number of P.E.O.s transitioning to these positions is challenging, the Service continues to monitor actual separations throughout the year and adjusts the P.E.O. hiring plan accordingly. As P.E.O. separations continue due to retirements or promotions to other positions, new P.E.O.s are hired at the lowest 'step' in the salary band, resulting in cost savings.

As at June 30, 2024, the P.E.O. strength is 368 compared to a budgeted complement of 357. There have been 17 separations to date in 2024. There are an additional 30 P.E.O.s expected to be part of the August 2024 Special Constable training class. An additional P.E.O. class of 30 is scheduled for November, and the class size may be adjusted to reflect latest separation data.

Conclusion:

As at June 30, 2024, the P.E.U. is not projecting any year-end variance.

Ms. Svina Dhaliwal, Chief Administrative Officer, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police

Attachments:

Appendix 1: Year to date and projection

Appendix 1

Category	2024 Budget (\$Ms)	Actual to June 30/24 (\$Ms)	Projected Year-End Actual (\$Ms)	Fav/(Unfav) (\$Ms)
1- Salaries	\$33.3	\$16.3	\$33.3	\$0.0
2- Premium Pay	\$1.9	\$1.1	\$1.9	\$0.0
3- Benefits	\$9.4	\$3.1	\$9.4	\$0.0
4- Materials & Equipment	\$2.0	\$0.5	\$2.2	(\$0.2)
5- Services	\$6.2	\$1.5	\$6.2	\$0.0
6- Revenue (e.g. T.T.C., towing recoveries)	(\$1.5)	(\$0.5)	(\$1.7)	\$0.2
Total Net	\$51.3	\$21.9	\$51.3	\$0.0

It is important to note that expenditures do not all follow a linear pattern and therefore year-to-date expenditures cannot be simply extrapolated to year-end. Rather, the projection of expenditures to year-end is done through an analysis of all accounts, taking into consideration factors such as expenditures to date, future commitments expected and spending patterns.



PUBLIC REPORT

August 2, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Subject: 2024 Operating Budget Variance Report for the Toronto Police Service Board, Period Ending June 30, 2024

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report, and forward a copy to the City of Toronto (City) Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer for information and inclusion in the variance reporting to the City's Budget Committee.

Financial Implications:

As of June 30, 2024, the Board is anticipating no year-end variance on its 2024 Operating Budget.

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to provide information on the Board's 2024 projected year-end variance as at June 30, 2024. The Board is not projecting any year-end variance on its 2024 Operating Budget. Anticipated savings in Salaries and Benefits will be offset by lower than projected draws from reserves.

Discussion:

Background

At its December 19, 2023 meeting, the Board approved the Toronto Police Service Board's 2024 Operating Budget at a net amount of \$2,335,300 (Min. No. P2023-1219-

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2.5 refers), a \$178,500 increase over the 2023 approved budget. Subsequently, City Council, at its February 14, 2024 meeting, approved the Board's 2024 Operating Budget at the same net amount.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

This report is in compliance with the Board's Budget Transparency Policy, approved on July 29, 2021 under Board Minute P2021-0729-3.0.

Overall Variance

As of June 30, 2024, no variance is anticipated at year-end. The following chart summarizes the Board's variance by expenditure category. Details regarding these categories are discussed in the sections that follow.

Expenditure Category	2024 Budget (\$000s)	Actual to June 30/2024 (\$000s)	Projected Year-End Actual (\$000s)	Fav/(Unfav) (\$000s)
Salaries & Benefits	\$1,749.2	\$671.8	\$1,410.8	\$307.9
Non-Salary Expenditures	\$1,671.8	\$455.6	\$1,671.8	\$0.0
Draws from Reserves	(\$1,065.7)	\$0.0	(\$727.3)	(\$307.9)
Total Net	\$2,355.3	\$1,127.4	\$2,355.3	\$0.0

It is important to note that not all expenditures follow a linear pattern and, as such, year-to-date expenditures cannot be simply extrapolated to year-end. Rather, the projection of expenditures to year-end is done through an analysis of all accounts, taking into consideration factors such as expenditures to date, future commitments and spending patterns.

Salaries & Benefits

Year-to-date expenditures for Salaries and Benefits are lower than budgeted, as not all Board staff are at the highest 'step' of their respective salary band, and there were three vacant positions which were filled in June and July of this year. Therefore a favourable variance of \$307,900 is expected at year-end.

These projected savings are expected to be fully offset by lower than budgeted draws from reserves.

Non-Salary Expenditures/Draws from Reserves

The majority of the costs in this category are for arbitrations/grievances and City charge backs for legal services.

The Toronto Police Service Board cannot predict or control the number of grievances filed or referred to arbitration, as filings are at the discretion of bargaining units. In order to address this uncertainty and ensure adequate financial resources are available to respond to these matters when they arise, the 2024 Operating Budget includes a \$424,800 contribution to a Reserve for costs associated with the provision of legal

advice and representation. Fluctuations in legal spending will be dealt with by increasing or decreasing the budgeted reserve contribution in future years' operating budgets so that the Board ultimately has funds available in the Reserve, upon which to draw, to fund these variable expenditures.

In case of a favourable operating variance at year-end, the Board may choose to draw less than the budgeted amount from the reserves in order to preserve the reserves' balances.

Conclusion:

As of June 30, 2024, no variance is being projected by the end of 2024. Favourable variances in salaries & benefits will be offset by reducing draws from reserves, which will help maintain reserve balances.

Respectfully submitted,

Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director



PUBLIC REPORT

July 30, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2023.77

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

The Professional Standards – S.I.U. Liaison (P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and the applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual

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assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police, of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- *Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.) 2019*

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person

SO – Subject Official

WO – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated July 17, 2024, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *“The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject officials.”*

The following *S.I.U. Incident Narrative and Analysis and Director's Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 23-TCI-425, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors_report_details.php?drid=3936

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

“The evidence collected by the SIU, including interviews with the Complainant and the SO, and video footage that captured the incident in parts, gives rise to the following scenario.

In the early morning of July 25, 2023, officers were dispatched to an address in the area of Bernard Avenue and St. George Street, Toronto, to deal with a male who had caused damage to an ambulance. The SO and the WO arrived on scene and spoke with paramedics, who identified the male responsible for the damage.

The male was the Complainant. The Complainant was of unsound mind at the time.

The SO and the WO arrested the Complainant for mischief in relation to the damage caused to the ambulance. The Complainant was pressed against the side of the

ambulance, handcuffed behind the back by the SO, searched and placed in the rear of a cruiser.

The Complainant was highly agitated. He flailed his legs and laid on his back inside the cruiser, and was eventually fitted with leg restraints. Concerned about his mental health, the Complainant was arrested under the Mental Health Act and transported to hospital in an ambulance.

In the weeks following his arrest, the Complainant spent time in hospital for treatment of cellulitis to his right arm. The medical records indicated that the infection was secondary to the application of handcuffs by the police on July 25, 2023.”

S.I.U. Analysis and Director’s Decision

“On October 17, 2023, the Complainant contacted the SIU to report that he had contracted cellulitis as a result of his handcuffing by TPS officers in the course of his arrest on July 25, 2023. The SIU initiated an investigation naming the SO the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant’s arrest and infection.

The offence that arises for consideration is criminal negligence causing bodily harm contrary to section 221 of the Criminal Code. The offence is reserved for serious cases of neglect that demonstrate a wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. It is predicated, in part, on conduct that amounts to a marked and substantial departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances. In the instant case, the question is whether there was a want of care on the part of the SO, sufficiently egregious to attract criminal sanction, that caused or contributed to the Complainant’s cellulitis. In my view, there was not.

There are no questions raised in the evidence regarding the lawfulness of the Complainant’s arrest. He had purposefully damaged an ambulance and was subject to arrest on that basis.

With respect to the care afforded the Complainant while in custody, I am satisfied that the SO did not transgress the standard prescribed by the criminal law. It might well be that the cuts to the Complainant’s wrist were the result of the handcuffs, but I am unable to reasonably conclude they were applied too tightly in breach of the criminal standard or that that was the reason for the cuts. There is evidence from the police that the SO sanitized his handcuffs after every use, and that he had double-locked the handcuffs on the Complainant to prevent them inadvertently tightening. There is also evidence that the cuts might have been caused by the Complainant’s movements in the cruiser with his arms handcuffed behind the back. On this record, the evidence of criminal negligence is insufficiently cogent or probable to warrant being put to the test by a court.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges in this case. The file is closed”.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service’s Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 01-08 (Criminal Code Release);
- Procedure 06-04 (Person in Crisis);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation));
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019*

Conclusion:

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.’s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct, the applicable T.P.S. procedures and the officer’s training. The following additional comments are provided.

The Complainant’s arrest and the force used on him, which consisted of holding and handcuffing him was lawful, proportionate in compliance with the officer’s training and procedure.

Staff Superintendent Shannon Dawson, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

July 30, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2024.05

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

The Professional Standards – S.I.U. Liaison (P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and the applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual

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assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police, of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- *Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.) 2019*

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person

SO – Subject Official

WO – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated May 22, 2024, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *“The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject officials.”*

The following *S.I.U. Incident Narrative and Analysis and Director's Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 24-TCI-041, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors_report_details.php?drid=3855

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

“The evidence collected by the SIU, including video footage that captured the incident in parts, gives rise to the following scenario. As was his legal right, the SO did not agree an interview with the SIU or the release of his notes.

In the early morning of January 28, 2024, WO #1 arrived at the scene of a single motor vehicle collision. A vehicle travelling westbound on Walsh Avenue had traversed the eastbound lanes and crashed by the southwest corner of the road's intersection with Mathews Gate. There were no occupants in the wreckage by the time of the officer's arrival. Witnesses indicated that a male, whom they described, had exited the vehicle and left travelling eastbound on Walsh Avenue towards Wilson Avenue.

WO #1 set off to locate the male and came across the Complainant walking on the south sidewalk in the vicinity of 1677 Wilson Avenue. The Complainant fit the

description of the male provided by the witnesses. The officer stopped his cruiser, called-out to the Complainant, and then approached him. The two spoke for a period before the Complainant left making his way eastward on the sidewalk and then onto Wilson Avenue. WO #1 followed and managed to grab the Complainant but lost his grip. By this time, another cruiser was arriving from the east.

The SO and his partner, WO #2, in the area on another matter, came across WO #1 and the Complainant and stopped to assist. The SO approached the Complainant and was thrown to the ground. He righted himself and was struck again by the Complainant. Shortly thereafter, WO #1 and WO #2 forced the Complainant onto the roadway, the latter delivering several punches in the process. The Complainant's combativeness continued on the ground – he flailed his legs, struck WO #1 in the face and refused to release his arms to be handcuffed. WO #1 responded with several knee strikes to the torso and the SO with a couple of punches to the face, after which the officers managed to wrestle control of the Complainant's arms behind his back and secure them in handcuffs.

Following his arrest, the Complainant was taken to hospital and diagnosed with a fractured nose.”

S.I.U. Analysis and Director's Decision

“The Complainant was seriously injured in the course of his arrest by TPS officers on January 28, 2024. The SIU was notified of the incident and initiated an investigation naming the SO the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's arrest and injury.

Pursuant to section 25(1) of the Criminal Code, police officers are immune from criminal liability for force used in the course of their duties provided such force was reasonably necessary in the execution of an act that they were required or authorized to do by law.

I am satisfied that WO #1 was within his rights in attempting to take the Complainant into custody. The Complainant fit the description of the male seen leaving the scene of a motor vehicle collision. He was, accordingly, subject to arrest by virtue of sections 200(1)(a) and 217(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

I am also satisfied that the force brought to bear by the officers was legally justified. The Complainant put up a spirited fight to resist arrest. He punched at the officers, striking and knocking one off his feet, flailed his legs, and struggled against their efforts to take him into custody. The officers responded in like manner, first, by taking him to the ground where they could better manage any further violence and, then, with several additional strikes when the Complainant continued to resist. These tactics, it seems to me, were reasonable and proportionate. With specific reference to the SO's punches when the Complainant was on the ground, one or more of which likely caused the injury, it bears noting that the officers were in live lanes of traffic. Though the Complainant

was effectively pinned at that point by WO #1 and WO #2, he had yet to be handcuffed and the officer could not be sure that his fight had abated. As time was of the essence, the SO was entitled, in the circumstances, to respond with sharp and decisive force to facilitate a prompt resolution of the hostilities. No strikes were delivered after the Complainant was handcuffed.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges in this case. The file is closed”.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service’s Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 07-01 (Transportation Collisions);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation));
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System); and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c 1, Sch 5*

Conclusion:

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.’s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of one of the designated officials was not in compliance with Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

Specifically, it was substantiated that this officer failed to activate their B.W.C. as required by Procedure 15-20. The matter was adjudicated at the Unit level.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the conduct of the SO was in compliance with Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation)) and their training.

Staff Superintendent Shannon Dawson, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

July 30, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2024.08

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

The Professional Standards – S.I.U. Liaison (P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and the applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual

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assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police, of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- *Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.) 2019*

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person

CW – Civilian Witness

SO – Subject Official

WO – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated June 17, 2024, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *“The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject officials.”*

The following *S.I.U. Incident Narrative and Analysis and Director's Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 24-TCI-069, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors_report_details.php?drid=3891

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

“In the early morning of February 18, 2024, police were called to a residence in the area of Lawrence Avenue East and Morningside Avenue, Toronto. CW #4 had called 911 to report that her family member – the Complainant – was at the address and suicidal. The SO was among the officers to respond, arriving on scene at about 1:20 a.m. He was joined by the WO, Officer #2 and Officer #1. The officers were greeted by CW #3, who questioned why the mobile crisis team had not been sent. They explained that the mobile crisis team was not available. After some back and forth in which the officers indicated they would not leave without checking on the Complainant, they were allowed into the house.

The Complainant was in a bedroom of the home with CW #1. He was distraught and contemplating self-harm. The Complainant refused to open the door to the officers. He

told the officers that he did not trust them and explained that it was his life and he could end it if he wanted to.

The officers explained they were there to help the Complainant and pleaded with him to open the door. CW #1 consoled the Complainant and also encouraged him to exit. CW #4 and CW #3 did the same from outside the bedroom. The Complainant refused and told the officers to leave. They responded that they could not leave without ensuring he was okay.

At about 1:45 a.m., after rattling was heard from inside the bedroom, the officers entered. The Complainant was face down on the floor at the foot of the bed, CW #1 leaning over him with her hands on his shoulder. Shortly thereafter, a gunshot was heard. The Complainant had fired a revolver into his face. The officers reacted quickly and began to apply first-aid with the help of the family. Paramedics were summoned to the scene.

Paramedics arrived at about 1:52 a.m. and took charge of the Complainant's care. He was transported to hospital and treated for a gunshot wound to the face."

S.I.U. Analysis and Director's Decision

"On February 18, 2024, the Complainant suffered a self-inflicted serious injury. As TPS officers were in the vicinity at the time, the SIU was notified of the incident and initiated an investigation. The SO was identified as the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's injury.

The offence that arises for consideration is criminal negligence causing bodily harm contrary to section 221 of the Criminal Code. The offence is reserved for serious cases of neglect that demonstrate a wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. It is predicated, in part, on conduct that amounts to a marked and substantial departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances. In the instant case, the question is whether there was a want of care on the part of the SO, sufficiently egregious to attract criminal sanction, that caused or contributed to the Complainant's injury. In my view, there was not.

The SO and the other officers on scene were lawfully present and engaged in the execution of their duties throughout the series of events that culminated in the shooting. Having been called to the scene to assist with a person in crisis, the officers were duty bound to attend to do whatever they reasonably could to prevent harm coming to the Complainant.

I am also satisfied that the SO and his colleagues comported themselves with due care and regard for the Complainant's wellbeing from start to finish. The video footage of their time at the residence depicts officers acting carefully to coax the Complainant out

of the bedroom. Their decision not to immediately barge into the bedroom was a reasonable one given the potential for such conduct to provoke rash behaviour on the part of the Complainant. Their decision to enter the bedroom when they did is also entitled to deference, particularly as they had no reason to believe that the Complainant was in possession of a weapon. There was a rattling noise emanating from inside the bedroom, presumably prompting concern on the part of the officers of imminent harm in the making. Regrettably, unknown to the police or his family, the Complainant had a revolver on his person, which he used to shoot himself before anyone knew what was going on. Thereafter, the officers acted quickly to render care and arrange for paramedics.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges in this case. The file is closed.”

Summary of the Toronto Police Service’s Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 06-04 (Persons In Crisis);
- Procedure 06-13 (Mobile Crisis Intervention Team (MCIT));
- Procedure 10-05 (Incidents Requiring the Emergency Task Force);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation));
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting); and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c 1, Sch 5*

Conclusion:

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable T.P.S. procedures.

Staff Superintendent Shannon Dawson, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

July 30, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Complainant 2024.09

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

The Professional Standards – S.I.U. Liaison (P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and the applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual

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assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police, of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- *Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.) 2019*

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person

SO – Subject Official(s)

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated June 18, 2024, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *“The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject officials.”*

The following *S.I.U. Incident Narrative and Analysis and Director's Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 24-TCI-073, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors_report_details.php?drid=3892

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

“The material events in question, clear on the evidence collected by the SIU, may briefly be summarized.

Just before midnight of February 20, 2024, a security company contacted TPS and asked that officers be dispatched to a break and enter in progress at a business on Avenue Road, Toronto. Security personnel had witnessed an intruder on the premises – a restaurant – removing items.

SO #2 was patrolling in the area and took up the call for service. He arrived at the laneway behind the restaurant and observed a black sedan. The sedan drove into his cruiser and made off northbound towards Highway 401, where it entered and travelled westward. SO #2 and SO #3, travelling separately, pursued the vehicle.

The sedan was being operated by the Complainant. The Complainant took the Keele Street exit and was stopped on the off-ramp when his vehicle was blocked from the front and rear by the cruisers operated by SO #2 and SO #3. SO #3 approached the vehicle's driver side and used his baton to smash out the window. The Complainant tried to drive through the blockade before retrieving a backpack and exiting his vehicle via the front passenger door. SO #2, followed by SO #3, chased him on foot.

About 200 metres north of Highway 401, on the west side of Keele Street, SO #2 caught up to the Complainant and tackled him onto a grass boulevard. The parties rolled on the snow-covered ground and the Complainant ended up in a prone position. The officer, positioned to the Complainant's right, attempted to secure his right hand, delivering about five punches to the back in the process. SO #3 and SO #1, the latter arriving on scene, joined in the struggle. The Complainant, still holding the backpack, refused to release his arms to the officers. SO #1 delivered about a half-dozen punches to the Complainant's upper torso and head area. SO #3 kicked in the direction of the Complainant's upper body. With the arrival of several uniformed officers, the Complainant's arms were wrestled behind the back and handcuffed.

The Complainant was transported to hospital following his arrest and diagnosed with a broken left orbital bone.”

S.I.U. Analysis and Director's Decision

“The Complainant was seriously injured in the course of his arrest on February 20, 2024, by TPS officers. The SIU was notified of the incident and initiated an investigation naming SO #2 and SO #3, and SO #1, subject officials. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the subject officials committed a criminal offence in connection with the Complainant's arrest and injury.

Pursuant to section 25(1) of the Criminal Code, police officers are immune from criminal liability for force used in the course of their duties provided such force was reasonably necessary in the execution of an act that they were required or authorized to do by law.

The Complainant was subject to arrest at the time of the struggle on Keele Street. The officers were apprised of information indicating he had just committed a break and enter at a restaurant.

With respect to the force brought to bear by the subject officials, I am satisfied the evidence falls short of any reasonable suggestion it was unlawful. The strikes delivered by the subject officials occurred as the Complainant resisted the officers' efforts to bring his hands behind the back. The officers were motivated to subdue and handcuff the Complainant as soon as possible, and for good reason. He had demonstrated a propensity for violence – he had twice driven intentionally into police vehicles – and was reasonably thought to be armed – he had possession of a backpack and was coming from the site of a break and enter. On this record, when the Complainant resisted the

officers' efforts to bring his arms behind his back, they were entitled to react with sharp force to overcome his recalcitrance and place him in custody. And that is what they did without resort to weapons but with the application of manual force that was significant but not uncalled for. Once handcuffed, no further strikes were delivered by the officers.

It remains unclear when and how precisely the Complainant incurred his injury. The evidence suggests a number of possibilities – when the driver's side window was smashed by SO #3, at the time of the takedown by SO #2, or the altercation that marked his arrest on the ground. Be that as it may, as there are no reasonable grounds to conclude that the subject officials comported themselves other than lawfully in their dealings with the Complainant, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges. The file is closed."

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the custody injury in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 05-03 (Break and Enter);
- Procedure 07-05 (Service Vehicle Collisions);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation));
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-10 (Suspect Apprehension Pursuits);
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System); and
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019*

Conclusion:

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this custody injury were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined the conduct of the designated officials was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable T.P.S. procedures. The following additional comments are provided.

Given the violence exhibited by the Complainant throughout this event, the force used by the three subject officials to subdue and arrest him was proportionate, lawful and reasonably necessary to bring this incident under control effectively and safely.

Staff Superintendent Shannon Dawson, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

July 30, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Firearm Discharge at Complainant 2023.84

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) forward a copy of this report to the Solicitor General as per O. Reg. 552/92 s.8.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

The Professional Standards – S.I.U. Liaison (P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of a designated official was not in compliance with Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police, of the relevant police service,

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to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- *Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.) 2019*

S.I.U. Terminology

BWC – Body-Worn Camera

Complainant – Refers to the Affected Person

SO – Subject Official

WO – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated April 12, 2024, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *“The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject officials.”*

The following *S.I.U. Incident Narrative and Analysis and Director's Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 23-TFP-512, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors_report_details.php?drid=3800

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

“In the evening of December 15, 2023, the TPS received a 911 call regarding an armed robbery at a retail store in Scarborough. The suspects had reportedly brandished a knife and gun during the robbery, and made off in an Acura SUV with stolen merchandise, including cell phones. As one of the stolen phones had a geo tracker, the police were able to discern the vehicle's movements as it travelled west into North York. Multiple TPS vehicles began to converge on the SUV.

The SO, operating a marked police vehicle, was among the officers attempting to locate the Acura SUV. Receiving word that the vehicle was on Plunkett Road, the officer fell in behind another marked police cruiser operated by WO #4 northbound on the roadway. As the cruisers cleared the intersection of Millwick Drive, WO #4 brought his cruiser to a stop by the east side curb. The SO came to a stop by the west curb a short distance behind WO #4's cruiser. North of their location, travelling southbound on Plunkett Road

from Cabana Drive, was the Acura SUV. As it approached the SO's and WO #4's cruisers, the Acura drifted into the southbound lane before it straightened and headed for the gap between the cruisers. It had just reached the driver's door of WO #4's cruiser when a shot rang out.

The SO, having exited his cruiser and taken a position by the west curb a few metres from the front of his vehicle, had fired the shot.

The Acura continued between the cruisers and collided head-on with another police vehicle. WO #1, operating the vehicle, was approaching the scene from the south attempting to close the gap at the time of the collision. The vehicle's occupants – Complainant #1, Complainant #3 and Complainant #2 – were taken into custody.”

S.I.U. Analysis and Director's Decision

“On December 15, 2023, the TPS contacted the SIU to report that one of their officers had earlier that day discharged his firearm at a vehicle. None of the occupants of the vehicle had been seriously injured. The SIU initiated an investigation naming the SO the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the shooting.

Section 34 of the Criminal Code provides that conduct that would otherwise constitute an offence is legally justified if it was intended to deter a reasonably apprehended assault, actual or threatened, and was itself reasonable. The reasonableness of the conduct is to be assessed in light of all the relevant circumstances, including with respect to such considerations as the nature of the force or threat; the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other means available to respond to the potential use of force; whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; and, the nature and proportionality of the person's response to the use or threat of force.

The SO was lawfully placed and in the execution of his duties throughout the series of events culminating in the discharge of his firearm. The officer had cause to believe that the occupants of the Acura had just committed an armed robbery involving a knife and gun. [4] In the circumstances, he was within his rights in doing what he reasonably could, as part of the larger police response to the situation, to assist in taking the Acura's occupants into custody. This, I am satisfied, included his participation with WO #4 in setting up a police roadblock of sorts on Plunkett Road just north of Millwick Drive.

When the SO exited his cruiser and, shortly after, fired his weapon at the Acura, he did so in self-defence. That is what he said he did in utterances soon after the collision, namely, that he feared for his life when he discharged his firearm, and there is no evidence to contradict his assertion. On the contrary, the circumstantial evidence lends credence to the SO's claim. Principally, that evidence consists of the Acura heading

towards the stopped cruisers on Plunkett Road (placing it in proximity to the SO standing outside his vehicle) and failing to stop.

With respect to the shooting, the evidence falls short of any reasonable suggestion that it was not justifiable force in self-defence. The roadblock established by the SO and WO #4, though a partial one, was a reasonable tactic. With the SO's emergency lights on, the driver of the Acura would have known that he was approaching police and there was some prospect that he would bring his vehicle to a stop. The SO's decision to exit his vehicle and position himself in front of the cruiser, gun drawn and pointed at the Acura as it approached his location, is more questionable. That left the SO vulnerable to the dangers of a moving vehicle which, as it turned out, was the impetus for the officer's gunshot. However, here too the officer's conduct was not without reason given the possibility that still existed at that point that the Acura would come to a stop. Shooting at a moving vehicle is also questionable given that gunfire is not likely to stop a vehicle in its tracks, not to mention the dangers of a vehicle not in the control of an operating mind. That said, the SO was faced with a difficult decision and only split seconds in which to make it. If he genuinely believed that his life was in danger by the operation of the Acura, and I am satisfied that he did, then incapacitating the driver made sense. This was particularly so if there was reason to believe that the driver might purposefully turn in his direction as he closed the distance with the officer. That contingency was very much a live one in this case. As the ICC video footage indicates, the Acura had briefly turned in the direction of the SO before it straightened out and was shot by the officer. Moreover, as the Acura bore down on the officers' cruisers and it became clear it was not going to stop, there was every possibility that it would jump the curb to circumvent the blockade, potentially putting it on a collision course with the SO. On this record, I am unable to reasonably conclude with any confidence that the SO acted without the protection of section 34 when he discharged his weapon.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges in this case. The file is closed."

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation

The Professional Standards – Firearm Discharge Investigators (P.R.S. – F.D.I.) assisted by the P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation.

This investigation examined the circumstances of the firearm discharge in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.R.S. – F.D.I. and P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest);
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons);

- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody);
- Procedure 07-01 (Transportation Collisions);
- Procedure 07-05 (Service Vehicle Collisions);
- Procedure 08-03 (Injured on Duty Reporting);
- Procedure 08-04 (Members Involved in a Traumatic Critical Event);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-01 (Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation));
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting);
- Procedure 15-03 (Service Firearms);
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System); and,
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The P.R.S. – F.D.I. and P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Special Investigations Unit Act*, 2019; S.O. 2019, c 1, Sch5
- *Police Services Act*, R.R.O. 1990 – Ontario Regulation 268/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the S.I.U.); and
- *Police Services Act*, R.R.O. 1990 – Ontario Regulation 926 (Equipment and Use of Force)

Conclusion:

The P.R.S. – F.D.I. and P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with this firearm discharge were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

An internal investigation was conducted by the P.R.S. – F.D.I. to determine if the subject officer was in compliance with Procedure 15-03 (Service Firearms) which prohibits an officer from discharging their firearm at the operator or occupants of a motor vehicle unless there exists an immediate threat of death or grievous bodily harm to officers and/or members of the public by a means other than the vehicle. In addition to the above, the investigation also examined if the subject officer had, when he discharged his firearm, used excessive or unauthorized force.

The P.R.S. – F.D.I. investigation concluded there was insufficient evidence to substantiate that the subject officer had failed to comply with Procedure 15-03. Further, the P.R.S. – F.D.I. investigation found that the subject officer had not used excessive or unauthorized force when he discharged his firearm.

The P.R.S. – F.D.I. investigation did substantiate that the subject officer committed misconduct when he failed to activate his B.W.C. as required by Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera). This matter was adjudicated at the unit level.

Staff Superintendent Shannon Dawson, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

June 12, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation of the Vehicle Injuries to Complainant 2024.07

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

The Professional Standards S.I.U. Liaison (P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison) investigation determined the conduct of the designated official was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and applicable Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures.

Discussion:

Background

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigates an incident involving death, serious injury, the discharge of a firearm at a person or the allegation of a sexual

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assault, provincial legislation requires the chief of police, of the relevant police service, to conduct an administrative investigation. This is the Chief's report in respect of this incident.

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures
- *Special Investigations Unit Act (S.I.U.A.) 2019*

S.I.U. Terminology

Complainants – Refers to the Affected Persons

SO – Subject Official

WO – Witness Official

S.I.U. Investigative Conclusion

In a letter to the Chief of Police dated June 3, 2024, Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised, *“The file has been closed and no further action is contemplated. In my view, there were no reasonable grounds in the evidence to proceed with criminal charges against the subject official.”*

The following *S.I.U. Incident Narrative and Analysis and Director's Decision* has been reprinted from the S.I.U. Director's report, number 24-TVI-052, which can be found via the following link:

https://www.siu.on.ca/en/directors_report_details.php?drid=3873

S.I.U. Incident Narrative

“The evidence collected by the SIU, including video footage that captured the event in question, gives rise to the following scenario. As was his legal right, the SO did not agree an interview with the SIU or the release of his notes.

In the evening of February 4, 2024, the SO was operating a marked police cruiser and travelling to the Castle Frank Subway Station at 600 Bloor Street East following an ‘unknown trouble’ call to police. With him in the passenger seat was the WO. The pair arrived on scene at about 6:30 p.m. The SO maneuvered into the left turn lane off eastbound Bloor Street East to travel north onto the driveway of the subway grounds, and waited for westbound traffic to clear.

At the same time, the Complainant was operating an e-bike travelling westbound on Bloor Street East in the designated bike lane adjacent to the north sidewalk. He

approached the subway driveway exit/entrance and struck the front push-bar of the SO's cruiser. The Complainant was thrown westward off his bike.

The SO had entered into the left turn and stopped, the front of his cruiser just into the bike lane – just as the e-bike was about to cross his path

The Complainant was taken from the scene to hospital for treatment of unascertained serious injuries.”

S.I.U. Analysis and Director's Decision

“On February 4, 2024, the Complainant was seriously injured in a collision with a TPS cruiser. The SIU was notified of the incident and initiated an investigation naming the driver of the cruiser – the SO – the subject official. The investigation is now concluded. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the SO committed a criminal offence in connection with the collision.

The offence that arises for consideration is dangerous driving causing bodily harm contrary to section 320.13(2) of the Criminal Code. As an offence of penal negligence, a simple want of care will not suffice to give rise to liability. Rather, the offence is predicated, in part, on conduct that amounts to a marked departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the circumstances. In the instant case, the issue is whether there was a want of care in the manner in which the SO operated his vehicle, sufficiently egregious to attract criminal sanction that caused or contributed to the collision. In my view, there was not.

The SO was lawfully placed and in the execution of his duties in the series of events culminating in his cruiser's collision with the Complainant and his e-bike. The officer was responding to a bona fide call for service involving a transit user and a potentially dangerous situation at the subway station.

With respect to the manner in which the SO drove the cruiser, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the officer transgressed the limits of care prescribed by the criminal law. The SO's speed as he made his way to the scene was unremarkable. Not aware of any exigent circumstances in relation to the call for service, he and his partner had not engaged their emergency equipment to get to the scene as soon as possible. But for the fact of the collision, the left turn appears to have been executed with due care. The SO waited for traffic to clear and then started into his turn at moderate speed. Drivers making a left turn bear the burden of ensuring they only do so when it is safe to proceed. In this case, it would appear the SO either did not see the Complainant until it was too late, or he did see the Complainant but miscalculated how much time he had to make the turn. In either case, it is important to note that the officer did come to a stop just as the e-bike was upon the cruiser; indeed, it is arguable that the Complainant had an opportunity to avoid the collision had he maneuvered to his right. For whatever reason, he did not do so; rather, he continued without decelerating in a straight line right into the front of the cruiser. On this record, the SO's indiscretion is fairly characterized

as a momentary lapse of attention, which, the case law establishes, will generally not amount to a marked departure from a reasonable standard of care.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges in this case. The file is closed.”

Summary of the Toronto Police Service’s Investigation

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison conducted an administrative investigation as is required by provincial legislation. This investigation was reviewed by Traffic Services (T.S.V.), as is required by Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit).

This investigation examined the circumstances of this collision in relation to the applicable legislation, policing services provided, procedures and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 07-03 (Life Threatening/Fatal Collisions);
- Procedure 07-05 (Service Vehicle Collisions);
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies);
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit);
- Procedure 13-17 (Notes and Reports);
- Procedure 15-11 (Use of Service Vehicles);
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System); and,
- Procedure 15-20 (Body-Worn Camera).

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Special Investigations Unit Act* (S.I.U.A.), 2019;
- *Highway Traffic Act* (H.T.A.)

Conclusion:

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison in consultation with investigators from the T.S.V. determined that the T.P.S.’s policies and procedures associated with these vehicle injuries were lawful, in keeping with current legislation, and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The P.R.S. – S.I.U. Liaison in consultation with investigators from T.S.V. found that the conduct of the subject official was in compliance with applicable provincial legislation regarding the Standards of Conduct and the applicable T.P.S. procedures.

Staff Superintendent Shannon Dawson, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police



PUBLIC REPORT

August 28, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Subject: Ombudsman Report: An Investigation into the Toronto Police Service's Communications About its Vulnerable Persons Registry

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive this report.

Financial Implications:

Implementation of the recommendations in the Ombudsman's Report may have financial impacts, although it is currently premature to assess them. The Service is currently exploring possible means of addressing these recommendations, and will report back to the Board inclusive of an analysis of costs.

Summary:

The purpose of this report is to transmit the findings of Ombudsman Toronto's recently concluded investigation into communications about the Service's Vulnerable Persons Registry. This investigation was conducted as part of the Memorandum of Understanding (M.O.U.) between the Board, the Service and the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct reviews regarding the fairness of the relevant procedures, processes, and practices of the Service and the Board. This report represents the first product of this M.O.U.

In this report, the Ombudsman made 13 recommendations to the Service based on these findings, which the Service has accepted in full, and committed to implement.

Toronto Police Service Board

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Discussion:

Ombudsman Toronto

At its meeting of December 16, 2022, the Board approved a Memorandum of Understanding (M.O.U.) with Ombudsman Toronto, for the Ombudsman to carry out fairness investigations on matters of public interest where the quality of service to the public may be unfairly affected by Board Policies and directions, Service procedures, or the administration of services by the Service (Min. No. P2022-1216-3.0. refers).

On August 27, the Board received the Ombudsman's report arising from the investigation into communications about the Service's Vulnerable Persons Registry, entitled "An Investigation into the Toronto Police Service's Communications About its Vulnerable Persons Registry" ("the Report.")

Under the relevant legislation, the *City of Toronto Act*, Ombudsman Toronto does not have jurisdiction over the Toronto Police Service (Service) or the Toronto Police Service Board (Board). In signing the M.O.U., the Board has completed the final step of a process initiated in recommendation 29 of the 81 recommendations on police reform approved by the Board on August 18, 2020 (Min. No. 129/20 refers), to engage with the City Manager, and discuss additional and alternative approaches to ensuring transparent auditing of police practices and policies.

Vulnerable Persons Registry

As mentioned in the attached Report, the Service launched its Vulnerable Persons Registry on December 4, 2019. The Registry aims to provide the public with an opportunity to create personalized de-escalation strategies for "vulnerable persons" to help officers better understand and respond to specific behaviours they may encounter when interacting with those persons in crisis.

Ombudsman's Report and Findings

The attached Report discusses findings from the investigation, including gaps in the Service's communication about the Registry that impact the public's ability to make informed choices about using it. Specifically, the Ombudsman found that "the Service does not provide the public with adequate information about the Registry's purpose and processes, or how it stores, accesses, and uses the personal information it collects from registrants."

The Report makes 13 recommendations, which the Service has accepted in full. The Report notes that the Service "intends to incorporate the spirit and intent of our recommendations as they work with their communities to change the current Registry program and plan for the future."

Conclusion:

The Ombudsman's Report is attached for the Board's information. Ombudsman Kwame Addo will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this Report.

Respectfully submitted,



Dubi Kanengisser
Executive Director

Attachments:

Ombudsman Report: An Investigation into the Toronto Police Service's
Communications About its Vulnerable Persons Registry



Ombudsman
Toronto

Ombudsman Report

An Investigation into the Toronto Police Service's Communications About its Vulnerable Persons Registry

September 2024





At Ombudsman Toronto, we know we have a responsibility to uphold and ensure fairness in our local government. We understand that this must be done with a respectful and culturally responsive approach, and we commit to ongoing learning, unlearning, engagement, and relationship-building in order to do so.

Land Acknowledgement

Ombudsman Toronto acknowledges that we are on the traditional territory of many nations, including the Mississaugas of the Credit, the Anishinaabeg, the Chippewa, the Haudenosaunee and the Wendat peoples, and that this land is now home to many diverse First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples. We also acknowledge that Toronto is covered by Treaty 13 signed with the Mississaugas of the Credit, and the Williams Treaties signed with multiple Mississaugas and Chippewa bands. We are here because this land has been colonized, and we recognize the ongoing harm done to Indigenous communities by this colonial system, including the effects of broken treaty covenants.

African Ancestral Acknowledgement

Ombudsman Toronto is committed to continually acting in support of and in solidarity with Black communities seeking freedom and reparative justice in light of the history and ongoing legacy of slavery that continues to impact Black communities in Canada. As part of this commitment, we would also like to acknowledge that not all people came to these lands as migrants and settlers. Specifically, we wish to acknowledge those of us who came here involuntarily, particularly those brought to these lands as a result of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and Slavery. We pay tribute to those ancestors of African origin and descent.



Kwame Addo
Ombudsman

Meredith Gayda
Acting Deputy Ombudsman

Ombudsman's Note: This investigation involved efforts by staff in all parts of our office, including Investigators, Complaints Analysts, Investigations Counsel, as well as research, communications, and operations staff, and was led by Lead Investigator, Meera Persaud.



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Executive Summary



The Vulnerable Persons Registry

The Toronto Police Service (“**Toronto Police**”) launched its Vulnerable Persons Registry (“**Registry**”) on December 4, 2019. Described by the Toronto Police as a voluntary database, the Registry aims to provide the public with an opportunity to create personalized de-escalation strategies for “vulnerable persons” to help officers better understand and respond to specific behaviours they may encounter when interacting with those persons in crisis.¹

The Registry stemmed from the Toronto Police’s 2012 review of its online reporting software, as well as former Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci’s 2014 review² of the Toronto Police’s encounters with people in crisis in which he recommended that a voluntary registry of this type be created.

The Toronto Police took seven years to launch the Registry and sought input from two dozen agencies, such as Autism Ontario and MedicAlert. The Toronto Police did not solicit any other public input. The Toronto Police also attempted to raise awareness about the Registry during the launch through social media and media outlets. However, it did not release any further communications or promotional campaigns for the Registry after the launch.

One year after the Registry’s launch, the Toronto Police began considering transferring ownership and management of the Registry to a third-party as it was not being frequently used and there were challenges with the flow of information from the Registry to officers. The Toronto Police is currently working with a third-party to define the nature and scope of this arrangement. In light of this decision, the Toronto Police decided not to allocate

¹ The Toronto Police defines a vulnerable person as “a person who by nature of an emotional, medical, psychological or other physical condition may exhibit patterns of behaviour that pose an increased risk of danger to themselves or others, who may require assistance from emergency services.” This definition was obtained from Service Procedure 04-08, located at <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. The Toronto Police’s website provides examples of conditions a person may be experiencing and that a member of the public may consider registering if the “condition affects their cognitive ability, their behaviour could be perceived as violent, they may pose a danger to themselves or others or are likely to be reported missing.” Reference <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024. References throughout this report to “vulnerable person” are in the context of this Toronto Police definition.

² The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, *Police Encounters with People in Crisis*, p 115. The Chief of Police committed to implementing all of the recommendations in the report, including creating a registry.



further resources to the Registry, including any marketing or promotional efforts. While I recognize that the Toronto Police no longer intends to own and manage the Registry, it still has a duty to the public to communicate clearly, meaningfully, and accurately about the Registry and the information stored in it, whether it is in its current form or managed by a third-party.

Our Investigation

On December 14, 2023, my office launched an investigation into the transparency and adequacy of the Toronto Police's communications about its Registry. Our investigation focused on the clarity and meaningfulness of the Toronto Police's communications to the public about:

- The purpose of the Registry;
- The Registry's registration, verification, and engagement process; and
- The Toronto Police's use of the information in the Registry.

The investigation also reviewed the Toronto Police's internal communications to identify any potential gaps and assess its staff's knowledge about the Registry.

Ombudsman Investigators conducted 28 interviews with Toronto Police and Toronto Police Service Board staff and members of the public. My office also reviewed over 100 documents provided by the Toronto Police and Registry information available on the Toronto Police's website and social media accounts.

What We Found

I acknowledge the Toronto Police's efforts and intentions in creating a Registry to support interactions with vulnerable persons. However, my investigation found gaps in the Toronto Police's communication about the Registry that impact the public's ability to make informed choices about using it.

Specifically, my office found that the Toronto Police does not provide the public with adequate information about the Registry's purpose and processes, or how it stores, accesses, and uses the personal information it collects from registrants. For instance:

- Despite being the main source of information about the Registry for the public, the Toronto Police's website provides insufficient details about the Registry's



purpose. This impacts the public's understanding of why the Registry exists and how de-escalation strategies can be used.

- Details about the registration process are only available in the Toronto Police's procedure document, yet the information provided there does not accurately reflect the current practice. This means the public cannot know what the registration process entails before enrolling.
- Further, the Toronto Police's communication about the registration process lacks important details on the information needed to create a personalized de-escalation strategy, thereby reducing the impact of the Registry.
- The Toronto Police advertise the Registry as a single database when it is in fact made up of four databases. This is significant as it can become difficult for Toronto Police to remove personal information from all databases.

Our Recommendations

I made 13 recommendations to the Toronto Police to improve their communication about the Registry and to help ensure the public can make informed decisions about whether to use it.

As the Toronto Police is actively seeking a third-party to own and manage the Registry, my recommendations address the most immediate communication concerns. However, so long as the Toronto Police offers the Registry as a resource to the public, its communications about the Registry should be transparent and meaningful regardless of who owns and manages it.

My recommendations include that the Toronto Police should:

- Publicize meaningful details about the Registry's goal and purpose.
- Clearly define and publicize the registration process to ensure that the public understands what information is mandatory, what information is required to create a personalized de-escalation strategy, and what supporting documents are accepted.
- Ensure the Registry service procedure document and current practices are aligned.
- Clearly explain when and how the Toronto Police will access and use the Registry information.



The Toronto Police's Response and Follow Up

In response to my report, the Toronto Police has accepted all 13 of my recommendations in full. The Toronto Police has committed to providing my office with updates on the implementation of these recommendations through a report to the Toronto Police Service Board. My office will continue to follow up quarterly with the Toronto Police until we are satisfied that the Toronto Police has implemented our recommendations.

Introduction



About Toronto Police Service and Toronto Police Service Board

1. The Toronto Police Service (“**Toronto Police**”) is the primary law enforcement and crime-prevention agency serving the City of Toronto. With 5,127 uniformed officers and 2,563 civilian staff,³ the Toronto Police is “committed to being a world leader in policing through excellence, innovation, continuous learning, quality leadership, and management.”⁴ The Toronto Police’s objectives, priorities, and policies are set by the Toronto Police Service Board (“**Board**”).⁵ The Board is an oversight body consisting of seven civilian members (four members of the public and three City Councillors)⁶ and is supported by seven Board staff members.
2. The Toronto Police units and pillars⁷ relevant to my investigation include:
 - West Field Command
 - East Field Command
 - Communication Services

³ Toronto Police Service Board Budget Committee Meeting, November 27, 2023. <https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=809:november-27-2023-budget-committee-meeting-minutes&catid=69>. Accessed June 5, 2024.

⁴ The Toronto Police’s Mission Statement. <https://www.tps.ca/mission-vision-values/>. Accessed June 5, 2024.

⁵ The Toronto Police Service Board’s description. <https://www.tps.ca/toronto-police-board/>. Accessed June 5, 2024.

⁶ The Toronto Police Service Board’s Mandate. <https://tpsb.ca/about/board-mandate>. The Toronto Police Service Board’s Membership. <https://tpsb.ca/about/board-members>. Accessed June 5, 2024. The Board’s oversight does not extend to the Toronto Police’s operational decisions and day-to-day operations.

⁷ The Toronto Police Service refers to the different sections within each command structure as “pillars.”



- Corporate Communications
- Community Partnership and Engagement
- Records Management Services
- Project Management Office
- Information Security and Access
- Toronto Police College

About Ombudsman Toronto

3. Ombudsman Toronto is an independent and impartial accountability office with the authority to review and investigate complaints about the administration of the City of Toronto, its agencies, boards, corporations, and divisions. My focus is on administrative fairness. Specifically, I seek to ensure there is a fair process, fair outcome, and fair treatment in City decisions or processes. At the conclusion of any investigation, I can make recommendations for improvement if I find instances of unfairness in how the City's agencies, boards, corporations, or divisions have addressed a matter.

Our Police Oversight

4. My authority to review the City of Toronto's divisions, agencies, boards, and corporations stems from the *City of Toronto Act, 2006*. However, this is not the case with the Toronto Police and the Board. Rather, my authority in this case stems from a Memorandum of Understanding ("**MOU**") I signed with the Board and the Toronto Police after direction from Toronto City Council.⁸

⁸ The MOU can be found at <https://www.ombudsmantoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/MOU-Fairness-Investigations-by-Ombudsman-Toronto-of-the-Toronto-Police-Service.pdf>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



5. The MOU gives my office the authority to review the fairness of the procedures, processes, and practices of the Toronto Police and the Board.⁹ Under the MOU, I can investigate issues of public interest and where I believe there is the potential to improve the fairness of the services provided to the public.¹⁰
6. My authority under the MOU does not extend to receiving or reviewing complaints about the Toronto Police or the Board, including complaints about police conduct or interactions, and employment or labour relations issues. I also cannot review matters that are under the jurisdiction or review of other agencies or bodies, such as the Special Investigations Unit and the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency, formerly the Office of the Independent Police Review Director.

The Investigation

7. I notified the Toronto Police and the Board on December 14, 2023, of my intention to investigate the transparency and adequacy of the Toronto Police's communications about its Vulnerable Persons Registry ("**Registry**").
8. The Toronto Police describes the Registry as a voluntary database that provides officers with important information such as de-escalation strategies and communication methods that can assist them in their interactions with vulnerable persons. The Toronto Police defines a vulnerable person as "a person who by nature of an emotional, medical, psychological or other physical condition may exhibit patterns of behaviour that pose an increased risk of danger to themselves or others, who may require assistance from emergency

⁹ See City Council Item 2021. CC31.1 at <https://secure.toronto.ca/council/agenda-item.do?item=2021.CC31.1>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

¹⁰ A non-exhaustive list of examples of investigative issues that my office may wish to explore are found in Schedule A of the MOU.



services.”¹¹ References throughout this report to “vulnerable person” are in the context of this Toronto Police definition.

9. The Toronto Police’s main communications about the Registry are on its website. Its website contains some details about the Registry’s purpose but lacks any details about the registration process and the Toronto Police’s use of the personal information in the Registry. The current communication failure prompted me to launch this investigation.
10. My investigation focused on the clarity and meaningfulness of the Toronto Police’s communications to the public about:
 - The purpose of the Registry;
 - The Registry’s registration, verification, and engagement process; and
 - The Toronto Police’s use of the information in the Registry.
11. My investigation also reviewed the Toronto Police’s internal communications to assess staff knowledge about the Registry as they play an important role in communicating information to the public. Such a review could identify any communication failures, as internal and external messaging may differ.
12. The Toronto Police supported my office’s decision to launch an investigation into its communication about the Registry and acknowledged the Registry could benefit from my office’s review.
13. My investigation of the Registry was limited to the Toronto Police’s communications to the public. It did not include a review of the Registry’s functionality or operations, or the nature and scope of any future third-party Registry arrangement outside of this context.

¹¹ Definition obtained from Service Procedure 04-08, located at <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. The Toronto Police’s website provides examples of conditions a person may be experiencing and that a member of the public may consider registering if the “condition affects their cognitive ability, their behaviour could be perceived as violent, they may pose a danger to themselves or others or are likely to be reported missing.” Reference <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



14. As part of this investigation, Ombudsman Toronto Investigators conducted 28 interviews and reviewed over 100 documents provided by the Toronto Police. My office met with employees at different levels within the Toronto Police and the Board. Investigators also interviewed community groups and organizations that serve vulnerable persons and members of the public who had experience with or insights about the Registry. My office also reviewed information about the Registry available on the Toronto Police's website and social media accounts.
15. The Toronto Police and Board cooperated fully with my investigation.

Establishing the Registry



The Purpose of the Registry

16. The Toronto Police's Service Procedure 04-08 ("**Service Procedure**"),¹² outlines the responsibilities of various Toronto Police units and pillars. Additionally, it explains the purpose of the Registry, and the limits on the use of Registry information. The Service Procedure is available on the Toronto Police's website.
17. The Service Procedure explains that the Registry's goal is to provide officers quickly and effectively with "critical information" about vulnerable persons, to reduce the risk they overlook this information during an emergency response.¹³
18. The Toronto Police's website explains that information shared through the Registry can help officers understand the behaviours they may encounter and how best to de-escalate the situation.¹⁴ Toronto Police staff¹⁵ explained that the Registry also gives the public an opportunity to voluntarily create a "personalized de-escalation strategy" with the Toronto Police, thereby increasing the likelihood of a positive police interaction.

Creating the Registry

19. In 2012, the Toronto Police undertook a review of its entire online reporting software. During the course of this review, the Toronto Police noted that other police services in Ontario used their online reporting software to create a registry for vulnerable persons. This led the Toronto Police to consider creating its own Registry.

¹² The Records Management Services unit developed a Registry protocol for their unit that outlined how to enter and confirm Registry information.

¹³ Service Procedure, <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

¹⁴ According to the Toronto Police's website, the Registry "provides important information to first responders about the issues that vulnerable members of the community might be coping with." <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed June 5, 2024.

¹⁵ Throughout this report, I use the term "Toronto Police staff" to refer to a person or persons employed by the Toronto Police, including civilian and uniformed officers of varying ranks and positions.



20. The need for a Registry gained momentum following former Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci's 2014 review of the Toronto Police's encounters with people in crisis ("**2014 Report**"). It recommended creating a voluntary registry for vulnerable persons to support the Toronto Police's response in the event of a crisis.¹⁶ The Toronto Police continued to assess how the Registry could be integrated within its existing online reporting software.
21. In 2016, the Ontario government introduced a Regulation under the *Police Services Act* that prohibited carding.¹⁷ Toronto Police staff explained that police databases were heavily scrutinized, and that the public was skeptical about why the Toronto Police would maintain any kind of database that recorded personal information about the public. Toronto Police staff told us that they believed that the Registry would be "painted with the same brush."
22. Following the introduction of the new Regulation, the Toronto Police consulted with their legal team to ensure it did not violate it or the *Personal Health Information Protection Act*. It also began a Privacy Impact Assessment ("**PIA**") prior to the Registry's launch to review the impact the Registry may have on registrants' privacy and ensure it met legislative requirements.¹⁸ However, as of

¹⁶ The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, *Police Encounters with People in Crisis*, p 115. The Chief of Police committed to implementing all of the recommendations in the report, including creating a registry. The recommendation stated the following:

[T]he creation of a voluntary registry for vulnerable persons, complementing the protocol recommended in (a), which would provide permission to healthcare professionals to share healthcare information with the police, only to be accessed by emergency responders in the event of a crisis situation and subject to due consideration to privacy rights.

The 2014 Report defined crisis as "a member of the public whose behaviour brings them into contact with police either because of an apparent need for urgent care within the mental health system, or because they are otherwise experiencing a mental or emotional crisis involving behaviour that is sufficiently erratic, threatening or dangerous that the police are called in order to protect the person or those around them." https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/2b/db/2bdb73f0-d271-4d8b-8e68-f59a34816fb6/police_encounters_with_people_in_crisis_2014.pdf. Accessed May 30, 2024.

¹⁷ Solicitor General, *Ontario Prohibits Carding And Street Checks, Sets Out New Rules For Police Interactions* (March 22, 2016) <https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/36238/ontario-prohibits-carding-and-street-checks-sets-out-new-rules-for-police-interactions>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

¹⁸ Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, *Expectations: OPC's Guide to the Privacy Impact Assessment Process*, Section 4. https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/privacy-impact-assessments/gd_exp_202003/. Accessed May 30, 2024.



the date of this report, the PIA remains incomplete and Toronto Police staff were unsure about the reason.

23. The Toronto Police gathered feedback on establishing the Registry from approximately two dozen agencies, including MedicAlert, ChildFind Ontario, the Alzheimer Society of Canada, and Autism Ontario. The Toronto Police also consulted with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario about data collection and possible privacy concerns.
24. The Disabilities Community Consultative Committee (“**DCCC**”),¹⁹ one of the Toronto Police’s 13 Community Consultative Committees, did not provide much input into the creation and promotion of the Registry. Toronto Police staff shared that the DCCC is a large platform of “heavy hitters” such as the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health and Autism Speaks. Toronto Police staff said that the DCCC has “amazingly powerful organizations with great reach into the communities” in the City of Toronto, but it was not fully used in promoting the Registry. The DCCC’s feedback was limited to a review of the Registry application form.
25. Throughout this process, the Toronto Police did not publicize its intention to create a Registry or seek public input beyond engaging with the two dozen agencies.

Launching the Registry

26. The Toronto Police launched the Registry publicly on December 4, 2019, seven years after it initiated its review of its online reporting software. Toronto Police

¹⁹ The Toronto Police’s website explains that its Community Consultative Committees seek to represent specific communities throughout the City of Toronto and provide a voice on policing issues, such as the Registry. The DCCC provides input into the Toronto Police procedures, delivers training, and shares resources with both the Toronto Police and public.

The DCCC is comprised of eight agencies, such as the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, and three Toronto Police staff members. The DCCC is not a public committee. In particular, the meetings and minutes are not available to the public. The membership was selected by the Toronto Police. <https://www.tps.ca/organizational-chart/communities-neighbourhoods-command/field-services/community-partnerships-engagement-unit/consultative-committees/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



staff pointed to various reasons for the delay, including a lack of resources, technological issues, and the fact that the Registry was a small part of the Toronto Police's overall review of its online reporting software.

27. The Toronto Police's Corporate Communications unit prepared a communication plan for the launch of the Registry.²⁰ Its communications plan indicated a soft launch with ongoing public communications as the preferred strategy to promote the Registry. The Toronto Police was concerned about its capacity to process a large volume of Registry applications. The Toronto Police's communications plan for the launch of the Registry indicated that "it is of value for a slow buy-in to the registry as an immediate influx will leave a backlog of submissions." With that in mind, it opted for a soft launch. According to the Toronto Police, a soft launch would allow the Toronto Police to minimize the Registry's promotion and assess its capacity and address any staffing support concerns. However, Corporate Communication's involvement ended after the launch.
28. Toronto Police staff explained that the Registry launch had "the fundamentals of a pretty solid launch." Namely, there was a news release, media engagement, a page dedicated to the Registry on the Toronto Police's website, and an announcement on the Toronto Police's website and social media accounts. According to Toronto Police staff, the key difference between a full launch and this soft launch was that it was not tied to an event, such as a news conference. Rather, the Toronto Police intended to plan an event in early 2020 to promote the Registry within the community. However, this did not occur. Toronto Police staff explained that events unfolding in 2020, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, began to take priority.
29. During the launch, Toronto Police communications explained that the Registry is "geared towards people who have lost cognitive ability or may not be able to communicate with officers, especially in a time of crisis."²¹ Its communications during the launch also contained the following:

²⁰ The Toronto Police shared the Registry communications plan with my office. The communication plan included media Q&A, key messages, background considerations, and the list of spokespeople for the Registry launch.

²¹ Toronto Police. *Vulnerable Persons Registry Now Available*. December 4, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20220711173210/https://www.tps.ca/media-centre/stories/vulnerable-person-registry-now-available/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



- Case stories where the Registry could have added value;
 - Examples of the type of information that can be shared through the Registry and by whom;
 - Information letting the public know that Registry details can be updated at anytime; and
 - Examples of how Toronto Police's access to Registry information can result in positive outcomes.²²
30. Toronto Police staff shared that they sought to use neutral and transparent language with respect to the Registry. However, an organization that works with vulnerable youth shared with my office their concern that the language about the Registry on the Toronto Police's website focused more on how the public can help the Toronto Police, rather than highlighting how the Toronto Police will help vulnerable individuals. They shared that the language could be more collaborative in nature.
31. During the launch, the Toronto Police ran a social media campaign from December 4 to December 16.²³ (See **Picture 1: December 4, 2019, Twitter Post about the Registry**).²⁴

²² Toronto Police. *Vulnerable Persons Registry Now Available*. December 4, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20220711173210/https://www.tps.ca/media-centre/stories/vulnerable-person-registry-now-available/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

²³ According to the Toronto Police's communication plan, the Registry social media campaign would push users to tps.ca/services and the social media posts reach was: 17,316 Twitter, 21,081 Facebook, 16,092 Instagram, and 4,513 Instagram Story.

²⁴ Toronto Police Tweet. December 4, 2019. <https://x.com/TorontoPolice/status/1202228392566890496>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



Picture 1:



32. The Toronto Police could not provide my office with social media posts or public news releases after 2019. Toronto Police staff told us that they believe the Registry does not require social media posts on an ongoing basis. Rather, Toronto Police staff shared that targeted marketing and promotion within communities would better suit the Registry. They told us that they believed that this approach would effectively promote the Registry to community groups and agencies that are interested in it. However, Toronto Police staff confirmed this did not happen.
33. For the launch, Corporate Communications also prepared a page about the Registry on the Toronto Police's website. On it, the Toronto Police included a number of Frequently Asked Questions ("**FAQs**") that address questions such as what information is included in the Registry, how long the Toronto Police retains the information, and how to remove it. The Toronto Police has not updated or changed the FAQs since the launch in 2019.



34. Toronto Police staff told us that they believe the Registry soft launch promotion was a success as media outlets responded positively and every major media outlet discussed it at that time.
35. Toronto Police staff said that there were no additional communications or promotional campaigns for the Registry after the launch. They said that a lot of the Toronto Police's communications are "one and done" as in this case. However, other Toronto Police staff told us the public communications should have been long-term, ongoing, and consistently included in all standard Toronto Police communications because "awareness is a very important piece" for the Registry.
36. Some Toronto Police staff believe that Corporate Communications, the Community Partnership and Engagement Unit ("**CPEU**"),²⁵ as well as the DCCC, should engage with the public to learn more about gaps in the Toronto Police's existing communications about its Registry. They told us that the Toronto Police should do a pulse check on the Registry to understand its successes and challenges, as well as any misconceptions the public may have about the Registry. These Toronto Police staff explained that the Toronto Police cannot improve the Registry without reviewing where it stands five years later.

Internal Communications and Promotions

37. The Toronto Police issued various internal communications to promote the launch of the Registry, including:
 - An article on the Toronto Police's main Intranet page;
 - Routine Orders from the Office of the Chief of Police to all Toronto Police staff;²⁶ and


²⁵ The Toronto Police's website explains that CPEU "is committed to providing an effective, efficient and economical support service to Service members in the practical application of Community Mobilization principles, as well as developing, enhancing and maintaining constructive community partnerships. CPEU continues to include a number of community mobilization functions that support the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) Mobilization & Engagement Model of Community Policing adopted by the Toronto Police Service."

²⁶ Routine Orders are mandated readings. To date, four Routine Orders were issued since 2019 about the Registry.



- A promotional brochure for divisional staff to share with the public.
(See **Picture 2: promotional brochure distributed to divisional staff in 2019 that remains unchanged to-date.**)

Picture 2:



38. The Toronto Police's internal communications generally explained that the Registry is a database that provides first responders with information about a vulnerable person, and that the information will be vetted at the divisional level before dispatchers, police officers, and support personnel can access it. In



addition to providing details about the Registry, these internal communications also encouraged Toronto Police staff to share information about the Registry with members of the public. The communications also identified the Vulnerable Person Coordinator as a point of contact for the Registry.

39. Toronto Police staff shared that they had not seen any internal communications about the Registry since the launch, and that some officers did not know that information about the Registry was available.
40. Toronto Police staff told my office that they believe it would be beneficial for the Toronto Police to share an email update to all staff about the Registry. Toronto Police staff told us that the email would share information and build awareness about the Registry.
41. Board staff shared that they learned about the Registry through the Toronto Police's general reporting to the Board about ongoing initiatives, including the implementation status of the 2014 Report recommendations. The Toronto Police did not independently report to the Board about the launch or ongoing use of the Registry.²⁷ The Toronto Police stated in an internal email that Board policy does not require the Toronto Police to report anything about the Registry.
42. Board staff told us that they believed that the Board could help promote the Registry by making community members aware through its website, Board reports, and through its Mental Health and Addictions Advisory Panel.²⁸
43. Toronto Police staff echoed similar sentiments, believing that regular reporting to the Board about the Registry would have held the Toronto Police accountable for the ongoing promotion, improvement, and communication about the

²⁷ There were no independent reports solely about the Registry. During the May 2019 Board meeting, the Toronto Police shared that the Registry launch would be delayed as governance and training needed to be completed. However, this information was contained as part of an overall update on The Way Forward Action Plan. <https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/613-may-30>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

²⁸ This is a Board panel. The Panel consists of members of the Board, members of the Toronto Police, and members from the community. The Panel discusses how it can ensure that community resources are available to the Toronto Police divisions and how to ensure that officers are calling those resources when necessary. Board staff and Toronto Police staff were unaware of any discussion about the Registry at the Mental Health and Addictions Advisory Panel.



Registry. Toronto Police staff said that instead, the creation of the Registry felt more like the Toronto Police had “checked a box.”

Registry-Related Training

44. The Service Procedure requires that the Toronto Police College (“**College**”) develop and provide Registry-related training. Toronto Police staff are expected to complete this training.²⁹
45. College staff shared that, while the College initially provided Registry training as part of the mandatory annual in-service training, it stopped after two years. College staff shared that the Registry is currently mentioned in other optional mental health training, but there is no longer any mandatory Registry training provided by the College at this time. Toronto Police staff speculated that new officers would have to learn about the Registry through interactions in the field.³⁰
46. There is also limited training about the Registry within the Toronto Police's units and pillars. For example, the Records Management Services (“**Records**”) unit provides one-on-one training for select staff that are responsible for Registry entries. In contrast, the Communications Services unit, which handles emergency and non-emergency calls and dispatch, did not have in-depth training as it was their “understanding that [the Registry] has been decommissioned for quite some time.”

The Future of the Registry

47. Approximately three years ago, the Toronto Police decided not to invest any further resources into the Registry. Senior Toronto Police staff explained that this decision was made because the Registry is not frequently used.³¹ Senior staff

²⁹ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

³⁰ Examples shared with us of officers learning about the Registry “in the field” include: when the Registry banner appears on their system when responding to a call for service; if officers are entering a general report and see the Registry option exists as a type of report to be entered.

³¹ There are currently 305 registrants. The Toronto Police shared this number with my office which is current as of as of March 27, 2024.



also acknowledged there are issues with how the information flows from the Registry to officers.

48. During the DCCC's town hall in January 2024, the Toronto Police's Chief Information Officer shared that the Toronto Police is looking to enter into an arrangement with a third-party. The arrangement would result in the third-party owning and managing the Registry. However, the specifics of this arrangement are still being explored.
49. The Toronto Police believes that while the idea of the Registry has merit, the Toronto Police owning and running it does not. Toronto Police staff said that the best place for the Registry to live is not in a "resource strapped emergency service," but in a place that could attend to the needs as the Registry deserves.
50. Toronto Police staff acknowledged that they did not continue to promote and market the Registry as they were unsure about its future. They explained their hesitancy to promote the Registry was because they did not want to release information about the Registry if it was no longer going to be a Toronto Police "product" in the near future.
51. The Toronto Police continues to explore the nature and extent of a possible third-party arrangement. It has not consulted the public nor asked for input about the arrangement, except for mentioning it at the DCCC's town hall in January 2024. Additionally, there are currently no public communications about the Toronto Police's decision to stop investing in the Registry.

Analysis and Findings

52. I recognize the efforts and intention behind the Toronto Police's endeavour to create the Registry with the public's interest in mind. It sought to provide a way for people to create a personalized de-escalation strategy with the Toronto Police that could assist officers in their interactions with vulnerable persons.
53. The Toronto Police created a voluntary Registry to gather and store information about vulnerable persons during a time of what it said was heightened public distrust and skepticism toward police data collection with limited public input. While I appreciate the difficulty of launching the Registry in light of the public's response to carding, this actually highlighted the need for greater public input into the creation of the Registry. Greater public involvement could have helped the Toronto Police address the community's lack of trust and skepticism.



54. I believe that the Toronto Police's public engagement efforts should have been more extensive. Although the Toronto Police received input from two dozen agencies, they did not gather feedback from the public generally.
55. The Toronto Police should have publicized its intention to create the Registry and should have asked for public input and feedback. My office heard from an organization that works with vulnerable youth that the language used on the Toronto Police's website lacked details about how the Toronto Police would help vulnerable persons. I believe that if the Toronto Police had sought public input, then concerns such as the website's language could have been raised and addressed prior to the Registry's launch.
56. In addition to the lack of public engagement, the Toronto Police did not use one of its greatest resources to its fullest potential: the DCCC. The DCCC is an excellent tool for the Toronto Police and could have provided invaluable insights due to its broad reach in communities in the City of Toronto. Additionally, the DCCC could have promoted the Registry on an ongoing basis within its communities and networks thereby increasing the chance that more people would learn about the Registry.
57. The Toronto Police prepared a communication plan to promote the launch of the Registry. However, its execution was incomplete, and the communications lacked continuity. Specifically, the launch did not follow through on the targeted marketing it had planned for 2020, and the Registry communications were "one and done" instead of following a "continued maintenance" strategy. An important aspect of raising awareness about the Registry is ongoing communications within communities that work with vulnerable persons. The Toronto Police should have followed through on these intentions.
58. The purpose of the Registry was communicated to the public at the time of the launch. The Toronto Police's news release and news story provided context about the purpose and goal of the Registry, including cases and examples of how the Registry could result in positive police interaction. However, these details were released five years ago and are no longer accessible on the Toronto Police's website.
59. While I recognize that the Toronto Police does provide some details about the Registry's purpose on its website, more information is needed. For example, the Toronto Police should share all communications issued during the launch and the details shared with my office, such as the Registry serving as a personalized de-escalation strategy on its website page. These details would add meaning to the communications, explain the Registry's purpose better, and help the public decide if they wish to use this resource. Addressing this communication failure should be a priority for the Toronto Police.



60. The Toronto Police should have also availed itself of the Board's resources to communicate and promote the Registry. Although the Toronto Police did mention the Registry to the Board, it did not send a specific report to the Board about the Registry's launch or establishment. As a result, details about the Registry were lost in other communications and updates.
61. Further, Toronto Police staff only received training about the Registry during the first two years after its launch. Despite the fact that the Toronto Police requires staff to be trained on the Registry, as outlined in its Service Procedure, it does not appear that Toronto Police staff currently receive any such training. Without training, it is unclear how new Toronto Police staff are meant to learn about the Registry or understand how to apply the information to their job. It is unreasonable to expect new Toronto Police staff to know about a Registry that they have not learned about, let alone promote it. I believe that Toronto Police staff, especially Communication Services and divisional staff, require training related to the Registry.
62. In addition to its lack of training for Toronto Police staff, it also appears that the Toronto Police lacked ongoing internal communications about the Registry, which in turn limited staff's awareness of it. As some Toronto Police staff suggested during my investigation, an update to all staff, such as an email update, should be shared in order to build awareness about the Registry. These steps will ensure that all Toronto Police staff are aware of the Registry, understand it, and use it consistently and appropriately.
63. As it currently stands, it appears that a third-party will eventually own and manage the Registry. However, the Toronto Police has not shared this decision with the public. I believe that the Toronto Police should disclose its intentions regarding the existing Registry and notify the public about the arrangement once its nature and scope are confirmed.
64. While I understand that the Toronto Police is actively looking for a third-party to own and manage the Registry, it continues to offer the Registry as a resource to the public. Therefore, the Toronto Police has an obligation to ensure that its communications about the Registry are accurate and up to date.
65. I believe the Toronto Police currently has two options. It can stop accepting Registry applications if it does not intend to continue training staff and communicating about the Registry. Or, if it continues to accept applications, it needs to start training its staff again and communicate about the Registry. The Toronto Police cannot justify a lack of communication about the Registry because of uncertainty about when a third-party may own and manage it. As long as the Registry continues to be available, the Toronto Police has a duty to the public to communicate about it meaningfully, accurately, and clearly. Clear



communications will allow the public to make informed decisions about whether to submit their information to the Registry for the Toronto Police's use.

Recommendations

66. My office has identified several concerns with the Toronto Police's current communications about the Registry. The following three recommendations and the remaining 10 throughout this report address the most immediate concerns, as the Toronto Police is actively considering transitioning management and ownership of the Registry to a third-party. The 13 recommendations in this report are intended to both address the issues identified during this investigation and inform future communications under any third-party arrangement.

Recommendation 1

Once the third-party arrangement is finalized, the Toronto Police should update its internal and external communication to explain the nature and scope of the arrangement. The communications should include details such as the impact of the arrangement on existing registrants and the difference between the current and new Registry.

Recommendation 2

The Toronto Police should make meaningful details about the Registry's goal and purpose available and accessible on its website.

Recommendation 3

The Toronto Police should train staff about their respective roles and responsibilities regarding the Registry and provide an update to all staff to increase awareness and understanding of the Registry.

The Registration Process



Registry Eligibility

67. Toronto Police staff said that they often receive questions about who is eligible to apply for the Registry and about how the Toronto Police defines a “vulnerable” individual. Toronto Police staff shared that there is no threshold, eligibility criteria, or limits on who can register. However, the Service Procedure defines a vulnerable person as:

[A] person who by nature of an emotional, medical, psychological or other physical condition may exhibit patterns of behaviour that pose an increased risk of danger to themselves or others, who may require assistance from emergency services.³²

Application Submission Process

68. Toronto Police staff explained that individuals learn about the registration process as they go through it. There are no public details, videos, or tutorials outlining this process. The Toronto Police does not provide any information about the registration process in its FAQ about the Registry.³³
69. Registry applications can be submitted online or in paper form to a division.³⁴ The application may be submitted by either the vulnerable person, their parent or guardian, or a person with Power of Attorney or similar authority over the individual (collectively referred to herein as “**registrant**”).

³² Definition obtained from Service Procedure <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. The Toronto Police’s website provides examples of conditions a person may be experiencing and that a member of the public may consider registering if the “condition affects their cognitive ability, their behaviour could be perceived as violent, they may pose a danger to themselves or others or are likely to be reported missing.” <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

³³ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

³⁴ To date, the Toronto Police primarily receives applications online. At least one divisional staff member confirmed that they redirect people to the online application.



70. Both the paper and online applications contain mandatory and optional information fields. Mandatory details include name, date of birth, gender, and address, while optional details include diagnosis, methods of communication, methods or approaches to avoid, and medication. However, there are no details on the Toronto Police’s website about what information is mandatory. Rather, applicants learn what information is mandatory once they begin the registration process.³⁵
71. The Toronto Police sends an automated email to the registrant once they submit their application. The email confirms the registrant’s submission and outlines the next steps in the registration process, including the approval of the application as well as a request for the registrant to confirm that they have the authority to submit the Registry information. The email also explains that the Registry information will not be available to officers until this confirmation is made.³⁶ There are no other details in the email or on the Toronto Police’s website about the approval requirements.³⁷
72. The Toronto Police’s Primary Report Intake Management and Entry unit (“**PRIME**”) will review and approve the submitted applications.³⁸ PRIME staff will exercise their discretion to approve applications based on what they believe to be the “totality of information” required to understand the vulnerable person’s needs. PRIME staff do not receive training or guidance on what information is needed in a Registry application.
73. Once PRIME staff approve the application, the Records unit will enter the information into the Toronto Police’s general system, called Versadex, for verification. The information now exists as a “general occurrence,” which is an incident report that is used to log any Toronto Police involvement.³⁹ The general

³⁵ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

³⁶ The Toronto Police shared a sample of the automated email with my office.

³⁷ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

³⁸ PRIME provides members of the public with telephone and online responses to non-emergency calls for service. <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

³⁹ If PRIME staff believe the application is incomplete, they will reject it and email the registrant with details about what information is missing. Registrants are invited to resubmit the application with the information.



occurrence is marked as unverified and is sent to the local police division to be verified.⁴⁰

74. At this stage, a second automated email is sent to the registrant. The email provides a reference number and explains that their application was approved. The email also includes the process required to add, change, or modify their information. However, the email does not provide any details about the verification process. After this email, the Toronto Police does not send any further updates or notifications to registrants.⁴¹

Verification Process

75. According to the Service Procedure, the verification process is handled at the divisional level by a Vulnerable Person Liaison Officer (“**Liaison Officer**”). The Liaison Officer is responsible for overseeing the verification process for the Registry at the local division.
76. The verification process involves the registrant meeting with a Liaison Officer in-person and providing supporting documents, such as a Power of Attorney or birth certificate, to establish their authority to register the vulnerable person.⁴²
77. There are no details on the Toronto Police’s website about the verification process. An organization that works with vulnerable youth told us that they were unsure about the process because no information was available.
78. Registrants learn about the verification process in the first email they receive after submitting their application to the Registry. The email explains that the registrant needs to confirm their authority to submit the information. The email also indicates that documents such as a birth certificate and Power of Attorney

⁴⁰ The general occurrence is sent to the registrant’s local police division based on the address listed in the Registry application.

⁴¹ The Toronto Police confirmed that they could only source these two notifications.

⁴² Reference <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



will be required, and that failing to verify this authority will result in the application information being deleted.⁴³

79. The Service Procedure requires that the registrant and Liaison Officer complete the verification process within seven days. That is, the registrant must submit their supporting documents and a Liaison Officer must review them within seven days.⁴⁴
80. Once the Liaison Officer completes the verification process, the general occurrence is marked as verified and flagged to the Records unit. If the Liaison Officer cannot complete the verification process, the general occurrence will remain unverified. In this case, the unverified general occurrence should be removed from the Toronto Police's system.⁴⁵
81. Toronto Police staff shared concerns about the lack of guidance on the verification process, as well as their belief that training would be beneficial. For example, while the Service Procedure states that a person has the required authority to register a vulnerable person if they are a parent, legal guardian, or Power of Attorney or similar authority, there is no explanation or guidance on what constitutes a "similar authority."
82. Additionally, supporting documents that may establish the requisite authority include a birth certificate, family court documents, a Power of Attorney, or similar documents.⁴⁶ However, there is no explanation in the Service Procedure or on the Toronto Police's website about what "similar documents" might include.
83. Toronto Police staff explained that these undefined terms have resulted in inconsistency in how divisions handle the verification process. An organization that serves vulnerable communities also told my office that they have

⁴³ The Toronto Police shared a sample of the automated email with my office.

⁴⁴ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

⁴⁵ The removal requirement came from the direction of the Privacy Commissioner as it said the Toronto Police should not store information if they could not confirm it.

⁴⁶ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



experienced variations across divisions with respect to the accepted “authority” to register a vulnerable person.⁴⁷

84. The seven-day timeline was arbitrarily chosen to ensure that unverified information did not remain available on the Toronto Police’s system for extended time periods. However, divisional staff said that scheduling conflicts and workloads make the seven-day turnaround time to complete the verification process unrealistic. They explained that it generally takes 30 days to review and confirm the documentation.
85. The Service Procedure states that a Liaison Officer will meet with the registrant in-person to verify their documents. However, the initial email notification sent to registrants indicates that the in-person meeting will be required in some cases, at the officer’s discretion.⁴⁸
86. Toronto Police staff shared that they asked internally for the registration process, such as the verification timeline, to be changed to reflect the current practice. A March 30, 2021, Routine Order⁴⁹ indicated that the Toronto Police amended the Service Procedure in consultation with the CPEU to reflect the current practice, such as scanning and attaching notes.⁵⁰ However, there was no change to the seven-day turnaround time, and no definitions for terms such as “similar authority” or general guidance on the verification process.⁵¹
87. Currently, no one in the Toronto Police is monitoring or reviewing the Registry or serving as the single point of contact for internal inquiries. Toronto Police staff note that this has been frustrating. There is also no point of contact for the public listed on the Toronto Police’s website.

⁴⁷ The organization shared that the legal authority requirements pose as an obstacle for their clients to access the Registry as it can be costly to obtain legal documents such as Power of Attorney. As a result, they have not referred clients to the Registry.

⁴⁸ The Toronto Police shared a sample of the automated email with my office.

⁴⁹ Routine orders are mandated readings.

⁵⁰ Changes to the Service Procedure also included replacing “Vulnerable Person Registry” with the acronym “VPR”, stylistic formatting, and removing the address for where the PRIME unit is located.

⁵¹ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



88. Toronto Police staff confirmed that some divisions were unaware that a Liaison Officer was assigned to their division, while others had no idea the role existed. My investigation confirmed the same. Specifically, at least one Toronto Police staff member confirmed that they had contacted four divisions to speak to a Liaison Officer, but no one knew what they were referring to. Furthermore, when my office was scheduling interviews using the list of Liaison Officers provided by the Toronto Police, my office confirmed that at least three divisions did not have or know about this role.
89. There was also a mistaken belief about who exactly the Liaison Officers are. Some staff believed that the divisional Liaison Officers and the CPEU Vulnerable Person Coordinator roles were the same. However, while the CPEU's Vulnerable Person Coordinator is sometimes referred to as the Vulnerable Person Liaison Officer, this role has different responsibilities. Additionally, at least one division believed that divisional Toronto Police staff played no role in verifying Registry information.

Information Input Process

90. After the verification process is complete, a Liaison Officer will flag the verified general occurrence to the Records unit, which will input the information into the Toronto Police's Computer-Aided Dispatch system ("**CAD**").⁵²
91. The information in the CAD is then linked to the vulnerable person's address and will be accessed only if there is a call for service to that address. (See **Picture 3: Sample Registry Entry into CAD**).

⁵² Reference <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



Picture 3:

The screenshot shows a 'Special Situations' form with the following fields and sections:

- Location:** Address Range (Street #, Prefix, Street Name, Type, Suffix Apt, Bldg, Area, Municipality, City), Use Range, Range (Low, High), Coordinates (North, West), Polygon Name, Polygon ID(s).
- Special Situations Records:** Situation Type, Priority, Message Type, Renewal (Record Summary), Message, Delete Record button.
- Record Type:** PREMISE, Priority, Phone, ESC, Office, Date (2013/11/11), Hr (09), Min (04), Manual #, Verify Location/ Renewal Records.
- Inst. Type:** Categories, Premise Name.
- Disp. Inst.:** OTHER.
- Details:** NPR SUBJECT KNOWING/UNKNOWING CONDITION - SCHIZOPHRENIC. METHOD OF COMMUNICATION - NON-VERBAL, SIGN LANGUAGE. METHOD OF APPROACH - QUIET TONE, CALM DEMEANOR. AVOID LOUD OR SUDDEN NOISES.
- Occupant / Suspect / Victim (Left):** Type (OCCUPANT), Age, DOB, Name (ONE, VULNERABLE), Description (M, WHT), Categories (M, ILL), Info Source (DIR), How Attacked, Injury, V.S. Notified, Disposition, Weapon, MTPB, Comments (VPR SUBJECT).
- Occupant / Suspect / Victim (Right):** Type (OCCUPANT), Age, DOB, Name (ONE, COMPANION), Description, Categories, Info Source (DIR), How Attacked, Injury, V.S. Notified, Disposition, Weapon, MTPB, Comments (FATHER OF VPR).
- Record Expiration:** Record Expires Date (2021/11/12), Time (10:28:09), Entered By, Date.
- Access:** No Restrictions (checked), Restricted to Agencies (TFS).
- Info Source:** 003, Unit (041), Return on Area Search (unchecked), Return as LCI (checked).
- Buttons:** Insert Record, Update Record.

92. Generally, Records staff will not add details beyond what is in the general occurrence. The only exception is when information regarding the method of communication, approach, or what to avoid is not provided by the registrant. The Records unit determined that these details should not be blank as it did not “look right.” In these cases, Records staff will add generic wording such as



“calm” and “relaxed” for methods of communication.⁵³ Records staff shared that they do not enter specific details or diagnosis information.

93. Once the information is entered into the CAD, Records staff will also add an entry into the Record unit’s SharePoint log, which is their internal record, to track the CAD entry.
94. In response to my investigation, Toronto Police staff reviewed the Registry applications data and noted concerning numbers. Specifically, Toronto Police staff told us that there are 136 general occurrences marked as verified that were not added to the CAD because divisional staff did not flag the general occurrences to the Records unit.⁵⁴ Toronto Police staff said that this is “very concerning,” as the registrant likely believes that their information will be available to officers. However, it is not.
95. Toronto Police staff noted that these numbers represent a liability issue. Records staff suggested internally that they enter these verified entries into the CAD even though they did not learn about these general occurrences until my investigation. However, they were concerned that it would not correct the underlying issue. Namely, that divisional Toronto Police staff are not consistently flagging the verified general occurrences to the Records unit.
96. In addition, there are 232 Registry general occurrences marked as unverified that still exist in the Toronto Police’s system.⁵⁵ According to the Service Procedure and Toronto Police staff, these general occurrences should not continue to exist and be accessible in the Toronto Police’s system beyond the seven-day period. However, that is not the case.

⁵³ The procedure provides examples of generic words that can be entered. For example, for methods of communication, the terms “calm” and “relaxed” are listed and for method of approach the terms “calm” and “non-aggressive” are listed.

⁵⁴ The Toronto Police shared this number with my office. It is current as of as January 18, 2024.

⁵⁵ As above.



Understanding the Low Registration Numbers

97. There are currently 305 registrants on the Registry.⁵⁶ Toronto Police staff acknowledged that the number of registrants is low. This is accentuated by the fact that there are 3,025,647 people in the City of Toronto.⁵⁷
98. Low registration has been an ongoing issue for the Toronto Police. In December 2020, one year after the Registry's launch, CPEU conducted a review of the Registry to better understand the low registration numbers. CPEU concluded that the low registration could be due to the following:
- A lack of public trust in sharing this type of information with the Toronto Police;
 - An unclear registration process that may deter people from registering; and
 - A lack of promotion and marketing of the Registry.
99. Senior Toronto Police staff told us that the Toronto Police continues to work on building public trust and repairing relationships within their communities.
100. The Toronto Police told us that it took steps to resolve some of the issues with the registration process, such as changing the term "incident" in the Registry application to "first name" when referring to the registrant and vulnerable person. However, Toronto Police staff explained that they were unable to resolve all the

⁵⁶ The Toronto Police shared this number with my office. It is current as of as of March 27, 2024.

⁵⁷ City of Toronto, *Toronto at a Glance* (2023) <https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/data-research-maps/toronto-at-a-glance/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



issues because of limitations with their online reporting software.⁵⁸ They acknowledged that a lack of promotion and marketing also remain an issue for the Registry.

101. A non-profit organization that works with vulnerable persons and the police shared that they were unaware of the Registry until my office launched this investigation. The DCCC said that the public's lack of awareness could be due to "a failure in communication."
102. Toronto Police staff believe the Registry needs a point of contact to allow staff and the public to get consistent responses to questions and to promote the Registry.
103. The Service Procedure indicates that the Vulnerable Person Coordinator at CPEU is responsible for managing the Registry, including engagement and outreach. However, according to CPEU staff, the Vulnerable Person Coordinator is not responsible for managing the Registry and is not the point of contact for public inquiries, engagement, or outreach. CPEU staff said this point is understood within the Toronto Police, but many Toronto Police staff that my office spoke with pointed to CPEU as the lead, owner, and point of contact of the Registry.
104. Additionally, the Service Procedure indicates that one of the Liaison Officers' responsibilities include promoting the Registry to the community. These promotions include informing local organizations of the existence of the Registry. However, as noted above, a Liaison Officer is not assigned to every division.

⁵⁸ The Toronto Police met with an advocate that had experience and knowledge about databases such as the Toronto Police's Registry. The person shared that the term "incident" was offensive as it was referring to the name of the vulnerable person. DCCC members also noted that there was tone deafness in the Registry application language as "incident" made persons feel like an object. The Toronto Police incorporated the feedback and made some changes to the Registry application such as changing "incident" when referring to the vulnerable person themselves. The Toronto Police explained that they were unable to make many changes to the online application because of technological limitations with the online reporting software.



Analysis and Findings

105. The Toronto Police's registration process was well intended. However, it lacks transparent and meaningful communications, both internally and externally.
106. Internally, Toronto Police staff expressed concerns about the lack of clarity in the verification process. In particular, it was unclear what authority and supporting documents were required to satisfy the criteria for "similar authority." There are no guides, training, procedures, or communications available to provide clarity or definitions to staff during the verification process.
107. Additionally, current practices do not align with the Service Procedure. For example, the seven-day verification timeline is not followed. The absence of a Liaison Officer at every division is also concerning, especially since the Service Procedure requires the Liaison Officers to verify Registry applications. Toronto Police staff have asked for the Service Procedure to be updated to reflect the actual practice, such as the verification timeline. However, this has not occurred.
108. Externally, except for the Service Procedure, there is no meaningful information online about the registration process. While the Toronto Police's website outlines the information that will be included in the Registry, it lacks videos, tutorials, or details about the registration process. As a result, individuals must learn about the process as they proceed with registration.
109. The Toronto Police's website explains who can provide information for the Registry. However, there are no details about who can be registered. Toronto Police staff shared that there is no threshold or eligibility criteria to register an individual, yet there is no way for the public to know this. There is a communication gap here.
110. Additionally, it is unclear what information is needed and important for the Registry application. Toronto Police staff shared that PRIME may exercise their discretion, without any guidance or training, to determine if a Registry application provides them with sufficient information to understand the needs of the vulnerable person. However, there is no information available to the public about the specifics required to provide a full picture of the vulnerable person's needs. Instead, it appears that certain de-escalation details, which are at the core of what the Registry seeks to provide, are treated as optional on the Registry application. The Records unit will use generic terms where the applicant does not provide these de-escalation details.
111. It is unreasonable to expect registrants to understand the purpose of the requested details when they have no information about the registration process,



what is needed, and why. As a result, individuals may only provide the mandatory information, which does not lead to the development of a personalized de-escalation strategy. However, the impact of only providing mandatory information is not highlighted in any of the Toronto Police's communications. As a result, registrants remain unaware of the consequences of not sharing optional details. I believe that it is crucial to address this inconsistency.

112. The Toronto Police's website lacks an explanation of the verification process, which requires applicants to confirm that they have the authority to share information with the Toronto Police. Registrants only learn about this process through the first automatic email, which notifies them that their application has been received. However, the details in this email do not clearly explain what authority or documents would be sufficient to satisfy the verification process. Additionally, the email implies that an in-person verification requirement may not be mandatory, which is inconsistent with the Service Procedure.
113. The Toronto Police does not notify registrants once the Registry information is input into the CAD. I learned that at least 136 Registry applications were not input into the CAD. These registrants voluntarily shared information with the Toronto Police, successfully completed the registration process, but due to the Toronto Police's error, their information is not being used as intended. I believe that notifications should not end at the Registry application approval process. Instead, registrants should be told when information is verified and added to the CAD. Such notifications will hold the Toronto Police accountable and ensure that registrants understand when the Registry information actually becomes available to officers.
114. The Registry's low registration is not surprising. I believe there is one common underlying issue for the low registration numbers: a failure for someone or a unit within the service to take responsibility for the Registry. This lack of accountability has created gaps in the Toronto Police's communication and promotion about the Registry. During this investigation, I learned that CPEU is responsible for managing the Registry, but CPEU has denied this. The Toronto Police told my office that Liaison Officers are responsible for promoting the Registry. However, a Liaison Officer is not assigned to each division. As a result, no one is promoting the Registry on an ongoing basis. Additionally, there is no one reviewing how communications can be improved, ensuring Toronto Police staff are fulfilling their roles, or providing a central place where the public and Toronto Police staff can get consistent answers to Registry-related questions.
115. The absence of clear ownership for the Registry makes it difficult for the public to know whom to contact. This problem is compounded by the fact that the term "Liaison Officer" refers to roles at both the divisional level and the CPEU, which



is confusing. Additionally, there is no information available on how to contact the Toronto Police with Registry-related questions.

116. Finally, as I noted earlier, the recent decision to transfer ownership and management of the Registry does not absolve the Toronto Police of its obligation to ensure that its practice, process, and communications are updated, accurate and clear.

Recommendations

Recommendation 4

The Toronto Police should clearly define and publicize all the steps and requirements in registration process for the Registry. A clearly defined process would ensure that the public understands what information is mandatory before registering, what information is required to create a personalized de-escalation strategy, who can register, and which supporting documents and authority are acceptable.

Recommendation 5

The Toronto Police should ensure that the Service Procedure and Registry practice are aligned.

Recommendation 6

The Toronto Police should update the Registry page on its website to inform the public about the generic terms that will be used to fill gaps in the Registry application, and when that will be done.

Recommendation 7

The Toronto Police should notify registrants when the Registry information is added to the Registry system and becomes available to officers.



Recommendation 8

The Toronto Police should assign a point of contact to respond to Registry-related questions received from Toronto Police staff members and the public. The information for the Registry contact should be made available on the Toronto Police's website and the Registry application.

Accessing and Using Registry Information



Storing Information

117. The Toronto Police advertise the Registry is advertised as a database. However, Toronto Police told us that it is not a separate database. Rather, the Registry information exists in four different Toronto Police systems.
118. The first system where Registry information exists is the Toronto Police's central record management system, Versadex. Versadex is the system that contains all the Toronto Police's general occurrences, including ones for the Registry, homicide, theft, and assault incidents. Toronto Police staff shared that Registry general occurrences do not reside in a separate database.
119. The second system, the CAD, is used by dispatch staff. The CAD contains the Registry information entered by the Records unit. However, similar to Versadex, the CAD contains information beyond just the Registry.
120. The third system is the Records unit's SharePoint log. SharePoint is only accessible by the Records unit and is used to track every entry their staff makes into the CAD.⁵⁹ SharePoint only contains information about the vulnerable person's name, date of birth, and address. There are no details about the vulnerable person's medical condition or de-escalation strategies.
121. The fourth system, used by at least one division, is the Push Pin Bulletin ("**Bulletin**"). The Bulletin is a secure network accessible by officers within that division. The division added verified Registry information to its Bulletin as there is no ability to search a database for Registry information. The division only adds Registry information for vulnerable persons that live within their division. This enables officers to search the Bulletin in instances when individuals have wandered off or gone missing, facilitating potential identification through the Registry.
122. Finally, while not a separate system per se, at least one division shared that they also keep a spreadsheet to track every Registry general occurrence they are assigned to verify, even if the general occurrence is ultimately deleted. The

⁵⁹ SharePoint is also the central database for the Records unit for operational procedures, policies, and training information. Toronto Police staff said that SharePoint is their "checks and balances" to confirm receipt of the Registry application and entry into the CAD.



spreadsheet contains information about the person's name, contact details, and whether the general occurrence was marked as verified, unverified, or deleted. The spreadsheet is saved on their personal Toronto Police drive for record keeping purposes.

123. Public information regarding the storage of Registry information can be found in the Registry application's privacy policy.⁶⁰ The policy states that the information is stored in the Toronto Police's records management software. No communications exist to explain that the Registry is not stored in a single database.⁶¹
124. Toronto Police staff said that a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) would have reviewed the Registry for legislative compliance, a communication plan, and identified the owner of the Registry. However, as discussed earlier, the Toronto Police has yet to complete the PIA as of the date of this report. Toronto Police staff explained that a PIA would have also identified all the Toronto Police's systems where Registry information exists and would have reviewed issues such as data retention, safeguards, collection, and use. Toronto Police staff explained that a PIA should have been completed and can be done retroactively. They said it was unusual that one was never finalized.
125. Finally, although the Toronto Police is exploring having a third-party own and manage the Registry, it appears that Registry information may still get stored in the Toronto Police's system. For example, an officer would make notations about the information used to assist in responding to a call, including any information shared from a third-party. These notations will be entered and stored on Versadex. This is a police practice. As such, some Registry information may be entered into the Toronto Police's system even if a third-party owns and manages the Registry.

⁶⁰ The privacy policy can be viewed by registrants and must be agreed to before submitting a Registry application.

⁶¹ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



Accessing Information

126. Registry information is generally first accessed by dispatchers when there is a call for service to a vulnerable person's address. The Registry information will first appear on the CAD and dispatch staff will be alerted that there is a vulnerable person at the address.
127. Responding officers are also notified that the vulnerable person is on the Registry when there is a call for service. Officers are then prompted by dispatch and a hyperlink on their mobile data terminal⁶² to review the Registry information on Versadex.
128. Toronto Police staff shared concerns about how the information is usually accessed. They explained that the call for service has to be at the address provided in the Registry in order for the information to be accessible during an emergency call. This is because the Registry information is tied to a location in the CAD, and not to the vulnerable person. If the vulnerable person wanders or if the call for service is not to the address listed in the CAD, dispatchers would not be alerted to the Registry information and officers would not know this person is on the Registry.
129. Toronto Police staff believe that Registry communications should explain that Registry information is not connected to the vulnerable person. Instead, the Registry information is connected only to the person's address listed in the Registry application. However, there is no information available about this limitation.⁶³
130. The Registry information on Versadex is available and can be accessed by all Toronto Police staff. However, Toronto Police staff said that officers should only be accessing the Registry information on Versadex when responding to a call for service.

⁶² These data terminals are commonly found in police patrol cars.

⁶³ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



Using Information

131. The Registry information is only to be used for locating or interacting with a vulnerable person. The Registry information cannot be used for court purposes, shared with other agencies except for health care professionals, released through any record disclosure processes, or used to create a wanted person bulletin.⁶⁴
132. The Toronto Police's website explains that the Registry information will be available to Toronto Police staff and accessible to other police agencies upon request. However, Toronto Police staff provided conflicting information about Registry disclosures. Some Toronto Police staff told us that Registry records would be released to other police agencies, while others indicated that the information would not.
133. The Registry application privacy policy states that Registry information will be used for emergency purposes only. The privacy policy explains that Registry information may be shared with Toronto Paramedic Services, Fire Services, or other police organizations, and if the person is reported missing the information may be shared with media, public transit, hospitals, or community housing.⁶⁵
134. The Toronto Police's website states that Registry information will not be shared with prospective employers or other organizations through police records checks, nor will it appear on the Canadian Police Information Centre. However, Toronto Police staff shared that human error may cause Registry information to be unintentionally used or disclosed. Toronto Police staff speculated that it is possible that staff may have made such a mistake, and this continues to be possible as long as they own and manage the Registry.
135. Toronto Police staff acknowledged that unintentional disclosure or use may happen if officers are unaware that the information first came from the Registry. For example, if an officer includes notations about Registry information that they relied on in responding to a call for service, this will be added to Versadex. Another officer may access the information in Versadex without realizing that it

⁶⁴ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

⁶⁵ Reference <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/> and a Toronto Police News Release dated December 4, 2019.



contains Registry information. As a result, the information may be inadvertently shared or disclosed. Such disclosure or use may unfold even if a third-party owns and manages the Registry.

136. An organization that works with vulnerable youth told us that, while the information in the Registry can be helpful, they fear it can also be weaponized. At the time of the Registry's launch, CBC news reported that there are "unanswered questions" about the management, control, and access of the Registry information. The CBC article explained that the issues were not answered in the information shared during the launch.⁶⁶

Removing Information

137. Registry information may be deleted in two instances. A registrant may request a deletion of their information at any time, and the Toronto Police will comply "without question."⁶⁷ In the absence of such a request, the information will automatically be deleted from the CAD two years after the registrant submits their application to the Toronto Police.⁶⁸ Registrants are not notified of the deletion unless the division emails them to confirm.
138. An organization that works with vulnerable youth explained to my office that the removal process is unclear. The Toronto Police's website indicates that registrants may file a supplementary report to remove the information. However, there is no information provided about what additional details are required to request removal. The Toronto Police's website also does not offer an online option for a "deletion" or "removal" supplemental report.

⁶⁶ Nasser, Shanifa. CBC News, "Toronto police vulnerable persons registry welcome but privacy questions remain, experts say." December 5, 2019. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-police-vulnerable-persons-registry-1.5385008>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

⁶⁷ Nasser, Shanifa. CBC News, "Toronto police vulnerable persons registry welcome but privacy questions remain, experts say." December 5, 2019. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-police-vulnerable-persons-registry-1.5385008>. Accessed May 30, 2024. and at <https://www.tps.ca/services/vulnerable-persons-registry/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.

⁶⁸ Toronto Police News Release dated December 4, 2019.



139. Additionally, the Toronto Police’s website provides inconsistent information about retention periods. The website states that the information will be retained for two years. However, the privacy policy for the Registry application states that the information will be automatically deleted if it is not updated within one year.
140. A community organization that my office spoke to shared that there are concerns about what data footprints remain on the Toronto Police’s systems, despite a removal request or information expiring.
141. Toronto Police staff told us that they would not be surprised if Registry information is not being removed from the systems after two years, as there is a corporate wide challenge with “getting things deleted and purged.” Additionally, during the creation of the Registry, a Toronto Police staff member raised the following concern about information deletion:
- [T]his is a risk for the [Toronto Police] that needs to be addressed. There is no oversight/responsibility with the [Toronto Police] and in fairness to members of the public, having a random anniversary date one year in the future would be very easy to overlook.
142. When the Registry information is deleted, the information will be removed from the CAD, but continues to exist on Versadex, SharePoint, and at times on the Bulletin. Records staff told my office that previously, information in Versadex would be deleted. However, they determined it was not a good record-keeping practice. Consequently, they now make the general occurrence inactive.⁶⁹ However, Toronto Police staff shared with my office that if there is no Registry information in the CAD, then it should also be deleted from every other system where it exists.
143. The Toronto Police shared a report that they prepared for my office, which stated that there are “severe issues with [the] current process.” To date, there are 232 general occurrences marked as unverified, and 104 general occurrences marked as verified, that have exceeded the two-year submission anniversary date but continue to exist on Versadex.⁷⁰ The Toronto Police explained that unlike with

⁶⁹ An inactive general occurrence continues to exist on Versadex. The general occurrence continues to be stored in the system’s memory, operating in the background like an archive. However, it is not visible in the forefront of the system.

⁷⁰ The Toronto Police shared this number with my office which is current as of March 27, 2024.



the CAD, there was no process implemented for the deletion of Registry entries in Versadex. There are also 72 entries on SharePoint that should not exist as they are expired or were requested to be removed.⁷¹

144. Information Security and Access staff⁷² shared that the 232 general occurrences that are marked as unverified should be locked until the Versadex system is cleaned up, to ensure that the information cannot be used and access to it is limited.

Analysis and Findings

145. I acknowledge the Toronto Police's attempt to communicate to the public about the access and use of Registry information. Nevertheless, these communications lack clarity, meaningfulness, and accuracy.
146. The Toronto Police's website indicates that the Registry is a database. My office learned this is not the case. Rather, the Registry is a series of general occurrences on Versadex, entries on the CAD, a list available on SharePoint, and a Bulletin for at least one division. One division also had a tracking spreadsheet. However, the Toronto Police did not explain how the information can be found in all four systems. The Toronto Police's public communications about the Registry as a database are unclear and misleading.
147. The Toronto Police may not have intended for the information to exist in systems outside of Versadex and the CAD. However, it appears that Toronto Police staff took it upon themselves to use a spreadsheet and tools, such as the Bulletin, to account for the shortcomings in accessing information from the Registry.
148. Currently, there is no available information that explains that the Registry information is tied to an address and not the vulnerable person. As such, the public is likely unaware that the Registry information is only accessed when there is a call for service to the vulnerable person's address provided in the Registry application. Consequently, people may not appreciate the importance of updating the vulnerable person's address or always referring to the Registry

⁷¹ The Toronto Police shared this number with my office which is current as of February 23, 2024.

⁷² Information Security and Access staff are the ones responsible for conducting and completing PIAs.



address in an emergency call regardless of where the call for service is being made from.

149. The Toronto Police stated that the information in the Registry may be shared with other police agencies and emergency services. While this information is clearly defined on their website, the disclosure practice followed by the Toronto Police is unclear. My office heard varying responses as to whether the information contained in the Registry would be shared with other police agencies. There should not be inconsistencies between the internal disclosure practice and what is communicated publicly.
150. The removal process is also unclear and as a result, the public information lacks important details. The information on the Toronto Police's website indicates that a supplemental report should be filed. However, it is not clear what additional details are required to request a removal of a registrant's information. Moreover, registrants do not have an option to delete or remove their information on the Toronto Police's website.
151. Simply put, the information that the Toronto Police has shared about removing Registry information is inaccurate and inadequate. My investigation discovered that the Toronto Police has failed to remove unverified and expired Registry information from its multiple systems. Further, there is a potential that information which has been requested for removal also remains on multiple systems within the Toronto Police. This is wrong. Registry information should not be accessible on any Toronto Police system if the verification process is unsuccessful, the two-year retention period has lapsed, or if a registrant exercised their right to request its removal.
152. The Toronto Police's communication about where Registry information is stored, when it is accessed, how it will be used, and its removal, is not transparent. Further, this information does not accurately reflect the current practice. This deprives the public of the chance to make an informed decision about whether to submit their information to the Toronto Police.
153. Based on the concerns noted, I believe that the Toronto Police should not have let the initial Registry PIA remain incomplete. The PIA would have allowed the Toronto Police to review the Registry and identify any issue with accessing, using, storing, and removing information and to provide recommendations on how to address the existing and ongoing concerns.



Recommendations

Recommendation 9

The Toronto Police's communications about the Registry should clearly detail what the Registry is, where the information is stored, and when and how the Toronto Police will access and use the Registry information. These communications should also include details indicating that the Registry information shared with officers responding to a call is address-specific and not connected to the name of the vulnerable person.

Recommendation 10

The Toronto Police should review and publicize the Registry information removal process, including where the information is removed from and when. The Toronto Police should notify registrants any time their information is removed.

Recommendation 11

The Toronto Police should contact all verified and unverified registrants that were not added to the CAD. The Toronto Police should notify these registrants that their information is not accessible during a call for emergency service and confirm whether they wish to be added to or removed from the system.

Recommendation 12

The Toronto Police should ensure that Recommendations 2 through 10 are incorporated in any third-party arrangement to ensure that the current Registry communication gaps do not recur.

Recommendation 13

The Toronto Police should provide Ombudsman Toronto with a status update on the implementation of these recommendations by December 12, 2024, and then on a quarterly basis thereafter.

Conclusion



154. The Toronto Police undertook to create a Registry that would allow the public to create personalized de-escalation strategies, guiding officers in their interactions with vulnerable individuals. The Toronto Police defines a vulnerable person as “a person who by nature of an emotional, medical, psychological or other physical condition may exhibit patterns of behaviour that pose an increased risk of danger to themselves or others, who may require assistance from emergency services.”⁷³
155. The Toronto Police decided to create and launch the Registry. In doing so, I recognize the challenges they faced, particularly during a time of heightened public distrust and skepticism toward police data collection. However, this social climate is all the more reason why the Toronto Police should have requested the input of the DCCC and the public during the creation of the Registry. The Toronto Police’s engagement efforts should have gone beyond collaborating with two dozen agencies.
156. The Toronto Police’s communication plan for the Registry’s launch was intended to promote and build awareness both inside and outside the Toronto Police; however, issues with its execution and continuity have hindered public awareness of the Registry.
157. Notably, the Toronto Police’s communications about the Registry should not have been a one-time effort. It should have engaged in targeted marketing, using resources such as the DCCC and the Board to build awareness about the Registry.
158. Additionally, while its communications during the launch clarified the Registry’s purpose, the information was not made accessible on the Toronto Police’s website post-launch, which hinders public understanding. The Toronto Police should provide the public with more details about the Registry’s purpose, including case examples and its value in personalized de-escalation in order to better inform their decision to use this resource.
159. The registration process on the Toronto Police’s website lacks detail, leaving the public uncertain about the required information, documents, and verification process before applying to the Registry.

⁷³ Definition obtained from Service Procedure 04-08, located at <https://www.tps.ca/service-procedures/>. Accessed May 30, 2024.



160. The lack of information about the registration process can result in members of the public not providing sufficient details in their application. As a result, the Records unit resorts to using generic terms when entering information in the CAD, which is inconsistent with the Registry's purpose to create a personalized de-escalation strategy for the vulnerable person.
161. Publicly available information in the Service Procedure⁷⁴ does not align with the Toronto Police's current practice, leading to misunderstandings amongst Toronto Police staff. Examples of discrepancies between documented procedures and actual operations include the absence of a Liaison Officer in each division and not adhering to the seven-day verification timeline.
162. The Toronto Police has acknowledged that the Registry has a low number of registrants. I believe that inconsistencies in the registration process have directly impacted the number of registrants. While I recognize that the idea of the Registry was commendable, the execution was lacking.
163. However, the Toronto Police's largest communication gap is related to the storage, access, use, and removal of registrants' information. These communications are unclear, lack meaningful content, and are inaccurate. The Toronto Police's current communications do not give the public an opportunity to make an informed decision on whether to supply personal information through the Registry.
164. The Toronto Police only provides the public with minimal details about the storage, access, use, and removal of the Registry information. Essential information is missing including that the Registry is not truly a database but lives on four of the Toronto Police's systems. Additionally, information remains accessible on the Toronto Police's systems beyond the two-year retention period, including unverified information.
165. Currently, no information explains that Registry information is tied to the vulnerable person's address. The public is unaware that this personal data is only available to officers when there is a call for service to the address provided in the Registry application. The vulnerable person has a mistaken belief that their personalized de-escalation strategy is available to the Toronto Police.

⁷⁴ The Toronto Police's Service Procedure outlines the responsibilities of various Toronto Police units and pillars. Additionally, it explains the purpose of the Registry, and the limits on the use of Registry information.



Consequently, there may be instances where the Toronto Police responds to a crisis involving a vulnerable person but is unaware that they are on the Registry. The Toronto Police's failure to provide this important detail also means the public is unaware of the importance of updating changes to the registrant's address in the Registry.

166. The Toronto Police's process for removing Registry information is unclear and misleading and does not include an option on its website for people to delete any information. Furthermore, while the Toronto Police indicates that personal information will be removed from its system, my investigation confirmed that unverified, expired, and quite possibly information requested for removal continues to exist on multiple systems within the Toronto Police. This contradicts the Toronto Police's public communications and raises concerns about data retention.
167. I believe that many of these storage and retention issues could have been identified if the Toronto Police had completed a PIA prior to the Registry's launch. If the Toronto Police completed a PIA, it would have had the opportunity to assess its data management practices and identify any areas for improvement.
168. After learning about the Toronto Police's lack of ongoing communication and promotion of the Registry and the absence of public input in creating the Registry, I am not surprised by the low number of Registry registrants. The Toronto Police clearly lacks proper ownership for the Registry and Toronto Police staff do not know who is responsible for managing, promoting, and communicating about the Registry. As a result, the public's awareness and understanding of the Registry is low.
169. My investigation has identified multiple areas for the Toronto Police to improve its public communications. While its discussion with a third-party regarding a future arrangement continues, the Toronto Police will need to explore how it will balance this potential third-party arrangement while continuing to offer the Registry to the public.
170. As long as the Toronto Police continues to offer the Registry, it needs to communicate clearly and meaningfully about it. The Toronto Police must continue to ensure the information it shares is transparent, meaningful, and accurate. By addressing the communications failures identified in this report, the public will be better informed about the Registry's purpose, processes, and how the information submitted will be used, thus allowing individuals to make informed decisions about the Registry.

Recommendations



171. My office has identified several concerns with the Toronto Police's current communications about the Registry. The recommendations in my report address the most immediate concerns, as the Toronto Police is actively considering transitioning management and ownership of the Registry to a third-party. The report's recommendations are intended to address the issues identified during this investigation and inform future communications under any third-party arrangement.

The Recommendations

Recommendation 1

Once the third-party arrangement is finalized, the Toronto Police should update its internal and external communication to explain the nature and scope of the arrangement. The communications should include details such as the impact of the arrangement on existing registrants and the difference between the current and new Registry.

Recommendation 2

The Toronto Police should make meaningful details about the Registry's goal and purpose available and accessible on its website.

Recommendation 3

The Toronto Police should train staff about their respective roles and responsibilities regarding the Registry and provide an update to all staff to increase awareness and understanding of the Registry.

Recommendation 4

The Toronto Police should clearly define and publicize all the steps and requirements in registration process for the Registry. A clearly defined process would ensure that the public understands what information is mandatory before registering, what information is required to create a personalized de-escalation strategy, who can register, and which supporting documents and authority are acceptable.



Recommendation 5

The Toronto Police should ensure that the Service Procedure and Registry practice are aligned.

Recommendation 6

The Toronto Police should update the Registry page on its website to inform the public about the generic terms that will be used to fill gaps in the Registry application, and when that will be done.

Recommendation 7

The Toronto Police should notify registrants when the Registry information is added to the Registry system and becomes available to officers.

Recommendation 8

The Toronto Police should assign a point of contact to respond to Registry-related questions received from Toronto Police staff members and the public. The information for the Registry contact should be made available on the Toronto Police's website and the Registry application.

Recommendation 9

The Toronto Police's communications about the Registry should clearly detail what the Registry is, where the information is stored, and when and how the Toronto Police will access and use the Registry information. These communications should also include details indicating that the Registry information shared with officers responding to a call is address-specific and not connected to the name of the vulnerable person.

Recommendation 10

The Toronto Police should review and publicize the Registry information removal process, including where the information is removed from and when. The Toronto Police should notify registrants any time their information is removed.



Recommendation 11

The Toronto Police should contact all verified and unverified registrants that were not added to the CAD. The Toronto Police should notify these registrants that their information is not accessible during a call for emergency service and confirm whether they wish to be added to or removed from the system.

Recommendation 12

The Toronto Police should ensure that recommendations 2 through 10 are incorporated in any third-party arrangement to ensure that the current Registry communication gaps do not recur.

Recommendation 13

The Toronto Police should provide Ombudsman Toronto with a status update on the implementation of these recommendations by December 12, 2024, and then on a quarterly basis thereafter.

Response and Follow-up



The Service and Board's Response to our Recommendations

172. The Toronto Police's formal response to my report indicates that they have accepted all 13 of my recommendations in full. The Toronto Police explains that it intends to incorporate the spirit and intent of our recommendations as they work with their communities to change the current Registry program and plan for the future.
173. The Toronto Police has committed to providing my office with updates on the implementation of these recommendations through a report to the Toronto Police Service Board. The Toronto Police will provide its first update by December 12, 2024.
174. The Toronto Police's formal response dated August 16, 2024, is attached to this report as Appendix A.

Ombudsman Toronto Follow-up

175. My office will follow up with the Toronto Police on a quarterly basis until we are satisfied that the implementation of my recommendations is complete.

Appendix



Toronto Police Service

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Website: www.TorontoPolice.on.ca



Office of the Chief of Police

File Number:

August 16, 2024

Sent via email

Kwame Addo
Ombudsman Toronto
375 University Avenue, Suite 203
Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J5

Dear Ombudsman Addo,

RE: Ombudsman Toronto's Preliminary Investigation Report Titled "An Investigation into the Toronto Police Service's Communications About its Vulnerable Person Registry"

The Toronto Police Service (Service) has reviewed a draft of your preliminary investigation report, including the 13 recommendations identified to address concerns with current communications about our Vulnerable Person Registry (VPR). Improving our VPR database, business processes and related communications is an endeavour that aligns with our Service's goals to:

1. Improve trust in and within the Service;
2. Accelerate reform and professionalization; and
3. Support safer communities.

Your investigation has clearly identified areas for improvement not only in our internal and external communications about the VPR, but also in the overall management of it. Importantly, your recommendations align well with our Service's broader efforts to find ways to best serve those dealing with mental health challenges. As such, we commit to implementing your recommendations in full.

As your report indicates, we are currently exploring transitioning to a third party administer for the VPR. As this transition cannot happen immediately, we will ensure that enhanced communication about the VPR in its current form will be included in our work to implement your recommendations.

To Serve and Protect - Working with the Community



The Service will provide an update via a report to the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) that we will ask the Board to forward to your office. To keep with your recommended timeline for updates, we will ensure our update report is included on the agenda for the Board's meeting on December 12, 2024. We thank you for your investigation and commit to working with our Board to ensure we are sufficiently resourced to undertake the reform initiatives we are currently engaged in including these 13 recommendations. That said we intend to ensure the spirit and intent of your recommendation are incorporated as we work with our communities in co-developing the changes to the current program and that which we plan for the future.

Sincerely,

Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police



CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

July 30, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

Subject: Report: Professionalism and Accountability – September 2024

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

The Professionalism and Accountability (P.A.C.) September 2024 report fulfils the Toronto Police Service's (T.P.S.) compliance with reporting requirements regarding public complaints, Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) investigations, suspect apprehension pursuits, and the Early Intervention Program. The report also highlights the achievements of T.P.S. members, as recognized through Service awards.

Discussion:

Background

On July 27, 2022 the Toronto Police Service Board approved a revised organizational chart for the Service.

The P.A.C. pillar was created as a result. Overseen by a Staff Superintendent and reporting directly to the Chief of Police, the Professionalism and Accountability pillar has the following business units reporting to it:

- Awards and Recognition
- Professional Standards Investigations
- Risk Analysis and Assessment

In September 2022, the reporting structure for P.A.C. was adjusted so that the pillar was now under the purview of the Deputy Chief of Specialized Operations Command. The make-up of the pillar remained the same.

P.A.C. provides support to numerous T.P.S. internal stakeholders and committees, such as the Disciplinary Hearings Office, Analytics and Innovation, the Incident Response Committee, the Service Vehicle Collision and Pursuit Reduction Committee, as well external agencies such as the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (O.I.P.R.D.) and the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.).

The data contained in this report is extracted from the Professional Standards Information System (P.S.I.S.) and covers a time period between January 1, 2023 and December 31, 2023. P.S.I.S. was implemented in 2003 to collect relevant data to proactively identify and analyze trends surrounding the practices, conduct, ethics, and integrity of T.P.S. members. The P.S.I.S. software, designed specifically for the law enforcement industry, contains data pertaining to complaints, Use of Force Reports, suspect apprehension pursuits, Service vehicle collisions, S.I.U. investigations, and additional internal investigative files.

Key findings highlighted within the report include the following:

- 707 Service awards were presented to members of the T.P.S., the community, and other police service members by the T.P.S. and the Board.
- 974 public complaints were received concerning officer conduct, as well as the policies or services of the T.P.S. 604 of these complaints were screened out by the O.I.P.R.D. 370 complaints were investigated. Misconduct was identified in 18 cases. In 61 cases, the complaint was resolved by informal resolution.
- T.P.S. officers had approximately 766,605 documented contacts with members of the public. The total number of public complaints filed (974) represents a fraction (0.1%) of documented contacts.
- The Special Investigations Unit invoked its mandate with respect to 88 incidents, compared to 69 incidents in 2022. This represents an increase of 27.5%.

- There were 256 suspect apprehension pursuits in 2023. This represents an 18% increase from the 2022 number of 217. Officers and pursuit supervisors discontinued 68.8% of the total number of suspect apprehension pursuits in the interest of public safety.

Conclusion:

In summary, the September 2024 Professionalism and Accountability report provides the Board with an overview of the statistics gathered between January 1 and December 31, 2023.

Staff Superintendent Shannon Dawson, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police

Attachments:

Report: Toronto Police Service Professionalism and Accountability – September 2024

Statistical information included in the Professionalism and Accountability Annual Report has been compiled from data contained in the software program IPro, also known as the Professional Standards Information System (P.S.I.S.) with additional input from the following units:

**Awards & Recognition
Professional Standards
Risk Analysis & Assessment
Special Investigations Unit Liaison Office**

The data contained in this report includes records entered into IPro / P.S.I.S. between January 1 and December 31, 2023



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Year at a Glance

AWARDS: 707 internal awards were presented to members of the Toronto Police Service, the community, and other police services by the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) and the Toronto Police Services Board (T.P.S.B.).



PUBLIC COMPLAINTS: 974 public complaints were received concerning the conduct of officers, policies or services of the Toronto Police Service. 370 were investigated. 604 were screened out by the O.I.P.R.D. 2023 represents a 13.4% increase, in comparison to 2022.

PUBLIC CONTACTS: Toronto Police Officers had approximately 766,605 documented contacts with members of the public. The total number of public complaints filed in 2023 (974) represents only a small fraction (approximately 0.1%) of documented contacts.



SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT: The S.I.U. invoked its mandate with respect to investigating 88 incidents, compared to 69 incidents in 2022, representing a 27.5% increase in the number of incidents year-over-year.



SUSPECT APPREHENSION PURSUITS: 18% increase in the number of pursuits initiated in 2023, from 217 in 2022 to 256 pursuits in 2023. In 68.8% of all pursuits in 2023, the pursuit was discontinued by officers.

Awards and Recognition

The Awards Program recognizes outstanding contributions and achievements by Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) members and members of the public. Recipients are recognized individually, or in groups, for acts of excellence, bravery, altruism, innovative contributions to community policing, public safety, and professional excellence. T.P.S. members are also recognized for their dedicated long service with milestone awards such as the 25 year wrist watch, and 20, 30, 40, and 50 year medals, bars, and commemorative pins. A Standing Awards Committee, comprised of uniform and civilian members of various ranks and positions from across the Service and representation from the Toronto Police Services Board (T.P.S.B) reviews eligibility for awards to ensure fairness and consistency.

Internal Awards

In 2023, 707 internal awards were presented to members of the Toronto Police Service, the community, and other police services by the T.P.S. and the Board. In addition to these awards for outstanding performance, the T.P.S.B. presented 209 members with their retirement plaques. The internal awards presented in 2023 are listed as follows.



Chief of Police Excellence Award

Granted by the Chief of Police to any person for acknowledgement of achievement through dedication, persistence, or assistance to the Service: *19 awards presented.*

Chief of Police Letter of Recognition (for external police agencies)

Granted by the Chief of Police to a police officer or a civilian member for excellence in the performance of duty, community policing initiatives, innovations, or initiatives that enhance the image or operation of the Toronto Police Service: *8 awards presented.*

Medal of Merit

Granted by the T.P.S.B. to the police officer or a civilian member for exemplary acts of bravery performance of duty, community policing initiatives, innovations, or initiatives that enhance the image or operation of the Toronto Police Service: *1 award presented.*

Merit Mark

Granted by the T.P.S.B. to the police officer or a civilian member for exemplary acts of bravery performance of duty, community policing initiatives, innovations, or initiatives that enhance the image or operation of the Toronto Police Service: *1 award presented.*

Commendation

Granted by the T.P.S.B. to a police officer or a civilian member for exceptional performance of duty, community policing initiatives, innovations, or initiatives that enhance the image or operation of the Toronto Police Service: *2 awards presented.*

Teamwork Commendation

Granted by the T.P.S.B. to a group of police officers and/or civilian members for exceptional performance of duty, community policing initiatives, innovations, or initiatives that enhance the image or operation of the Toronto Police Service: *212 awards presented.*

Community Member Award

Granted by the T.P.S.B. to citizens for grateful acknowledgement of unselfish assistance rendered to the T.P.S. or for an initiative, or innovation that had a positive effect on the image or operation of the Toronto Police Service: *91 awards presented.*

Mental Health Excellence Award

Granted by the T.P.S.B. to a police officer or a civilian who has demonstrated excellence, compassion and respect in their interaction with members of the community who are experiencing mental illness: *1 award presented to 4 recipients.*



Robert Qualtrough Award

Granted by the T.P.S.B. to community and Service members who have demonstrated excellence and leadership through their participation in an innovative and effective police-community partnership initiative: *1 award presented to 8 recipients.*

Civilian Long Service Recognition Pin (20, 30 & 40 years)

Granted by the T.P.S.B. and presented to civilian members upon the completion of 20, 30, 40, and 50 years of employment with the Toronto Police Service: *88 pins presented.*

25 Year Commemorative Watch

Granted by the T.P.S.B. and presented to police officers, civilian members, and auxiliary officers upon completion of 25 years of full-time employment: *69 watches presented.*



Communicator of the Year

Granted by T.P.S. to communication operators (C.O.) who displayed exemplary customer service during an event that involved the preservation of life, protection of property, the enhancement of personal safety, or security in a manner that is consistent with unit goals and service values: *1 award presented (following page for more details)*

Communicator of the Year Communications Operator Peter Karagiannis



Scan the QR Code to read more about the
2023 Communicator of the Year



Kim Ferris Award - Communications Operator Heidi Paterson

This award, inspired by C.O. Kim Ferris, is awarded to the member who has a significant positive impact on their co workers and morale. Support, kindness, honesty, reliability, inclusivity and positivity are the cornerstones of the qualities in addition to participation in platoon and unit initiatives as well as mentoring and guiding junior members.



External Awards

There were 379 awards presented to Toronto Police Service members by external agencies or organizations in 2023. The external awards presented in 2023 are listed as follows:

Ontario Auxiliary Police Medal

Presented by the Chief of Police on behalf of the Ontario Government to auxiliary officers for dedicated service upon the completion of 20, 25, 30, and 35 years of service: *13 medals/bars presented.*

Ontario Women in Law Enforcement Award

Presented in recognition of outstanding achievements made by women, uniform and civilian, in Ontario law enforcement. Categories include: valour, community, mentoring, and leadership: *2 awards presented.*

Peace Officer Exemplary Service Medals

Granted by the Governor General of Canada to recognize long and meritorious service of peace officers. The medal is presented to eligible peace officers who have attained 20 years of service; a silver bar is presented upon completion of every additional 10-year period: *29 medals/bars presented.*

Police Exemplary Service Medals

Granted by the Governor General of Canada to recognize long and meritorious service of police officers. The medal is presented to eligible police officers who have attained 20 years of service; a silver bar is presented upon completion of every additional 10-year period: *216 medals presented.*

Police Excellence Award

Presented since 1967 by T.P.S. in partnership with the T.P.S.B. and the T.P.A. to recognize officers who make significant contributions to the safety of the citizens of Toronto: *24 awards presented to 24 recipients.*

Police Officer of the Year Award

Presented annually by T.P.S. in partnership with the T.P.S.B. to recognize the efforts of outstanding police officers. Recipients are selected from the list of Police Officer Excellence Awards: *6 award presented to 6 recipients.*

Business Excellence Award of the Year 2023

Presented by T.P.S. in partnership with the T.P.S.B. to recognize significant contributions to the T.P.S. and the City of Toronto based on innovation, community service, technical achievement, or customer service and reliability: *8 awards were presented this year.*

Civilian Excellence Award of the Year 2023

Presented by T.P.S. in partnership with the T.P.S.B. to recognize superior diligence, dedication, initiative and/or leadership which has improved the administration or operation of T.P.S. and the City of Toronto: *1 award presented.*

St. John Ambulance Award Lifesaving Award / Certificate of Commendation / Automated External Defibrillator Award

Presented to an individual(s) who saves or attempts to save a life by means of their knowledge of first aid and where the application of first aid was involved. Recipients also receive a gold or silver lapel pin: *35 awards presented.*

Ontario Medal for Bravery

Presented by the Governor General of Canada to a police officer for individual acts of outstanding courage. Ontario: *5 awards presented.*



57th Annual Police Excellence Awards

The 57th Annual Police Excellence Awards were held on May 15th, 2024.

“The Police Officer Excellence Awards were created by the Board of Trade in 1967 as the Police Officer of the Year Awards, with the purpose of recognizing officers of the Toronto Police Service who have made significant contributions to making Toronto one of the safest cities in the world. The awards have evolved over time and have since been expanded to include the Service’s civilian members as well. Winners are selected by a panel of judges which include media representatives, members of the community, and students, using the following criteria: bravery, humanitarianism, superior investigative work and outstanding police skills.”

A few of our Police Excellence Award Winners are detailed in the following pages, including our 2024 recipients of the Police Officer of the Year Award, the Business Excellence Award, the Civilian Excellence Award and the inaugural Police Animal Excellence Award.

To learn more about the Annual Police Excellence Awards scan the QR code to the right.





Police Officer of the Year 2023 – Constables Paul Frias, Chris Dowling, Nana Kiany, Trevor McGarrity, Colin Nasmith and Michael Rowe (absent)

On November 21, 2022, a young man called 9-1-1, telling the Communications Operator that his father was on his 18th floor balcony, saying that he wanted to kill himself and was about to jump.

This group of officers rushed to the scene, and immediately launched into collectively effective action, each playing a crucial role in this collaborative response. Constable Frias was the first onto the balcony, finding the man precariously perched, standing on the railing without holding anything for support and refusing to listen to anyone.

Constable McGarrity gained entry to the balcony above to potentially take hold of the man. Constable Dowling took over radio communications providing detailed updates for everyone involved, and Constable Kiany gathered information from the man's family to meaningfully support the de-escalation process.

Constable Frias determined it would be best to take a non-confrontational position, so he backed off; speaking calmly with the man.

“All of the officers who responded to this call worked effectively as a team in order to safely rescue the man who was intent on taking his life,” said Superintendent Donovan Locke. “Our officers risk their lives daily by putting themselves in frontline response to meet the needs of the community and in this instance, someone who was in crisis. This is the pinnacle of de-escalation. They effectively used their training to positively interact with the individual and, as a result, we had a positive outcome.”



Civilian Excellence Award 2023 - Booking Officer Kelly Penton

On May 19, 2023, while working the day shift, Booking Officer Kelly Penton received a phone call at the front desk from a man advising he was at Scarborough Town Centre with the aim of causing harm to an old acquaintance. He also claimed he had a knife.

Booking Officer Penton calmly engaged the man who, a short time later, as a result of her discussions with him, walked into the Division and surrendered the knife to Booking Officer Penton.

Booking Officer Penton, and other Service members displayed tremendous empathy and compassion with the man, who cooperated with them, while admitting he was in distress and did not wish to harm anyone.

Apprehended under the Mental Health Act, the man was subsequently transported to hospital for assessment and treatment. After his release, he and his family were provided additional resources through the FOCUS table at the Division, which helps connect people who are in need of community supports with those resources.

Booking Officer Kelly Penton said, *"This was a situation where someone was in distress and was seeking help, so I'm happy that I, along with team members at our Division, were able to help him and resolve the situation without anyone getting harmed."*

**Police Animal Excellence Award 2023 –
Detective Sergeant Michael Palermo & Police Dog Luke**



The inaugural recipients of the Police Animal Excellence Award are being recognized for their dogged effort to find an 86-year-old man with dementia.

The man, who suffered from other underlying medical conditions went missing from his apartment building later on October 19, 2023, leaving behind his mobility devices, making him vulnerable to falls.

Adjacent to his building is a heavily wooded ravine that when combined with his frailty and without shoes, and dressed in little clothing, presented significant and immediate safety concerns.

Detective Sergeant Palermo, along with his five-year-old canine partner Luke – a highly motivated half German Shepherd, half Belgian Malinois cross – carefully assessed the hazards associated with the ravine, and began to track the man.

A steady rain made finding a track more difficult than usual, with the team gaining and losing momentum, but persisting with the search.

“We worked together for four years as partners so if there was no scent, I could tell by his reactions and body language,” Detective Sergeant Palermo said. “But from what he showed me, the intensity, the way he was pulling with his nose down to the ground, I knew there was scent; it was just a matter of taking the time and pinpointing an exact track.”

After more than an hour through brush in pitch black conditions, they came to a ridge and Luke began barking. Using his flashlight, Detective Sergeant Palermo found the man lying down and covered in leaves, suffering from the cold, but otherwise uninjured.

“It was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Toronto Police Service and is one more example of excellence of which the residents of Toronto can be justifiably proud. It was an outstanding effort for which both Detective Sergeant Palermo and Luke should be recognized.” said Inspector Craig Young.

Early Intervention

Early Intervention

One of the ways in which the T.P.S. achieves corporate and member risk management is through the Early Intervention (E.I.) Program. The E.I. Program is key to helping identify performance patterns that require intervention before these patterns result in misconduct or degrade a member's health and wellness. Moreover, the E.I. process identifies potential gaps in training and/or Governance and reduces risk to the Service.

The E.I. Program uses data analytics to proactively identify T.P.S. members with potential performance, wellness, or conduct issues. A comprehensive report is then generated and provided to managers in order to assist them in developing a personalized strategy, designed to support the member and improve their performance. The E.I. Program is administered by the Risk Analysis & Assessment (RA&A) unit.

Early Intervention Program

The E.I. Program is a philosophy, process and mechanism for enhancing member wellness, as well as fostering accountability and transparency.

Early intervention is a proactive process that seeks to identify members with potential performance or conduct issues that do not warrant formal disciplinary action, but suggest potential concerns or atypical performance characteristics. It provides the identified members' unit with comprehensive reports to assist in the development of strategies to help members. The E.I. process creates an opportunity for the member and supervisor to discuss any issues, formulate a plan if necessary, and provide support and guidance to address those issues.

Supervisors are able to provide non-disciplinary direction and training before the officer's actions become a potential liability. Officers are encouraged to improve their performance through counseling, training or coaching, heightened monitoring, review of assignment and referrals to the Employee & Family Assistance Program (E.F.A.P.), Medical Advisory Services (M.A.S.), Equity, Inclusion & Human Rights (E.I. & H.R.) and Psychological Services. The process also allows for supervisors to check in on the wellbeing of their members (for example, to discuss accumulative stress as a result of attending high risk calls). The E.I. process is supported by the statistical data

and functions of the Professional Standards Information System (P.S.I.S.; otherwise known as the IAPro application), meaning that the process is empirical, objective, and analytical, having the capacity to identify trends and patterns.

Threshold Analysis

An E.I. alert is triggered when a member exceeds a pre-set threshold for incidents, or performance indicators, monitored through P.S.I.S. Performance indicators are measurable activities or functions relating to the member. Some of the performance indicators currently used are complaints, use of force incidents, firearm pointed at a person incidents, firearm discharge incidents, vehicle pursuits, vehicle collisions, and Special Investigations Unit investigations. It is important to note that these incidents, or reports, are not normally indicative of poor performance; rather the majority of incidents reflect procedural reporting obligations.

Once an alert is triggered, the incidents contained in the alert, and the identified member's conduct history, are manually reviewed by RA&A. The purpose of the review is to identify if there are any emerging trends, wellness concerns, or atypical behaviours that may be reflected in the reports capturing the details of each incident. If there are no concerns raised by the circumstances within the incidents, or if it is determined that the E.I. report would not be beneficial, the alert is closed. If concerns are identified, the member's unit is provided with a comprehensive E.I. report to assist the management team in developing performance-improving strategies.

RA&A regularly conducts data analysis to set and review the thresholds to ensure they continue to be relevant and accurate. In fact, the E.I. Program is dynamic and continually evaluated and adjusted to reflect current trends and T.P.S. risk management concerns.

In 2023, there were 1800 alerts triggered in relation to members, which is a 21.7% decrease compared to 2022 when there were 2299 alerts generated. This decrease is due to the completion of a body-worn camera pilot project which occurred in 2022.

In 2022, a pilot project occurred where officers who were equipped with body-worn cameras triggered an early intervention alert each time the officer was involved in an incident type currently tracked in P.S.I.S. The incidents were reviewed to evaluate the deployment, ensure compliance with Body-Worn Camera Procedure 15-20, ensure the police and public interaction is bias-free, fosters trust and accountability, and if applicable, supports improved evidence for investigative, judicial and oversight purposes. In 2022, 642 alerts were generated in relation to members involved in an incident and were body-worn camera equipped. This pilot project concluded in 2022 as more officers were equipped with body-worn cameras.

Monitored Officers

In 2018, RA&A initiated a new alert process that monitors Probationary Constables for 12 months from the date of first deployment. An alert is triggered when the monitored officer is linked as the subject officer to an incident entered into P.S.I.S. Alerts are manually reviewed by RA&A for emerging trends or patterns, atypical behavior, training issues and adjustment to the policing environment. In 2022, this process was expanded to include newly hired Special Constables, Court Officers and Parking Enforcement Officers, as well as continuing to monitor all newly hired Police Constables. As a result, 660 out of the total 1800 alerts (or 22.9%) triggered in 2023 were in relation to Probationary Monitored Officers. If concerns are identified in the member's performance, the matter is escalated in order to ensure that appropriate intervention strategies are considered and initiated.

Overall Alerts

In 2023, 216 of the total 1800 alerts were classified as Overall Alerts, representing 12%. The Overall Alert incorporates all other types of alerts. The Overall Alert captures incidents that in their totality may not have triggered an alert, but when combined and taken in the context of all other alerts, may be the beginning of a pattern of atypical behaviour. The key to the Overall Alert is the timeframe and frequency; for instance, the member may not have any previous alerts, but in the span of 12 months is the subject officer in regards to five (5) different incidents. None of these incidents on their own would have triggered an alert, but 5 incidents in 12 months may indicate an officer performance issue.

Use of Force Alerts

Alerts generated by Use of Force incidents continued to be the highest incident type that triggered an alert in 2023. Of all alerts in 2023, 51.7%, or 931 were related to Use of Force reports submitted by officers. Use of Force incidents are individually reviewed to ensure that the reason for force, application, level of force, and the selected use of force option was reasonable and justifiable in relation to the circumstances of the interaction.

Public Complaints

The Ontario Police Services Act (P.S.A.) governs all police services across the province¹. Section 80 of the P.S.A. defines police misconduct, which includes any violation of the Code of Conduct, as described in Ontario Regulation 268/10. The Code of Conduct categorizes misconduct as discreditable conduct, insubordination, neglect of duty, deceit, breach of confidence, corrupt practices, unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority, damage to clothing or equipment, and consuming drugs or alcohol in a manner prejudicial to duty.

Ontario Regulation 3/99 requires every Chief of Police to prepare an annual report for their Police Services Board reflecting information on public (external) complaints from the previous fiscal year. This section of the report is intended to address the annual reporting requirement.

The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (O.I.P.R.D.)

The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (O.I.P.R.D.) was established under the Independent Police Review Act and is a civilian-staffed, independent agency that acts as an objective, impartial office responsible for receiving, managing, and overseeing all public complaints against police officers in Ontario. The O.I.P.R.D. began operation on October 19, 2009².

To connect to LECA, which is now responsible for managing public complaints, scan the QR Code to the right.



The O.I.P.R.D. ensures complaints are dealt with in a transparent, effective, and fair manner for both the public and the police. In addition to managing public complaints, the O.I.P.R.D. is responsible for setting up and administering the public complaints system, including oversight, systemic reviews, audits, education, and outreach.

Investigation of complaints received by the O.I.P.R.D. may be conducted by O.I.P.R.D. investigators, an outside police service, or the police service in question. The O.I.P.R.D. reviews all complaints to determine their classification as either a conduct, policy, or service complaint. Section 60 of the P.S.A. grants the O.I.P.R.D. the discretion to screen out complaints, for example,

¹ Community Safety and Policing Act replaced the Ontario Police Services Act on April 1, 2024.


² As of April 1, 2024, Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA) – formerly known as the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) – is responsible for receiving, managing and overseeing public complaints about misconduct of police officers.

if the complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious, made in bad faith or not in the public interest. The complaints that are screened out by the O.I.P.R.D. are captured as ‘not investigated’ in this report.

Presently, LECA permits the investigation of complaints made by third party complainants and those received beyond the six month limitation period.

Trend Analysis

In 2023, a total of 974 public complaints were received concerning the conduct of uniform members, the policies, or the services of the T.P.S. Of the 974 complaints, 370 were investigated and 604 were screened out by the O.I.P.R.D. 2023 represents a 15.6% increase, in comparison to 320 investigated complaints in 2022. The total number of complaints in 2023 (974 - both investigated and screened out) represents an increase of 13.4% from 2022, and is above the five-year average of 804.4 complaints (Figure 1.1).



Note: It is relevant to consider the volume of interactions T.P.S. members had with members of the public when evaluating the statistics presented in this report. For example, the total number of public complaints filed in 2023 represents only a small fraction (approximately 0.1%) of documented contacts that officers had with members of the public.³

³ Documented contact numbers are a combination of the following data: calls for service, Provincial Offence Act Notices (POT, Warnings, Form 104, Suspension Notices), M.H.A. apprehensions (including voluntary), and arrests.

Sub-Classification of Complaints based on Alleged Misconduct

The P.S.A. Code of Conduct is utilized by the T.P.S. as a means of sub-classifying conduct complaints received by the O.I.P.R.D. A single complaint may involve one or more subject officers who, in turn, may be accused of multiple categories of misconduct. The most serious allegation in a single complaint is used to sub-classify the complaint as a whole. It should be noted that a public complaint is classified on the initial allegations provided by the complainant and information gathered during the intake process. Complaint classifications and sub-classifications may be revised as the investigation progresses and/or upon concluding findings.

In 2023, discreditable conduct represented 35.9% of complaints investigated, which is a decrease compared to the five-year trend of 45.3%. This broad sub-classification captures conduct that may bring discredit to the T.P.S. but does not fall within one of the more specific classifications.

Allegations of unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority accounted for 15.9% of investigated complaints in 2023. This is a decrease compared to the five-year average of 19.5% of investigated unlawful and/or unnecessary exercise of authority complaints. Allegations in relation to policy and service complaints increased in 2023, from 16.3% in 2022 to 19.2% in 2023. Figure 1.2 details the sub-classifications of investigated complaints received in 2023.





Figure 1.3 depicts investigated complaints received in 2023 that have been sub-classified as discreditable conduct, further categorized by specific charges under the P.S.A. Code of Conduct. A description of these charges is included in the Glossary of Terms section at the conclusion of this report.

Figure 1.3
Discreditable Conduct Allegations



In 2023, allegations of incivility accounted for 5.3% of discreditable conduct allegations, a decrease from 9.4% in 2021, and below the five-year average of 12.4%. Allegations of disorderly conduct have remained the most common allegation under the category of discreditable conduct at 81.9% in 2023. This is an increase, in comparison to the 72.7% five-year average. Allegations of discrimination represented 11.3% of all discreditable conduct allegations in 2023, which is a decrease compared to 15.1% in 2022 and comparable to the five-year average of 13.4%.


Years of Service and Rank of Subject Officer

Figure 1.4 illustrates a correlation between years of service (grouped by start date ranges), the percentage of the overall T.P.S. workforce that the age group represents and the number of complaints in which an officer is named as a subject officer.

In 2023, T.P.S. officers with less than five years of service represented 35.2% of subject officers named in public complaints; this is the highest category in this section. Officers with 15-19 years of service represented the second highest category at 21.7%.

In general, trends in the “Years of Service” category reflect years of experience, training and assignment.


Figure 1.4
Years of Service of Subject Officer



The rank of police constable continue to account for the majority (85.7%) of subject officers named in public complaints. This is explained by the fact that the majority of the T.P.S. uniform strength (80.6%) are police constables and that, by the nature of their roles and responsibilities, they are usually the first line of police interaction with the public.

Figure 1.5 shows a comparison of the percentage of officers named in public complaints to the percentage of officers by rank Service-wide.

Figure 1.5
Rank of Subject Officer



Investigated Complaints by Command


Note: In March of 2021, the T.P.S. underwent a restructuring of Units and Commands. The new Organizational Chart resulted in changes to command titles, which therefore impacted the historical breakdown of investigated complaints by Command (Figure 1.6).

Investigated complaints in relation to officers attached to Community Safety Command accounted for 88.9% of public complaints received in 2023. Divisional Primary Response Officers, the Public Safety Response Team and Traffic Services fall under these Commands. These officers are primarily responsible for responding to calls for service and general patrols that afford them frequent daily interactions with the public.



Subject officers and/or commands that have not yet been identified, or are not applicable (for example, policy/service, or withdrawn complaints), account for 3.2% of complaints received in 2023. This number is expected to decrease as more investigations are concluded.

Figure 1.6 displays the breakdown of complaints received by command in 2023.



An expanded chart comparing the number and percentage of complaints for all divisions and units is contained in the Supplementary Data section of the report.


Disposition of Investigated Complaints

To date, 38.9% of the investigated complaints received in 2023 have been concluded with the disposition: allegations found to be unsubstantiated. 41.9% of investigated complaints in 2022 were found to be unsubstantiated. It should be noted that 4.9% of investigated 2023 complaint files remain open; as these files are concluded the disposition numbers will be affected.

Complaint withdrawals represent 20.5% of concluded 2023 complaints, compared to 20.9% in 2022. Informal resolutions made up 16.5% of concluded 2023 complaints, compared to 2022 where 14.4% were resolved in this manner.

The number of complaints where misconduct was identified continues to represent a small proportion of all investigated complaints. Misconduct was identified in just 4.9% of concluded 2023 complaints thus far, a decrease compared to 7.5% in 2022, and also comparable to the five-year average of 5.8% of complaints (Figure 1.7).

**Figure 1.7
Disposition of Investigated Complaints**



Civilian Oversight Complaint Reviews

Public complaints against police officers can be reviewed by an independent civilian agency on the basis of the complaint classification and/or disposition.

In cases where the complaint was investigated by police and found to be unsubstantiated, or designated as less serious, the complainant(s) can request that the O.I.P.R.D. conduct a review of the investigation. When a complaint is investigated by the O.I.P.R.D., the decision is final and no review will be conducted. Following their review, the O.I.P.R.D. Review Panel may confirm the findings or determine that the investigation requires further action. If the complainant is dissatisfied with the results of a disciplinary hearing, they can appeal to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (O.C.P.C.), an independent agency under the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

Of the complaints received in 2023, there were 51 cases where the complainant requested that the file be reviewed by the O.I.P.R.D., a decrease of 8 cases compared to 59 from 2022. With respect to the 51 reviews conducted, the O.I.P.R.D. upheld 34 decisions and ordered 8 new investigations; 8 reviews are still ongoing and 1 investigation resulted in a panel varied decision.⁴

If a complainant requests a review of a policy or service complaint they can appeal to the respective Police Services Board.

⁴ Request for Review statistics sourced from [Toronto - 2023 - LECA Stats Dashboard \(oiprd.on.ca\)](https://www.leca.on.ca/Toronto-2023-LECA-Stats-Dashboard-oiprd.on.ca)

Judicial Critical Narrative

The Toronto Police Service has been tracking and reporting comments from the judiciary regarding officer conduct and testimony when advised of such findings since 2013. This is a result of a request from the Toronto Police Services Board (Min. No, P74/13).

Both the Ministry of the Attorney General – Crown Law Office and Public Prosecution Services of Canada have internal directives that govern when they are required to report to the Toronto Police Service concerns in relation to police officer misconduct.

The Ministry of the Attorney General’s guidance is found within the Crown Prosecution Manual, at *Directive 29: Police*, within the paragraph “Police as witness – Allegations of Dishonesty”.

To be connected to the Ministry of the Attorney General – Crown Prosecution Homepage, scan the QR Code to the right.



The Public Prosecution Service of Canada guidance is found within the Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, at *Part II: Principles Governing Crown Counsel’s Conduct*, within the paragraph “2.13 Allegations of Misconduct by Persons Involved in the Investigation of Charges”.

To be connected to the Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook Homepage, scan the QR Code to the right.



In 2023, Professional Standards was made aware of thirteen (13) complaints from the Ministry of the Attorney General and/or Public Prosecution Service of Canada. Complaints were raised regarding the conduct or credibility of twenty (20) officers, involved in the thirteen (13) separate investigations. All thirteen (13) complaints of adverse judicial findings and twenty (20) members, were investigated by Professional Standards.

Misconduct was determined to be unsubstantiated in eight (8) of the cases and substantiated in four (4) cases, one (1) case remains active. Of the cases where misconduct was substantiated, two (2) members were found guilty of Discreditable Conduct (PSA), one (1) officer was found guilty of Insubordination (PSA) and one (1) officer was found guilty of Neglect of Duty.

Public Contacts

Community-based policing is a priority for the T.P.S. The residential population of Toronto is estimated at 2.79 million (2021 City of Toronto Census). Service members have extensive contact with members of the community in order to ensure public safety. In 2023, there were 407,543 calls for service for events attended by the T.P.S., 299,910 provincial offence tickets were issued, 13,628 Mental Health Act (M.H.A.) apprehensions following a Person in Crisis call for service and 45,524 arrests. In total, T.P.S. officers had approximately 766,605 documented contacts⁵ with members of the public in 2023 (this figure includes repeat contacts).



It is relevant to consider the volume of interactions T.P.S. members had with members of the public when evaluating the statistics presented in this report. For example, the total number of public complaints filed in 2023 represents only a small fraction (approximately 0.1%) of documented contacts. Further, when comparing the number of S.I.U. investigations to documented contacts, there was one S.I.U. incident investigated for every 8,711 documented contacts with members of the public (or less than 0.01%) in 2023.

Time Taken to Conclude Investigated Complaints

The P.S.A. requires that respondent officers be given notice of a hearing within six months of the decision to retain or refer a complaint for investigation, where there is a decision of a substantiation of serious misconduct. As such, the O.I.P.R.D. directs police services to complete and submit the investigative report within 120 days. In order to ensure these timelines are met, T.P.S. procedures stipulate that complaint investigations shall be completed within 90 days.

⁵ Documented contact numbers are a combination of the following data: calls for service, Provincial Offence Act Notices (POT, Warnings, Form 104, Suspension Notices), M.H.A. apprehensions (including voluntary), and arrests.

However, there are provisions for investigations that require additional time. For all investigated complaints received in 2023, 91.3% have been concluded to date. Of the concluded investigations, 56.5% were completed within 90 days, compared to 46.7% in 2022 and the five-year average of 49.1%.

Figure 1.8 compares the time taken to conclude complaints that were received between 2019 and 2023.

Figure 1.8
Days to Conclude Investigated Complaints

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	5 Year Avg.
0 to 30 days	31	46	68	73	73	58.2
31 to 60 days	36	34	63	37	63	46.6
61 to 90 days	52	44	51	51	63	52.2
91 to 120 days	63	55	77	62	72	65.8
121 to 150 days	55	41	35	36	34	40.2
151 to 180 days	21	25	21	16	21	20.8
Over 180 days	29	51	32	41	26	35.8

Comparison to Other Police Services

The O.I.P.R.D. publishes a dashboard on their website reporting on the number of external complaints they receive in relation to all Ontario police services. Figure 1.9, depicts information obtained from the O.I.P.R.D. Stats Dashboard and compares the T.P.S. to other police services in the province.

Figure 1.9
OIPRD Statistics* - Comparison to other Police Services

Police Service*	Number of Officers	Total Complaints	Screened Out**	Investigated**	Total Complaints per 100 Officers	Investigated Complaints per 100 Officers
Durham Regional	1007	176	102	74	17.5	7.3
Hamilton	881	161	91	70	18.3	7.9
Kingston	209	71	44	27	34.0	12.9
London	800	156	108	48	19.5	6.0
Niagara Regional	772	190	115	75	24.6	9.7
Ottawa	1,500	336	194	142	22.4	9.5
Peel Regional	2,200	289	184	105	13.1	4.8
Toronto***	5,224	963	650	313	18.4	6.0
Waterloo Regional	851	156	110	46	18.3	5.4
York Regional	1,600	236	141	95	14.8	5.9
Total Complaints***	26,704	4654	2,952	1702	17.4	6.4

Source: OIPRD Stats Dashboard, <http://stats.oiprd.on.ca/?service=Ontario> (extracted 2024.08.06)

* Police Service "Number of Officers" Statistics from "Statistics Canada - Police Personnel and selected crime statistics". Please see individual Police Services' sites for a breakdown of employees (civilian vs. sworn members).

** T.P.S. complaint numbers featured in this report differ from the OIPRD dashboard due to delays in reporting and when complaints were screened in or out. For consistency purposes, T.P.S. numbers as they appeared on the OIPRD dashboard were used in the agency comparison analysis above.

*** This number includes all police services in Ontario and includes the agencies listed above.

Special Investigations Unit

The Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is a civilian law enforcement agency with a mandate to maintain confidence in Ontario's police services by assuring the public that police actions resulting in serious injury, death, or allegations of sexual assault are subjected to comprehensive, independent investigations.

The S.I.U. is independent of the police and is at arm's length to the Ministry of the Attorney General. Any incident that may reasonably fall within the mandate of the S.I.U. must be reported to the S.I.U. by the police service involved and/or may be reported by the complainant or any other person.

To be connected to the Special Investigations Unit Homepage, scan the QR Code to the right.




Trend Analysis

In 2023, the S.I.U. invoked its mandate with respect to investigating 88 incidents, compared to 69 incidents in 2022, representing a 27.5% increase in the number of incidents year-over-year.

Of the incidents occurring in 2023, 62 cases were concluded with the designation No Charges for the subject officer(s), the S.I.U. withdrew its mandate in 21 cases, 2 cases resulted in officers being charged criminally, and investigations are ongoing in 3 cases (Figure 2.1).

The S.I.U. withdraws its mandate in cases that do not meet the threshold for intervention; for example, the injury was not serious or the actions of the officer did not contribute to the injury.

**Figure 2.1
Number of S.I.U. Investigations**



A low proportion of police contacts with the public result in the S.I.U. mandate being invoked. When comparing the number of S.I.U. investigations to the documented number of community contacts that officers had in 2023, there was one SIU incident investigated for every 8,711 contacts. In other words, less than 0.01% of community contacts resulted in a SIU investigation.⁶

The number of custody-related incidents increased 31.6% from 38 in 2022 to 50 in 2023. There were ten (10) vehicle-related incidents in 2023 which is an increase compared to five (5) in 2022, but is below the five-year average of 6.6 incidents. Figure 2.2 provides a five-year perspective of S.I.U. investigations involving T.P.S. officers.

⁶ Documented contact numbers are a combination of the following data: calls for service, Provincial Offence Act Notices (POT, Warnings, Form 104, Suspension Notices), M.H.A. apprehensions (including voluntary), and arrests.

Figure 2.2
Reasons for SIU Investigations

Occurrence Type	2019		2020		2021		2022		2023		5 Year Avg.	
	Death	Injury	Death	Injury	Death	Injury	Death	Injury	Death	Injury	Death	Injury
Firearm incident	1	4	2	3	3	11	2	6	1	9	1.8	6.6
Vehicle incident	1	3	0	11	2	2	0	5	1	9	0.8	6
Custody incident	2	26	8	29	10	36	4	34	3	47	5.4	34.4
Allegation of Sexual Assault	N/A	9	N/A	11	N/A	18	N/A	16	N/A	17	N/A	14.2
Other Death or Injury	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.4	0.4
Total	4	42	10	54	16	67	7	62	5	83	8.4	61.6

The S.I.U. invoked its mandate to investigate five (5) deaths in 2023, a decrease from seven (7) in 2022, and below the five-year average of 8.4 deaths. In relation to the five (5) 2023 investigations, officers were exonerated in all five (5) incidents.

At the time this report was drafted, 2.3% of all incidents investigated by the S.I.U. in 2023 resulted in officers being charged criminally; this is comparable to the five-year average of 2.7% incidents.

Chief’s Administrative Investigations

Provincial legislation requires that the Chief of Police conduct an administrative investigation into any incident in which the S.I.U. is involved. The administrative investigation is intended to examine the policies of, and/or services provided, by the police service along with the conduct of its police officers.

These investigations are conducted by subject matter experts drawn from various units within the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) including Homicide and Missing Persons Unit, Sex Crimes, Traffic Services, and Professional Standards.

Comparison to Other Police Services

The Special Investigations Unit maintains a statistical dashboard with respect to investigations where the SIU mandate was invoked in relation to all Ontario police services. Additionally, the S.I.U. publishes an Annual Report (reporting period is January 1 to December 31).

Figure 2.3 features information contained in the 2023 S.I.U. Annual Report, as well as the S.I.U. Stats Dashboard (updated regularly) and compares the Toronto Police Service to other police agencies in Ontario with respect to S.I.U. investigations.

Figure 2.3
S.I.U. Statistics - Comparison to other Police Services

Police Service	Number of Officers*	Injury	Firearm			Custody		Vehicle		Sexual Assault Allegation	Other		Total Investigated	Cases per 100 Officers
			Death	Discharge at Person	Injury	Death	Injury	Death	Injuries		Deaths			
Durham Regional	1007	0	0	1	4	0	6	0	0	0	1	12	1.2	
Hamilton	881	0	1	0	9	0	1	0	4	0	0	15	1.7	
Kingston	209	0	0	0	6	3	0	0	0	0	0	9	4.3	
London	800	0	1	0	15	0	3	1	3	0	0	23	2.9	
Niagara Regional	772	0	1	0	12	1	1	0	1	0	1	17	2.2	
Ottawa	1,500	1	1	3	5	1	2	1	2	0	0	16	1.1	
Peel Regional	2,200	0	0	2	21	3	5	1	2	0	0	34	1.5	
Toronto	5,224	4	1	5	47	3	9	1	17	0	1	88	1.6	
Waterloo Regional	851	2	0	0	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	9	1.1	
York Regional	1,600	0	1	1	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	16	1.0	
Investigated by S.I.U.**	26,704	13	7	29	217	25	47	6	58	1	8	411	1.5	

Sources: S.I.U., Breakdown of Occurrences (January 1, 2023 to December 31, 2023): https://www.siu.on.ca/en/report_occurrences.php (extracted 2024.06.26); S.I.U., Status of Cases, 2023: http://www.siu.on.ca/en/cases_e_status.php (extracted 2024.06.26).

* Police Service "Number of Officers": Statistics from "Statistics Canada - Police Personnel and selected crime statistics". Please see individual Police Services sites for a breakdown of employees (civilian vs. sworn members).
 ** This number includes all police services in Ontario and includes the agencies listed above.

Suspect Apprehension Pursuits

The Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General has established detailed guidelines regarding police vehicle pursuits, including when and how pursuits are to be commenced or continued, supervisory obligations during the pursuit process, and reporting requirements.

Recognizing the inherent risk to both officers and members of the public when pursuits are initiated, the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) has undertaken a number of strategies to both reduce the number of pursuits initiated and develop targeted training to enhance safe driving practices.

Ontario Regulation 266 / 10

Legislation governing police pursuits in Ontario is found in Ontario Regulation 266/10, entitled Suspect Apprehension Pursuits. According to the Regulation, a suspect apprehension pursuit (S.A.P.) occurs when a police officer attempts to direct the driver of a motor vehicle to stop, the driver refuses to obey the officer, and the officer pursues in a motor vehicle for the purpose of stopping the fleeing motor vehicle, or identifying the fleeing motor vehicle, or an individual in the fleeing motor vehicle.

The Regulation allows an officer to pursue, or continue to pursue, a fleeing vehicle that fails to stop if the officer has reason to believe that a criminal offence has been committed, or is about to be committed, or for the purposes of motor vehicle identification, or the identification of an individual in the vehicle.

The Regulation further requires that each police service establish written procedures on the management and control of S.A.P.s. T.P.S. Procedure 15-10 (Suspect Apprehension Pursuits) was specifically amended to address this requirement. The Regulation also directs every officer who initiates a pursuit to complete a provincial Fail to Stop Report. The report provides a comprehensive description of the pursuit, including the reasons for and the results of the pursuit, charge information, and the environmental conditions prevailing at the time of the pursuit.

Pursuit Reduction Initiatives

Police officers, by the demands of their profession, are asked to perform far more difficult driving tasks than the average motorist on the road. Unique aspects of police driving can be broken down into three functions: patrol, emergency response and suspect apprehension pursuit. Police

Vehicle Operations (P.V.O.) delivers specialized decision-based driver training programs that are developed by subject matter experts. The program is highly engaging with interactive classroom activities, simulation exercises and practical in-car training.

Driver Simulator Training

The Service uses an L3 PatrolSim driving simulator to enhance delivery of S.A.P. training to frontline officers. Training scenarios are customized and are developed reflecting issues identified through various sources and analysis, such as Service vehicle collisions, S.A.P. statistics, and in-car camera video.

During the training, officers are able to drive in, and observe, a variety of common emergency response and S.A.P. scenarios, reinforcing classroom lectures and discussions. By combining S.A.P. with a cooperative driving system, customized simulation exercises and practical in-vehicle training, the result is an advanced driving program designed to reinforce appropriate driving behaviours consistent with legislative requirements and T.P.S. procedures.

The T.P.S. is the only police service in Ontario that currently uses a driving simulator to enhance the delivery of driver training to frontline officers, making the Service a leader within Ontario with respect to safe police vehicle operations.



Trend Analysis


Number of Pursuits

In 2023, 458 Fail to Stop Reports were submitted, representing a 29.4% increase from 2022. Of the reports submitted in 2023, 55.9% (256) resulted in the initiation of a pursuit, which is a decrease when compared to the five-year average of 64.1%. This is also a 17% year-over-year increase in the number of pursuits initiated in 2023, from 217 in 2022 to 256 pursuits in 2023 (Figure 3.1).

It is important to note that not all instances of failing to stop for the police result in a pursuit. Further, the decision to engage in pursuing a suspect vehicle that has failed to stop for the police is a set of entirely different circumstances.

The Fail to Stop Report is mandated by the Ministry; both circumstances are captured on the same Ministry Form.

Figure 3.1
Fail to Stop Reports and Pursuits
Initiated




Reasons for Initiating Pursuits

Of the 256 pursuits initiated in 2023, 55.9% occurred as a result of the commission of *Criminal Code* offences. Within the *Criminal Code* category, the majority of pursuits were initiated as a result of the dangerous operation of a motor vehicle or stolen vehicles. In 2023, there were 55 pursuits initiated with respect to stolen vehicles, an increase compared to the five-year average of 44.8 pursuits.

Of the pursuits initiated in 2023, 40.6% resulted from the commission of offences under the *Highway Traffic Act (H.T.A.)*. This is comparable to the five-year average (42.6%). Within the *H.T.A.* category, the most common reason for initiating a pursuit was in relation to moving violations, representing 28.5% of all pursuits initiated in 2023. Moving violations have consistently remained the most common reason for initiating a non-criminal pursuit over the last five years, representing 29.1% of all pursuits.


Miscellaneous circumstances, including reports from the public and suspicious vehicles, accounted for 3.5% of pursuits initiated, as indicated in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2
Pursuit Initiation Reasons



Years of Service

In 2023, T.P.S. officers with less than five (5) years of service initiated the majority of pursuits (55.9%), despite representing only 21.6% of all officers within the T.P.S. This discrepancy is indicative of the fact that officers with less than five (5) years of service are primarily deployed to uniform front line policing duties and experience a great opportunity to observe and engage with other drivers on the road. Figure 3.3 illustrates the years of service of subject officers involved in pursuits.




Results of Initiated Pursuits

In 68.8% of all pursuits in 2023, the pursuit was discontinued by officers; this is comparable to 68.2% of all pursuits initiated in 2022. In 2023, the designated pursuit supervisor terminated 15.6% of pursuits initiated, in comparison to terminating 17.5% of pursuits in 2022 (16.8% of terminated pursuits is the five-year average).

In 5.9% of all pursuits in 2023, officers were able to stop suspect vehicles using specific techniques (for example, rolling block, intentional contact, etc.), which is above the five-year average of 3.9%. In 7.0% of pursuits initiated in 2023, the vehicle was stopped by the driver, which is a comparable to the five-year average of 7.6%. Pursuit results are indicated in Figure 3.4.

**Figure 3.4
Pursuit Results**



Charges Laid in Initiated Pursuits


In 2023, 80 pursuits resulted in charges being laid in relation to offences committed under the *Criminal Code*, the H.T.A., and/or other statutes, compared to 62 pursuits in 2022 where charges were laid. The 80 pursuits in 2023 resulted in 69 people being charged with *Criminal Code* offences and 49 people charged with H.T.A. offences. This is compared to 55 and 42 respectively in 2022.

In total, 372 combined *Criminal Code*, H.T.A., and other statute charges were laid in 2023, comparable to the 314 charges laid in 2022, and a 4.9% decrease when compared to the five-year average (391 charges). *Criminal Code* charges equated to the majority of those laid in 2023 (63.4 %).

Collisions and Pursuit Related Injuries

In 2023, seven (7) pursuits resulted in collisions (either during, or subsequent to the pursuit), representing 2.7% of all pursuits initiated. Of the 256 pursuits last year, seven (7) resulted in injuries, for a total of eight (8) individuals injured: seven (7) individuals in the pursued vehicle, and one (1) individual in a third party vehicle (Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5
Pursuit Related Injuries



Supplementary Data

Public Complaints

Classification of Complaints						
Complaints - Investigated	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	5 Year Avg.
Conduct-Less Serious	245	267	309	260	294	275.0
Conduct-Serious	17	9	9	8	5	9.6
Policy	2	5	3	1	2	2.6
Service	24	17	31	51	69	38.4
Number and Percentage of Complaints (Investigated)	288	298	352	320	370	325.6
	47.2%	37.8%	44.5%	37.3%	38.0%	40.5%
Complaints - Not Investigated	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	5 Year Avg.
Abandoned	0	0	1	0	0	0.2
Better Dealt with in Other Law	34	62	26	21	19	40.8
Complaint Over Six Months	4	0	0	9	10	4.6
Frivolous	84	68	62	85	64	72.6
No Jurisdiction	30	37	29	40	65	40.2
Not Directly Affected	8	23	18	33	25	21.4
Not in the Public Interest	160	298	300	342	407	301.4
Vexatious	2	2	2	6	13	5
Withdrawn	0	0	1	3	1	1
Number and Percentage of Complaints (Not Investigated)	322	490	439	539	604	478.8
	52.8%	62.2%	55.5%	62.7%	62.0%	59.5%
Total Number of Public Complaints	610	788	791	859	974	804.4

Alleged Misconduct - Investigated Complaints												
	2019		2020		2021		2022		2023		5 Year Avg.	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Breach of Confidence	2	0.7	2	0.7	1	0.3	2	0.6	3	0.8	2.0	0.6
Consuming Drugs or Alcohol	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	0.2	0.1
Corrupt Practice	0	0.0	2	0.7	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1.0	0.3
Deceit	1	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0	0.4	0.1
Discreditable Conduct	125	43.4	166	55.7	175	49.7	139	43.4	133	35.9	147.6	45.3
Insubordination	4	1.4	2	0.7	5	1.4	1	0.3	4	1.1	3.2	1.0
Neglect of Duty	46	16.0	45	15.1	75	21.3	70	21.9	98	26.5	66.8	20.5
Unlawful or Unnecessary Exercise of Authority	84	29.2	59	19.8	61	17.3	54	16.9	59	15.9	63.4	19.5
Policy/Service	26	9.0	22	7.4	34	9.7	52	16.3	71	19.2	41.0	12.6
Total	288	100.0	298	100.0	352	100.0	320	100.0	370	100.0	325.6	100.0

Number of Days to Conclude Investigated Complaint Investigations												
	2019		2020		2021		2022		2023		5 Year Avg.	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
0 to 30 days	31	10.8	46	15.5	68	19.6	73	21.2	73	20.7	58.2	18.2
31 to 60 days	36	12.5	34	11.5	63	18.2	37	10.7	63	17.9	46.6	14.6
61 to 90 days	52	18.1	44	14.9	51	14.7	51	14.8	63	17.9	52.2	16.3
91 to 120 days	63	22.0	55	18.6	77	22.2	62	18.0	72	20.5	65.8	20.6
121 to 150 days	55	19.2	41	13.9	35	10.1	36	10.4	34	9.7	40.2	12.6
151 to 180 days	21	7.3	25	8.4	21	6.1	16	4.6	21	6.0	20.8	6.5
Over 180 days	29	10.1	51	17.2	32	9.2	41	11.9	26	7.4	35.8	11.2
Total	287	100.0	296	100.0	347	100.0	345	91.6	352	100.0	319.6	100.0

Top Three Sub-Classifications of Alleged Misconduct												
	2019		2020		2021		2022		2023		5 Year Avg.	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Discreditable Conduct												
Discrimination	12	9.6	25	15.1	26	14.8	21	15.1	15	11.3	19.8	13.4
Profane language re: individuality	3	2.4	2	1.2	2	1.1	2	1.4	2	1.5	2.2	1.5
Incivility	33	26.4	28	16.9	11	6.3	13	9.4	7	5.3	18.4	12.4
Contravene P.S.A.	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Acts in a disorderly manner	77	61.6	111	66.9	137	77.8	103	74.1	109	82.0	107.4	72.7
Total	125	100.0	166	100.0	176	100.0	139	100.0	133	100.0	147.8	100.0
Neglect of Duty												
Neglects to perform a duty	46	100.0	44	97.8	74	98.7	69	98.6	97	99.0	66	98.8
Fails to report or bring offender to justice	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	0.2	0.3
Fails to report matter	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.3	1	1.4	0	0.0	0.4	0.6
Fails to disclose evidence	0	0.0	1	2.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.2	0.3
Omits to make entry in a record	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	46	100.0	45	100.0	75	100.0	70	100.0	98	100.0	66.8	100.0
Unlawful/Unnecessary Exercise of Authority												
Unlawful/unnecessary arrest	11	13.1	12	20.3	21	34.4	17	31.5	23	39.0	16.8	22.0
Unnecessary force	73	86.9	47	79.7	40	65.6	35	64.8	33	55.9	58.4	76.6
Collect information about individual	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	3.7	3	5.1	1	1.3
Total	84	100.0	59	100.0	61	100.0	54	100.0	59	100.0	76.2	100.0

Disposition - Investigated Complaints												
	2019		2020		2021		2022		2023		5 Year Avg.	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Discontinued	0	0.0	1	0.3	1	0.3	0	0.0	1	0.3	0.6	0.2
Informal Resolution	66	22.9	67	22.5	76	21.6	46	14.4	61	16.5	63.2	19.4
Misconduct Identified	13	4.5	14	4.7	25	7.1	24	7.5	18	4.9	18.8	5.8
No Jurisdiction	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.6	3	0.9	1	0.3	1.2	0.4
Not in Public Interest	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.2	0.1
Policy/service - Action Taken	3	1.0	2	0.7	2	0.6	2	0.6	4	1.1	2.6	0.8
Policy/service-No Action Required	14	4.9	9	3.0	18	5.1	32	10.0	28	7.6	20.2	6.2
Terminated	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	1.7	10	3.1	19	5.1	7.0	2.1
Unsubstantiated	131	45.5	138	46.3	150	42.6	134	41.9	144	38.9	139.4	42.8
Withdrawn	60	20.8	66	22.1	67	19.0	67	20.9	76	20.5	67.2	20.6
Investigation not Concluded*	1	0.3	1	0.3	4	1.1	2	0.6	18	4.9	5.6	1.7
Total	290	100.0	298	100.0	352	100.0	320	100.0	370	100.0	326.0	100.0

*Number is anticipated to decrease as complaints are concluded, this will effect the final dispositions.

Investigated Complaints by Involved Unit										
Involved Unit	2019		2020		2021		2022		2023	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
11 Division	10	3.5	7	2.3	11	3.1	12	3.8	17	4.6
12 Division	7	2.4	5	1.7	9	2.6	10	3.1	11	3.0
13 Division	11	3.8	5	1.7	8	2.3	5	1.6	8	2.2
14 Division	23	8.0	14	4.7	26	7.4	27	8.4	21	5.7
22 Division	8	2.8	11	3.7	14	4.0	20	6.3	28	7.6
23 Division	11	3.8	9	3.0	13	3.7	7	2.2	24	6.5
31 Division	10	3.5	11	3.7	17	4.8	12	3.8	9	2.4
32 Division	14	4.9	19	6.4	9	2.6	15	4.7	20	5.4
33 Division	7	2.4	2	0.7	11	3.1	20	6.3	18	4.9
41 Division	9	3.1	19	6.4	12	3.4	13	4.1	16	4.3
42 Division	7	2.4	7	2.3	15	4.3	14	4.4	16	4.3
43 Division	12	4.2	22	7.4	31	8.8	8	2.5	22	5.9
51 Division	21	7.3	23	7.7	31	8.8	26	8.1	30	8.1
52 Division	21	7.3	26	8.7	21	6.0	34	10.6	26	7.0
53 Division	11	3.8	14	4.7	8	2.3	15	4.7	20	5.4
54 Division	7	2.4	7	2.3	4	1.1	0	0.0	0	0.0
55 Division	9	3.1	8	2.7	22	6.3	23	7.2	16	4.3
Communication Services	3	1.0	4	1.3	4	1.1	17	5.3	6	1.6
Community Pship and Engagement	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0
Corporate Communications	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	1	0.3	0	0.0
Court Services	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	0.8
Drug Squad	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	0	0.0	2	0.5
Emergency Management & Public Order	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3
Emergency Task Force	4	1.4	5	1.7	1	0.3	1	0.3	2	0.5
Financial Crimes Unit	1	0.3	1	0.3	2	0.6	0	0.0	1	0.3
Forensic Identification Services	1	0.3	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0	1	0.3
Hold Up Squad	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	1	0.3
Homicide	2	0.7	2	0.7	3	0.9	0	0.0	0	0.0
Information and Technology Cmd	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.6	3	0.9	8	2.2
Intelligence Services	0	0.0	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3
Marine	0	0.0	1	0.3	3	0.9	0	0.0	1	0.3
Mounted	1	0.3	2	0.7	1	0.3	1	0.3	0	0.0
Not Applicable	32	11.1	23	7.7	25	7.1	8	2.5	9	2.4
Not Identified	7	2.4	14	4.7	7	2.0	6	1.9	3	0.8
Organized Crime Enforcement	3	1.0	4	1.3	5	1.4	4	1.3	4	1.1
Parking Enforcement	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
People and Culture	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3
Police Dog Services	2	0.7	0	0.0	2	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0
PRIME	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3
Pro ROPE, Fug Sq & Bail Comp	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
Professional Standards	1	0.3	1	0.3	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0
Property & Video Evidence Mgmt	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0
Public Safety Response	2	0.7	3	1.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	1	0.3
Records Management Services	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	0.9	0	0.0	1	0.3
Sex Crimes Unit	4	1.4	2	0.7	2	0.6	0	0.0	2	0.5
Strategy Management	1	0.3	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
Talent Acquisition	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0
Toronto Police College	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	2	0.6	0	0.0
Toronto Police Operations	5	1.7	4	1.3	1	0.3	0	0.0	3	0.8
Traffic Services	19	6.6	19	6.4	22	6.3	9	2.8	16	4.3
Total	288	100.0	298	100.0	352	100.0	320	100.0	370	100.0


Suspect Apprehension Pursuits

Pursuit Initiation Reason												
	2019		2020		2021		2022		2023		5 Year Avg.	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Criminal Code												
Break and Enter	6	2.6	3	1.0	6	2.3	4	1.8	14	5.5	6.6	2.6
Dangerous Operation	20	8.7	44	15.0	31	11.9	19	8.8	29	11.3	28.6	11.4
Impaired Operation	9	3.9	19	6.5	21	8.1	15	6.9	11	4.3	15	6.0
Other*	36	15.7	32	10.9	43	16.5	26	12.0	24	9.4	32.2	12.8
Prohibited Operation	1	0.4	4	1.4	1	0.4	2	0.9	1	0.4	1.8	0.7
Robbery	12	5.2	10	3.4	1	0.4	2	0.9	9	3.5	6.8	2.7
Stolen Vehicle	45	19.7	54	18.4	29	11.2	41	18.9	55	21.5	44.8	17.8
Sub-total	129	56.3	166	56.7	132	50.8	109	50.2	143	55.9	136	54.1
Highway Traffic Act												
Equipment Violation	11	4.8	29	9.9	20	7.7	15	6.9	10	3.9	17	6.8
Moving Violation	54	23.6	81	27.6	87	33.5	70	32.3	73	28.5	73	29.1
Other	19	8.3	11	3.8	14	5.4	16	7.4	18	7.0	15.6	6.2
R.I.D.E.	1	0.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.4	0.4	0.2
Suspended Driver	0	0.0	1	0.3	1	0.4	1	0.5	2	0.8	1	0.4
Sub-total	85	37.1	122	41.6	122	46.9	102	47.0	104	40.6	107.0	42.6
Miscellaneous												
Other**	2	0.9	1	0.3	2	0.8	1	0.5	0	0.0	1.2	0.5
Report from Public	1	0.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	1.2	0.8	0.3
Suspicious Vehicle	12	5.2	4	1.4	4	1.5	5	2.3	6	2.3	6.2	2.5
Sub-total	15	6.6	5	1.7	6	2.3	6	2.8	9	3.5	8.2	3.3
Total	229	100.0	293	100.0	260	100.0	217	100.0	256	100.0	251.0	100.0

* Other Criminal Code offences for which officers engaged in pursuits in 2023 included Theft, Shooting and Firearms investigations, Armed Suspects, Attempted Carjacking, Threatening and Assault occurrences, and Wanted Persons.

** Other Miscellaneous events for which officers engaged in pursuits in 2023 was a Suspicious Incident event.

Vehicle Pursuit Distance		
	2023	2023%
0-1KM	128	49.8%
1 KM < 2 KM	78	30.4%
2 KM < 3 KM	18	7.0%
3 KM < 4 KM	6	2.3%
4 KM < 5 KM	10	3.9%
5 KM < 6 KM	6	2.3%
6 KM < 7 KM	2	0.8%
7 KM < 8 KM	4	1.6%
8 KM < 9 KM	0	0.0%
9 KM < 10 KM	1	0.4%
>10	4	1.6%
Total:	257	100.0%



Glossary of Terms

Police Services Act Definitions

Discreditable Conduct

- 2(1)(a)(i) Fails to treat or protect a person equally without discrimination with respect to police services because of race, ancestry, place or origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status or disability.
- 2(1)(a)(ii) Uses profane, abusive or insulting language that relates to a person's race, ancestry, place or origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status or disability.
- 2(1)(a)(iii) Is guilty of oppressive or tyrannical conduct towards an inferior in rank.
- 2(1)(a)(iv) Uses profane, abusive or insulting language to any other member of a police force.
- 2(1)(a)(v) Uses profane, abusive or insulting language or is otherwise uncivil to a member of the public.
- 2(1)(a)(vi) Wilfully or negligently makes any false complaint or statement against any member of a police force.
- 2(1)(a)(vii) Assaults any other member of a police force.
- 2(1)(a)(viii) Withholds or suppresses a complaint or report against a member of a police force or about the policies of, or services provided by the force of which the officer is a member.
- 2(1)(a)(ix) Is guilty of an indictable criminal offence or criminal offence punishable upon summary conviction.
- 2(1)(a)(x) Contravenes any provision of the *Act* or the regulations.
- 2(1)(a)(xi) Acts in a disorderly manner or in a manner prejudicial to discipline or likely to bring discredit upon the reputation of the police force of which the officer is a member.

Insubordination

- 2(1)(b)(i) Is insubordinate by word, act or demeanour.
- 2(1)(b)(ii) Without lawful excuse, disobeys, omits or neglects to carry out any lawful Order

Neglect of Duty

- 2(1)(c)(i) Without lawful excuse, neglects or omits promptly and diligently to perform a duty as,
 - (A) A member of the police force of which the officer is a member, if the officer is a member of an Ontario police force as defined in the *Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009*, or
 - (B) A police officer appointed under the *Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009*,
- 2(1)(c)(ii) Fails to comply with any provision of the *Special Investigations Unit Act, 2019*,
- 2(1)(c)(ii.1) Failed to comply with any provision of Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the Special Investigations Unit) before the revocation of that regulation,
- 2(1)(c)(iii) Fails to work in accordance with orders, or leaves an area, detachment, detail or other place of duty, without due permission or sufficient cause.
- 2(1)(c)(iv) By carelessness or neglect permits a prisoner to escape.
- 2(1)(c)(v) Fails, when knowing where an offender is to be found, to report him or her or to make due exertions for bringing the offender to justice.
- 2(1)(c)(vi) Fails to report a matter that is his or her duty to report.
- 2(1)(c)(vii) Fails to report anything that he or she knows concerning a criminal or other charge, or fails to disclose any evidence that he or she, or any person within his or her knowledge, can give for or against any prisoner or defendant.
- 2(1)(c)(viii) Omits to make any necessary entry in a record.
- 2(1)(c)(ix) Feigns or exaggerates sickness or injury to evade duty.
- 2(1)(c)(x) Is absent without leave from or late for any duty, without reasonable excuse.

-
-
- 2(1)(c)(xi) Is improperly dressed, dirty or untidy in person, clothing or equipment while on duty.

Breach of Confidence

- 2(1)(e)(i) Divulges any matter which it is his or her duty to keep secret,
- 2(1)(e)(ii) Gives notice, directly or indirectly, to any person against whom any warrant or summons has been or is about to be issued, except in the lawful execution of the warrant or service of the summons,
- 2(1)(e)(iii) Without proper authority, communicates to the media or to any unauthorized person any matter connected with,
- (A) The police force of which the officer is a member, if the officer is a member of an Ontario police force as defined in the *Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009*, or
- (B) The police force with which the officer is working on a joint forces operation or investigation, if the officer is appointed as a police officer under the *Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009*, or
- 2(1)(e)(iv) Without proper authority, shows to any person not a member of the police force described in sub-sub clause (iii) (A) or (B), as the case may be, or to any unauthorized member of that police force any record that is the property of that police force;

Unlawful or Unnecessary Exercise of Authority

- 2(1)(g)(i) Without good and sufficient cause makes an unlawful or unnecessary arrest.
- 2(1)(g)(i.1) Without good and sufficient cause makes an unlawful or unnecessary physical or psychological detention.
- 2(1)(g)(ii) Uses any unnecessary force against a prisoner or other person contacted in the execution of duty.
- 2(1)(g)(iii) collects or attempts to collect identifying information about an individual from the individual in the circumstances to which Ontario Regulation 58/16 (Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties) made under the Act applies, other than as permitted by that regulation;



PUBLIC REPORT

July 30, 2024

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Service Board

From: Myron Demkiw
Chief of Police

**Subject: Semi-Annual Report: Suspended Police Officers –
January 1, 2024 to June 30, 2024**

Purpose: Information Purposes Only Seeking Decision

Recommendation:

This report recommends that the Toronto Police Service Board (Board) receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the recommendation contained in this report.

Summary:

This report covering the period of January 1, 2024 to June 30, 2024, identifies the police officers who are currently suspended from duty with and without pay, and those previously suspended and reinstated within this time period.

Background

At its meeting of August 21, 1997, the Board requested a semi-annual status report on members suspended from the Toronto Police Service (Min. No. P347/97 and C226/01 refer).

Toronto Police Service Board

40 College Street, Toronto, Ontario M5G 2J3 | Phone: 416-808-8080 Fax: 416-808-8082 | www.tpsb.ca

Relevant Board Policies and Compliance

- Toronto Police Services Board policy
- *Police Services Act (P.S.A.)*
- *Community Safety Policing Act (C.S.P.A)*

Discussion:

Lists covering the period from January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024, are attached. These lists identify the police officers who are currently suspended, and those previously suspended and reinstated within the same period; as well as those suspended officers who have resigned, retired or been terminated.

These lists identify ten (10) officers who are currently suspended from duty with pay, one (1) officer suspended without pay, and seven (7) officers who were previously suspended and reinstated within this period. One (1) officer resigned during January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024.

Information regarding the civilian members of the Toronto Police Service who were, or are, currently suspended is provided to the Board in a separate report.

This semi-annual report covers the period of January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024. The table below compares this same six month period for the years 2020 through 2024.

	Suspended With Pay	Suspended Without Pay	Resigned, Retired or Terminated	Suspended and Reinstated	TOTALS
2020	42	1	0	3	46
2021	26	3	3	6	38
2022	11	0	0	7	18
2023	17	2	0	10	29
2024	10	1	1	7	19

Conclusion:

This report covers the period of January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024, and identifies the police officers who are currently suspended from duty with and without pay, those previously suspended and reinstated within this time period, and those suspended officers who have resigned, retired or been terminated.

This report also compares the same period from the previous five years (2020 through 2024).

Staff Superintendent Shannon Dawson, Professionalism and Accountability, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Reason for Confidential Information

Part V *Police Services Act* (P.S.A.) Section 95

“Every person engaged in the administration of this Part shall preserve secrecy with respect to all information obtained in the course of his or her duties under this Part and shall not communicate such information to any other person.”

Respectfully submitted,

Myron Demkiw, M.O.M.
Chief of Police

Attachments:

Confidential Appendix – Charts of police officers who are currently suspended from duty with and without pay, those previously suspended and reinstated, and those suspended officers who have resigned, retired or been terminated for the period of January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024.

**Toronto Police Service Board
Public Meeting
September 12, 2024**

**** Speakers' List ****

1. Confirmation of the Minutes from the regular public meeting held on July 31, 2024 and the Minutes of the Board's Budget Committee Meeting held on August 27, 2024

Deputation: Michael Rein (virtual)

2. Analytics Presentation

Deputations: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)

Nicole Corrado (written submission only)

3. IT Rationalization

Deputations: Kris Lagenfeld (virtual)

Nicole Corrado (written submission only)

4. Toronto Police Service's Multi-Year Hiring Plan

Deputations: Daniel Tate (in person)
Giuseppe Scoleri (virtual)
Camille Rogers (virtual)
Elliot Van Woudenberg (in person)
Sean Meagher (in person)
Dasha Koulia (virtual)
Derek Kreindler (in person)
Jessica Westhead (in person)
Marlee Wasser (in person)
Ruby LaForest (virtual)
Sebastian Decter (in person)
Miguel Avila (in person)
Michael Longfield (in person)
Helen Armstrong (virtual/written submission included)
Val Yu (virtual)

Manisha (in person)
Kris Langenfeld (virtual)
Omo – Adasa Advocay (in person/written submission included)

Howard Morton, Law Union of Ontario (written submission only)
John Sewell (written submission only)
Nicole Coraddo (written submission only)
Jon Reid, President, TPA, (written submission only)

5. 2025-2028 Strategic Plan Update

Deputations: Derek Moran (in person/written submission included)
Miguel Avila (in person)
Kris Langenfeld (virtual)
Ramy Elitzur (virtual)

Howard Morton, Law Union of Ontario (written submission only)

6. 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Completion and Evaluation

Deputations: Nora Ottenhof (virtual)
Miguel Avila (in person)
Susan Davis (virtual)
Nicole Corrado (virtual/written submission included)
Kris Langenfeld (virtual)

11. Contract Awards to Olin Canada ULC, Lloyd Libke Inc. and Rampart International Corp. for Ammunition

Deputation: Nicole Coraddo (written submission only)

13. Budget Variance Reports

Deputations: Derek Moran (in person)
Kris Langenfeld (virtual)

14. Chief's Administrative Investigation Reports

Deputation: Nicole Corrado (written submission only)

15. Ombudsman Report: An Investigation into the Toronto Police Service's Communications About its Vulnerable Persons Registry

Deputations: Nicole Corrado (virtual/written submission included)

John Sewell (written submission only)

16. Professionalism and Accountability – September 2024

Deputations: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)

Nicole Corrado (virtual/written submission included)

17. Semi-Annual Report: Suspended Police Officers – January 1, 2024 – June 30, 2024

Deputation: Kris Langenfeld (virtual)

Name: Nicole Corrado

Agenda item: 2

Format: Written only

The analytics presentation shows two human police officers on two horse officers. The use of horses is outdated and dangerous to the horses. The hard pavement is bad for their feet, and the ice in winter is risky. I saw a police officer in Montreal kicking a horse wearing spiky cleats. This type of abuse is not needed. There are alternatives like drones and bicycles. Horses do not consent to dealing with noise, hard pavement, or angry violent people. Human officers know what they are doing.

<https://www.change.org/p/people-for-the-ethical-treatment-of-animals-peta-ban-the-use-of-police-horses-as-crowd-control-in-the-police-force>. Please modernize policing by retiring the horses to a sanctuary.

Please also continue to detask police through the Toronto Community Crisis Service, Gerstien 911 Diversion, make Toronto Animal Services available 24/7, and provide a Volunteer Citizens On Patrol program like they have in Baie Durfe Quebec.

Name: Nicole Corrado

Agenda item: 3

Format: Written only

The presentation shows two human police officers on two horse officers. The use of horses is outdated and dangerous to the horses. The hard pavement is bad for their feet, and the ice in winter is risky. I saw a police officer in Montreal kicking a horse wearing spiky cleats. This type of abuse is not needed. There are alternatives like drones and bicycles. Horses do not consent to dealing with noise, hard pavement, or angry violent people. Human officers know what they are doing.
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Please also continue to detask police through the Toronto Community Crisis Service, Gerstien 911 Diversion, make Toronto Animal Services available 24/7, and provide a Volunteer Citizens On Patrol program like they have in Baie Durfe Quebec.

Nicole Corrado

Name: OMO

Organization: ADASA

Agenda item: 4. Multi Year Hiring Plan

Format: In person

Note: The following summary deputation is the foundation to which my discussion will be framed around.

****Summary Deputation****

“Good [morning/afternoon/evening], esteemed members of the board,

Today, I want to address the concept of detasking Canadian police, specifically within the context of Toronto. Detasking refers to the process of shifting certain non-criminal responsibilities from police officers to specialized professionals. This approach is increasingly relevant given the current strain on our police services and the growing complexity of the issues they are tasked with addressing.

****Issues and Threats:****

The traditional role of police in Toronto has expanded far beyond crime prevention and emergency response. Officers are frequently dispatched to handle situations involving mental health crises, homelessness, and other social issues that may require specialized intervention. This expansion of duties often stretches police resources thin and can lead to delays in responding to genuine emergencies.

For vulnerable communities, the implications are particularly concerning. When police handle non-criminal issues, there’s a heightened risk of escalating situations unnecessarily. For individuals with mental health challenges or those experiencing homelessness, encounters with law enforcement can result in further trauma rather than resolution. This inadvertently fosters a cycle of criminalization rather than addressing the root causes of these issues.

****Critical Examination of Positives:****

Detasking presents an opportunity to address these challenges. By reallocating responsibilities to professionals who are trained specifically to handle mental health crises or social work, we can ensure that individuals receive appropriate care. This model not only alleviates pressure on police but also improves the overall effectiveness of community services. Detasking can ultimately lead to enhanced safety and well-being for all community members.

****Supporting AI Automated Responders:****

Incorporating AI automated responders into law enforcement can be a key support mechanism. AI can assist by triaging calls and directing them to the appropriate resources—whether it's police, mental health professionals, or social services. By leveraging AI, we can streamline the process of detasking, ensuring that responses are timely and that specialized cases are handled by the right experts. This integration helps in maintaining police focus on criminal activities while ensuring other issues are managed effectively.

In conclusion, detasking and the integration of AI automated responders could significantly enhance the efficiency and equity of our law enforcement approach. Thank you for your time and consideration.”

LAW UNION OF ONTARIO

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September 10, 2024

Chair Ann Morgan
Toronto Police Services Board
40 College St.
Toronto, ON M5G 2J3

Re: Item 4, Multi Year Hiring Plan

Dear Chair Morgan:

We ask the Board to hold proper public consultations about the Multi-Year Hiring Plan proposed by the Toronto Police Service before proceeding further with this Item. City Council should also be advised of this Plan and be given an opportunity to weigh in on it as it will impact future City budgets. Inviting City Councillors “to share feedback” with only two interviews is not enough. The “Community Engagement” involved 73 community members with existing ties to the TPS as “partners” or “Police Liaison Committee” membership. The Public Engagement involved 93 people responding to a TPS-commissioned public survey. More is required.

We have many concerns about the Plan as outlined in the TPS presentation, including:

1. The Plan bakes-in assumptions about policing requirements in Toronto going forward. The Plan is very much a business-as-usual plan crafted to give legitimacy to ever-increasing police budgets. It assumes, for example, that efforts to de-task the police in such areas as mental health crisis intervention will have no impact on policing needs moving forward and that obvious administrative and operational efficiencies will not be pursued and/or achieved. We think these assumptions are unwarranted and have the effect of undermining efforts to reform policing in Toronto.
2. The “Cop-to-Pop” scenario envisages unrealistic population growth projections of between 40,000 to 70,000 *per* year for the City of Toronto. The census figures for the City of Toronto show that in a period of unprecedented high levels of immigration from 2019 to 2023, the City’s population grew by 34,000 a year. A number of factors tell against such continued growth, including changes in immigration policy, changes in employment patterns with more remote work and migration out of the City driven by high housing costs and increasing traffic congestion. It also assumes that 168 officers per 100,000 residents is the minimum appropriate staffing level, an assumption which we and many others in the community challenge.
3. We question both the wisdom and the legality of this Board committing to this Plan, given that the underlying assumptions in the Plan are likely to change and given that the current Board cannot bind the hands of subsequent Boards. While such planning may inform future budget proposals by the TPS and assist a future Board in understanding them, it cannot derogate from the Board’s statutory duties under the Act.

Yours Truly,



Howard Morton, Q.C.
For the Policing Subcommittee of the Law Union of Ontario

Toronto Police Accountability Coalition

info@tpac.ca www.tpac.ca

September 10, 2024.

To Toronto Police Service Board

Subject: Sept 12 agenda,
Item 4, Police multi-year staffing plan

The starting point for any consideration of staffing needs of the Toronto Police service must be a desire to ensure that Toronto is a vibrant and safe city where residents feel and are secure, and a commitment to working collaboratively with other public service providers to reach that goal. We have a good base to build on: of all large cities in Canada, Toronto has the lowest rate of crime, except for Quebec City.

At the same time, we must recognize that safety and security is not just a function of formal policing: it depends on strong publicly funded community and social services, and adequate affordable housing and incomes for all residents. In regard to these factors, Toronto is not doing well, with far too many people who are without housing, living rough or in shelters, and far too many households paying too much of their income for housing, which is requiring the expansion of food banks so people can survive. As well, because of addiction problems, far too many people are forced to buy illegal drugs on the street and those drugs are often poisoned, resulting in far too many deaths from drug overdoses – almost 600 such deaths in 2023, which is ten times higher than the number of people murdered in Toronto that year.

No increase in the number of police officers can address these social and community problems, even though we know that these problems are directly related to increases in rates of crime, particularly among younger members of our city. Too often we think that safety and security is a police

function, when it is much broader and complex than that. Increased public spending is allocated to police services at the expense of social and community services, when more funding to these latter functions will mean we need to spend less on policing, while improving public safety.

Unfortunately, the police service report on multi-year staffing does not touch on these aspects of safety and security. The report discusses four approaches to multi-year staffing, all of which are very mechanical and are based on what might be done with existing police expenditures using abstract indices for increasing staffing levels (or in one scenario), not increasing staffing levels at all. It also compares Toronto police staffing levels with other cities to argue we need more police officers, when those cities are present different complexities and contexts than Toronto, and ignore the fact that those cities with higher number of police per capita have much greater levels of crime.

A better approach

We believe the Board needs to take a more sophisticated approach that assumes that publicly funded community and social services can be tasked with many functions currently performed by TPS officers. As we proposed in our letter of July 25, 2024 (attached), the first place to start is by looking for efficiencies, ways in which policing can be delivered with less cost while being at least as (and perhaps more) effective. As well, there will be a need to consider which police services need more staffing – investigations, for instance – and factor that in.

Once that is done, one can then consider new demands on policing.

The Board must look at and advocate for well-funded social and community services that are required to build stronger communities and consequently reduce rates of crime.

We believe that this kind of analysis needs to be undertaken by a third party able to integrate social, community, and policing needs. We recommend that the Board discuss this kind of approach with city officials before

making a decision in multi-year staffing levels of the Toronto police service.

Yours very truly,

John Sewell for
Toronto Police Accountability Coalition

Name: Nicole Corrado

Agenda item: 4

Format: Written only

Please save money and lives by detasking police. The Toronto Community Crisis Service should be the first response for all non violent mental health calls, and a correspondent for all mental health calls. Gerstien Centre 911 Diversion should not be removed. 911 should be answered by a non police agency. The Toronto Animal Services must be reinstated as a 24/7 service. And please create a volunteer Search and Rescue like Pointe Claire and Baie Durfe, two Quebec municipalities, have. Please also copy Baie Durfe's Volunteer Citizens On Patrol, and look into other non police alternatives for responding. Beaconsfield Quebec has its Vulnerable Persons Registry run by the library.



Submission to the Toronto
Police Service Board

President Jon Reid
Toronto Police Association
September 12, 2024

Chair Morgan, Chief Demkiw, Members of the Toronto Police Service Board and Command, on behalf of the more than 8,000 police and civilian members of the Toronto Police Service we are sending the following deputation in response to **Item #4: Multi-Year Hiring Plan.**

It is our strong position that this plan is void of any utility given our current impasse on collective bargaining.

How can the Board ask Command to provide a multi-year staffing plan with any credibility when it cannot assure its current and prospective members what their fundamentally important terms and conditions of employment will be?

In the absence of a resolved collective agreement, this plan has no basis in the reality in which we currently operate.

Since the Toronto Police Service was granted a \$20M budget increase for 2024, in part due to our advocacy efforts, the organization has struggled to recruit the resources needed to adequately bolster the ranks of the frontline.

Since January 2024, we have lost 288 members to retirement and resignations. In 2023, that number was 413 members. While some rightly reached their years of service, 50% left the Service for other careers in policing or simply were exhausted by the lack of support from the Board, the Mayor and City Council. This is 20% higher than it was in 2019.

The plan proposed today by Chief Demkiw outlines multiple staffing scenarios. But in practice any choice will prove fruitless so long as those interested in policing can join any other service in the province and provide a

better future for their families through a compensation and benefits package that respects their sacrifice.

We are not talking about pennies.

A police officer in Toronto currently makes a base salary of \$109,000. For that money, they are responsible for providing police services in the largest city in Canada, responding to more than two million calls every year. They are faced with rising crime rates and greater risks to their personal safety and wellbeing.

For \$5,000 more they can go to the surrounding police services and arguably work less. In three years, they would make almost \$20,000 more. Why does this matter? Because in the next five years, 85% of the senior officer rank and more than 60% of Staff Sergeants and Detective Sergeants will be eligible to retire. If they can earn \$20,000 more in their last years, they will.

Without more staff coming in or the ability to keep the ones we have; the implications are far greater than you realize.

Lower staffing levels result in higher wait times. With fewer resources available to respond to the increase in calls generated by a growing population, residents will continue to experience double-digit wait times for the most urgent emergencies.

With fewer members available to perform the police responsibilities needed in a city as complex and dynamic as Toronto, the operational budget will continue to be pressured by premium pay because the work does not stop.

There will be greater risk to the Service, its members, and the public. Fewer members equal less supervision and, riskier still, the loss of experienced members means fewer opportunities to mentor others. Without compensation and benefits that compete with neighbouring services, the TPS has no opportunity to recruit lateral hires and bolster its ranks with experience from other organizations.

With further member separations, creating vacancies that can't be filled, the Board will be at risk of breaching its legislated duty to provide adequate and effective policing services to the city of Toronto.

Finally, as described in the plan, without more members the Service will be forced to reduce important programs such as its Neighbourhood Community Officers and further deplete any effort to proactively engage with the public. This has significant consequences for community wellbeing.

It does not have to be this way. But, if the city wants world-class policing, it must be prepared to pay for it. Otherwise, plans like the one proposed today by the Chief will be a waste of time.

A credible multi-year hiring plan has the potential to allow the Service to be staffed to the standard it needs to be at, objectively. We would therefore ask the Chief to join us in asking the Board to provide market leading collective agreements for our uniform and civilian members with a compensation package that would enable the Command team to successfully execute on its multi-year hiring plan.

We are also asking you, Chair Morgan and Councillor Carroll, to revisit your position on our collective agreements with Mayor Chow and bring us a fair

deal that appropriately compensates our current members and provides a strong basis for which others will want to proudly serve this city.

Thank you.

Jon Reid, President
Toronto Police Association

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September 10, 2024

Chair Ann Morgan
Toronto Police Services Board
40 College St.
Toronto, ON M5G 2J3

Re: Item 5, 2025-2028 Strategic Plan Update

Dear Chair Morgan:

As we did for Item 4, Multi-Year Hiring Plan, we ask the Board to hold proper public consultations about the Strategic Plan proposed by the Toronto Police Service. The consultations to date appear to be only for forms sake and the listed consultations are identical to those listed for the Multi-Year Hiring Plan.

The Presentation and accompanying Report from the TPSB Director provide no details about what the actual “priorities and actions” the public and community engagement are supposed to “validate” in the next stage of this process and what the Board will actually approve. The “key guiding principles” and the “draft actions” are too vague to provide any meaningful guidance or plans. Instead, the Plan speaks in blandishments such as “Effectively engage with Toronto’s diverse communities” while offering no details about how this is proposed to be done and what priorities are going to be given for these “draft actions.”

We don’t think the Plan as presently proposed complies with Section 39 of the *Community Safety and Policing Act*. It does not set out the objectives and priorities of the TPS for the next four years in any tangible way. It does not address how the Board and the TPS will improve relations and interactions with racialized groups and youth. It provides no guidance on what the TPS and Board’s plans are to improve interactions with the mentally ill members generally and specifically what priority the TPS and Board place on diverting mental health crisis calls to community agencies. It does not set out “quantitative and qualitative performance objectives and indicators of outcomes” relating to these and other policing areas.

As it presently stands the Strategic Plan does not set out neither tangible strategies nor actionable plans for meeting the challenge of policing in Toronto for the next four years nor any basis for the consultations with community groups and organizations and members of the public as required by the *Act*.

Yours Truly,



Howard Morton, Q.C.
For the Policing Subcommittee of the Law Union of Ontario

Name: Nicole Corrado

Organization: Spiritual Autism Ministries

Agenda item: 6. 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Completion and Evaluation

Format: By WebEx/Phone

Plain text: While 80% of mental health calls involve unarmed individuals experiencing a neurological event, most of these are unfortunately managed by police. Removing the Gerstien Centre 911 Diversion Program on the basis that it is “competition” with the Toronto Community Crisis Service is just absurd. The Gerstien Centre program is a non police telephone operator, and the TCCS is a non police first responder service. They compliment, not compete. Going back to the original police answer 911 model is backwards and will inevitably result in police response rather than TCCS. Especially when, as mentioned in the study by CAMH, the police see the client is a Vulnerable Persons Registry User and they assume, “we know this person, we can respond”. Most autistic black men and boys killed by police had been on a VPR, including Stephon Watts, Ryan Gainer, and countless others. Ryan Gainer, if you recall, was a 15 year old Black and autistic boy who was shot fatally just this year within minutes of police arriving at the home. His “crime”? Neurological dysregulation while raking leaves. This article describes the fatal or serious physical consequences of a police response to an autistic person of colour. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/21/ryan-gainer-autistic-teen-police-killing-california>. As an autistic person, the only reasons I am alive today, at 37, is that I am white and female presenting. I get neurologically dysregulated too, and have found a non police response to be far better than police in reregulating my brain during an episode. I have found simply talking to someone on the phone (even my mother) is calming and regulating. I am particularly concerned by the “cold” response of now refusing to ask a client if they want police or not. Please save lives by reversing the decision to end the Gerstien Centre 911 Diversion program. Instead of having police answer 911 and decide who to transfer to, please have a non police agency answer 911 (Gerstien, firefighters, paramedics, TAIBU, volunteer search and rescue, etc) who then decides if police are needed. Please also consider a corespondent program like MCIT or TCCS plus police for calls that require police, like an “elopee” (person goes missing due to a neurological dysregulation), a child in crisis, a suicidal person, an injured person, or someone with an actual weapon (not just some vaguely sharp random item that couldn’t kill anyone). TCCS is very capable of handling any situation.

Name: Nicole Corrado

Agenda item: 11. Contract Awards to Olin Canada ULC, Lloyd Libke Inc. and Rampart International Corp. for Ammunition

Format: Written only

Plain text: Stop wasting nearly a million dollars on bullets. Consider how much the library could use on books. Reading reduces crime.

Name: Nicole Corrado

Agenda item: 14. Chief's Administrative Investigation Reports

Format: Written only

Two items deal with mental health. One involves a man who was dysregulated and had a meltdown in an ambulance. Instead of respecting his need to move his body, police violently handcuffed him. This man was not "arrested" under the Mental Health Act, he was violently apprehended. This could have been avoided by having a properly trained response like Toronto Community Crisis Service treat the client in neurological distress. Paramedics and police need better training too from neurodivergent people. The second item deals with a man who was suicidal. Police didn't know he had a gun. He shot himself but thankfully survived. I thank the police for saving him. This case proves that, even if a mental health crisis call involves a weapon, it doesn't have to involve police using violence. Thank you for handling this situation humanely! You deserve an award!

Nicole Corrado

Name: Nicole Corrado

Agenda item: 15. Ombudsman Report: An Investigation into the Toronto Police Service's Communications About its Vulnerable Persons Registry

Format: By WebEx/Phone

This item is very close to my heart. I am autistic and a self registered user of the Vulnerable Persons Registry in Beaconsfield Quebec. When I lived in Toronto I used the TPSVPR. The TPSVPR is misunderstood even in this Ombudsman report. For one, a person can self register and is even encouraged to. The problem is, the form can not be read ahead of time. This is problematic for a person who needs to be prepared for a task. Also, the form is an incident report form. This has the unfortunate consequence of referring to the person and their photograph as an incident. That is dehumanizing. The TPSVPR was not created in connection with any actual persons with disabilities. That is the problem. The Beaconsfield Quebec VPR is better because it is for self registration, calls people humans, and is run by and managed by the city library, not police.

Nicole Corrado

Toronto Police Accountability Coalition

info@tpac.ca www.tpac.ca

September 10, 2024.

To Toronto Police Service Board

Subject: Sept 12 agenda, Item 15
Vulnerable Persons Registry

It is clear from the Ombudsman's report that the Police Service has not managed the registry with the attention required. While the police attend annually to more than 30,000 calls regarding mental health calls, only 305 people have registered with the registry. As the Ombudsman notes, communication with the public lacks 'clarity, meaning and accuracy.'

The Ombudsman agrees that the police should seek a third party to manage the registry. The chief stated in January of this year that the service was looking for a third party manager, and here we are, nine months later and that has not been completed. It is as though the search for a third party manager is subject to the same lack of attention as the registry itself.

It would also be useful if current users of the current system were asked for their experience using it: that might help to tweak arrangements before some other company is brought in.

We urge the Board to take in hand the search for a third party manager (such as Medic Alert) and ensure it is in place no later than the end of 2024.

Yours very truly,

John Sewell for
Toronto Police Accountability Coalition

Name: Nicole Corrado

Agenda item: 16. Professionalism and Accountability – September 2024

Format: By WebEx/Phone

This item is very close to my heart. I am autistic and a self registered user of the Vulnerable Persons Registry in Beaconsfield Quebec. When I lived in Toronto I used the TPSVPR. The TPSVPR is misunderstood even in this Ombudsman report. For one, a person can self register and is even encouraged to. The problem is, the form can not be read ahead of time. This is problematic for a person who needs to be prepared for a task. Also, the form is an incident report form. This has the unfortunate consequence of referring to the person and their photograph as an incident. That is dehumanizing. The TPSVPR was not created in connection with any actual persons with disabilities. That is the problem. The Beaconsfield Quebec VPR is better because it is for self registration, calls people humans, and is run by and managed by the city library, not police.

Nicole Corrado