Public Meeting

March 23, 2017

Auditorium – Police Headquarters
1:00 PM

Public Meeting - Agenda

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1.   Call to Order

2.   Moment of Silence – the Board will observe a moment of silence in memory of RCMP Constable Richer Dubuc who died while on duty on March 6, 2017 in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec.

3.   Declarations of Interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

4.   Confirmation of the Minutes from the meeting held on February 23, 2017.

Presentations

5.   "Understanding the Impact of Police Stops" – a report dated January 17, 2017 prepared for the Toronto Police Services Board by Anthony N. Doob and Rosemary Gartner

A copy of the report is here.

Professor Doob and Professor Gartner will deliver a presentation with respect to their report.

Deputations – refer to speakers list which will be available at the meeting.

6.   Consent Agenda

6.1   February 16, 2017 from Roberto Rossini, Deputy City Manager & Chief Financial Officer, City of Toronto
        Re: Update on the Shared Services Project

6.2   March 07, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: Special Constables: Appointments and Re-Appointments

6.3   March 01, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Semi-Annual Report: Write-off of Uncollectible Accounts Receivable Balances: July to December 2016**

6.4   March 23, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2016 Use of Conducted Energy Weapons**

6.5   March 02, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2016 Hate/Bias Crime Statistics**
        A copy of the full report is here.

6.6   February 13, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2016 Parking Enforcement Unit – Parking Ticket Issuance**

6.7   March 01, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2016 Proof of Claim Documents Filed on Behalf of the Board**

6.8   March 01, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2016 Uniform Promotions**

6.9   March 01, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2016 Secondary Activities**

6.10   February 10, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2016 Auxiliary Members – Termination of Appointments**

6.11   March 01, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2016 Labour Relations Counsel and Legal Indemnification: Cumulative Legal Costs**

6.12   February 03, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Annual Report: 2017 Filing of Toronto Police Service Procedures**

Reports Deferred from the Previous Meeting - none

Items for Consideration

7.   February 08, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Response to City Council Motions – Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians**

8.   March 02, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Suicide Prevention Mental Health Support for First Responders**

9.   March 07, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
        Re: **Vendor of Record – Transforming Corporate Support Capital Project**

10. March 01, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Toronto Police Service: 2016 Capital Budget Variance Report for the Period Ending December 31, 2016**

11. March 01, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Toronto Police Service: 2017-2026 Capital Program Request - Revised**

12. March 01, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Toronto Police Service: 2017 Operating Budget Request - Revised**

13. January 13, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Chief's Administrative Investigation: Firearms Injury to Peter Logaridis**

14. February 14, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Chief's Administrative Investigation: Firearms Injury to Daniel Duarte-Alvarez**

15. January 23, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Chief's Administrative Investigation: Custody Injury to Youth 2016-A**

16. February 15, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Chief's Administrative Investigation: Custody Injury to Sean Gill**

17. February 10, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Chief's Administrative Investigation: Custody Injury to Satinderpal Banwait**

18. January 13, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Chief's Administrative Investigation: Custody Injury to Michael Fuentes-Alfaro**

19. January 23, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Chief's Administrative Investigation: Alleged Sexual Assault Complainant 2016-B**

20. January 23, 2017 from Mark Saunders, Chief of Police
    Re: **Chief's Administrative Investigation: Alleged Sexual Assault Complainant 2016-D**

Correspondence Arising from Previous Business

21. February 21, 2017 from Steven Del Duca, Minister of Transportation
    Re: **Response to Recommendation to Amend Highway Traffic Act – Directing Traffic**

Adjournment

Next Meeting

Date: Thursday, April 20, 2017
Time: 1:00 PM

Members of the Toronto Police Services Board

Andy Pringle, Chair   Marie Moliner, Member
Chin Lee, Councillor & Vice-Chair   Dhun Noria, Member
Shelley Carroll, Councillor & Member   John Tory, Mayor & Member
Ken Jeffers, Member

Moment of Silence – the Board will observe a moment of silence in memory of RCMP Constable Richer Dubuc who died while on duty on March 6, 2017 in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec.

Declarations of interest under the *Municipal Conflict of Interest Act*.

Confirmation of the Minutes from the meeting that was held on February 23, 2017.

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF POLICE STOPS

Anthony N. Doob and Rosemary Gartner

Centre for Criminology & Sociolegal Studies
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Understanding the Impact of Police Stops

Anthony N. Doob and Rosemary Gartner

17 January 2017

Contents

Introduction

Imagine that technology existed such that the police could, electronically, identify and track everyone and every motor vehicle in the city and that this information were stored electronically and available to the police, as required, for solving crime. Even if such information was not admissible as evidence, one could easily see its possible value in solving crime. If a home were broken into, one only would have to search a data base to find out who had been in the neighbourhood. If a pedestrian were hit by a car that did not remain at the scene of the accident, one would only need to see what vehicles had been at that scene around the time of the accident to narrow down the possible suspects considerably. If a person were found to be using or in possession of drugs, one would only need to see whom that person had been in close contact with in recent times to identify a fairly small group of suspects as the source of those drugs. If a person were thought to be a member of a gang, it would be easy to find out whom that person associated with on a regular basis.

We don't live in such a society. Obviously the information that the police have about the non-criminal activities of ordinary citizens is much more limited than that described in the previous paragraph. But what if it turned out we did live in the world described in the previous paragraph and people suddenly expressed the desire no longer to live in a world with constant and complete police scrutiny of their ordinary activities? One could imagine the suggestion would be made that not allowing police the kind of surveillance described in the previous paragraph would limit their ability to solve crime.

We raise this hypothetical scenario for a particular reason: There is no point in arguing whether complete or highly detailed information about the day-to-day movements or meetings that Canadians have *might* be useful to the police in solving crime. At a more mundane level, we see on an almost daily basis that footage from 'security' cameras is now routinely used to solve crime in a manner not too different from that described above.

Our second example comes closer to the issue of police stops. Imagine that there were no controls whatsoever on the power of the police to stop pedestrians and motorists and ask them to identify themselves. Even if, in law, citizens were not required to identify themselves or to answer any questions, one could argue that maintaining whatever information was obtained could be useful if a crime took place in that neighbourhood or someone associated with the person who had been stopped was suspected of some wrongdoing. That this information could potentially be useful is not the point. The question that needs to be raised in both of these examples is a much more complex one: What might be the 'costs' and 'benefits' to society of these kinds of data gathering programs?

Even these two hypothetical scenarios are missing something crucial: comparison groups. The question, in most public policy areas, is not whether there are some successful outcomes from a particular procedure, but whether there are *better* outcomes *overall* than there might be under some other procedure. For example, in each of the hypothetical scenarios described above, it might be that deployment of resources in some quite different way or a decision to address some quite different problem would serve the community better than the scenarios described. Or such procedures as described earlier might help solve crime but would lessen cooperation with the police on important matters. Comparison groups or procedures typically are not employed adequately when assessing possible policy choices, but in reality the need for a 'comparison' is usually important. In a discussion about police equipment (e.g., body worn cameras), not only might one want to know whether they affect police or citizen behaviour (implying a comparison with how police or citizens behave without the device), but a serious policy analysis should include an analysis of alternative uses of the resources that would be required for the purchase and use of the devices.

An example of the inappropriate use of implied comparisons is when changes in police strength or police tactics are implemented after an unusual (e.g., serious, violent) incident. When police, understandably, change their approach to policing a neighbourhood that experienced an unusual incident or high concentration of serious incidents, they sometimes infer that any subsequent return to 'normal' levels of crime is 'caused' by changes they made in their presence in the neighbourhood. Without adequate comparison areas (e.g., areas that experienced a 'spike' that did not result in changes in policing), such causal inferences simply aren't defensible.

The issues become more complex when one moves closer to reality. One fact about crime that noone questions is that it is not evenly (or even randomly) distributed across people, groups of people, or neighbourhoods in our society. Young males, for example, are disproportionately more likely to be involved in a variety of different kinds of crime than other people. People who live in certain kinds of neighbourhoods are more likely to commit offences than people in other neighbourhoods. But some neighbourhoods themselves appear to have characteristics that make them more likely to be the sites for crime above and beyond the characteristics of the individuals who live in them (see, for example, the research summaries provided on pages B1 and B2: 1-2-2; 6-2-7[1]). In this context, a policing

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[1] Hereafter, we will simply cite the page number in Part B of this report for the full summary from *Criminological Highlights*. The numbers that follow are the *Criminological Highlights* reference (volume, issue number, item number). The "Part B" page numbers are at the bottom right of each page.

perspective that did not consider any other concerns could justify focusing surveillance resources on certain neighbourhoods or types of people (e.g., young males). The problem is that there almost always *are* other concerns, and concerns that could easily have the effect of undermining the crime control goal of proactive policing activities, such as police stops.

This report examines some of the more reliable research that has been carried out on issues broadly related to 'street stops' of ordinary citizens. It makes the assumption that stops can have more than one effect and that some of these effects might, broadly speaking, be favourable and others unfavourable. Hence this report is more than an attempt to answer the question of whether street stops have a short term effect on local crime.

We are not claiming to provide an exhaustive review of the literature that summarizes all of the research on issues related to street stops. Were we to do so, we would spend considerable resources reviewing and discarding inadequate research papers. Instead we are relying on *Criminological Highlights*, a research information service, produced by the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies of the University of Toronto.[2] The papers summarized in this information service not only have been reviewed by reputable social science journals, but also by our editorial board (currently of about 11 people), which has read and evaluated each paper that is summarized in *Criminological Highlights*. The one page summaries of articles we cite are attached to this report and are an integral part of it. Most importantly, these summaries make it easy for readers to evaluate the information on which our conclusions are based.

Evaluating the evidence on 'police crackdowns'

One of the difficulties in separating effective policing strategies from ineffective ones is that during the time that the most experimentation on these issues was carried out – starting in the early 1990s – crime was decreasing in many areas of the US, Canada, and in some other countries. Hence, where the comparison was 'what was happening before the change in police activities,' almost any policing strategies appeared to be effective. Perhaps the most famous example of this was in New York City where the police chief (William Bratton) took credit for a drop in crime, suggesting that aggressive policing of disorder was responsible for a more than 50% decrease in homicides. His argument would have been more persuasive if relatively comparable drops in crime had not occurred in a number of US cities that did not change their policing strategies (B3:1-4-5). But in addition, the overall pattern of the decreases in homicide (e.g., similar decreases in firearms homicides for men and women; decreases in non-firearm homicides for all age groups) do not fit the conclusion that it was aggressive policing *per se* that was responsible for the drop, though it is possible that massive attempts to keep firearms off the street and out of public places could have had some impact, at least on firearms homicides (B4:2-5-7).

A careful analysis of the changes in policing strategies and crime rates that took place in three cities illustrates this problem. All three cities had police interventions. All three cities also experienced decreases in their homicide rates. A careful analysis of the effects in two cities (New York and Boston), which compared their crime trends with those of 95 other cities, showed no consistent effects of the interventions. Only in Richmond, Virginia, was there some evidence that the police intervention had an impact. However, one simple fact makes that conclusion problematic: Richmond's homicide rate varied from about 80 to 36 homicides per 100,000 residents; the 95 "comparison cities" varied from about 20 to 13. Clearly the "comparisons cities" were much safer that Richmond to begin with and so could not be considered to be appropriate comparisons (B5:7-5-2).

The need, in research on issues such as the effectiveness of police interventions, is not just for *any* comparison group. What is needed is a comparison city (or other location) that is similar in all ways other than the fact that an intervention took place.

The police and crime: Hotspots and intensive police activities

Nobody seriously questions the importance of the police as a key agency in the criminal justice system. The disagreements that arise about the importance of the police in preventing crime arise largely in discussions about the degree to which the police can affect the amount of crime that occurs in society and whether particular broad approaches to policing can be relied on to reduce crime.

Some issues aren't necessary to discuss. For example, the issue of what crime rates would look like if there were no police (e.g., if a strike were to take place) has little bearing on the issue of what effect variations in the normal activities or concentration of police might have on crime. At the same time, it is worth remembering that police services are not the only important determinant of crime, or of variation in crime over time. Various scholars have noted that police services are not well placed to stop a good deal of crime. The apprehension, and contributions to the successful prosecution, of those who offend is important in and of itself. But other organizations are also involved in crime prevention. For example, one of the apparent 'crime prevention' successes in recent years – reduction in auto thefts – relates more to engineering and design than to traditional policing (see B6:7-5-1, and B7:16-1-8).

This is not to say that the police cannot affect crime rates in a neighbourhood. There is sufficient research on the policing of so-called 'hot spots' – locations in which high rates of crime take place over an extended period of time – to know that 'hot spot' policing *can* reduce crime. Fortunately, there is sufficient evidence on this issue that it is plausible to draw certain (at least tentative) conclusions.

The context for one study was concern about firearms misuse in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In response to this concern, concentrations of police were increased dramatically (20% to 50%) in local areas in which there was evidence of illegal carrying of firearms in public places. The increased police presence occurred at times and locations that had been high in crime. These newly deployed police did not respond to normal calls for service but, instead, concentrated on 'stopping and talking' to people whom they considered to be at high risk for carrying firearms. Essentially, visible police presence increased dramatically. Using "assault related gunshot injuries" and reports of "shots fired" as measures of success, it appeared that this high concentration of police in small local areas was successful in suppressing firearms violations while the police were there. Perhaps not surprisingly, however, the effectiveness of the strategy seemed to be limited to the times and locations in which the police concentration was high (B8:7-6-1).

A very similar result (in the same city) was found for concentrated enforcement of drug laws in locations that the police had identified as 'nuisance bars' where illegal drug sales were taking place. Although the results are somewhat complex, essentially the 'positive' impact of concentrated police action was quite local (suppressing drug sales in the establishment that was targeted and the immediate area only) and, more importantly, the reduction in illegal drug activity did not last long after enforcement was reduced to normal levels (B9:6-3-5).

Sometimes there is a conflict between what the police say about a targeted program and what systematic evidence demonstrates. An effort by London, England, police to interrupt

drug trafficking by arresting those selling drugs on the street provides such an illustration. The goal had been to make drug purchases more difficult and more expensive. Though the police described it as a "spectacular success", systematic evidence collected from drug users suggests that this wasn't the case (B10: 4-5-3).

These findings are similar to the impact of intensive foot patrols on crime. In Philadelphia, in 2009, 120 'hotspots' for serious crime (homicide, aggravated assaults, robberies) were identified. In 60 of them intensive patrols were instituted; the other 60 locations served as controls. The locations that got the intensive patrols were randomly assigned; hence prior to the intervention it is reasonable to assume that locations the received intensive patrols were similar to those that did not. A careful analysis of the project demonstrated that there was approximately one crime averted in the areas subjected to intensive patrols for every 2174 person-hours of patrol (B11:12-3-3). However, these effects were short lived. After the high concentration patrols stopped, the effects disappeared (B12:13-3-2).

The mechanism for these effects appears to be fairly simple: People do not offend when they perceive there is a high likelihood of being apprehended by the police. However, even these effects seem to be more pronounced when the police concentrate their 'suppression' efforts on specific named individuals who are thought to be involved in crime (B13:15-2-3). Presumably, focusing activities that make the presence of police salient to those most likely to commit offences is, simply, more efficient. In another study, it was shown that high density patrols in which police officers engaged in various activities, such as checks of buildings, vehicles, and pedestrians, as well as other activities that made their presence known, had some favourable impacts on certain crimes. What was a bit surprising, however, is that the effects were limited to reducing non-domestic firearms assaults (and not, for example, firearms robberies). It appeared that focusing police attention on arrests and checking occupied vehicles accounted for the crime reducing effect. One important aspect of this study was that it dealt with very small geographic areas (each area had an average of 128 residents). These geographic areas were *randomly* assigned to receive policing as usual, high density (ordinary) policing, or high density 'active' policing. Without the control conditions, it would have been impossible to determine what the effects really were since firearms crimes decreased in all areas (B14:14-5-3).

Clearly under some circumstances high visibility active police presence in a community can reduce crime. One obvious mechanism, already mentioned, is that such activities increase the perceived likelihood of apprehension for those who might otherwise commit offences. Police enforcement programs for traffic offences that are visible to ordinary drivers – often because their implementation is combined with media campaigns – can be effective in reducing serious traffic accidents in large part because people change their behaviour if they

perceive a high likelihood of apprehension (B15:7-6-7). It has been suggested, more generally, that police should, in their crime control efforts, focus on activities that increase the perceived likelihood of apprehension (B16:11-6-1).

It is important, however, to note that simply increasing the number of police officers in a jurisdiction does not necessarily lead to a decrease in crime. During the period 1995-2000, the US Department of Justice gave some local police services funds for the hiring of more police officers. Since funds were not distributed equally across cities, it was possible to see whether the new funds had a consistent impact on crime. There were no consistent effects (B17:8-6-6), perhaps because the size of the increases in police was, on average, quite small.

The lesson seems to be that 'more' is not necessarily better; resources need to be targeted to activities that can be demonstrated to have favourable impacts.

"Broken windows" policing and proactive police stops and searches: Effects on crime.

In considering whether 'disorder' in neighbourhoods should be viewed as a 'crime problem', probably the first thing to assess is whether 'neighbourhood disorder' is causally linked to crime. One study (B18: 3-3-1), carried out in Chicago, examined this directly.

Social disorder (e.g., adults loitering or congregating in public places, public alcohol consumption, drug selling) and physical disorder (e.g., presence of garbage or litter, graffiti, abandoned cars) were quite highly correlated. Not surprisingly, "disordered" neighbourhoods were poorer, more likely to have high concentrations of immigrants, and lower in "collective efficacy" (i.e., the willingness of neighbours to "do something" in response to problems, trust in one's neighbours, neighbourhood social cohesion, etc.). Collective efficacy has been found in previous studies to be an important predictor of neighbourhood crime above and beyond characteristics of the individuals in the neighbourhood.

The most important findings, however, were that measures of social and physical disorder (what some have termed "broken windows") were *not* related to personal violence and household burglary (assessed by victimization measures) once characteristics of the neighbourhood (e.g., collective efficacy, mixed land use) were controlled for. "The results are consistent and point to a spurious association of disorder with predatory crime" (p. 627[3]).

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[3] Page references for quotes are the page in the original article where the quote appeared. The citation can be found in the cited *Criminological Highlights* summary in Part B.

When examining officially recorded crime, "disorder" once again disappeared as a predictor of homicide and burglary once measures of collective efficacy and prior crime rates were controlled for. "The key result is that the influences of structural characteristics and collective efficacy on burglary, robbery, and homicide are not mediated by neighbourhood disorder" (p. 629). The exception was officially recorded measures of robbery where there was a relationship with disorder even after controlling for other factors. Whether this is due to a "complex feedback loop" (p. 637) or an artifact of official data (e.g., "citizen calls to the police or police accuracy in recording robberies is greater in areas perceived to be high in disorder" --p. 638) is not clear.

The authors of this study concluded that: "The active ingredients in crime seem to be structural disadvantage and attenuated collective efficacy more than disorder. Attacking public disorder through police tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce crime, mainly because such a strategy leaves the common origins of both [disorder and crime], but especially [crime] untouched. A more subtle approach suggested by this article would look to how informal but collective efforts among residents to stem disorder may provide unanticipated benefits for increasing collective efficacy... in the long run lowering crime" (p. 638).

In this context, then, it is not surprising that attempts to deal with serious crime by focusing on those responsible for minor disorder (e.g., those using drugs in public) are not likely to be effective. One study (B-19: 8-5-8) noted that if the police 'theory' is that the way to deal with important crime is to crack down on less serious matters, such as using marijuana in public view, then the police can easily (though not necessarily purposefully) create findings that make it seem that a crackdown was effective. This study found that the locations with the biggest *drop* in crime were those with the largest *increases* in crime in the period immediately before marijuana arrests had been instituted as a crime control technique. The police, presumably believing that public order arrests would reduce crime, focused on those locations with the largest increases in recent years. In fact, the precincts with the largest violent crime decline after the public order arrests started were those that had the largest increases in crime in earlier years and, coincidentally, the largest 'crack down' on using marijuana in public places. When the violent crime rate prior to the marijuana crackdown or the change in violent crime prior to the marijuana arrest policy is taken into account, those locations with the *most* marijuana arrests had higher, not lower, levels of violent crime.

These findings are very similar to another study (B20: 8-4-1) that demonstrated the necessity of controlling adequately for pre-existing changes in crime rates.[4]

Not surprisingly, the research on the impact of 'order maintenance policing' – the aggressive targeting of minor problems (vagrancy, loitering, littering, prostitution, etc. – is not entirely consistent across studies. One study (B21:9-1-2) suggested that about 4% of the decline in homicide and robbery in New York between 1988 and 2001 was due to variation in the implementation of order maintenance policing. The other 96% of the decline was, presumably, due to other factors. It is possible, however, that the precincts in which order maintenance policing was implemented most aggressively also implemented other policies related to crime. In any case, it is almost certainly safe to conclude that variation in this form of aggressive policing was not responsible for much of the drop in crime in New York City during this period.

One theory used to justify 'order maintenance policing' is that frequent police stops and 'zero tolerance' policies for minor infractions send a message to the community that crime of any sort won't be tolerated. Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to be that simple. One study (B22:4-5-4), for example, found that targeting aggressive enforcement at minor infractions might have increased compliance with these minor matters, but had little measurable impact on real crime. The authors of the paper concluded that "[q]uality of life initiatives are often employed without the benefit of careful problem identification or analysis, without any effort to identify underlying conditions and causes, and without careful consideration of a wide range of possible alternatives" (p. 880).

One study (B23:15-5-2) that looked at 28 relatively high quality studies of 'policing disorder interventions' found very small effects on crime, but all of the favourable (crime reducing) effects were attributable to those studies involving community problem solving. Those programs that attempted to carry out 'aggressive order maintenance' programs (e.g., focusing on minor forms of disorder such as public drunkenness, prostitution, vandalism, disorderly youth, or traditional arresting of those thought to be gang members) did not show statistically significant effects. The authors concluded that "When considering a policing disorder approach, police departments should adopt a 'community co-production model' rather than drift toward a zero-tolerance policing model, which focuses on a subset of social incivilities…." (p. 581). This latter approach appears to be ineffective.

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[4] Essentially what we are referring to here is a phenomenon sometimes called "regression to the mean" which refers to circumstances where, when an observation that is first made is extreme, it will 'naturally' tend to be closer to the mean on a subsequent observation. A mundane example might be that if it is unusually cold on Day 1, it is more likely that the Day 2 temperature will be warmer (closer to the mean) on Day 2.

"Stop, question, and frisk" (SQF) approaches to order maintenance have been criticised on a number of grounds, including that they are racially targeted. In New York City, for example, it was found (B24:14-5-4) that there were 26 stops of Black people per 100 Black residents, compared to 3 stops of White people per 100 White people. The results reported in this study regarding crime, however, were less clear. The results "show few significant effects of several 'stop, question and frisk' (SQF) measures on precinct robbery and burglary rates" (p. 116) and the significant results did not hold across crimes or type of analyses. A cautious conclusion, according to the authors, might be that one "cannot conclude from the current investigation that SQF has no impact on crime in New York. But we can be more certain that, if there is an impact, it is so localized and dissipates so rapidly that it fails to register in annual precinct crime rates, much less the decade-long citywide crime reductions that public officials have attributed to the policy. If SQF is effective, but its effects are highly focused and fleeting, policy-makers must decide whether expansions in a policy that already produces nearly 700,000 police stops a year are warranted, especially given the ongoing controversy regarding the disproportionate impact of SQF on racial and ethnic minorities and the possibility that it reduces police legitimacy, which may erode its crime-reduction effects over the long term" (p. 117-118).

Another study (B25:15-6-3) that looked in detail at SQF approaches in New York City found that "in the peak years of SQFs in NYC, the almost 700,000 SQFs would lead to only a 2% decline in crime" (p. 47). Attributing the decline in crime solely to SQF is problematic in that it is impossible to separate out the effect of SQF on crime from the mere presence of police. In addition, attributing this modest drop in crime to SQF ignores the "degree that SQFs are coupled with other policing strategies" (p. 49). Specifically, "[i]n light of research findings on the effectiveness of directed patrol, the prolonged presence of police in a crime hot spot might very well be the active ingredient of SQFs, as opposed to anything that the police were doing" (p. 61). As one commentator noted "the efficacy of the SQF tactic, at least from the standpoint of marginal deterrence, is considerably more ambiguous than its advocates might like to admit" (p. 62). Finally, even if there is a small effect, it is impossible to know whether this effect relates only to certain types of SQFs (e.g., those involving actual offenders).

Changes in policing do not necessarily have simple effects. For example, the previous study (B25: 15-6-3) noted that "The aggressive use of SQFs could erode citizens' willingness to report crime to, or to cooperate in investigation or intelligence gathering with, the police. In a recent survey… young respondents who were stopped more frequently reported less willingness to report crimes even when they were the crime victims" (p. 63). Even if it could be shown that the apparent effects of SQFs on crime are due to SQFs and not some other correlated factor, "[t]he question is whether this approach [SQFs] is the best one for crime

prevention at hot spots and whether its benefits are greater than its potential negative impacts on citizen evaluations of police legitimacy" (p. 50). But in addition, one study (B26:10-3-4) found that intensive policing of some neighbourhoods in which the police engaged in crackdowns on street-level disorder *increased,* rather than decreased, the likelihood that people would feel unsafe in their neighbourhoods.

Police stops: Race

It would be almost impossible, and inappropriate, to discuss police stops of citizens and not talk about race. We hasten to point out, however, that we do not think that the issue of race is the only one relevant to concerns about police stops. Nevertheless, it is hardly controversial to suggest that race is an important factor to be concerned about.

One of the reasons that we should be concerned about the relationship of race to the likelihood of being stopped is that the perception that racial profiling takes place leads to inferences by many citizens that the police are acting in an illegitimate fashion (B27:7-1-4).

A number of different studies have attempted to determine whether police stops (and searches) disproportionately target members of certain racialized groups. One Canadian study (B28: 12-5-5), using a nationally representative survey of 4,164 youths, found that youths who were Black, Arab/Middle Eastern or Aboriginal were more likely to be questioned by the police than other youths (White or East/South Asian) even when other potentially relevant factors were controlled for. These 'other factors' included such things as staying out late or low income. But in addition, controlling for three forms of self-reported delinquency did *not* reduce the higher likelihood that youths who were Black/Aboriginal/Arab/Middle Eastern would be stopped. More interesting, perhaps, is the finding that among youths who reported involvement in violence in the previous year, those who were Black/Aboriginal/Arab/Middle Eastern were no more likely to be stopped by police than other youth. However, there was a sizable difference in level of police contact for youths who had *not* been involved in violent crime in the previous year: 28.5% of Black/Aboriginal/Arab/Middle Eastern youths had contact with the police compared to only 10.1% of the other youths. The overall finding, and the fact that the effect was due largely to differential treatment of non-violent youths, lends some support to the conclusion that the difference in treatment of the two groups relates to racial targeting by the police.

These findings are fairly similar to those from a representative survey of Toronto high school students (B29: 16-3-4), which found that Black high school students were considerably more likely to be stopped at least once than were white high school students (63% vs. 41%). 30% of high school youths of other races reported being stopped at least once. Other variables also predicted stops and/or searches including social class, the level of

engagement in public activities on the street, involvement in partying, frequency of driving, involvement in illegal activities, and membership in gangs. However, while these factors independently predicted stops and searches, being Black had an impact above and beyond these factors for Toronto high school students. This study also included a sample of 'street youths' – those living on the street or in a shelter. For the street youths, race did *not* predict stops or searches. 66% of the street youths met the criteria set in the study for being 'highly involved in illegal activities.' It would seem that "high criminality exposes people of all races to equal levels of police scrutiny" (p. 341). Hence, street youths, as a group, had a very high likelihood of being stopped and searched no matter what their race. At the other end of the spectrum, however, for youths who reported *no* involvement in illegal activities, 4% of the White youths and 27% of the Black youths reported multiple police stops. It seems that "good behaviour does not protect Black youth from police contact to the same extent that it protects White youth" (p. 340).

There have been a number of studies in various countries about the differential treatment of people of different races by the police. As various authors have pointed out, (e.g., B30: 7-2-2), determining what the 'expected' rate of stops for any group is not simple. But in addition, the vulnerability of different groups to being stopped seems to vary across areas. People who appear to be 'out of place' (e.g., Black motorists in predominantly white areas) appear to be particularly likely to be stopped (B31:5-4-2).

There are even more complex findings on what happens *after* citizens are stopped by the police. A study (B32:13-2-8) in St. Louis, Missouri, found that after a stop of a motorist for a traffic violation, searches were most likely to take place when White officers stopped Black drivers (searches took place in 8.2% of stops) and were least likely when Black officers stopped White drivers (1.5% of stops). Between these two extremes, White officers were more likely to search White drivers (5.1% of stops) than were Black officers who stopped Black drivers (3.9% of stops). But in addition, this pattern varied according to the racial makeup of the neighbourhood in which the stop took place.

The consequences of being stopped also appear to vary across race. One study (B33: 6-4-4) based on a survey of US residents found that Blacks and Hispanics who are stopped were more likely to be subject to police actions (such as being ticketed, arrested or being subject to the use of force). However, Blacks and Hispanics were less likely to be found to be involved in any criminal wrongdoing, suggesting, perhaps, that "targeting drivers solely or even partially on the basis of their race/ethnicity is not an effective, efficient, or responsible policing strategy at the national level [in the U.S.]" (p.82). These findings are similar to those of another study (B34: 12-1-7) which summarized the findings from 27 independent high quality studies of what happens to suspects when they come in contact with the police.

Depending on exactly what outcome was considered, between 19 and 24 of the 27 studies show effects supporting the conclusion that minorities are more likely to be arrested than whites. Pooling across the 27 studies there was a significant effect of race. On average the arrest rate for whites was about 20%; for minorities it was about 26%. Studies varied, of course, on how adequately they controlled for legally relevant factors. However, the adequacy of the controls for legally relevant factors was not related to the race effect: Even in the best studies, Blacks were more likely to be arrested than Whites. Similarly, those studies that attempted to control for the demeanour of the suspect showed race effects on the outcome of police decisions as large as those that did not.

In this context, then, it is not surprising that Blacks are more likely than others to perceive that policing decisions are made, in part, along racial lines (B35: 3-1-3).

Importantly, one does need to consider that even stops that don't lead to any formal criminal justice consequences can have negative impacts on people. It appears (B36:14-5-2) that people become less engaged with their communities if they are subject to what might be considered 'unproductive' police stops.

A related issue: Warnings

Although warnings given to those stopped and questioned by police are not central to the question about the 'impact' of police stops, there is a growing literature on this topic. A question underlying much of this research is a simple one: Do warnings effectively convey to people what they legally do and do not have to do? Said differently, if people agree to answer questions, or agree to being identified and searched after being warned about potential consequences, is it safe to assume that they understand the warning? We won't go into this literature in great detail but we think it should be considered in when thinking about the effects of police stops.

The first finding – and one that may help explain other findings from this line of research -- is that "warnings" given to suspects by the police do *not* seem to affect the ability of an accused person to resist giving a confession (B37: 5-5-5). Another (US) study (B38: 13-4-2) similarly found that warnings do little to protect accused youths from the consequences of making statements.

More relevant are two Canadian studies that examined whether warnings given to adults (B-39: 11-3-7) or to youths (B40: 15-6-7) are adequately understood by those who receive the warning from the police. The conclusion of these two studies is simple: Warnings are not well understood by either adults or youths.

The study of warnings given to Canadian youths concluded that perhaps because warnings are often long and written in language that is difficult for youths to understand, it is it not surprising that young people do not fully understand the warnings that are normally used by police. "Also of importance was the fact that participants [who were read the warnings used by their local police] reported high levels of confidence in how much they understood and almost always confirmed that they understood the rights that were presented – despite the overall low level of comprehension. This finding suggests that simply asking youths whether they understood the rights is not a useful procedure for ensuring that youths actually understand their rights" (p. 821). But, in addition, other research suggests that even if they understand the 'words', youths may not be able to resist the pressures to make statements to the police.

The importance of fair treatment by the police

The view that fair treatment of ordinary citizens by the police is important is, we think, widely shared. Society asks police to do certain jobs and grants the police certain unusual powers (e.g., the use of force) but in return expects fair treatment. There is considerable evidence that procedurally fair treatment by the police is important in motivating ordinary people to cooperate with the police. Furthermore, procedural justice appears to be just as important for youths as it is for adults (B41: 15-1-5).

But there are other important reasons for wanting fair treatment from the police, most notably that unfair treatment by the police leads people to question the legitimacy of the police and their right to use force. One study (B42: 15-3-2) found that perceptions of the legitimacy of the police are correlated with perceptions that the police act in a procedurally fair manner. Furthermore, it showed that those who see the police as acting with legitimacy are less likely to support ordinary people's use of violence for personal protection, to resolve disputes, or to achieve political goals.

Another (Australian) study (B43:15-4-3) found that being treated in a courteous, friendly way and being given an explanation for a stop by the police was "consistently important for influencing both emotional reactions and compliance [with the law and the police]…. By engaging with the public in a polite, respectful, and empathetic manner, police officers will be able to reduce negative sentiments and emotion directed at them, thereby increasing people's willingness to comply with them both immediately and in the future" (p. 269). "If the police wish to be able to effectively manage citizen behaviour and promote compliance with the law, the findings… suggest that they ought to treat people with procedural justice" (p. 270).

There also is evidence (B44: 12-5-6) that the degree of "legal cynicism" in a neighbourhood – lack of support for the legitimacy of laws and lack of confidence in the police – is related to crime rates in the neighbourhood. Simply put, if the law is unavailable because citizens do not trust the police, people may resolve their grievances in their own ways, which may include violence.

One longitudinal study (B45:16-3-7) of 689 African American youths noted that "For the state to secure voluntary compliance from the public, it is necessary for it to be perceived as morally credible" (p. 520). It found that the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of young Black Americans is undermined most dramatically when negative interactions with the police occur to those who live in neighbourhoods with high levels of legal cynicism. These results are independent of individuals' record of offending, arrests or other criminal justice contact.

How the police behave toward citizens, then, can affect crime. A study of officially recognized police misconduct in New York City (B46:7-6-3) found that in highly disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the level of police misconduct predicted the violent crime rate. "In [the poorest] communities, residents may feel the most marginalized and socially dislocated and they may respond the most adversely to (real or apparent) violations of procedural justice norms by the police, who represent the most visible agents of official social control … These findings suggest the importance of police departments meeting procedural justice expectations, specifically in extremely disadvantaged communities" (p. 492).

Citizens' views of the police.

The quality of the treatment that people receive affects people's views of the justice system. In fact, it appears that the quality of the treatment – as opposed to factors like the ability of the police to reduce crime – is most important in understanding people's views of the justice system (B47:4-4-1).

Statistics Canada survey data suggest that, in general, Canadians have quite positive views of the police. A study[5] using the 2009 Statistics Canada General Social Survey data that looked at urban Ontario residents' views of the police found variation across racial and ethnic groups in how the police were viewed, but in general, the police were given quite positive ratings. In the table below, the scores are on a 3-point scale where 1=poor, 2=average, and 3= good. The dimensions on which the police were rated were divided into two groups:

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[5] Sprott, Jane B. and Anthony N. Doob (2014). Confidence in the Police: Variation Across Groups Classified as Visible Minorities. *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 56*(3), 367-379.

(a) "Technical" dimensions: enforcing the law, promptly responding to calls, supplying information to the public on how to prevent crime, ensuring safety.

(b) "Interpersonal" dimensions: being approachable and easy to talk to, treating people fairly.

Looking at the 98% of urban Ontario residents who identified themselves using one racial group, we see that all groups of urban Ontario residents, on average, rated their local police as being between 'average' and 'good'.

Interpersonal Questions	Ontario – Technical questions	Ontario – Interpersonal Questions
White	2.57 [AB] (3288)	2.63 [AB] (3223)
Chinese	2.51 [C] (160)	2.50 [A] (150)
South Asian	2.67 [ACD] (261)	2.65 [C] (256)
Black	2.56 (154)	2.41 [BC] (143)
Aboriginal	2.41 [BD] (78)	2.46 (77)

Scale: 1=poor, 2=average, 3 =good (weighted N's in parentheses).
Cells in the same grouping (province and type of question) with a superscript in common are significantly different from each other.

Without going into too much detail, there are, in addition to the generally favourable ratings, three findings that are worth keeping in mind.

1) The racialized groups differ from one another in their views of the police on these two dimensions.

2) The pattern of the ratings of the police across groups for the "technical questions" is not the same as for the "interpersonal" questions.

3) In their ratings of the police on "technical" matters, Black residents are almost identical to White residents, but on the "interpersonal" dimensions Black residents rate the police lower than do Whites and South Asians.

It would appear, then, that people do differentiate between certain technical aspects of police work and how fair/approachable the police are seen.

Citizens' views of the police do seem to reflect how they are treated by the police. One study (B48: 8-5-5) of citizens' views of encounters with the police in Chicago found that it was important to differentiate between citizen- and police-initiated encounters. For citizen-

initiated encounters, overall satisfaction with the police was related to whether the citizen thought the police had behaved well (e.g., had been helpful, polite, thorough in their explanations, etc.) and not to the citizen's age or race. For police-initiated contact, there was a 'race' effect, but it was considerably smaller in magnitude than were the effects of the quality of the encounter itself (e.g., whether the police officers explained their actions, or whether they were perceived as fair and polite).

The data would suggest, then, that the impact of race on ratings of the police is largely due to differential ratings of the quality of the police-initiated contact.

The problem for the police, however, is that negative experiences with the police have large (negative) impacts on ordinary citizens' views of the police. Positive interactions, however, are much less important determinants of citizens' views of the police, perhaps because 'good behaviour' is seen as expected (B49: 8-2-1). "For both police-initiated and citizen-initiated encounters [with the police], the impact of having a bad experience is four to fourteen times as great as that of having a positive experience. The coefficients associated with having a good experience – including being treated fairly and politely, and receiving service that was prompt and helpful – were very small and not statistically different from zero" (p. 100). It would appear that it is more important for police administrators interested in improving citizens' assessments of the police to focus on ways of avoiding negative interactions with the public than on creating opportunities for positive interactions.

The positive aspect of these findings is that citizens' views of the police are within the power of the police to improve. Avoiding what might be considered to be 'offensive language', for example, appears to be very important (B50: 7-2-3). The nature of the interaction between citizens and police officers is clearly important.

In a study of crime victims (B51:13-2-5), for example, "Respondents who felt that police did not show enough interest were much less likely to be satisfied… regardless of whether the offender [related to their victimization] had been identified and/or charged. Those who felt the police had shown enough interest, by contrast, were more likely to be satisfied… regardless of what had happened in relation to the offender" (p. 413). Outcomes did matter, but the positive impact of the outcome was considerably less in cases where police seemed uninterested in the case compared to cases where citizens thought police showed appropriate interest. Hence, police officers or police organizations that focus solely on "getting a result" (p. 417) run the risk of losing the support of the public they serve.

A policing style oriented toward procedural justice is likely to have a positive impact on public satisfaction. Aside from anything else, being effective in dealing with crime is largely out of the control of an individual police officer; but the police officer can nevertheless

enhance the public's view of police by demonstrating that a citizen's concerns are taken seriously (B52: 11-2-3).

Ensuring cooperation with the police

Given the research findings already summarized in this report, it should not be surprising that a study (B53: 13-5-6) of residents of London, England, found that voluntary cooperation with the police (e.g., by offering to provide them with information) appears to be related to some extent with feelings of *obligation* to obey the police. But in addition, high ratings of the police on lawfulness, procedural fairness and distributive fairness were also associated with the citizens' willingness to voluntarily provide the police with crime-related information.

In a world in which terrorism appears to be a more salient problem than in the past, it is probably particularly important for the police to be able to count on members of the public to bring to their attention people or events that are potentially significant. In a study (B54: 11-4-1) of Muslim Americans' views of cooperation with the police in New York City, it was found that broad integration into American society was important in ensuring cooperation.

Those respondents who thought that the police acted in a procedurally fair manner within their (Muslim) communities were more likely to indicate their willingness to alert the police to possible terrorism threats. In addition, those respondents who believed that anti-terrorism policies had been created in a legitimate fashion (e.g., that the community had been given an opportunity to provide input and community views were considered) were more likely to cooperate with the police in averting terrorism and they were more willing to alert the police to possible terrorism activities. Muslim Americans who reported experiencing discrimination at school, work, or in dealing with authorities, were less willing to cooperate with the police or report possible terrorism activities to the police. Finally, those respondents who had strong identification with America (e.g., who agreed with the statement that "Being an American is important to the way I think of myself as a person") were more willing to alert the police.

Most New York Muslim respondents indicated that they would engage in cooperative actions if asked to do so by the police, and most indicated that they would report possible terrorist related activities to the police. The variation that did exist in Muslims' willingness to combat terrorism appears to be in large part affected by the degree to which Muslims have had positive versus discriminatory interactions with others in American society. Those who felt excluded from American society through overt discrimination, for example, as well as those who reported that the police did not treat them fairly, were less likely to be cooperative on terrorism matters.

In another study (B55:12-5-2) it was found that "The shift in policing from crime control to counterterrorism does not appear to have changed public expectations of police behaviour or to have altered the basis on which police are evaluated…" (p. 435). Procedural justice mechanisms are just as important for Muslim Americans as they are for non-Muslim minorities and for whites. "Even when police confront grave threats, both minority and majority populations expect law enforcement officers to respect procedural justice values and are more likely to withhold their cooperation if they do not…. Non-Muslims, who rate the threat of terror as larger than do Muslims, are nonetheless sensitive to procedural justice in counterterrorism policing, particularly the targeting and harassment of Muslims" (p. 436). "Three elements of procedural justice – neutrality in decision making, trust in the motives of the police, and treatment with respect – remain central to the definition of procedural justice and its effect on legitimacy" (p. 437). This is just as true in dealing with terrorism as it is in responding to ordinary crime.

A study (B56: 13-3-1) of police legitimacy in another country not immune from terrorism – Israel – arrived at very similar conclusions. In this study, a high and a low threat/risk area were compared. The performance and the efficiency of the police were important in both the 'high terrorism' area and in the comparison areas, but, as predicted "under conditions of threat, evaluations [of performance] play a significantly larger role in predicting police legitimacy than when there is no specific threat in the background" (p. 18). More interesting, however, is the fact that procedural justice was *equally* important in predicting police legitimacy in both the 'high threat' and the 'low threat' areas. "The results of the present study suggest that the desire for procedural justice is an enduring, stable trait, regardless of the security situation. Under conditions of security threats, individuals do value police performance to a greater extent when forming evaluations of police legitimacy. However, there does not seem to be a zero-sum game between performance and procedural justice: under threat, while performance increases in importance, procedural justice does not decline in importance and indeed remains the primary antecedent of legitimacy, as is the case when there is no security threat in the background" (p. 19). In more mundane terms, the police cannot afford to minimize the importance of dealing with citizens in a procedurally just fashion just because the community is facing serious external threats.

The effects of contact with the criminal justice system

Obviously the police need to have direct contact with some youths. But there has been a fair amount of concern expressed about the possible crime-*increasing* effect of contact between youths and the police. In one longitudinal study (B57: 14-4-5) carried out in the US it was found that youths who were stopped and/or arrested by the police were more likely, subsequently, to reoffend than a matched comparison group. The results showed that after

matching youths on their propensities to experience police contact, those who were arrested were significantly more likely to engage in delinquencies than those who were only stopped, and those stopped were more likely to engage in delinquencies than those who had no police contact. Furthermore, there was a tendency for greater amounts of police contact to reduce commitment to school, increase the likelihood the youth would have delinquent friends, and reduce their feelings of guilt about offending. Stop-and-frisk interactions between youths and police "may have the unintended consequence of increasing future delinquent involvement. Thus police practices of engaging in high rates of stops, many of which are 'unproductive' or 'innocent,' may be counterproductive" (p. 956). "For both youth who are stopped and youth who are arrested, delinquency amplification is partially explained by the attenuation of prosocial bonds, changes in deviant identity, and increased involvement with delinquent peers" (p. 956-7). Another study (B58: 15-4-8) suggests that this effect may demonstrate itself most dramatically among those who have had some, but not much, experience in offending.

Many youths commit offences, but only a subset of them are ever apprehended or arrested by the police. Thus it is possible, with surveys, to identify pairs of youths who are very similar in terms of their backgrounds, including their involvement in offending, but who differ on whether they were ever arrested. The data from one such study (B59: 14-6-1) suggest that being arrested increases subsequent violent offending; and being arrested once increases the likelihood of being rearrested. Hence it appears that being arrested makes the youth more likely to offend. But quite independent of offending rates, "a first juvenile arrest seems to increase subsequent law enforcement responses to those youth compared to other youth who offend at a comparable level but have managed to evade a first arrest. This could result from increased scrutiny of the individual's future behaviour, by police as well as others… as well as from reduced tolerance by police … of an arrestees' future transgressions" (p. 363). Part of the reason that being arrested may be ineffective in reducing subsequent offending is that being arrested does *not* affect the perceived likelihood of being apprehended in the future (B60: 8-1-7).

These findings are not unique. One paper (B61:11-4-3) reviewed 29 separate sets of findings in which youths were, in effect, randomly assigned to receive formal court processing or less formal approaches. It found that, overall, court processing appeared to create, on average, small *increases* the likelihood that youths would be involved in at least some subsequent offending, though there were non-trivial differences across studies. Youths processed by the courts were, on average, involved in more crime than those processed in other ways. Similar effects were found for severity: Formal court processing of youths, if anything, increased the severity of subsequent offending.

A conservative conclusion would be that court processing does not reduce subsequent offending. "Given that the evidence indicates that there is no public safety benefit to [youth justice] system processing, and its greater costs when compared to release, even the most conservative cost-benefit analyses would favour release over [youth justice] system processing" (p. 38). Obviously some youths, because they have committed serious offences, will be brought to court in any jurisdiction. Furthermore, one cannot generalize the findings from these "matching" studies to those youth because these studies focused largely on youths charged with relatively minor offences.

At the same time it should be noted that "the data from these studies do not support a policy of establishing [formal] diversion programs for juveniles who normally would not have been officially processed…." (p. 39).

In another study (B62: 6-5-3) it was found that a youth's likelihood of graduating from high school was lowered as a result of police or juvenile justice involvement even after controlling statistically for previous offending, parental poverty, and school ability (at age 12). A separate analysis found that "experiencing official [criminal justice] intervention in adolescence is significantly associated with reduced odds in favour of staying in school in a subsequent period" (p. 1301). An analysis of self-reported criminal activity at age 19-20 demonstrated that police or juvenile justice intervention earlier in adolescence was associated with increased criminal behaviour in early adulthood. The effect of police or juvenile justice intervention "has stronger crime amplification effects among the disadvantaged [African American youths living in poverty]" (p. 1306).

Part of the negative effects of criminal justice processing may relate to its effect on an important determinant of a person's life chances: graduating from high school. The evidence (B63: 14-6-2) seems quite clear that "Arrest in adolescence hinders the transition to adulthood by undermining pathways to educational attainment." (p. 54). Youths who are arrested are more likely to drop out of school than are equivalent youths who are not arrested while in high school. Given the effects of arrest on high school completion and on enrolment in 4-year post-secondary programs, juvenile arrest can, therefore, be viewed "as a life-course trap in the educational pathways of a considerable number of adolescents in contemporary American cities" (p. 55).

A first time court appearance for a youth appears to have more negative impacts on education outcomes than a first time arrest that does not eventually lead to court (B64: 8-5-4). These findings are similar to those reported for adults: Arrests, even when they do not lead to convictions, make it harder for someone to get a job (B65: 15-1-7).

Conclusion

The police have a number of important roles to play in public safety and in the operation of the criminal justice system. The findings that we cite here which suggest that certain approaches to crime and public protection either do not work or have overall negative impacts should be placed in this larger context.

Perhaps the conclusion that one could come to that might be the least controversial would be the need to monitor and evaluate police policies related to police stops to ensure that the benefits outweigh the possible harm that could come from the intervention. This is the same conclusion that one could apply just as easily to medical or educational interventions as to police interventions.

An important point to remember is that one cannot conclude that something *is* effective, just because assertions are made that it is. Data are important. And sometimes, the findings are complex. Certain kinds of activities of the police can have quite positive effects if the community is engaged in an appropriate fashion (see, for example, B66:1-6-3).

But looking at the issue that we started with – street stops by the police of people who have not apparently committed an offence – it is quite clear to us that it is easy to exaggerate the usefulness of these stops, and hard to find data that supports the usefulness of continuing to carry them out.

This is not to say that the police should not be encouraged to continue to talk to people on the street. But the evidence that it is useful to stop, question, identify, and/or search people and to record and store this information simply because the police and citizens "are there" appears to us to be substantially outweighed by convincing evidence of the harm of such practices both to the person subject to them and to the long term and overall relationship of the police to the community.

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Communities where residents can count on their neighbours to intervene when there is minor trouble, and where residents trust one another, are likely to have low levels of violence *above and beyond the characteristics of the individuals who live in that neighbourhood.*

Background. In the previous issue of *Criminological Highlights*, we presented a paper demonstrating that communities which teach their members to have social and moral obligations to others have less crime. The idea that there are characteristics of *communities* above and beyond the characteristics of *individuals* that are important in understanding levels of crime is not new, but at the same time, it is not an idea that has received much systematic research attention. This study, coming from the "Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighbourhoods" demonstrates that there are characteristics of communities -- above and beyond the characteristics of individuals -- that are important "protectors" from crime.

This study. This study looked at victim reported crime in 343 "neighbourhood clusters" in Chicago. These clusters were relatively small -- about 8000 people each -- and were designed to approximate local neighbourhoods in Chicago. A measure which the authors call "collective efficacy" was assessed by interviewing 8782 people (at least 20 per neighbourhood cluster). Respondents were asked how likely it was that their neighbours could be counted on to intervene in various ways if children were misbehaving, or committing minor offences, or if their local fire station was threatened with budget cuts. In addition, they were asked various questions relating to social cohesion: whether neighbours are willing to help one another, whether people in the neighbourhood can be trusted, etc. The answers to ten such questions were combined, for each neighbourhood, into a scale value of "collective efficacy." Various measures of the characteristics of those living in the neighbourhood were also obtained. There were three measures: (1) How often residents reported various forms of violence to have occurred in their neighbourhood in the previous six months, (2) whether they, or a member of their household, had experienced any violence while in the neighbourhood, and (3) whether a homicide had been recorded by the police as having occurred in the neighbourhood during that year (1995).

"Collective efficacy" obviously does not stand alone. It turns out to be negatively related to some other factors. Such factors included the concentration, within the community, of "disadvantaged" people (the unemployed, those below the poverty line, single-parent families, etc.). In addition, "collective efficacy" was lower in neighbourhoods that had higher proportions of those born outside the country and higher levels of "residential instability" (e.g., where people have moved a lot). These relationships make sense for obvious reasons: communities where there may be a language barrier, or where people have not lived in the neighbourhood for long may "impede the capacity of residents to realize common values and achieve informal social controls."

Findings. Above and beyond the other factors, "collective efficacy" (neighbourhood informal social control and cohesion) was a predictor of perceived neighbourhood violence, whether or not respondents had been the victim of violence, and whether a homicide had occurred in the neighbourhood.

Conclusion. "Collective efficacy" (or neighbourhood informal social control and cohesion) is, in part, shaped by social and economic factors. However, given its apparent independent impact on all three measures of violence, it appears that one way to address problems of crime is to consider how neighbourhoods themselves can be strengthened.

Reference: Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls (1997). Neighbourhoods and violent crime: A multilevel study of collective efficacy. *Science, 277*, 15 August 1997, 918-924.

Women who live in economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods are more likely than other women to experience violence at the hands of their intimate partners. This finding appears to be a true *neighbourhood* effect – that is, it holds true even when relevant characteristics of the couple are statistically held constant.

Background. "There is evidence that intimate violence against women is associated with economic disadvantage at both the neighbourhood and individual levels" (pp. 207-8). The challenge is clearly to determine whether the effects that appear at the neighbourhood level are due to characteristics of the victim and offender or, alternatively, to those of the neighbourhoods in which they live. While traditionally less studied in the criminological literature, the latter explanation is not without theoretical support. According to social disorganization theory, "residents of structurally disadvantaged areas are more likely to have weak social bonds to their neighbours than [are] residents of advantaged neighbourhoods" (p.209). As such, this lack of social cohesion may lead to increased risk for domestic violence because potential victims are isolated and their neighbours are less likely to intervene or call the police.

This study examines data from a U.S. longitudinal survey and focuses on 5031 couples identified in 1994 as having lived together since they were initially interviewed in 1988. If at least one of the two partners indicated that violence had been used against the woman in the previous year, the case was described as being one in which wife assault had taken place. Using 1990 census data, respondents were divided into four equal groups according to the level of disadvantage of their neighbourhood in 1994. In neighbourhoods falling into the three most advantaged groups, the rates of violence against the female partner were remarkably similar (roughly 3.5%). In contrast, the rate of violence in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods was almost twice as high (6.9%). In other words, "[i]t is only in the upper end of the distribution [of economic disadvantage] that the crime-related effects of disadvantage [on wife assault] are manifested" (p.218).

The results focus on the level of wife assault in 1994 holding constant not only the level of intimate violence that she experienced in 1988 but also various other characteristics of the couple (*e.g.,* several income measures, whether the male was reported to have a drinking problem, instability of employment of the male, age, race, and education). Not surprisingly, women who had experienced violence in 1988 were more likely to have been assaulted six years later. Male employment instability was also associated with high levels of intimate violence against the female partner in 1994 (consistent with findings reported in *Criminological Highlights*, 3(2), Item 6).

Most interesting were the neighbourhood effects. It is often difficult to disentangle neighbourhood effects from individual effects because it may be the case that the couple's *own* disadvantaged socioeconomic status puts them at risk for both living in a disadvantaged community and increased domestic violence. However, this study demonstrated that when the couple's own socioeconomic status was controlled for, the average socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood affected the likelihood of domestic violence. Indeed, those women living in neighbourhoods with either the highest level of concentrated disadvantage or high concentrations of people who had moved during the previous five years (a measure of neighbourhood instability) were most likely to have experienced violence at the hands of their partners.

Conclusion. The likelihood of being the victim of wife assault is a function not only of the characteristics of the couple, but also of the neighbourhoods in which they reside. It would appear that the risk to *any* woman of being the victim of wife assault increases if the couple lives in a neighbourhood whose level of social and economic disadvantage is severe.

Reference: Benson, Michael L; G. L. Fox; A. DeMaris and J. Van Wyk (2003). Neighborhood Disadvantage, Individual Economic Distress and Violence Against Women in Intimate Relationships. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, *19*, 207-235.

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Crime may have decreased in New York during William Bratton's reign as chief of police. But it almost certainly did not happen because he endorsed a "zero tolerance" strategy toward minor crime and other irritants. For one thing, murders decreased in other cities (e.g., San Diego where murders decreased 41%) that had completely different approaches to policing. But more importantly, the idea that crime was reduced in New York through a "zero tolerance" approach simply does not fit the facts: there were far too many other things going on in New York to make it plausible that simple changes in police strategies made a difference.

Context.   William Bratton was chief of police in New York City for a few years beginning in January 1994. This was good timing: murder rates peaked in or around 1993 in many cities and states in the U.S. and began to decline thereafter. The reductions were as dramatic as the increases in the late 1980s had been. Criminologists have debated, and still are trying to explain, both the 1980s increase and the 1990s decrease in violent crime. William Bratton must find such debates rather senseless. He takes full credit, in this short article, for the decline in crime in New York. As he states the case, "The murder rate has declined by over 50 per cent in New York City because we found a better way of policing" (p. 41). [The reader should understand that the "we" is a "royal we."]

Most thoughtful analysts disagree with Bratton. One -- Charles Pollard, the Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police notes that the rhetoric associated with New York's "new" police style is "concentrated on aggression: on ruthlessness in dealing with low level criminality and disorderliness...., of confrontational accountability systems.. and on the single-minded pursuit of short term results" (page 44).

These papers. The first of these papers is a simple clear statement by Bratton himself about why he takes personal credit for the crime reduction that occurred in New York. The second, by Chief Constable Pollard is a thoughtful -- and gentle -- critique of Bratton's paper. He points out, for example, that "zero tolerance" and the "broken windows" theory of crime are not the same. The latter implies that "minor incivilities", if unchecked and uncontrolled, produce an atmosphere in a community or on a street in which more serious crime will flourish." Minor problems give a sign that disorder will be ignored. This is quite different from the "zero tolerance" notions so favoured by the right which imply "aggressive, uncompromising law enforcement."

Pollard points out that "zero tolerance" law enforcement has the unintended effect of taking most of one's police officers off the street and out of the communities since they will be spending all of their time processing minor criminals through the criminal justice system. Furthermore, it could well undermine the legitimacy of the police since it implies that all problems of order are police problems and should be dealt with harshly rather than sensitively. Finally, Pollard points out that Bratton's own description of what went on in New York can be challenged on empirical grounds: he noted how easy it is for the data to be manipulated by police highly motivated to do so (page 52-3).

Conclusion. In responding to William Bratton's self-serving description of policing in New York, Chief Constable Charles Pollard of the Thames Valley (England) Police points out that the "New York miracle" has to be examined carefully and when it is, it is found to be wanting. More important is his observation that "law enforcement on its own has only limited capacity to deal with crime, disorder and fear." And when the limits of aggressive policing are met, there is nowhere to go: "The police will have lost touch with the community. Confidence will have drained away" (p. 54). Zero tolerance policing provides just one more example of how simple solutions rarely solve complex problems.

References. Bratton, William J. Crime is down in New York City: Blame the police.
Pollard, Charles. Zero tolerance: Short term fix, long term liability? Both articles in Dennis, Norman (editor). *Zero tolerance: Policing a free society.* London, England: Institute of Economic Affairs Health and Welfare Unit, 1997.

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The so-called "New York Miracle" -- the large decline in homicides that took place in the early-mid 1990s was not as unusual as some have suggested. In fact, it is made up of two quite different trends: a slow and steady decline in non-gun homicides and a big decrease (after a large increase) in gun homicides. Simple explanations do not fit the data.

In searching for an explanation for the drop in homicides in New York from 1991 to 1996, the single most important fact to keep in mind is that there are actually two trends.

- From 1985 to 1995 there was a gradual but remarkably steady decrease in the number of non-gun homicides such that by 1996, there were about half as many as there were in 1985.
- Gun homicides, on the other hand doubled between 1985 and 1991. By 1995 the number had returned to its 1985 level and in 1996 was lower than its 1985 level.

In other words, masked by the large increase and equally large decrease in gun homicides, there has been a large decrease, for a long time, in non-gun homicides. The data are inconsistent with the suggestion that there was simply a shift from non-gun to gun homicides.

Any attempt to explain the drop in homicides in New York (1991-96, a 51% drop) must take into account the following facts:

- There have been *larger* declines since the mid-1980s in homicides in two other cities (a 59% drop in Houston and a 61% drop in Pittsburgh).
- The decline in gun homicides (1991-96) was similar for men and women.
- All age groups showed roughly the same pattern for gun homicides: increasing from 1985 to the early 1990s and then going down.
- Non-gun homicides went down (1985-95) for all age groups.
- Gun assaults and non-gun assaults showed patterns that paralleled, more or less, the homicide data.

When one looks to possible explanations, the data suggest the following:

- Policing changes cannot explain, in any way, the long term trend downwards in non-gun homicides.
- "The increase in [police] patrol strength beginning in 1991 may have had a positive effect on reducing visible homicides [homicides taking place in public places, which began declining in that year]" (p. 1316). "The pattern... is much more consistent with gun-oriented policing [policing strategies that focus on keeping guns off the street and out of public places] than with indiscriminate quality of life interventions as a cause of decline" (p. 1322).
- "Incarceration trends seem to be unrelated to homicide trends" (p. 1317).

What can be concluded?

- The gradual decline in non-gun homicides must reflect some type of gradual changes that were taking place over a period of a decade. "Attributing non-gun homicide declines to law enforcement changes was premature and unjustified" (p. 1323).
- Some of the decline could have been simply "regression" -- "natural" return to traditional levels. Some, however, could be due to changes in police practices (e.g., a focus on guns). However, the case for regression is strong: New York, compared to other large states, had, relatively speaking, a much larger number and higher rate of homicides during the 1988-90 period (p.1494-5). In any case, some "compensatory" force (p. 1494) appeared to be important in returning gun homicide rates to their "natural" level.

Reference: Fagan, Jeffrey, Franklin E. Zimring, and June Kim. Declining homicide in New York City: A tale of two trends. *The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology,* 1998, *88*, 1277-1323. Maltz, Michael D. Which homicides decreased? Why? (p.1389-96).

Widely publicized police interventions in three American cities show more consistency in their claims than in their effects in reducing homicide rates.

During the 1990s, homicide rates were dropping in many American cities. It was inevitable, therefore, that there would be a "chorus of self-congratulation" from politicians and police chiefs who could claim to have changed some part of the criminal justice system prior to or during the drop in reported crime. Hence aggressive policing, youth curfews, targeting career criminals, adding more police officers, and policies that encouraged community policing were all used to explain local crime drops. These explanations ignored the fact that the programs were typically implemented locally, but the "crime drop" was widespread.

This study looked at homicide rates in three cities with highly publicized crime reduction programs: Boston (*Operation Ceasefire*), New York (*Comstat*) and Richmond, Virginia (*Project Exile*). Using data from 95 large U.S. cities, the basic design involved examining the change in homicide rates in each of these three cities to see if the change could be attributed to the program implemented in that city, given the pre-existing downward trends across the country as well as the known determinants of homicide rates (e.g., resource deprivation).

Boston's *Operation Ceasefire* focused on communication with gang youth, telling them in face-to-face meetings that firearm possession would not be tolerated, and that a tough approach toward youth gangs would be followed as long as the problem existed. Those apparently responsible for violence were also told that "all available levers would be pulled to ensure swift and tough punishment of violators" (p. 423). New York's *Comstat* focused on being intolerant of minor crimes and disorder and aggressively restoring order, as well as making the police managers "responsible" for crime patterns in their districts. Richmond's *Project Exile* used a traditional deterrence and/or incapacitation logic, focusing on harsher penalties

for violence or drug crimes in which firearms were used. Extensive use was made of advertising the criminal justice consequences of illegal firearm possession and use.

All three cities, like U.S. cities on the whole, showed decreases in homicide rates. At the beginning of the interventions, Boston's homicide rate was about 18 (per 100,000 in the population), New York's was about 20, and Richmond's was about 70. [In contrast, homicide rates in Canada's 9 largest cities have averaged between 1.25 and 2.86 in the last decade.] In Boston, the drop in youth firearms homicides was insignificant once existing trends in other cities and other known contributors to homicide were taken into account. In New York there was no evidence of an effect of the police intervention program on homicides overall, or on firearms homicides in particular. In Richmond there was a significant decline in firearms homicides when other known determinants of homicide were taken into account, but not when looking at homicide rates in isolation from other factors.

Conclusion. One of the difficulties with all evaluations of single-city programs such as these is that the programs themselves are multi-

faceted, and the manner in which they are implemented and the cities themselves vary considerably. In addition, different evaluations of these same programs have arrived at a range of different findings. The variation in findings is not surprising, given that there is no unambiguously "best" or broadly accepted model for evaluating programs such as these. Indeed, part of the problem may be that homicide rates themselves vary dramatically and the effect of interventions may be specific to local conditions, including local homicide rates. Richmond's homicide rate varied from a low of about 36 per hundred thousand in the population (in 2001) to a high of 80 (in 1994) – rates that are dramatically higher than the average U.S. city. Large Canadian cities show much less year-to-year variation. A conservative conclusion, therefore, might be that one cannot be confident that any of these highly publicized programs would have a significant impact on homicides (or gun homicides) in cities in which they might be implemented.

Reference: Rosenfeld, Richard, Robert Fornango, and Eric Baumer. (2005) Did *Ceasefire, Comstat,* and *Exile* reduce homicide? *Criminology and Public Policy, 4*(3), 419-450.

Why don't the police stop crime? Largely because they are not well placed to do so.

The public often looks to the police to stop almost all types of crimes – from household burglaries, vandalism, and impaired driving to domestic violence, gun crimes, gang violence, and pornography (though they typically are not seen as responsible for preventing crimes involving senior officers of large corporations such as Hollinger, Inc.) If this is the way in which they are seen, why do we have so much crime? A number of different answers can be offered.

First, their main role in dealing with crime has to do with apprehension of offenders and aiding in their prosecution. This has little effect on crime rates. Though some crime is avoided through the apprehension and imprisonment of serious offenders, the impact of these activities on overall crime rates is limited (see *Criminological Highlights, 3*(1)#1). The presence of the police *generally* may have a deterrent effect. This is sometimes evident in property crime sprees when police go on strike or when, for other reasons, they are not available for apprehending offenders. However, their overall impact on crime in normal circumstances is clearly limited, and it is probably limited to certain types of offences.

Second, "there is increasing recognition that policing is not just the business of … police forces," and that "problem oriented strategies involve cooperation in crime reduction with a wider range of departments and agencies" (p. 5). Long term trends in crime rates (e.g., the decrease in reported rates of serious violence that have occurred in the U.S. and to some extent in Canada in the past 10-15 years) appear to have little to do with the police. Though the police sometimes take credit for crime drops (e.g., New York City – see *Criminological Highlights, 1*(4)#5 and

this issue, #2), the evidence often is otherwise.

Third, it appears that many traditional police tactics are not very effective. Much crime is not detectable by the police and is unaffected by traditional unsystematic police patrols. This activity consumes large portions of police budgets yet it appears to have little overall impact.   This is not surprising: crimes are rare events and it is unlikely either that a police officer would be in a position to intervene or apprehend offenders at the scene of a crime. Increasing patrol density does not appear to have an impact on crime just as decreased "response times" seldom affect crime levels. The theory that through dealing aggressively with minor incivilities, crime can be reduced, though popular, appears to be without empirical foundation (see *Criminological Highlights, 5*(1)#6; *3*(3)#1). Police organizations have a range of legitimate priorities and concerns that may, at times, not be consistent with strict enforcement of the law.

Finally, even if certain techniques could be identified that were effective, the police organization is one that can easily resist change. In part change in police organizations is difficult to accomplish because

"discretion increases as one moves down the hierarchy" (p. 15) in police organizations.   Evidence-based policies are therefore, more difficult to implement than they would be in other organizations.

Conclusion. To say that the police are not an important force in preventing crime is not a criticism of police organizations. "[Police] need to be alert to the dangers of concentrating single-mindedly on traditional approaches to crime reduction. Doing so not only has inherent dangers, but it can also divert attention from other tasks and objectives of policing" (p. 19). One might suggest, therefore, that those responsible for policies related to policing should examine carefully how police resources can best be allocated to accomplish the various responsibilities allocated to the police. Such an approach might lead to a different, and more effective, allocation of scarce resources.

Reference: Dixon, David (2005) Why Don't the Police Stop Crime? *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 38*(1), 4-24.

Most of the explanations that have been offered for the 'crime drop' that has occurred in many western countries are plausible sounding, but they are each almost certainly inadequate.

Whether one looks at the results of victimization surveys or police reported crime, it would appear that the rates of many categories of crime have dropped quite dramatically in recent decades in many countries including the US, Canada, England & Wales, Australia, and New Zealand.

Many explanations have been offered for the drop. This paper suggests that none of them is a sufficient explanation though some may offer a partial explanation for the drop in certain crime rates. Previous work has tended to suggest 'single factor' explanations, such as the aging of the population. However, changing demographics (see *Criminological Highlights* 2(6)#7, 5(4)#4) may account for a small portion of the drop for some offences but not all of it. Similarly, it can quite easily be shown that explanations based on a specific change in society, such as the availability of abortion, are almost certainly wrong (*Criminological Highlights 9*(6)#8).

This paper takes a different approach. It examines each of 17 hypotheses about the crime drop and uses four 'tests' of the ability of each explanation to account for the changes that took place, in recent decades, in crime rates. The four tests are the following:

(1) Can the explanation be applied to different countries? On the 'abortion' issue, for example, the crime trends for Canada and the US are very similar, but only the US had changes in the availability of abortion at the critical time in question.

(2) Before crime rates went down, they typically went up quite rapidly. Does the explanation account for this increase?

(3) Some rates for some crimes have increased recently. Can the explanation account for that variation?

(4) The timing of the crime drop. Can the explanation account for the fact that the changes in rates vary across types of crime?

Seventeen hypotheses have been proposed for the crime drop. These include the following: changing demographics, a strong economy, consumer confidence/price inflation, laws that allow the carrying of concealed weapons, gun control laws, capital punishment, changes in rates of imprisonment, new or changes in policing strategies, more police, waning of the hard drug market, legalization of abortion, lead poisoning, immigration, civilizing processes, internet-induced changes in life styles, cell phone ownership and guardianship, and improved security systems.

As already noted, these explanations have one important thing in common: they choose a possible cause that could affect large numbers of people (e.g., the presence of lead), note that there is a change in that hypothetically causal variable, and then correlate that change in the causal variable to changes in crime (in this case, when youths who grew up in an environment when lead was presumably more likely to be in the atmosphere). The problem, however, is

that the explanation may fit one set of data but not all the data. In the case of lead in the US, for example, "all proxies for lead increased dramatically from around 1910 through 1970. If the lead hypothesis is correct, then crime should have displayed a measurable increase between 1925 and 1985" (p. 451). Unfortunately for the hypothesis, crime rates were much more varied than one would expect.

Conclusion: Each of the 17 hypotheses that have been suggested as explanations for the crime drop was subjected to four separate empirical tests. No explanation for the crime drop was fully consistent with the data. One explanation – that we now have improved security (e.g., to protect from thefts of and from vehicles) - fits the data for certain crimes but is less persuasive for others. Variation in the propensity to commit crime within a society appears to be better understood than changes in crime rates within a society *across time.*

Reference: Farrell, Graham, Nick Tilley, and Andromachi Tseloni (2014). Why the Crime Drop? *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research* (Michael Tonry, ed.), *43*, 421-490.

Though not all police crackdowns on gun violence are effective, some seem to be able to suppress gun violence, at least temporarily.

"Project Safe Neighbourhoods" brought over a billion dollars to cities in the United States to reduce crime, especially gun violence. The political debate about guns in the U.S. has focused largely on attempts to restrict access to guns by "high risk" individuals (e.g., youths or those with criminal records). More recently, however, "targeted enforcement" strategies have been used to try to reduce gun violence. It appears that such strategies are sometimes effective, but often are not.

It would seem that there are a few general principles that apply in this area: (a) efforts to *reduce gun misuse* are likely to be more cost effective than broad efforts to *reduce availability*, and (b) "for a given level of law enforcement spending, we may achieve a greater deterrent effect by *increasing the certainty rather than the severity* of punishment" (p. 680; See also *Criminological Highlights, 6*(2)#1). This paper, therefore, suggests that "enforcement activities could be made more effective by prioritizing... targeted police patrols that seek to deter high risk people from carrying guns illegally" (p. 681).

A number of strategies that were part of *Project Safe Neighbourhoods* almost certainly were ineffective or have large costs relative to their value. These include providing gun locks (to prevent thefts), school prevention programs, better controls on gun purchases, and better tracing of guns involved in crime. Two programs that are sometimes seen as being effective – those in Richmond, Virginia and in Boston (see *Criminological Highlights, 7*(5)#2) – are shown to be largely ineffective: "Homicide rates in Richmond were trending downward even before the launch of Project Exile" (p. 693-4) just as the decreases in Boston were no larger than decreases in other parts of the state. Simply put, the flaw in simple claims of success with respect to many American "violence prevention" programs in the 1990s is that the programs were started during a period of broad decline in

violence rates in many American cities. Said differently, crime rates went up in the latter part of the 1980s and then began declining *before* programs such as those in Richmond and Boston were implemented. Those cities that showed the largest increases in the 1980s showed the largest decreases in the 1990s. The gun homicide rate in Boston, for example, had decreased by about half prior to the beginning of the program. It then continued to decrease for about three more years.

One potentially promising strategy that appears to have been evaluated carefully was used in Pittsburgh. In response to concerns about guns being illegally carried in public places, concentrations of police on the street were increased dramatically (20%-50%) in high risk areas, during high crime periods (specified days and times). The police officers involved in this show of force did not have to respond to normal calls for service. Their focus, instead, was on traffic stops and "stop-and-talk" activities with pedestrians who appeared to have a high "risk" for carrying guns. The analysis involved comparisons of intensively policed areas with control areas, pre- and post-implementation during the targeted times and the "regular patrol density" times.

Using "assault related gunshot injuries" and reports of "shots fired" as the measures of success, there appeared to be larger decreases in the densely-patrolled areas during the times when there were many

police present. Furthermore, perhaps because of intensive officer training, focused activities, and community involvement, the decrease in gun violence was apparently accomplished without aggravating community-police relationships. The concern, obviously, is that if targeted patrols of this sort were employed in a city, they could be seen giving the police a license to target certain racial (or other) groups.

Conclusion. It would appear that targeted increases in police patrols can suppress gun violence at least during the time that the police are present, and that with proper procedures, it is possible to do this without creating strained relationships between the police and the community. To the extent that the focus can be narrow (i.e., on people and locations likely to have a high rate of carrying illegal guns), and to the extent that there is "extensive officer training and... [involvement of the] community in project design and implementation" (p. 682) the overall impact can be positive. Nevertheless, it would appear that the effectiveness of such strategies is likely to be limited to those times and locations in which the concentration of police is high.

Reference: Ludwig, Jens (2005). Better Gun Enforcement, Less Crime. *Criminology and Public Policy, 4* (4), 677-716.

Police raids on bars in which illegal drug selling apparently was taking place had a relatively brief effect on the suppression of drug dealing in the neighbourhood. In the long term, this intervention was almost completely ineffective.

Background. Given that crime is not evenly distributed across neighbourhoods within cities, there is a natural interest in identifying strategies that can be used to address problems of illegal activity in high crime areas. In some cities (such as the site of this study - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), certain bars have sometimes been labelled by police as likely sites of illicit drug selling. A common response by police to such problems is to increase the frequency of raids on these locations. The underlying theory behind this practice is deterrence, based on the idea that certainty of apprehension is considerably more likely than severity of punishment to reduce criminal activity (p.259; See also *Criminological Highlights*, 6(2), #1).

This study examines the impact of police raids carried out between 1990 and 1992 on establishments that had been identified as "nuisance bars" by the Pittsburgh police narcotics squad. The number of raids as well as the period of time over which they took place varied considerably. The amount of drug dealing was estimated indirectly by using "drug-related 911 calls" in the area immediately surrounding the nuisance bar.

The results of this study are complex. First, it was found that enforcement – in the form of raids on these nuisance bars – suppressed drug dealing in the immediate 2 to 3 block radius. That is, within one month of the commencement of a series of drug raids, some reduction in the number of drug calls was apparent. However, this decrease was only temporary in nature. Second, the size of this decrease – assumed to be an indication of reduced drug dealing in the immediate area of the nuisance bar – increased as the amount of enforcement rose. Yet, while this effect continued after the enforcement ended, the suppression of drug dealing only lasted for a few months. Indeed, although "[l]arger reductions in drug calls accompany longer enforcement periods… enforcement effects achieved during an intervention do not persist after treatment is withdrawn" (p.286). An unexpected finding was that the closure of a nuisance bar appeared to *increase* the amount of visible drug dealing in the area – possibly constituting "further indirect evidence of limits on residual suppression effects after enforcement ceases" (p.279). Both of these outcomes – the relatively short duration of the initial enforcement effects and the negative impact of closing problematic establishments – highlight the importance of looking beyond the short term when evaluating enforcement strategies. Finally, the nature of the areas in which the bars were located was also important. For example, the (temporary) enforcement effects were largest in "low risk" areas (*e.g.,* areas with little vacant land, few bars and a low proportion of commercial properties). However, "even these most responsive enforcement targets… show little evidence of being able to sustain the suppression effects achieved during periods of active police enforcement into post-enforcement periods" (p.290).

Conclusion. Though drug dealing enforcement - in the form of raids on bars in which dealing is thought to be occurring - can reduce drug problems on the streets during the time that the police are active in suppressing it, there is, unfortunately, "little indication that these reductions are sustained after the special enforcement is withdrawn" (p.289). In this light, claims that a crime suppression or deterrence program is successful should be tempered by the knowledge that the success of these programs may be a criminological will-o'-the wisp.

Reference: Cohen, Jacqueline; Wilpen Gorr and Piyusha Singh (2003). Estimating Intervention Effects in Varying Risk Settings: Do Police Raids Reduce Illegal Drug Dealing at Nuisance Bars? *Criminology, 41* (2), 257-292.

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A police crackdown on drug dealers in London, England which was designed to "stifle the availability of illegal drugs on our streets" (p. 738) was described by the police as a "spectacular success" (p. 738). However, information obtained from drug users and drug dealers in this city suggests that it had no impact on drug availability or prices.

Background. Supply reduction is one of the most common anti-drug interventions in many cities. The theory is simple: interrupting the supply chain will make it difficult (or expensive) to obtain drugs and, consequently, drug availability and use will decrease. However, systematic studies of frequent drug users suggest that this population has multiple sources for its drugs (on average, they know more than a dozen dealers).

This study reports on the impact of a November 2000 blitz by the Metropolitan (London, England) police. In the first two weeks of this well publicized crackdown, more than 240 people were arrested for selling drugs. After these initial 14 days, drug users were interviewed.

The findings question whether the drug crackdown was having its intended impact.
- Only 31% of the drug users were even aware that the police were doing anything special. For those who did notice the change, they did not attribute much significance to it. One person who had purchased crack every day during the crackdown reported having noticed more police activity, but saw it as simply an "occupational hazard" (p. 741).
- Of the 174 people interviewed (over 100 of whom had recently purchased heroin, crack, and cannabis), only seven reported an increase in drug prices during the two weeks of the crackdown. Most (over 80%) reported that no change had occurred. The rest reported a decrease in prices.
- Over 80% of those interviewed indicated that there had been no change (or an increase) in the purity and availability of the three drugs (heroin, crack, cannabis).

However, it should be noted that the possibility exists (though not tested in this paper) that increased police activity may deter irregular users. Nevertheless, this hypothesis seems relatively unlikely given that price and availability to frequent users did not appear to be affected.

Conclusion. The findings "offer no support for the suggestion that the markets for heroin, crack and cannabis are sensitive to increased police activity, at least not in the short term, even when such activity is associated with a number of significant drug seizures and with the removal of a large number of dealers from the street" (p. 744). These results support the assertion that "supply reduction endeavours are not strongly linked to illicit drug market forces" (p. 744).

Reference: Best, David; John Strong; Tracy Beswick and Michael Gossop. 2001. Assessment of a Concentrated, High-Profile Police Operation. *British Journal of Criminology* 41: 738-745.

Very intensive foot patrols by police can have an impact on street crime.

Police foot patrols have been seen as a popular way to address crime, though the evidence that they actually deter crime has been weak. The public appears to believe that if there is an officer on foot patrol in their neighbourhood, they will be safe. From a management perspective, foot patrols are expensive. If, however, foot patrols are used selectively to target crime "hotspots" – locations where crime rates (or street crime in particular) are high – it has been suggested that they may be especially effective.

Unlike some studies that looked at relatively large geographic areas, this study examined the impact of intensive police foot patrols on street crime using a large number of small geographic areas. Crime hotspots were identified, in early 2009 in Philadelphia, by looking at the number of homicides, aggravated assaults, and robberies that had occurred outdoors in recent years. In all, 120 hotspots were located, each including at least one of the most violent street corners in the city. These hotspots had an average of 14.7 intersections and 1.3 miles of streets. These 120 hotspots were then divided into 60 pairs of hotspots with similar numbers of violent incidents. One of each pair was then randomly determined to be a 'control' hotspot (with no special change in police patrol intensity). The other received intensive patrols for 12 weeks in addition to normal policing. The intensive patrols consisted of 2-person foot patrols for 12 weeks from 10a.m. until 2 a.m., 5 days a week (Tuesday morning to early Sunday morning). In all, then, 57,600 hours of 2-person police patrol (115,200 person-hours) were used during the 12 week period in the 60 intensive patrol hotspot areas. The activities of the police officers varied considerably across areas in terms of the number of recorded pedestrian and vehicle stops, arrests, and recorded disturbances and drug-related disorder.

Overall, there was a slight reduction in the average number of violent crimes recorded in the experimental areas, compared to the average number before the intensive foot patrols (a reduction of about 0.88 crimes per area during the 12 week period). In the control areas, there was a slight increase in the number of crimes during the 'treatment' period, as compared to the earlier period (0.52). However, this apparent relative reduction only occurred in the highest crime areas. These were the areas, not surprisingly, in which the foot patrol officers were most likely to have direct contact with citizens as a result of arrests or responding to various forms of disorder. In the relatively low crime areas (which were, of course, hotspots relative to the city as a whole), the patrols had essentially no impact on crime.

However, it would appear that some of the violent crime reduction in the intensive foot patrol areas was a result of displacement to adjacent areas. It was estimated that 90 violent crimes were averted in the target areas as a result of the intensive foot patrols, but an estimated 37 of these crimes were displaced to adjacent areas. Thus there were an estimated 53 fewer crimes as a result of the intervention, or one crime for every 1087 hours of 2-person patrols (or 2174 person-hours of patrol).

Conclusion: It would appear that highly intensive policing can modestly reduce the number of violent crimes that take place in an area. In part because the effect is small and is limited to the very highest crime areas, it is difficult to know whether to attribute the drop in crime to the mere presence of a police officer in the area or to the activities of the police in the neighbourhood. The data would suggest that it may be that foot patrols can only deter violent street crime in very violent areas. However, the investment of police time for each crime averted was non-trivial.

Reference: Ratcliffe, Jerry H., Travis Taniguchi, Elizabeth R. Groff, and Jennifer D. Wood (2011). The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Police Patrol Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots. *Criminology, 49*(3), 795-831.

Intensive foot patrols by police can reduce street crime, but the effects don't last after police strength is reduced to normal.

Previous research has demonstrated "that highly intensive policing can modestly reduce the number of violent crimes that take place in an area" (*Criminological Highlights* V12N3#3). This study is a follow-up of an earlier study that examined the impact on crime of intensive 2-person patrols during a 12-week period. The earlier study compared the rate of street crime in areas that received intensive 2-person foot patrols (as well as adjacent areas) to the street crime rates in similar locations that (on a random basis) did not receive intensified foot patrols. The crime reducing effect of the foot patrols was demonstrated, but the amount of crime reduction was not large. It was estimated for every 2174 person-hours of patrol, one crime was averted.

Aside from the cost of implementing high intensity police foot patrols in a neighbourhood, little is known about their long term impact. In particular, it is important to know whether the crime-reducing effects of intensive patrols remain after policing strength (and, therefore, visible presence) returns to 'normal' levels. During the 'intensified foot patrol' period of the original study, foot patrol officers were responsible for a 64% increase in pedestrian stops, a 7% increase in vehicle stops, and a 13% increase in arrests.

This study focuses on the first 15 month period *after* the intensive foot patrols ceased. From a practical perspective, this period is important because it tests whether the effects of intensive patrols were long-lasting, or whether the effect only lasted while the police officers were present and visible on the street. Previous research (e.g., *Criminological Highlights* V7N6#1) would suggest that one should not expect the effects of the intensive patrol to last after the patrols stop.

In fact, that is what happened. As soon as the extra patrols left, the crime suppressing effect disappeared. "No significant differences were found between the treatment and control areas on levels of violence from the beginning to the end of the post-treatment period" (p. 83). In fact, there was no evidence of a gradual decay: the effects of the intervention ended abruptly when the intensive patrols ended. Crime, in effect, returned to expected levels.

The original study also looked at displacement of crime into adjacent areas. After the intensive patrols stopped, crime in the areas adjacent to where the intensive patrols had taken place went down suggesting that some crime might have moved back to the areas from which it had been displaced during the intensive foot patrols.

Conclusion: It would seem that "the effects of crackdowns [in the form of intensive police foot patrols] are short term and [they] decay rapidly" (p. 87). It has been suggested that intensive foot patrols deter crime because, in deterrence terms, they act as a "certainty communicating device." "In Philadelphia, once the 'certainty communicating device' was removed, no differences between the treatment [high intensity foot patrols] and control locations were detectable" (p. 87). Since "most police agencies allocate patrol resources disproportionately at high-crime places…., it is questionable whether better funded crackdowns will elicit the aggregate crime reductions predicted. It would appear that "more holistic strategies" (p. 92) are needed to fulfill the goal of effectively reducing the amount of crime in a neighbourhood.

Reference: Sorg, Evan T., Cory P. Haberman, Jerry H. Ratcliffe, and Elizabeth R. Groff (2013). Foot Patrol in Violent Crime Hot Spots: The Longitudinal Impact of Deterrence and Posttreatment Effects of Displacement. *Criminology, 51* (1), 65-101.

Putting extra resources into the policing of high crime areas isn't enough. To reduce violent crime police need to focus their attention on specific individuals who were known or suspected to be involved in violent crimes – an approach that can be carried out without an increase in the indiscriminate stopping and questioning of ordinary residents.

There is some evidence that increased police presence in high crime areas can have some impact on crime, although the effects may be short-lived. Other research suggests that what the police do when policing a high crime area may be the key to understanding these effects on crime 'hot spots' (see *Criminological Highlights 12*(3)#3, *14*(5)#3, *13*(3)#2).

This study examined the impact of three different police tactics designed to reduce the incidence of violent crime in high crime areas. 27 areas (with an average of 3 miles of streets and 23.5 intersections) with high levels of violent crime were identified by the police as being appropriate for each of the three experimental treatments. 20 were randomly assigned to receive the treatment; 7 were randomly assigned to be policed as they always had been.

One third of the experimental areas were assigned to receive foot patrols for a minimum of 8 hours per day, 5 days a week. Typically officers patrolled in pairs. In another set of areas, officers were encouraged to engage in 'problem-oriented policing' and were given special training for this. The actual activities of these officers varied from area to area. In another set of areas, police officers engaged in 'offender-focused policing' in which residents of the area suspected or known to engage in repeat violence were identified by the police intelligence unit. Police officers made contact with these people or, in some cases, served arrest warrants for recently committed offences. More commonly, the police simply exercised surveillance on these people.

Each policing tactic was implemented for a minimum of 12 weeks and a maximum of 24 weeks. Violent crime in all areas (experimental and control) was monitored for 38 weeks. The "offender focused" approach caused a reduction in violent crime in the experimental areas of about 42%. Analyses of changes in crime in adjacent areas suggest that there was no displacement of violent crime to these areas. If anything, there was a reduction in violent crime in adjacent areas suggesting a "diffusion of crime-control benefits" (p. 42).

Neither the problem-oriented policing nor the foot patrols had significant impacts on violent crime. In fact, it was very difficult for police officers to implement the problem-oriented policing tactics. Even though the areas had been chosen because they were relatively high in violent crime, police officers reported that in many of the areas citizens did not see violent crime as the biggest local problem.

In the "offender focused" areas, there was no increase in the number of pedestrian stops, car stops, or narcotics incidents. This suggests that if the police have a specific set of individuals to watch, they will not bother those not on their list. This is a very different approach, then, from 'saturation patrols' in which ordinary people are indiscriminately stopped and questioned or in which people are arrested for minor (e.g., drug possession) offences.

Conclusion: A focus by the police on people known or suspected of involvement in serious violence appears to be an effective use of police resources in reducing violent crime. Furthermore, it can be done without the negative impact of increased use of stops of ordinary citizens. "By focusing police efforts on the problem people associated with the problem places, police can achieve significant crime reductions while avoiding negative community perceptions of their actions" (p. 46).

Reference: Groff, Elizabeth R. J. H. Ratcliffe, C.P. Haberman, E.T. Sorg, N.M. Joyce, and R.B. Taylor (2015). Does What Police Do at Hot Spots Matter? The Philadelphia Police Tactics Experiment. *Criminology, 53*(1), 23-53.

Focusing police patrols on high crime areas can reduce the incidence of some types of crimes if the police do more than merely increase the frequency of their patrols.

Recent research has suggested that high density police patrols targeting high crime areas (hot spots) can reduce crime, at least temporarily (*Criminological Highlights* 12(3)#3, 13(3)#2). However, little is known about what kinds of activities by police are necessary to have any impact.

This paper reports the results of an experiment in which small geographic areas (an average of 8 one-block segments with an average of 128 residents per area) in St. Louis, Missouri, were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. For the 'control' areas, policing was carried out in the manner in which it normally had been. In the 'high density only' areas, police spent a disproportionate amount of their time in these areas, but did nothing unusual while there. In the 'enhanced high density' patrol areas, police not only spent a disproportionate amount of time in the area, but also engaged in self-initiated activities while there. These activities included arrests, pedestrian checks, building checks, occupied and unoccupied vehicle checks, foot patrols, and problem solving. The special patrols took place over a 9 month period daily between 3 p.m. and 7 a.m. The goal was to reduce certain firearms violence (non-domestic firearms assaults and firearms robberies).

The importance of having a control group was demonstrated by the fact that there was a substantial reduction in firearms crime in the control areas (in which policing style and patrol density had not changed) during the 9-month period in which the study was carried out. In the 'high density only' patrol areas, the reduction in firearms violence was *not* significantly different from the reduction that took place in the control areas. However, in the 'enhanced high density' patrol areas, there was a significantly larger reduction in firearms violence than in the control areas. This was a result, completely, of the effect of the 'enhanced high density' patrols on non-domestic firearms assaults. For reasons that are not at all clear, there was no effect of increased police patrols (enhanced or not) on firearms robberies.

The effectiveness of the 'enhanced high density' patrols appears to be linked to two self-initiated activities by the police: arrest and checks on occupied vehicles. The other police-initiated activities appeared to be unrelated to drops in non-domestic firearms assaults. There did not appear to be displacement of crime into adjacent areas, or other time periods, or to other (e.g., non-firearms) offences. In other words, these police activities did not 'push' the crime to other times or locations.

Conclusion: The study demonstrates that high density police patrols, combined with certain police-initiated activities, can reduce certain firearms crimes. The fact that the reduction in crime was limited to firearms assaults and not firearms robberies is puzzling. "Certainty of arrests and occupied vehicle checks (but none of the other enforcement activities [that were] examined, were associated with reductions in nondomestic firearms assaults" (p. 446) during the period when the high intensity patrols were taking place. The study also underlines the importance of having a control group. Because there was a control group, it was possible to see that the size of the crime reduction in high intensity patrol areas that did not have enhanced police-initiated activities was not significantly greater than the reduction that occurred 'naturally' in the control areas. Crime rates are not consistent over time making 'no treatment' control groups crucial if one wants to determine whether an innovation has an impact.

Reference: Rosenfeld, Richard, Michael J. Deckard, and Emily Blackburn (2014). The Effects of Directed Patrol and Self-Initiated Enforcement on Firearm Violence: A Randomized Controlled Study of Hot Spot Policing. *Criminology, 52*(3), 428-449.

Police crackdowns on bad driving can prevent serious traffic accidents.

In 2001, Canada's traffic accident death rate was 8.9 per hundred thousand residents – about five times the country's homicide rate for that year. Various enforcement programs have been used to try to control bad driving. Most of these programs have the goal of increasing the perceived risk of apprehension. Although there have been thousands of local police programs designed to reduce the number of serious traffic accidents, only a tiny proportion of these have received adequate evaluations.

This paper examines programs designed to crack down on problematic driving. Thirty-three high quality evaluations were found. These involved studies of the effects of random breath testing or "sobriety check points" to reduce impaired driving (15 studies), the use of speed (5 studies) and red-light cameras (4 studies), studies evaluating a combination of these two "camera" deterrents (4 studies), random "road watch" by police looking for traffic law violators (1 study), and mixed programs (4 studies) using one or more approach.

The theory behind all of these programs is the same. Rather than focusing on what to do with law violators once they are caught, these programs attempt to affect the behaviour of those *unapprehended* individuals who might be sensitive to the *threat* of punishment. If completely effective, then, nobody would be apprehended and punished, but everyone would perceive a high likelihood of apprehension if they were to offend. Given this underlying theory, it is not surprising that most programs – 23 of the 33 (70%) – were implemented along with media campaigns. There was, however, some variation on this dimension. In 13 of 15 (87%)

drinking-driving programs there were media campaigns, compared to only 7 of the 13 (54%) speeding or red-light camera programs

The results were overwhelmingly positive: 30 of the 33 programs showed reductions on such measures as fatal accidents or traffic accidents resulting in serious injuries. The three studies that did not show a reduction had one thing in common: they were "automated" systems – red light or speed cameras. It is possible that these "failures" reflect bad judgement concerning the locations in which the cameras were placed or the failure of the program to communicate the increased threat of apprehension that the cameras provided to law violators.

In some cases there was evidence that the effect of the crackdown generalized to locations not covered by the program itself. Though there was some variability in the size of the effect of these programs (e.g., the reduction in the percent of accidents with injuries ranged from 23% to 31%), there appeared to be more variability in the size of the effect for the "automated" red light or speed cameras.

Conclusion. It is clear that police practices that increase the perceived likelihood of apprehension for traffic violations can reduce the number of serious traffic accidents. It appears that police crackdowns for impaired driving as well as crackdowns of speeding and running red lights can be equally effective.

Reference: Blais, Etienne and Benoit Dupont (2005) Assessing the Capability of Intensive Police Programmes to Prevent Severe Road Accidents. *British Journal of Criminology, 45*, 914-937.

Rather than focusing on severity-based policies that increase already harsh sentences, policy makers should shift their attention to programs that use the police to make the risks and consequences of crime more clear and certain. Such a policy shift holds the promise of reducing both crime and imprisonment.

Imprisonment rates in many countries, most notably the United States, are a concern in part because of the various costs of imprisonment and the fact that high imprisonment rates appear to have little effect in reducing crime. There is a substantial amount of research suggesting that increasing the severity of sentences from current levels will not increase the (general) deterrent impact of the criminal justice system (see *Criminological Highlights, 6*(2)#1) and is not efficient in reducing crime through incapacitation (*Criminological Highlights, 3*(1)#1, 10(2)#5).

This paper points out that deterrence always depends on both certainty and severity. But variation in sentence severity – within levels that are plausible in western societies – does not appear to have much, if any, impact on crime. Given the various costs of imprisonment (financial as well as social), a very attractive criminal justice approach to crime prevention is one that reduces *both* crime *and* imprisonment levels. Incapacitation does not qualify as such a policy since it "necessarily will increase the rate of imprisonment. In contrast, if the policy also prevents crime by deterrence, then it is possible that it will be successful in reducing both imprisonment and crime" (p. 16). In addition, to the extent that the experience of prison is criminogenic (see *Criminological Highlights, 11*(1)#1, *11*(1)#2, *11*(4)#2), policies that reduce imprisonment have an additional advantage. There are, of course, many other ways to reduce crime. However, given that substantial amounts of public money are spent on the criminal justice system, the question that should be addressed by criminal justice policy makers is a simple one: how can this "criminal justice budget" best be used?

A careful analysis of the data suggests that a fundamental shift should occur – from focusing on sentence severity to focusing on the certainty of apprehension. A shift of this sort does not mean that by increasing police budgets, crime rates will automatically be lowered. Instead this analysis suggests that *targeted* increases in police activity that increase the likelihood that offenders will be apprehended can prevent crime in the first place and thereby avert the need for punishing an apprehended offender. In other words, averting crime also averts punishment. For example, regular drug testing of probationers to enforce prohibitions against drug use resulted in more certain but shorter imprisonment periods (1-2 days); this, in turn, was quite effective in deterring probationers from drug use and other probation violations. In this way, the certainty of apprehension averted the need for exacting further punishment. What is crucial, of course, is that potential offenders must believe that their likelihood of apprehension *and* punishment is high.

The difficulty is that achieving certainty in delivering punishments is elusive. Not all police programs – or programs that simply increase the number of police in a neighbourhood – achieve high levels of real or perceived certainty of punishment. However, "the key empirical conclusions… are that at prevailing levels of certainty and severity, relatively little reliable evidence of variation in the severity of punishment having a substantial deterrent effect is available and that relatively strong evidence indicates that variation in the certainty of punishment has a large deterrent effect, particularly from the vantage point of specific programs that alter the use of police" (p. 37).

Conclusion: If policy makers are committed to using criminal justice budgets effectively, shifting funds from imprisonment to policing could be effective in reducing both crime and imprisonment. Since people are likely to be deterred by programs that increase the (perceived) likelihood of apprehension, those program will prevent crime and those people who are deterred will not end up in prison. There are, obviously, potential costs to such programs as well. Hence programs that appear to be effective in one location need to be continually evaluated as they are implemented in new locations. And these evaluations need to examine not just the impact on crime, but also other impacts on communities and residents.

Reference: Durlauf, Steven N. and Daniel S. Nagin (2011). Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced? *Criminology and Public Policy, 11*(1), 9-54..

Between 1995 and 2000 the U.S. Department of Justice dropped $8.8 billion into local municipalities so that they could hire more police officers and improve community policing. These cash grants had no impact on crime.

Because policing, in some jurisdictions such as the U.S. and Canada, is largely controlled by local municipalities, the role of the national government in policing is limited. In the latter half of the 1990s, however, the U.S. federal government made about 30,000 grants to 12,000 police agencies, the purpose of which was largely to hire approximately one hundred thousand additional police officers.

Prior research results suggest that the funding did not put 100,000 more police on the streets. Furthermore, it is not clear that the grants program accelerated the community police movement. However, some preliminary studies suggested that the program *did* reduce violent and property crime. The challenge, in any such studies, is to control for other factors that may have accounted for the association between new federal funding and a drop in crime. One factor that had not been controlled for was pre-existing law enforcement expenditures: communities that, for one reason or another, funded their police forces generously, might show decreases in crime. This study examined the impact of these federal government grants on crime in large cities only (100,000 residents or larger), controlling for 'standard' correlates of crime (e.g., percents of the population who were age 18-24, poor, black, or living in a female headed household, etc.). Seven different crime figures were examined (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft). The analysis took advantage of one important fact: these federal funds were not equally distributed across cities. Some cities received no federal funding, some received a considerable amount of federal funding for additional police, etc.

The results demonstrate that there were no consistent effects of additional federal funding for police organizations on any of the crimes. Indeed, a large infusion of new federal funding to police forces was just as likely to be associated with more crime as it was with less crime. In other words, the grants to support local community oriented police "had no discernible effect on serious crime during the period covered by [the] analysis, after controlling for annual fiscal expenditures" (p. 170). Various statistical 'checks' on the findings were carried out to ensure that any impact of the grants program was not suppressed as a result of the particular type of analysis that was used, or because of a small number of very unusual effects in certain cities. None of these supplementary analyses challenged the main finding: the 8.8 billion dollar federal program of funding local police departments did not affect crime.

Conclusion. Multiple analyses, looking at the data in various ways, failed to find evidence that federal government grants to local police forces for the purpose of hiring more police had any impact on crime. "It is not encouraging to find that some $8 billion of taxpayer dollars may have done little reduce crime" (p. 183). On the other hand, the findings are not terribly surprising when one considers one other fact: Grants to these municipalities averaged only $407,515 per year. This constitutes only about ½ of 1% of fiscal expenditures for policing in these communities. When one considers that few additional police officers can be hired with a grant of that size, and, therefore, the impact of such a grant on 'police on the street' at any given moment is tiny, it is not surprising that the grants had no impact on crime.

Reference: Worrall, John L and Tomislav V. Kovandzic (2007). Cops grants and crime revisited. *Criminology, 45*(1), 159-190.

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Systematically measured neighbourhood disorder ("broken windows") does not cause crime in a community. "The current fascination in policy circles… on cleaning up disorder through law enforcement appears simplistic and largely misplaced, at least in terms of directly fighting crime" (p.638). "Broken windows" may be more prevalent in high crime areas, but the data suggest that disorder is not directly responsible for crime.

Background. The idea that "fixing broken windows" will reduce crime has been popularized, but never demonstrated empirically, by various criminologists such as George Kelling and James Q. Wilson. The notion they have popularized, based on the metaphor of broken windows, is that "public incivilities – even if relatively minor as in the case of broken windows, drinking in the street, and graffiti – attract predatory crime because potential offenders assume from them that residents are indifferent to what goes on in their neighbourhood" (p. 604). Politicians in favour of crackdowns who are looking for a political "quick fix" find "broken windows" an attractive theory. The alternate theory is that "structural constraints such as resource disadvantage and mixed land use account for both crime and disorder simultaneously" (p. 614).

This study reports a careful examination of the "broken windows" theory of crime by first getting an independent observation by researchers of how "disordered" (socially and physically) neighbourhoods (in Chicago) actually were. Social disorder (e.g., adults loitering or congregating, drinking alcohol in public, drug selling) and physical disorder (e.g., presence of garbage or litter, graffiti, abandoned cars) were quite highly correlated. Not surprisingly, "disordered" neighbourhoods were poorer, more likely to have high concentrations of immigrants, and lower in "collective efficacy" (willingness of neighbours to "do something" in response to problems, trusting one's neighbours, neighbourhood social cohesion, etc.). Collective efficacy has been found in previous studies to be an important predictor of neighbourhood crime above and beyond characteristics of the individuals in the neighbourhood.

The most important findings, however, were that measures of social and physical disorder ("broken windows") were *not* related to personal violence and household burglary (assessed by victimization measures) once characteristics of the neighbourhood (e.g., collective efficacy, mixed land use) had been controlled for. "The results are consistent and point to a spurious association of disorder with predatory crime" (p. 627). When one looks at officially recorded crime, "disorder" once again disappears as a predictor of homicide and burglary once measures of collective efficacy and prior crime rates are controlled for. "The key result is that the influences of structural characteristics and collective efficacy on burglary, robbery, and homicide are not mediated by neighbourhood disorder" (p. 629). The exception is the case of officially recorded measures of robbery where there is still a relationship with disorder. Whether this is due to a "complex feedback loop" (p. 637) or an artifact of official data (e.g., "citizen calls to the police or police accuracy in recording robberies is greater in areas perceived to be high in disorder" --p. 638) is not clear.

Conclusion. "The active ingredients in crime seem to be structural disadvantage and attenuated collective efficacy more than disorder. Attacking public disorder through police tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce crime, mainly because such a strategy leaves the common origins of both [disorder and crime], but especially the last [crime] untouched. A more subtle approach suggested by this article would look to how informal but collective efforts among residents to stem disorder may provide unanticipated benefits for increasing collective efficacy... in the long run lowering crime" (p. 638).

Reference: Sampson, Robert J. and Stephen W. Raudenbush. Systematic social observation of public spaces: A new look at disorder in urban neighbourhoods. *American Journal of Sociology,* 1999, *105*, 603-651.

New York City's attempt to snuff out violent crime by arresting those found to be smoking marijuana in public places failed.

Criminal justice officials and legislatures in many countries constantly search for easy ways to reduce crime. The appearance that something is being done to prevent or reduce crime seems to be at least as important when crime rates are decreasing (as they did in the 1990s in the U.S.) as when crime is increasing or staying the same. Between 1994 and 2000, the New York City police increased their arrest rate for the misdemeanour charge of smoking marijuana in public view (MPV) from fewer than 2,000 arrests to over 50,000 arrests per year. In 2000, arrests for MPV accounted for 15% of all felony and misdemeanour arrests in the city. Aside from any other concerns that one might have, these arrests disproportionately targeted African-Americans and Hispanics. Compared to whites, members of these two groups in New York City were, according to a previous study, more likely to be arrested, detained in custody awaiting trial, convicted, and sentenced to jail. Presumably the justification for the crackdown on MPV is simple and is based on the "broken windows" theory of crime control. By cracking down on minor crimes – in this case MPV – other more serious crimes would, it was asserted, miraculously disappear.

The miracle did not happen. This paper, using data collected by the authors of a previous study, examined the impact of MPV arrests on crime in the city's police precincts. The statistical techniques used were similar to those used in an earlier study (see *Criminological Highlights, 8*(4)#1). The most simple analysis (looking at the relationship between arrests for MPV and violent crime) would appear to support the 'broken windows' hypothesis: violent crime was lower in locations in which MPV arrests were highest during the 1990s, controlling for the overall rate of crime in the precinct for the decade and for overall trends during the decade. When the authors added various controls (e.g., police strength in the precinct, unemployment, proportion of population that was between age 19 and 24, race), there was still an effect.

The problem is that such an analysis does not take into account a simple fact: crackdowns on crime in different parts of the city are likely to relate to pre-existing levels of crime. The locations that show the biggest *drop* in crime might reasonably be expected to be those that showed the largest *increases* in an earlier period. Indeed, the police precincts with the highest violent crime rates in 1989 experienced the largest MPV arrests in the 1990s and the largest declines in violent crime between 1989 and 2000. More importantly, the precincts with the largest violent crime decline in the 1990s were those that had the largest increase in crime between 1984 and 1989 and, coincidentally, the largest 'crack down' on MPV in the 1990s. When the violent crime rate in 1989 (before the marijuana crackdown) or change in violent crime between 1984 and 1989 is taken into account, it would appear that those locations with the *most* MPV arrests had higher, not lower, levels of violent crime.

Conclusion. "New York City's psychedelic experiment with misdemeanour MPV arrests – along with all the associated detentions, convictions, and additional incarcerations – presents a tremendously expensive policing intervention" (p. 13). It disproportionately punished Blacks and Hispanics and did not contribute to combating serious crime in the city. If anything it led to increased violent crime. Once again, simplistic approaches to reducing serious crime are shown not to work.

Reference: Harcourt, Bernard E. and Jens Ludwig. Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989-2000. Law and Economics Working Paper, No. 317. University of Chicago Law School, December 2006.

The police strategy of targeting minor disorder on the street – so-called 'broken windows policing' – does not reduce crime.

In 1982, in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling suggested that if the police targeted minor instances of visible disorder – e.g., panhandling, prostitution – the rates of more serious crimes would drop. Though 25 years later the evidence supporting their theory is at best mixed, there continues to be widespread belief that this strategy works.

This study re-examined an earlier important study that purports to show beneficial effects of 'broken windows policing' – a study of crime in New York by Kelling and Sousa. Although Kelling and Sousa were not willing to share their data with the current authors, equivalent data were compiled from original sources which allowed for more stringent assessment of the impact of this policing strategy on crime. The problem in assessing the impact of changes in policing strategies during the 1990s is that "Any study of the influences on American crime patterns during the past 20 years is complicated by the massive period effects that have generated dramatic year-to-year changes in crime across the country… Those cities that experienced the largest increases in crime during the [beginning of] this period [the 1980s] subsequently also experienced the largest drops [in the 1990s]" (p. 291).

This same problem is evident in New York City when one looks at individual neighbourhoods. Crime dropped in New York City during the 1990s. And, crime dropped most in those neighbourhoods in which broken-windows policing was most aggressively implemented. It would appear, at first blush, that broken windows policing was a cause of the drop. However, it is also true

that broken windows policing was most aggressively implemented in neighbourhoods that had experienced the largest increases in violent crime during the 1980s. The Kelling-Sousa study essentially related changes in violent crime to levels of misdemeanour arrests, ignoring the fact that the changes were, essentially, reversions to an earlier level of crime. Controlling for the size of the change (generally an increase) in violent crime during the period 1984-1989 eliminated the crime reducing impact of misdemeanour arrests during the period 1989-1998. What goes up comes down, whether or not there is a police officer or city employee nearby fixing broken windows.

The Kelling-Sousa study was not the only published study apparently showing support for the broken windows hypothesis. Another study noted that there was a relationship, for the period 1970-2000 in New York as a whole, between the rate of misdemeanour arrests and violent crime, controlling for known correlates of crime. The problem, once again, is that this 'effect' is driven largely by the decrease in crime that occurred in the late 1990s (the period when 'broken windows policing' was in vogue in New York). The problem is that attributing a drop in crime that occurred largely in one time period

to a single cause is risky. The authors note that one could logically examine the 'Broken Yankees Hypothesis' (p. 298) by looking at the cumulative number of New York Yankee (baseball) championship wins as the possible cause, on the theory that New Yorkers are happy when their home team is winning and thus less likely to commit crime. Plugging this variable into the equation, one finds that the 'Broken Yankee Hypothesis' fits the data just about as well as the 'broken windows' hypothesis.

Conclusion. Though it can be shown that certain police activities – e.g., the targeting of 'hot spots' where crime is chronically prevalent – can reduce crime, the suggestion that broken windows policing will reduce violent crime is without empirical support and is most likely an artefact of the practice of focusing police resources (and, in particular, high rates of police charging of minor offenders) in those areas in which crime had been on the rise.

Reference: Harcourt, Bernard E. and Jens Ludwig. (2006) Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment. *The University of Chicago Law Review, 73* (1), 271-320.

A high rate of arrests for minor offences was associated with a small reduction in violent crime in New York City in the 1990s.

New York City politicians and police officials have made themselves famous by suggesting that police policies that gave priority to "aggressively targeting so-called quality-of-life offences and arresting violators for vagrancy, loitering, prostitution, littering [and other minor offences]" (p. 356) were responsible for the reduction in serious crime that occurred in New York in the 1990s. The underlying theory was that arresting people for these matters "sends a message… that police are paying attention and will enforce community standards" (p. 356). Though few deny the fact that recorded crime in New York dropped, people disagree about whether order maintenance policing (OMP) was responsible for this drop.

A previous study (see *Criminological Highlights* V8N4#1) suggested that the apparent drop in overall violence was due to the fact that those locations in New York City with the biggest increase in crime in the late 1980s had the highest rate of OMP and the largest drop in crime. The suggestion was that the reduction was not due to the OMP but rather was a result of 'mean reversion': what goes up also comes down. This paper looks at two specific crimes – homicide and robbery – in part because rates of other violent crime (e.g., rape and assault) are more susceptible to problems of measurement. In addition, it used a different indicator of OMP – one that included violations of city ordinances as well as misdemeanours. In addition, other controls and somewhat different statistical techniques were used.

It is no wonder that New York City politicians claimed to have solved the crime problem: between 1990 and 2001, robbery and homicide rates dropped by about 76%. Though crime started dropping dramatically after 1990, the OMP arrests did not start increasing until 1994, levelling out in 1997. Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this paper suggests that there was a small impact of OMP on both homicide rate and robbery rate even after various relevant controls (e.g., amount of disorder, number of police officers, 1988 robbery or homicide rate) were taken into account statistically.

OMP activities were greatest, not surprisingly, in precincts with high growth in disorder (as measured by citizen complaints), number of police officers, drug use (measured by cocaine deaths) and high rates of felony arrests as well as in precincts with higher proportions of blacks and disadvantaged residents.

It appears that high rates of OMP were responsible for some of the decline in homicide and robbery rates. The decline in homicide and robbery rates was large: from 120 robberies per 100K residents in 1988 to 31.1 in 2001, and from 26.7 homicides per 100K residents in 1988 to 7.6 in 2001. OMP was estimated to have been responsible for some of this decline, but not a lot: about 4% of the decline in robbery rates and about 10% of the decline in homicide rates are estimated to be attributable to the increase in OMP.

Conclusion. It appears that those precincts that implemented Order Maintenance Policing (OMP) faithfully were more likely to experience declines in homicide and robbery than were those precincts in which this policy was implemented less thoroughly. It is possible, of course, that these same precincts more faithfully implemented other policies that related to crime. What is clear, however, is that if OMP did have an impact, it was not responsible for most of the drop in crime in New York City.

Reference: Rosenfeld, Richard, Fornango, Robert, and Rengifo, Andres F. (2007). The Impact of Order-Maintenance Policing on New York City Homicide and Robbery Rates: 1988-2001. *Criminology, 45* (2) 355-384.

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A policy of 'cleaning up the streets' and getting rid of those who make people feel uncomfortable may make good politics, but it does not appear to have much of an impact on crime.

Background: Based, in part, on the unsupported "broken-windows" theory of community order, the aggressive enforcement of "disorder offences" has become popular in many cities. Although there are data to suggest that people who live in socially and physically disordered communities experience more fear, the relationship between disorder and actual crime does not appear to exist.

This study examines the impact of "quality of life" policing. The theory is that such police tactics will send a signal to potential offenders that crime will not be tolerated. Police in Chandler, Arizona (an area just outside of Phoenix) imposed "quality of life" policing on an economically depressed area of the city. The targeted location was one in which residents complained about street level illegal drug and alcohol sales, prostitution, and general disrepair of the neighbourhoods. In November 1995, the police began an aggressive policy of enforcement of all municipal codes and county laws, making traffic stops as well as stopping and interviewing residents. Inspections were increased and people who did not comply with orders were charged. Marked and unmarked cars as well as bicycles were used to increase police presence.

The findings were mixed. The area was divided into four main "zones". There was some decline in the number of calls to the police concerning public morals matters in three of the four zones. These decreases lasted beyond the aggressive enforcement period in only two of the four targeted locations. For physical disorder, calls to the police *increased* during the aggressive policing period but subsequently reverted back to normal levels in three of the four zones, presumably because the police were responding to these matters.   However, the effect on "real crime" was less positive. In some instances, *increases* rather than decreases occurred in reports of certain crimes in some zones. Thus, although the aggressive policing strategy may have reduced calls to the police for public morals, there appeared to be some displacement of certain types of offending (e.g., drugs) to adjoining areas.

From the perspective of residents, those surveyed were more likely to think that the crime problem had increased (26%) than decreased (19%). However, they were also more likely to think that the appearance of the neighbourhood had improved (36%) than deteriorated further (10%).

Conclusion. "The program had a far less substantial effect on serious crime than on disorder-related crimes and violations. In other words, the benefits were restricted primarily to problems on which the project focused specifically…. It may be that "crime" and "grime" are two separate problems, and it is easier for the police to reduce disorder [than to reduce crime]" (p. 89). This paper supports the conclusion that "[q]uality of life initiatives are often employed without the benefit of careful problem identification or analysis, without any effort to identify underlying conditions and causes, and without careful consideration of a wide range of possible alternatives" (p. 880).

Reference: Katz, Charles; Vincent J. Webb and David R. Schaefer. 2001. An Assessment of Quality-of-Life Policing on Crime and Disorder. *Justice Quarterly* 18: 825-865.

Policing strategies that focus on local forms of disorder can be reduce crime. However, aggressive order maintenance strategies that target individual disorderly behaviours appear to be ineffective.

Dealing with physical and social disorder appears to be a central feature of some police services' crime prevention strategies. Whether such strategies are effective, however, is contentious (*Criminological Highlights* *1*(4)#5, *4*(5)#4, *5*(1)#6, *8*(4)#1, *8*(5)#8, *9*(1)#2, *10*(3)#4, *14*(5)#3), in part because the strategies used and the problems that are targeted vary considerably.

In this paper, a very thorough search of the published and unpublished research literature on the policing of disorder took place. All adequately designed studies addressing the question of whether policing disorder reduces crime were examined. To be included in the review, there had to be some kind of 'control areas' within the cities. Hence in all cases, the disorder-oriented police strategy was compared to a control area where, typically, policing took place in its normal fashion. Twenty-eight studies reporting 30 independent tests of policing disorder interventions were found. Two studies were from the U.K.; the rest were carried out in the U.S. In 9 of the studies, a random, controlled, experimental design was used. In the rest, an attempt was made to find equivalent areas in which the intervention did not take place.

Across all 30 tests, there was a significant effect of police interventions. Those areas in which social and/or physical disorder was targeted tended to have statistically significantly lower crime rates. However, the effect is described as 'modest.' To get an idea of what 'modest' means, imagine that in a targeted area, there were, on average 50 criminal incidents a month prior to the intervention being instituted, and that this varied such that for most (95%) of the months we would expect to find between 40 and 60 incidents. The targeted police interventions described in these 30 studies would be expected to reduce the number from 50 to approximately 48.85 incidents.

However, only the community problem solving programs instituted by the police demonstrated significant crime reduction. Using the hypothetical example above, these programs would be expected to reduce the number of crimes from 50 to 48.6 crimes per month.

Those programs that attempted to carry out 'aggressive order maintenance' programs (e.g., focusing on minor forms of disorder such as public drunkenness, prostitution, vandalism, disorderly youth, or traditional arresting of those thought to be gang members) did not show statistically significant effects.

The effective types of programs seem to have had fairly similar impacts on violent crime, property crime, and disorder and drug offences.

Conclusion: Policing that focuses on "community problem-solving that seeks to change social and physical disorder conditions at particular places produces [statistically] significant crime reductions" (p. 581) though these effects are relatively modest in size. "When considering a policing disorder approach, police departments should adopt a 'community coproduction model' rather than drift toward a zero-tolerance policing model, which focuses on a subset of social incivilities…." (p. 581). This latter approach appears to be ineffective.

Reference: Braga, Anthony A., Brandon C. Welsh, and Cory Schnell (2015). Can Policing Disorder Reduce Crime? A Systematic Review and Meta-analylsis. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 52*(4), 567-588.

The police practice of "Stop, question, and frisk" appears to be an ineffective way to reduce street crime.

Stop, question, and frisk (SQF) approaches to policing urban areas have often been criticized because they target innocent people and are sometimes used in a racially biased fashion. In New York City, the documented number of police stops increased dramatically in the first decade of this century. In 2010, there were about 26 stops of Black people per 100 Black residents compared to about 3 stops of White people per 100 White residents. Because crime dropped between 2000 and 2010, it is sometimes suggested that SQF approaches were responsible for this decrease. Between 2003 and 2010 about 6.6% of stops in New York City resulted in arrest.

This study examines the impact of police stops on rates of robbery and burglary in 75 New York City precincts between 2003 and 2010. The annual rate of police stops varied from 33 to 4,381 stops per 10,000 people in the general population. Various controls were used in multivariate analyses including neighbourhood disadvantage, neighbourhood stability, the percent Black in the neighbourhood, as well as the overall trend in crime rates. In addition, the analyses were carried out examining the impact of police stops on crime in the current year as well as the impact of stops in each of the two previous years. The research question was straightforward: Do SQF activities in a given year reduce crime in that year and/or the two following years?

There was a small, but somewhat inconsistent effect of police stops on robbery rates in the precinct. Depending on the specific analysis, larger numbers of police stops in the current year or in the year before were associated with

a decrease *or an increase* in robbery rates. The results for burglary suggest that police stops were not associated with a reduction in this form of crime. These same analyses were repeated to determine if there was a consistent effect of SQF *arrests* (the *percent* of SQF events leading to arrest and the SQF arrest *rate*). There were no effects. When the effect of misdemeanour arrests were examined, it was again found that there were no consistent effects on the robbery or burglary rates when full controls were included (a finding similar to previous research: see *Criminological Highlights 8*(4)#1, *8*(5)#8).

Conclusion: The results "show few significant effects of several 'stop, question and frisk' (SQF) measures on precinct robbery and burglary rates" (p. 116) and those results that are significant do not hold across crimes or type of analyses. A cautious conclusion might be that one "cannot conclude from the current investigation that SQF has no

impact on crime in New York. But we can be more certain that, if there is an impact, it is so localized and dissipates so rapidly that it fails to register in annual precinct crime rates, much less the decade-long citywide crime reductions that public officials have attributed to the policy. If SQF is effective, but its effects are highly focused and fleeting, policy-makers must decide whether expansions in a policy that already produces nearly 700,000 police stops a year are warranted, especially given the ongoing controversy regarding the disproportionate impact of SQF on racial and ethnic minorities and the possibility that it reduces police legitimacy, which may erode its crime-reduction effects over the long term" (p. 117-118).

Reference: Rosenfeld, Richard and Robert Fornango (2012). The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010. *Justice Quarterly, 37*(1), 96-122.

Police interactions with ordinary citizens involving 'stop, question, and frisks' appear to have very little effect on crime.

High rates of policing of locations known to be high in crime (crime 'hot spots') appear to have a modest impact on crime in that location, but the impact is apparently temporary and may only be effective if high density policing is coupled with certain types of police activity (*Criminological Highlights 12*(3)#3, *13*(3)#2, *14*(5)#3).

This study looks at the impact of "stop, question, and frisks" (SQFs) of ordinary citizens in New York City (NYC). SQFs often take place in locations identified by the police as 'hot spots.' This and other forms of active policing are sometimes seen as the cause of the drop in homicides in NYC. It is estimated that in 2003, there were approximately 160,000 SQF stops and 597 homicides. The number of SQF stops increased such that by 2011, there were 685,000 and 'only' 515 homicides. After the courts ruled them unconstitutional in 2013, the number of such stops dropped to about 47,000 in 2014 and homicides also declined to 333. This study attempts to see whether SQFs – carried out at high rates before they were found to be unconstitutional - actually have an impact on crime.

The method was to look at crime on 'street segments' – essentially a city block, including the two intersections – during the years (2006-11) when an unconstitutionally high number of SQFs were carried out. The goal was to see if an SQF carried out on a given street segment in a given week had any effect on crime on that same street segment the following week. Looking across all 5 NYC boroughs, the data suggest that an SQF one week reduced non-traffic related crime on that street segment in 3 of the 5 boroughs.

However, "in the peak years of SQFs in NYC, almost 700,000 SQFs would lead to only a 2% decline in crime" (p. 47). Attributing the decline in crime solely to the SQF is problematic in that it is impossible to separate out the effect of the SQF on crime from the mere presence of police. In addition, attributing this modest drop in crime to the SQF ignores the "degree that SQFs are coupled with other policing strategies" (p. 49). Specifically, "[i]n light of research findings on the effectiveness of directed patrol, the prolonged presence of police in a crime hot spot might very well be the active ingredient of SQFs, as opposed to anything that the police were doing" (p. 61). As one commentator noted "the efficacy of the SQF tactic, at least from the standpoint of marginal deterrence, is considerably more ambiguous than its advocates might like to admit" (p. 62). Finally, even if there is a small effect, it is impossible to know whether this effect relates only to only certain types of SQFs (e.g., those involving actual offenders).

Conclusion: Although the data suggest that stop, question and frisks (SQFs) may be associated with small reductions in crime in the location in which the police stop took place, one has to consider the other effects of SQFs: "The aggressive use of SQFs could erode citizens' willingness to report crime to, or to cooperate in investigation or intelligence gathering with, the police. In a recent survey… young respondents who were stopped more frequently reported less willingness to report crimes even when they were the crime victims" (p. 63). Even if it could be shown that the apparent effects of SQFs on crime are due to SQFs and not some other correlated factor, "[t]he question is whether this approach [SQFs] is the best one for crime prevention at hot spots and whether its benefits are greater than its potential negative impacts on citizen evaluations of police legitimacy" (p. 50).

References: Weisburd, David, Alese Wooditch, Sarit Weisburd, and Sue-Ming Yang (2015). Do Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices Deter Crime? *Criminology & Public Policy, 15*(1), 31-56. Apel, Robert (2015). On the Deterrent Effect of Stop, Question and Frisk. *Criminology & Public Policy, 15*(1), 57-66.

Intensive policing of minor disorder in neighbourhoods increases fear.

"Broken windows policing" has come to mean a form of policing involving crackdowns on signs of disorder (e.g., street prostitution, littered vacant lots, drug trafficking) the purpose of which is to reduce all types of criminal activity. The theory has been that if "disorder goes untreated, citizens become fearful and withdraw from the community, informal social control decreases and/or is perceived to be low by criminals, [and, as a result of this process] disorder and crime increase as criminals increase their activity in the area" (p. 504, Figure 1).

The effect of this approach on overall crime is not well established (see *Criminological Highlights* 8(4)#1, 8(5)#8, 5(1)#6). However, the hypothesized mechanism (reduced fear in the community) is itself important. This paper examines the impact of an intensive crackdown on street drug activity, prostitution, and other forms of street-level disorder, involving motor vehicle stops, sting operations, and generally a large increase in police presence in very small target areas.

In this study, some block-long street segments were subject to intensive policing and some were not. In addition, researchers systematically recorded signs of social disorder (e.g., people loitering, loud disputes, noticeably drunk people, homeless people) and physical disorder (abandoned buildings, graffiti, litter). Residents were interviewed and were asked about their own perceptions of disorder. The main dependent variable was the residents' report of how safe they felt walking alone outside at night on their block. In addition, actual measures of reported crime were recorded as well as characteristics of the respondents. The analysis also controlled for residents' pre-intervention levels of fear.

The results showed that "those living in areas that received the extra police presence were more fearful than those in other areas, controlling for levels of crime, disorder and [pre-intervention levels of fear] and various other factors [e.g., demographic characteristics of the respondents]" (p. 508). Clearly, these results suggest that 'broken windows' approaches to policing of troubled neighbourhoods cannot be justified by the suggestion that people in those neighbourhoods will feel more comfortable.

Dividing respondents into those who felt either 'safe' or 'unsafe' walking on their own block at night, it was clear that disorder itself had a large impact. Most (72%) of those living on the most disordered streets reported feeling unsafe, compared to only 15% of those who lived on the least disordered streets. But 57% of those who experienced extra police presence felt unsafe as compared to only 29% of those whose streets got no extra police presence during the experiment.

Conclusion: Given that extra police presence increased, rather than decreased, fear, it seems unlikely that 'broken windows policing' could reduce crime by making the streets

feel more inviting for those who are likely to exercise informal social control. "Seeing a sudden increase in police presence on their block may lead residents to infer that crime has increased and that their block is more dangerous and crime prone than in the past" (p. 509). "Broken windows policing approaches that are detached from the community and pay little attention to community sentiment may in some sense be doomed to failure" (p. 510).

Reference: Hinkle, Joshua C. and David Weisburd (2008). The Irony of Broken Windows Policing: A Micro-Place Study of the Relationship Between Disorder, Focused Police Crackdowns and Fear of Crime. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 36,* 503-512.

The perception that racial profiling by police takes place can have broad effects in the community at large: It can reduce both citizens' assessments of the legitimacy of police actions and citizens' general support of the police.

There is substantial evidence that "racial profiling" takes place in many locations (see *Criminological Highlights 5*(4)#2). In any police questioning of a citizen, it seems likely that the citizen will make attributions on why the stop took place. This paper looks at two questions: What are the consequences that flow from a situation in which a citizen explains police behaviour by attributing it to profiling? What factors shape a citizen's conclusion that profiling takes place?

Using four separate surveys, this paper examines the hypothesis that "people will evaluate police actions using procedural justice criteria" (p. 255: See *Criminological Highlights 4*(4)#1). In the first study, roughly equal numbers of whites, blacks, and Hispanics who had recently been stopped by the police took part in the survey assessing the citizen's willingness to accept the legitimacy of the police actions. The predictors of the assessment of the police actions were the same for both minority and white respondents. Not surprisingly, those who attributed the stop to profiling (on the basis of race, age or sex) were less willing to see the stop as being legitimate. But those "who experience high quality interpersonal treatment [from the police] – politeness, respect, acknowledgement of their rights – are also less likely to feel that they have been profiled" (p. 259).

A second study (of 18-26 year olds in New York) showed that both white and non-white respondents believe that profiling is prevalent and unjustified. For non-white respondents, the belief that they themselves had been racially profiled led to poor ratings of the police. The perception by young people of whether they had received respectful treatment at the hands of the police shaped both their views of whether they had been profiled and their views of the police. The third survey (of New York residents) showed, not surprisingly, that minorities were more likely than whites to believe that profiling takes place. This survey also demonstrated that for whites and non-whites the quality of the treatment that they felt they could expect from the police affected their view of whether profiling takes place. Finally, a telephone survey of New York residents found, once again, that "support for the police is undermined if the police are believed to engage in profiling" (p. 273).

Conclusion. It would appear that the belief that profiling takes place can undermine the perceived legitimacy of the police. However, these same data suggest that "the police can maintain their legitimacy by exercising their authority fairly" (p. 273). The data do not support the view that the public thinks that profiling is the result of prejudice: only 12% of whites and 33% of nonwhites thought that "when the police do stop minorities more frequently than whites, they are doing it out of prejudice" (p. 275). However, for both white and black respondents,

if a police officer profiles, that officer's behaviour is seen as less legitimate. "When people indicate that they have experienced fairness from the police and/or when they indicate that the police are generally fair in dealing with their community, they are less likely to infer that profiling takes place" (p. 276). Three aspects of procedural fairness – quality of decision making, quality of treatment, and inferences about trustworthiness – were found to significantly affect the inferences people make about their interactions with the police" (p. 277).

Reference: Tyler, Tom R. and Cheryl J. Wakslak. (2004). Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority. *Criminology, 42,* 253-281.

Canadian youths who are Aboriginal, Black, or of Arab or Middle East background are more likely than other youths be questioned by the police even when other relevant factors such as involvement in crime have been taken into account.

Disproportionate contact with the criminal justice system by various segments of society is a well established criminological fact. For example, for decades, Aboriginal people have been over-represented in Canada's prisons – in comparison to the proportion of the population that they represent. Some of the over-representation of certain groups may be due to differences in the involvement of crime. The challenge, however, is to determine whether, in fact, members of certain groups are more likely to be stopped and questioned by the police even when involvement in crime is controlled.

This study used data from a nationally representative survey of 4,164 Canadian youths age 12-17 in 2000/1. One survey question asked them whether they had been "questioned by the police about anything they thought you did" in the year prior to being interviewed. The parent most knowledgeable about the youth was also interviewed. Youths were asked about their involvement in three types of crime: violence, property and drugs. Information was also obtained on the youth's family structure, household income, whether the youth stayed out all night or had run away, the relationship with parents, parental monitoring of the youth, and friends' involvement with drugs or other crime.

The youths were categorized as White or one of two separate groups: (1) Aboriginal, Black, and Arab/Middle Eastern youths who were thought to be particularly vulnerable to special treatment by the police; and (2) all others (largely East and South Asians). The Aboriginal/ Black/ Arab/ Middle Eastern group was found to be at 'high risk' of police contact (compared to Whites and other visible minorities).

They are the focus of the study. This 'high risk' group was, however, also more likely to report involvement in violent crime (but not property or drug crime). Not surprisingly, self-reported involvement in all three types of crime increased the likelihood of contact with the police.

More important is the finding that controlling simultaneously for the three forms of self-reported delinquency did *not* reduce the higher likelihood of police contact for youths from this 'high risk' group. In addition, when other factors that were shown to be related to police contact and to membership in this 'high risk group' were controlled (e.g., staying out all night or running away from home, living in rental accommodation, low income), the effect of being a member of the 'high risk' group on police contact did not change appreciably. Interestingly, however, the impact of being a member of the 'high risk' group on police contact was larger for non-violent youths. Indeed, for youths who reported involvement in violence in the previous year, there was not a significant difference in the amount of contact with police for those from

this 'high risk' group compared to the other groups. However, there was a sizable difference in level of police contact for youths who had *not* been involved in violent crime in the previous year: 28.5% of the 'high risk' minority youths had contact with the police compared to only 10.1% of the other youths.

Conclusion: Even controlling for involvement in crime as well as other relevant factors, Canadian youths who are Black, Aboriginal, or of Arab/Middle Eastern background are more likely than other youths to be questioned by the police about possible offending. This overall finding, and the fact that the effect was due largely to differential treatment of non-violent youths, lends some support to the conclusion that the difference in treatment of the two groups relates to racial targeting on the part of the police.

Reference: Fitzgerald, Robin T. and Peter J. Carrington (2011). Disproportionate Minority Contact in Canada: Police and Visible Minority Youth. *Canadian Journal of Criminology & Criminal Justice, 53*(4), 449-486.

Black high school students in Toronto are more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than non-Black students. However, there do not appear to be differences between Black and White youths living on the street in the rate of being stopped and searched.

There is a substantial amount of evidence from many jurisdictions that Blacks are more likely to be stopped and searched by the police even when various relevant controls are taken into account. This paper replicates these findings using a survey of 3,393 high school students carried out in 2000 along with data from 396 'street youths' recruited in three shelters and four drop-in centres that provide services for Toronto's homeless.

Students from 5 randomly chosen homeroom classes in each of 30 randomly chosen Toronto high schools (public and Catholic) were sampled. Most (82%) of the youths who were asked to participate in the survey completed it. Street youths, defined as those between ages 14 and 24 who were living either on the street or in a shelter, were interviewed (face-to-face) to ensure that those who might have difficulty reading a survey would be able to answer the questions.

Most (86%) street youths reported being stopped at least once in the previous 2 years, compared to 'only' 39% of the high school students. 74% of the street youth had been searched at least once during this same period, compared to 18% of the high school students. Black high school students were considerably more likely to be stopped at least once than were white high school students (63% vs. 41%). 30% of high school youths of other races reported being stopped at least once. Other variables also predicted stops and/or searches including social class, the level of engagement in public activities on the street, involvement in partying, frequency of driving, involvement in illegal activities, and membership in gangs. However, while these factors independently predicted stops and searches, being Black had an impact above and beyond these factors for the high school students.

Youths who reported higher levels of involvement in illegal behaviour were more likely to be stopped by the police than youths with lower levels of involvement. For those highly involved in illegal activities, there was no difference between Blacks and Whites in the likelihood of being stopped by the police: Multiple stops were reported by 86% of the Black youths and a statistically indistinguishable 80% of the White youths. At the other end of the spectrum, however, for youths who reported no involvement in illegal activities, 4% of the White youths and 27% of the Black youths reported multiple police stops. It seems that "good behaviour does not protect Black youth from police contact to the same extent that it protects white youth" (p. 340).

Among the street youths, however, race did *not* predict stops or searches. 66% of the street youths met the criteria for being 'highly involved in illegal activities.' It would seem that "high criminality exposes people of all races to equal levels of police scrutiny" (p. 341). Hence, street youths, as a group, had a very high likelihood of being stopped and searched no matter what their race.

Conclusion: "For high school students… race attracts police attention. Among youth who engage in roughly similar types of behaviour, and similar levels of delinquency, black youth are stopped and searched more often than white youth" (p. 342). For street youths, who by definition are seen as being deviant, race becomes less important. For these youths, multiple stops and searches are part of normal existence, independent of race.

Reference: Hayle, Steven, Scot Wortley, and Julian Tanner (2016). Race, Street Life, and Policing: Implications for Racial Profiling. *Canadian Journal of Criminology & Criminal Justice, 58*(3), 322-353.

Do the police engage in disproportionate stops of people of certain races? The answer may depend on what is meant by 'disproportionate.'

'Racial profiling,' or the disproportionate stopping (and/or searching) of people of non-dominant groups, is obviously a contentious issue in many countries including England, the United States, and Canada. Simply put, there are two problems in assessing whether racial profiling is taking place. First, one has to measure or estimate the numerator – the number of people of various groups who are stopped and/or searched. Second, one has to measure or estimate the denominator – the proportion of each group in the population.

Each of these measurement tasks is problematic. Getting valid data on the group membership of those stopped depends on having adequate police records, self-reports of citizens, or direct observations by third parties. Denominator data are equally, if not more, problematic. What population is one trying to estimate? The problem is that the population of *residents* may not reflect the population of people who are *available* to be stopped. Simply put, if the police are expected to stop people on the street in proportion to their membership in racial groups, one has to know the racial makeup of those *on the streets* not the racial makeup *of the population as a whole*.

This study argues that "the use of the residential population as the comparative basis [for police "stop" statistics] is problematic, not least because different sections of the population may use public space differently" (p. 890). In other words, the over-representation of any group (e.g., young males, blacks) may simply reflect the fact that the members of the group are more likely to be available in public places where the police stop citizens and therefore are at greater "risk" to be stopped. In two cities in England (Reading and Slough) observers systematically counted the numbers of white, black, Asian, and 'other' people in public areas where the police were known to be likely to stop and search people on the street. Thousands of people in each city were counted. These data were then compared to official records of stops and searches. Compared to *census* data, blacks were more likely to be stopped and searched in both cities. In Slough, for example, blacks made up 6% of the population but were the subject of 15% of the stops. However, blacks made up 17% of the *available population* (the population of those on the street). The data for Reading were similar. Blacks were not over-represented in stops when compared to the "available" population, but were when compared to the census figures. Asians in Slough were under-represented in stops. They made up 40% of the "available" population but were the subject of only 31% of the stops. In addition, young men had a dramatically higher likelihood of being stopped and searched than their numbers on the street would have predicted.

Conclusion. The study demonstrates the importance of considering in a more sophisticated manner what the "expected" rate of stops would be for various groups if "profiling" did not exist. In this study, resident population figures for two cities would suggest racial profiling was taking place, while available "street population" estimates would suggest that blacks in particular were not the subject of racial profiling. The analysis suggests that one not only needs analyses of profiling that take into account the "available" population, but one also needs to consider why certain *locations* (as opposed to certain *groups*) are identified as appropriate for increased police proactive stops.

Reference: Waddington, P.A. J., Kevin Stenson and David Don (2004) In Proportion: Race, and Police Stop and Search. *British Journal of Criminology, 44,* 889-914.

African-American automobile drivers are more likely to be stopped and questioned than other drivers, when taking into account the racial makeup of those who drive. In addition, African-American drivers are particularly likely to be stopped in areas which are predominantly white.

Background. Racial profiling - or "a police initiated action that relies on the race… rather than the behaviour of an individual…" (pp. 403-4) - has been the subject of considerable controversy and research. There is substantial evidence that a black American automobile driver is more likely than a white person to be stopped and questioned by the police. To the extent that the police believe that blacks are more inclined toward criminality, they can explain such a propensity to stop/question blacks as "good police work" (p.402). This explanation should be particularly salient if the black drivers are not in a "place" in which they might be seen as "belonging." More specifically, if a driver is seen as being "out of place," he or she may be especially subject to surveillance in the form of proactive police stops. To the extent that blacks are seen as having a low probability of living in the suburbs or middle class areas (and, therefore, are "out of place"), they should be particularly subject to proactive police stops in these locations.

This study took advantage of the fact that police in the jurisdiction under examination have access to in-car computers, permitting them to check citizens directly without consulting anyone. Given that such computer verification can be seen as a form of surveillance and that the computer can be programmed to keep records of those persons (by way of the license plate number) who are queried, accurate records of the individuals who are subject to proactive record checks can be obtained. The department under study – in a city of 75,000 which is characterized as largely white and blue-collar, with a police force with few women and no minorities – borders a city that is predominantly black.

The results are based on comparisons drawn between the race of those proactively stopped and questioned and the race of others driving on the roads in those neighbourhoods. Thirteen percent of the drivers were African-Americans, but 27% of all proactive queries (on the mobile computer) were of this group. However, the proactive stopping of blacks was not uniform across the city. The relative ratio (*i.e.* relative to the proportion of drivers of each race) of blacks to whites being stopped was highest in the areas of the city located furthest from the black residential areas. "As African American drivers move from [the sectors of the city that border black residential areas] their chances of being the subject of a query increase dramatically" (p.417). In fact, they are three to four times as likely to be stopped and questioned as their numbers in the driving population would suggest.

The "hit rate" (*i.e.* the rate at which the computer indicated a legal problem with the car or driver) for African Americans was not significantly higher than that for whites. However, the "hit rate" for whites was higher than that for blacks in the white areas (*i.e.,* locations distant from the black residential areas). Finally, the proactive stops of blacks were particularly pronounced for those police officers who made frequent use, generally, of the in-car computers during proactive stops. It would seem that racial profiling is most frequent for those officers who carry out the most proactive stops.

Conclusion. Compared to their numbers as drivers, blacks appear to be more likely than whites to be subject to proactive stops. This phenomenon is most pronounced when blacks are driving through white areas. These results suggest that "a focus on individual attitudes and behaviour [of police officers] misses the underlying societal and occupational *structural* problems that produce racial profiling" (p.423) since racial profiling was responsive to place.

Reference: Meehan, Albert J. and Michael C. Ponder (2002). Race and Place: The Ecology of Racial Profiling African American Motorists. *Justice Quarterly, 19,* 399-430.

When police officers stop cars for traffic violations, the likelihood that they will also conduct a search depends not only on the race of the driver and the race of the officer, but also the racial makeup of the neighbourhood in which the stop took place.

Searches of ordinary citizens that take place when there is no evidence that a serious offence has taken place are among the most intrusive actions that police can take. This paper examines a straightforward hypothesis: that the likelihood of a search of a driver stopped for a traffic violation depends on the race of both the citizen and the police officer as well as the racial makeup of the neighbourhood in which the traffic stop takes place.

It is suggested that White officers, who may be seen in American society as higher status than Black police officers, will be more likely to search people they stop than will Black police officers. Black citizens, who may be seen as lower status than White citizens, will be more likely to be searched. The hypothesis, then, is that searches are most likely to take place when a White officer stops a Black citizen. Searches would be least likely to take place when a Black officer stops a White Citizen. When the race of the officer and citizen is the same, the likelihood of a search should be between these two extremes, with White officers somewhat more likely to search White citizens than Black officers would be to search Black citizens.

This paper examines records of ordinary traffic stops by police officers in St. Louis, Missouri. Its goal was to understand the circumstances in which police carry out searches of drivers. State law requires that, for each stop, records be kept of various aspects of the stop including the race of the driver. The study examined 69,543 stops that took place in 2007 in which searches were discretionary on the part of the police officer (i.e.,

when there were no outstanding warrants related to the driver). Searches were most likely to take place when White officers stopped Black drivers (searches took place in 8.2% of stops) and were least likely when Black officers stopped White drivers (1.5% of stops). Between these two extremes, White Officers were more likely to search White drivers (5.1% of stops) than were Black officers who stopped Black drivers (3.9% of stops).

Perhaps the most interesting findings relate to the effect of the racial composition of the community in which the traffic stop took place. St. Louis is roughly half Black and half White and is heavily segregated by race. The income of White households is roughly twice that of Black households. Nine districts in St. Louis were identified, three of which had a low representation of Black citizens (average 26%); three had medium representation of Blacks (72%) and three had very high concentrations of Black residents (96%). In the areas with a relatively low concentrations of Blacks, the results were more or less the same as for the city as a whole. For the neighbourhoods with a medium concentration of Black residents, however, those with the

highest likelihood of being searched were White drivers stopped by White police officers. In areas with very high concentrations of Black residents, White drivers stopped by White officers were, again, most likely to be searched. Situations in which both the driver and officer were Black were the least likely to result in a search. Other predictors of whether a search took place also varied across neighbourhoods suggesting, at a minimum, that police officers modify their decisions on whom to search according to the racial characteristics of the neighbourhood.

Conclusion: The results suggest that despite the increase in the number of Black officers in the U.S., Black and White citizens are treated differently when they are stopped by the police. But the data from neighbourhoods that differ in their racial composition suggest that "the racial composition of a community has a strong, [though]… not easily interpreted, influence on police search patterns" (p. 1016).

Reference: Rojek, Jeff, Richard Rosenfeld, and Scott Decker (2012). Policing Race: The Racial Stratification of Searches in Police Traffic Stops. *Criminology, 50* (4), 993-1024.

When stopped by the police, blacks and Hispanics in the U.S. are more likely than are whites to receive a traffic ticket, be arrested, or be subject to the use of force. However, they are not more likely to be carrying contraband.

Background. "The practice of targeting racial minorities for routine traffic and pedestrian stops [in the U.S.] can be traced back to the war on drugs, which promoted profiling as an effective policing tactic to detect drug offenders" (p.50). At the height of this American era, "drug arrest rates were five times higher for blacks than for whites despite consistent evidence… of similar rates of drug usage by the two racial groups…" (p.52). Indeed, these types of findings have challenged the notion defended by profiling advocates that "it is reasonable and efficient for police to consider race in their decision making [on whom to stop]" (p.54). However, in order to conclude that the over-representation of black citizens among those stopped does not, in fact, constitute efficient policing, it is necessary to know the "hit rate" on these stops – the proportion of searches which produce contraband. The research on this issue is mixed, with 8 of 16 published studies showing higher "hit rates" for black and/or Hispanic citizens than for whites. Unfortunately, these studies have typically been carried out in single cities or states. As such, it is not known the extent to which the findings may be generalized.

This study used data from a national survey of U.S. residents. Overall, black drivers were somewhat more likely than whites to have been stopped in the previous year. Further, blacks who were stopped also had a higher probability than white drivers of being given a ticket, searched, arrested, and subject to the use of force by the police (including the use of handcuffs). This relationship held even after the researchers statistically controlled for various characteristics of the driver (*e.g.,* age, income), the stop (*e.g.,* its stated purpose - an impaired driving assessment, traffic offence, vehicle defect) and the community (*e.g.,* the location in which the stop took place - the centre of a large city, a non-central area).

More importantly, although blacks and Hispanics who were stopped were more likely to be subject to various police actions, "contraband was discovered on fewer minority drivers than on white drivers…. [Specifically,] 16% of the Caucasian drivers who were searched were found to be in possession of contraband, compared to only 7.5% of non-Caucasian drivers…" (p.76). Clearly, these findings are "[c]ontrary to the argument made by many law enforcement officials that minorities are more likely to be carrying drugs and/or weapons" (p.76).

Conclusion. The two major findings of this study – that blacks and Hispanics who are stopped are more likely to be subject to police actions but less likely to be found to be involved in any criminal wrongdoing – suggest that "targeting drivers solely or even partially on the basis of their race/ethnicity is not an effective, efficient, or responsible policing strategy at the national level [in the U.S.]" (p.82). It would certainly seem that it is not the drivers but the practice of racial profiling that needs to be stopped.

Reference: Engel, Robin Shepard and Jennifer M. Calnon (2004). Examining the Influence of Drivers' Characteristics during Traffic Stops with Police: Results from a National Survey. *Justice Quarterly, 21,* 49-90.

A meta-analysis of 27 independent findings demonstrates that minority suspects who come in contact with the police are more likely to be arrested than white suspects.

Researchers interested in the effect of race on the decision by police to arrest a suspect typically attempt to control for legal factors such as the strength of the evidence against the accused, the seriousness of the offence, the criminal record and any mandatory policies that might exist in the jurisdiction. Defining arrest as "taking a person into custody for the purpose of charging him/her with a criminal offence", this study examines all available high quality studies carried out in the U.S. between 1966 and 2004.

A thorough search of published and unpublished sources located studies involving 27 independent data sets. Obviously these studies varied on a number of dimensions including whether the data were recorded by an observer, the police officer, or victims, whether the study focused on juveniles or people of all ages, and whether the study controlled for such factors as the amount of evidence, type of offence, the demeanour of the offender, the seriousness of the offence, the suspect's prior record, and whether the victim made a request to the officer on whether to arrest the accused. The meta-analysis allows one to determine whether the inclusion of these variables affects the relationship between race and arrest rate.

Because some studies reported more than one estimate of the impact of race on arrest decisions, four different estimates were used: the average effect size, the largest, the smallest, and what was judged to be the methodologically best estimate of the effect. Nevertheless, the results are remarkably similar: between 19 and 24 of the 27 studies (depending on which effect size is included) show effects supporting the conclusion that minorities are more likely to be arrested than whites. Pooling across the 27 studies there was a significant effect of race. On average the arrest rate for whites was about 20%; for minorities it was about 26%. Studies varied, of course, on how adequately they controlled for legally relevant factors. However, the adequacy of the controls for legally relevant factors was not related to the race effect: even in the best studies, Blacks were more likely to be arrested than Whites. Similarly, those studies that attempted to control for the demeanour of the suspect showed effects as large as those that did not.

Conclusion: "The results are not mixed. Race matters [in police decisions on whether to arrest]. [The] finding is consistent with what most of the American public perceives, and that finding holds over time, research site, across data collection methods, and across publication types. Furthermore, controlling for demeanour, offense severity, presence of witnesses, quality of evidence at the scene, the occurrence or discovery of a new criminal offence during the encounter, the suspect being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, prior record of the suspects, or requests to arrest by victims does not significantly reduce the strength of the relationship between suspect race and arrest" (p. 498). Even though the overall average size of the effect might seem to be relatively small, "because of the interconnectedness of decisions made in the criminal justice system, even small racial differences that occur at many points in the criminal justice process will compound and produce profound effects further along in the system" (p. 498).

Reference: Kochel, Tammy Rinehart, David B. Wilson, and Stephen D. Mastrofski. Effect of Suspect Race on Officers' Arrest Decisions. *Criminology, 49*(2), 473-512.

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Black residents of both the U.S. and Canada are more likely than white residents to perceive that the criminal justice system is biased on racial grounds. In Canada, contact with the police or the courts increases the perception of bias for black residents.

Background. It has been suggested that social class has become more important than race in determining perceptions of criminal justice agencies. Some have suggested, for example, that it is class, not race, that determines the targets of "police misconduct" and the perception that the system is biased. These two studies suggest otherwise.

These studies, one carried out in Canada, the other in the U.S., both look at the role of race (and educational achievement) on respondents' views of discrimination by the police.   The American study examined opinions regarding the role of the police in providing security in neighbourhoods, confidence that the police treat people of both races equally, unfair treatment by the police, and the perception of how widespread the problem of racism against blacks is among police officers.

The Canadian study looked at the perception that certain groups are treated worse (e.g., the poor, the young, blacks) by the police and the courts. Generally speaking, Canadian respondents perceive more discrimination by the police than by criminal court judges. In addition, "black respondents are much more likely to perceive police and judicial discrimination than either Chinese or white respondents" (p. 446-7). Canadian blacks "are more likely than their white and Chinese counterparts to report that discrimination is both severe and commonplace" (p.448). The American data are similar: controlling for education, income, age, gender, region of the country, and political orientation, "Blacks are significantly more likely than whites to view themselves as being the brunt of harsh treatment at the hands of the criminal justice system.... and to believe that racism among police officers is very or fairly common" (p. 500).

Education does make a difference. In the US, the more educated a respondent is, the more likely it is that there will be negative appraisals of the criminal justice system's treatment of blacks generally. Similarly, in Canada, those who were best educated were most likely to perceive the criminal justice system as being unjust.

The most dramatic finding for Canada, however, was that contact with the police or the courts was likely to *increase* perceptions of criminal *injustice,* particularly for blacks. This may not be too surprising given that blacks were much more likely to report that they had been stopped by the police (43% of males reported being stopped at least once in the past two years) than were whites (25%) or Chinese (19%). Hence the problem is not that blacks hold an uninformed stereotype of the police and courts based on no direct experience. When they actually have contact with the criminal justice system, their views become even more negative.

Conclusion. These findings -- that blacks are much more likely than whites to perceive racial bias on the part of the police and courts -- are important for a number of reasons including the fact that "people obey the law [in part] because they believe that it is proper to do so... People are more responsive to normative judgements and appeals than is typically recognized by criminal legal authorities..." (p. 461). Given that most people believe that it is the responsibility of the police and others in the criminal justice system to maintain confidence in the system, these perceptions of injustice cannot be ignored. They are also important because they are one more indicator of differential treatment of blacks by the police and other parts of the justice system.

References. Wortley, Scot. Justice for all? Race and perceptions of bias in the Ontario criminal justice system -- a Toronto study. *Canadian Journal of Criminology,* 1996, 439-467. Weitzer, Ronald and Steven A. Tuch. Race, class, and perceptions of discrimination by police. *Crime and Delinquency*, 1999, *45*, 494-507.

Unproductive police stops of ordinary citizens leads to political alienation, distrust and, more generally, civic disengagement for people living in areas targeted by the police.

In some cities, the police have stepped up their stop-and-frisk activities. New York City, for example, increased the number of such stops from about 90,000 in 2002 to 700,000 in 2011; nonetheless, the proportion of stops leading to arrest was essentially unchanged at about 5-6%. One problem with large numbers of police stops is that these can be seen as a form of public shaming of those stopped, suggesting disrespect or unneeded harassment by the police.

Previous research has found that "police-initiated contacts are strongly and negatively related to the probability that an individual will later call the police in times of need" (p. 205-6). More generally, it seems that contact with the criminal justice system reduces civic engagement (*Criminological Highlights 14*(4)#1). It appears, then, that police interactions with citizens "shape how communities interact with the state more broadly" (p. 206). Police stops can range from those in which citizens only identify themselves to stops that lead to arrest, summons, etc. In this paper, stops were labeled "surplus" if they involved a frisk, search, or use of force but did not result in an arrest, summons, or finding of contraband. From the perspective of the target of the stop as well as those who observed or heard about it, the stop was likely to be seen as gratuitous.

In this paper, the researchers used as an indicator of civic engagement the rate of citizen calls to their municipal governments regarding their needs, concerns, and demands of the local government. These calls may involve broken streetlights, graffiti, complaints about city services, or other concerns.

Calls to local government can be seen as "a way of connecting citizens to their municipal government… and fostering citizens' confidence in the public sector" (p. 207). "By voicing their complaints, however mundane, citizens interact with government at the local level and obtain a response" (p. 208). Alternatively, people in communities who do not use this service may have disengaged from and lost trust in their civic communities. In other words, they would see their city as not having an interest in their concerns.

For this study, New York City was divided into small neighbourhood groupings (or blocks) involving about 1000 residents each. Data – on 311 calls to municipal governments and police stops – were examined during a 24 month period. In New York City, there are on average about 224 calls per 100 residents per year. The "stop rate", the proportion of stops that were 'surplus', and the number of 311 calls all varied considerably across blocks.

After controlling for measures of disadvantage in the neighbourhood, high rates of 'surplus' stops were associated with lower rates of 311 calls (overall, and calls concerning crime and safety). In another analysis, adjacent neighbourhoods that were in different police precincts and had very different rates of surplus stops were compared. Again, those living in areas with high rates of surplus stops were less likely to make 311 calls.

Conclusion: The results demonstrate that "when police search a higher number of citizens or deploy more force in their stops of community members, people become much less likely to make claims on local government" (p. 217). The results were, however, different for the density of stops that did not involve 'surplus' force, suggesting that it is the "quality of policing, not merely the quantity" (p. 217) that makes the difference.

Reference: Lerman, Amy E. and Vesla Weaver (2014). Staying out of Sight? Concentrated Policing and Local Political Action. *ANNALS of the American "Academy of Political and Social Science, 651*, 202-219.

Warnings given by police to suspects concerning their rights have had a "negligible effect on the ability of the police to elicit confessions and on the ability of prosecutors to win convictions" (p. 203).

Background. When the *Miranda* warnings were imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966, police and prosecutors suggested that it would no longer be possible to obtain confessions and that offenders would go unpunished. However, early studies on the actual use and effectiveness of this legal requirement did not find strong empirical support for the belief that prosecutions would be made more difficult. Rather, they suggested that warnings tended to be given most often in important cases "when failure to do so might jeopardize the admissibility of a highly valued confession" (p.233). At the same time, it was noted that most suspects did not appear to fully understand the impact and importance of the material in the warning. Furthermore, some research suggested that the required warnings neither affected the likelihood that an accused would confess nor the success of prosecutions (p.234). Although other work found a somewhat lower confession rate for certain offences, this phenomenon did not invariably translate into a lower *conviction* rate. In fact, it was concluded in one study that "police interrogators used the warnings to their advantage to create the appearance that a voluntary statement had been obtained" (p.234). Generally speaking, the early studies suggested that "the *Miranda* rules had only a marginal effect on the ability of the police to elicit confessions and on the ability of prosecutors to win convictions, despite the fact that some detectives continued to perceive a substantial *Miranda* impact" (p.238).

This paper contrasts these early conclusions regarding the use and effectiveness of Miranda warnings with those from more recent studies. While "quantitative claims [made by those arguing that the warnings have impeded prosecutions] have not been generally accepted in either the legal or social science community" (p.244), they underline the controversy which still surrounds this legal requirement. In an attempt to synthesize the current consensual view of the *Miranda* warning, this study notes the following points:

- While the police give warnings in almost all cases in which they are legally required, questioning does occur "outside" *Miranda*.
- The police have developed strategies which induce *Miranda* waivers in part by downplaying the significance of the warning or suggesting that benefits may be attributed to those individuals who talk to them.
- Waivers are given in most (78-96%) police interrogations although this percentage drops with suspects who have a criminal record. As one researcher noted, "[n]ext to the warning label on cigarette packs, *Miranda* is the most widely ignored piece of official advice in our society" (p.247).
- In some jurisdictions, police are trained to violate the warning.
- There appear to be fewer seriously abusive interrogations than there were 40 years ago. Nevertheless, "*Miranda* has not changed the psychological interrogation process that it condemned but has only motivated police to develop more subtle and sophisticated – and perhaps more compelling – interrogation strategies" (p.255).

Conclusion: The *Miranda* warning may "tap into a basic vein of fairness that transcends the [Supreme Court's original] assumptions about the diminished free will of suspects facing police interrogation" (p.265). However, there is no consistent evidence that it has affected the ability of an accused person to resist giving a confession. Part of the reason for this reality appears to be because "the police adjusted to [the necessity of giving] *Miranda* [warnings] and learned how to comply in a way that minimizes the chance that the suspect will resist interrogation" (p.207). In other words, it would seem that police clearly include the right to confess as part of the Miranda warning.

Reference: Thomas, George C. III, and Richard A. Leo. (2002). The Effects of *Miranda v. Arizona:* "Embedded" in Our National Culture? *in* M. Tonry (ed). *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*. Volume 29. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 203-271.

Legally required warnings to youths about the consequences of making statements to the police do little if anything to protect youths' rights.

Many jurisdictions have special procedures to warn youths about the consequences of making statements to the police (e.g., the U.S. *Miranda* warning). Developmental psychology suggests, however, that although youths may understand the meaning of the words they are told, they may lack the judgment and maturity to appreciate the purpose and importance of the rights they are being asked to waive.

To understand the interrogation of youths, this study examined records of 307 interrogations of 16- and 17-year-olds charged with felonies in four Minnesota counties. All were completed cases and constituted all formal police interrogations of 16-17 year-olds that took place in these counties between 2003 and 2006. The data examined included recordings of these interrogations (which were required by the state courts), the police reports related to the cases, as well as court records. Most of the youths (69%) had been arrested prior to the incident in which they were interrogated and most (57%) had been to court before. Their charges varied considerably.

To get youths to waive their rights, police used 'standard' interrogation techniques, including "communicating the value of talking – 'telling her story' – and telling the truth before they gave a *Miranda* warning" (p. 10-11). When speaking to the youths, police sometimes referred to the warning as a formality or a bureaucratic exercise, but were careful to ensure that youths indicated that they understood the warning. 93% of the youths who were interviewed waived their rights to silence and to counsel. Those youths with prior felony arrests were somewhat less likely to waive their rights (87%) than were those with no prior felony arrests (95%). But even 'experienced' youths were largely willing to talk to the police.

Most interrogations were very short: 77% took 15 minutes or less. Only 10% took more than 30 minutes. Most youths (80%) were cooperative with the police. It appeared that "most juveniles did not require a lot of persuasion or intimidation to cooperate" (p. 14). The police used a variety of 'standard' interrogation techniques that are used with adults. In 69% of the cases they used one or more 'maximization' techniques which are designed to "convey the interrogator's rock-solid belief that the suspect is guilty and that all denials will fail" (p. 5). These included confronting the youth with evidence such as statements from witnesses or co-accused (54% of cases). In 33% of the cases the police accused the youth of lying and in about 30% they urged the youth to tell the truth. Another set of techniques involved "minimizing tactics [on the part of the police officer which] offer face-saving excuses or moral justifications that reduce a crime's seriousness, provide a less odious motivation or shift blame…" (p. 15). As with adults, these were used less frequently than 'maximization techniques' (17% of cases). Most youths (59%) "confessed within a few minutes of waiving *Miranda* and did not require prompting by police" (p. 17). Only 12% did not make incriminating admissions.

Conclusion: Statements from youths were rarely excluded from court hearings. "Police [in these interrogations] acted professionally and complied with *Miranda's* protocol – there is no ambiguity about warnings and waivers. In addition, most juveniles confess and tapes provide unimpeachable evidence of their statements" (p. 23). However, "*Miranda's* assumption that a warning would enable suspects to resist the compulsive pressures of interrogation is demonstrably wrong" (p. 24). Youths, like adults, may understand the words in the warning, but they "lack ability to understand and competence to exercise rights" (p. 24). This article suggests youths be required to consult a lawyer before waiving their rights, because if they "cannot understand and exercise rights without legal assistance, then to treat them as if they do denies fundamental fairness and enables the state to exploit their vulnerability" (p. 26).

Reference: Feld, Barry C. (2013). Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids. *Law & Society Review, 47* (1), 1-35.

Canadian police services use a wide variety of different wordings when cautioning those facing interrogation. These cautions vary considerably in their verbal complexity and the ability of listeners to understand their meanings.

Canadian police are required to tell those who are facing a police interrogation that they have the right to remain silent and they have the right to consult a lawyer. Accused people can waive these rights if they have been informed that they have these rights and if they appreciate the consequences of waiving them. However, there does not appear to be a standard warning that is given to accused people across the country. Individual police departments (or provincial bodies) have developed their own warnings. This paper examines warnings used by Canadian police services with a goal of understanding whether the variation in the wording of the warnings might be associated with variation in the ability of Canadians to understand and appreciate the meaning of these warnings.

American research has demonstrated that the so-called *Miranda* warnings vary considerably in their length, readability, complexity, their use of unusual words, as well as the length and complexity of the sentences. Using cautions collected from across Canada, the first step in this study was to examine the cautions for "readability." Perhaps the most frequently used technique for this is the "Flesch-Kincaid" score – an estimate of the (English language) reading level necessary to understand the warning. It has been suggested that no higher than a Grade 6 reading level should be acceptable for these warnings (i.e., that a person who could read at the Grade 6 level or higher would be able to understand the warning).

Using this standard most of the right-to-silence cautions (15 of the 19) were found to be acceptable. What is interesting, however, is the variability: it was estimated that someone with slightly higher than a Grade 5 level could understand the Halifax right-to-silence caution, whereas a person

would need more than a Grade 8 education to understand the British Columbia caution. There was similar variation on the right-to-legal counsel cautions. It was estimated that a Grade 5 education was sufficient to understand the Charlottetown Police Department's caution, whereas more than a Grade 8 education was needed to understand Calgary's caution.

A limited number of cautions concerning the right-to-legal counsel were compared by having these cautions read to undergraduate students in Canada. Once again, the most important finding was that there was variability across cautions in how complete the students' understanding was of the various warnings. On some criteria, relatively few people understood the meaning of the warning; and on other criteria, there were large differences across different wordings.

Conclusion: A caution given to a person who is being arrested or interrogated is only effective if its

meaning is understood. This paper suggests that some Canadian police services have been more successful than others at developing effective cautions. More importantly, perhaps, this paper suggests that police services (or governments) could, if they were interested, develop *and test* the effectiveness of their warnings. This process is straightforward, but not necessarily easy. For example, the "model" warning created by the authors of the paper was not as effective, *on some criteria*, as warnings currently in use.

Reference: Eastwood, Joseph, Brent Snook, and Sarah J. Chaulk (2010). Measuring Reading Complexity and Listening Comprehension of Canadian Police Cautions. *Criminal Justice and Behavior, 37* (4), 453-471.

It is unlikely that warnings from Canadian police given to youths are adequately understood by them.

As with adults, Canadian police must inform accused youths of their legal rights. For example, youths have a right to legal counsel; they can consult parents or other adults, and youths can choose to have parents and/or counsel present during questioning. They are not required to make statements to the police.

The Youth Criminal Justice Act specifies that the warnings to the youth of the youth's rights must be "in language appropriate to his or her age and understanding" (s. 146(2)(b)). However, the form of the various warnings is not specified in the legislation. Hence police services have developed special formal warnings for youths that can be read to youths when they are arrested. This study examines a simple question: Is it likely that youths understand these warnings?

There is a good deal of research (e.g., *Criminological Highlights* 11(3)#7) that suggests many police warnings designed for ordinary citizens are often written in ways that make them difficult to understand. In this study, 50 warning statements from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and from at least one police service in each province and territory were studied. There were 31 "unique" warnings. (The remainder were used by more than one police service). The police services that provided the warnings for the study are responsible for policing at least 90% of Canada's population.

Two very different forms of assessment of these 31 different warning forms were employed. First, the 'complexity' of the forms was assessed. For example, long statements are generally more difficult to understand. The warnings varied in length from 239 to 1192 words. The statements were also assessed according to standardized measures of the school grade level needed to comprehend the statements as well as the grade level at which specific important words would be likely to be understood. The estimated grade level needed to understand the warnings ranged from approximately Grade 6 (age 12) to Grade 12 (age 18). Many of these warning statements contained words that would not be expected to be understood by those well over the age of criminal responsibility in Canada (age 12).

In a separate study, 32 students, aged 15-17, in St. Johns, Newfoundland & Labrador were read the forms used by their local police service. They were asked to indicate whether they understood what was read to them and their confidence in their comprehension of the warning. They were then asked to write down the information that they would give to a close friend who was arrested. Broadly speaking, the students were, not surprisingly, able to recall more of the warnings when tested after each section was read to them than when they were asked to recall what they had been told after all information had been delivered. However, only 22% of the respondents recalled more than half of the information contained in the warning.

Conclusion: Perhaps because warnings are often long and written in language that is difficult for youths to understand, it is it not surprising that young people do not fully understand the warnings that are normally used by police. "Also of importance was the fact that participants [who were read the warnings used by their local police] reported high levels of confidence in how much they understood and almost always confirmed that they understood the rights that were presented – despite the overall low level of comprehension. This finding suggests that simply asking youths whether they understood the rights is not a useful procedure for ensuring that youths actually understand their rights" (p. 821). But, in addition, other research would suggest that even if they understand the 'words', youths may not be able to resist the pressures to make statements to the police (*Criminological Highlights* 13(4)#2).

Reference: Eastwood, Joseph, Brent Snook, and Kirk Luther (2015). Measuring the Reading Complexity and Oral Comprehension of Canadian Youth Waiver Forms. *Crime & Delinquency,* 61(6), 798-828.

Procedural justice is just as important for youths as it is for adults in understanding their views of the legitimacy of the police and their willingness to report crimes to the police.

A number of studies have demonstrated that the manner in which the police treat those whom they come in contact with is important in understanding citizens' views of the legitimacy of the police and their willingness to report offences to the police (see, for example, *Criminological Highlights 4*(4)#1, *7*(1)#4, *11*(4)#1). This study examines whether the effect of fair treatment on the perceived legitimacy of the police is the same for youths as it is for adults.

A heterogeneous sample of 513 youths (age 12-17) in grades 7-10 in a medium sized Australian city were sampled along with 2611 adults (age 18-94, mean=49) from the same city. In a written survey, police legitimacy was measured by the extent of agreement with statements such as whether "Most police are honest" and "I have great respect for the police." Respondents' views of procedural justice by police were measured as the extent of agreement with statements such as "It depends on what mood a police officer is in whether they book you/tell you off" or "Police treat you differently depending on where you live". Police effectiveness was measured with questions such as "How well do police do in dealing with problems that concern people in your suburb/at keeping an eye on gangs of young people?" (p. 76). Various control measures were included in regression analyses including age, gender, whether respondents were of Australian ancestry, and whether they had had recent contact with the police.

Regression analyses, carried out separately for youths and for adults, showed generally similar effects for youths and adults. Those who rated the police favourably on the measure of procedural justice were more likely to see the police as acting legitimately in the community. A similar, and independent, effect on police legitimacy was found for police effectiveness. Further, those who viewed the police favourably on the procedural justice measures were also more likely than others to report that they would report crimes (e.g., a gang beating up someone). However, one effect was significant only for youths: youths, but not adults, who saw the police as being highly effective were more likely to indicate that they would report criminal incidents to the police.

The effects of procedural justice and police effectiveness on reporting criminal incidents to the police were mediated by views of the legitimacy of the police. When adults and youths believe that the police act in a procedurally fair way, they see police as generally acting legitimately. This, in turn, appears to increase the likelihood that they would report crime to the police. The results for adults are similar to those for youths, but it would appear that views of police legitimacy in adults do not fully mediate, or explain, the relationship between views of procedural justice of the police and the reporting of crime.

Conclusion: "Procedural justice policing has many advantages over a coercive deterrence-based policing approach. The main advantage is that the motivation by young people to obey the rules and norms of society, as well as obey police directives, is self-regulatory under a procedural justice policing model. This means that… people voluntarily defer to police requests and directives and are less likely to challenge and defy police decisions" (p. 71). It appears that youths' views of the police, once established, are related to cooperation with the police in much the same way as they are for adults. Once again, the findings demonstrate the importance of fair and respectful treatment by the police of ordinary citizens – for both youths and adults.

Reference: Murphy, Kristina (2015). Does Procedural Justice Matter to Youth? Comparing Adults' and Youths' Willingness to Collaborate with Police. *Policing and Society, 25*(1), 53-76.

People who believe that the police act unfairly are likely to believe that it is all right for ordinary people to use violence for personal protection, to resolve disputes, or to achieve political goals.

Previous research has suggested that "when police act in line with the norms and values of procedural justice, members of the public tend to believe that the police have the right to [use force]" (p. 479). This study examines whether there are "empirical links between how the police [are seen to] exercise their authority (procedural justice)… and whether those [who are subject to the police] believe it is acceptable to use violence to achieve certain social and political goals" (p. 480).

Studies have suggested that those who perceive the justice system to be more legitimate are more likely to comply with the law, cooperate with the police, and support the police in their exercise of their power (*Criminological Highlights, 4*(4)#1, *7*(1)#4, *11*(4)#1, *12*(5)#2). This study examines whether those who see the police as acting in a legitimate manner "also believe that one should not use violence to achieve certain goals – that is that the police have a right and just monopoly over violence in society" (p. 481).

The study was carried out in 4 boroughs of London, England. Within each of these locations, males, age 16-30 "self-identifying as members of a non-majority ethnic or racial group" (p. 483) were sampled. The acceptability of three types of violence was assessed: violence to protect oneself from attack or intruders, violence to resolve disputes or take revenge, and violence for political goals. In addition, trust in the fairness of the police, belief in the effectiveness of the police, and belief in the legitimacy of the police were assessed. Finally, fear of crime, feelings of belonging in

Britain, and attitudes toward democracy were included along with various demographic measures and experiences with police stops.

Controlling for all other measured factors, "the study's core finding is that [perceived] procedural justice explains variation in police legitimacy, which in turn is negatively correlated with attitudes to [all three types of] private violence (p. 486). In other words, the relationship of procedural justice to the acceptability of violence appears to be indirect – by its impact on the perceived legitimacy of the police. This suggests the more people perceive the police to be acting legitimately "via compliance with standards of procedural justice, the less favourable are people's views about the acceptability of private violence" (p. 486). There is little evidence that judgments of police *effectiveness* are related to attitudes concerning the legitimacy of using private violence. Independent of these effects, "A positive view of democracy and feelings of belonging to the nation are negatively correlated with approval of political violence" (p. 486).

Conclusion: Consistent with previous research, this study found that perceptions of the legitimacy of the police are correlated with perceptions that the police act in a procedurally fair manner. Those who see the police as acting with legitimacy, then, are less likely to support the use of violence for personal protection, to resolve disputes, or to achieve political goals. Although causal statements cannot be drawn from these correlational results, the findings underline the likely importance of police acting in a manner that elicits perceptions that they are acting in a procedurally fair manner.

Reference: Jackson, Jonathan, Aziz Z. Huq, Ben Bradford, and Tom R. Tyler (2013) Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes Toward the Acceptability of Violence. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 19*, 479-497.

Treatment by the police that is perceived to be unfair reduces citizens' willingness to be law abiding because being treated badly leads people to feel angry or resentful which, in turn, makes them less likely to follow the law and obey the police.

There is considerable evidence that procedurally fair treatment by the police is important in motivating ordinary citizens to cooperate with them and to follow the law (*Criminological Highlights* 4(4)#1, 7(1)#4, 11(4)#1, 12(5)2, 15(1)#5, 15(3)#2). This paper, reporting the results of a survey and an experiment, examines the psychological mechanism whereby unfair treatment appears to reduce the view that obeying the law and the police is important.

In this study, a representative sample of Australians (drawn from voting lists) was asked to fill out a survey questionnaire in 2007, and again in 2009. The study focuses on those who had contact with the police in the previous 12 months. Procedural justice was measured by such questions as whether the police were polite, respectful, and fair. Those who reported that they were treated fairly, etc., by the police were less likely to report being angry, resentful, frustrated, etc., after the interaction with the police (controlling for age, gender, level of education, and income). Those who reported having been treated in a procedurally fair manner were also more likely to report willingness to comply with the law and to obey the police. However, when the reported emotional response of the respondent to the encounter was controlled for, the effect of procedural justice disappeared. This pattern of findings suggests that the relationship between being treated in a procedurally just fashion and compliance with the law and the police is mediated by negative affect created by procedurally unjust treatment. Said differently, being treated in a procedurally unjust fashion leads to feelings of frustration and anger

which, in turn, reduce the likelihood of future compliance with the police and with the law.

In the second (experimental) study, Australian university students were given descriptions of one of two scenarios in which they were to imagine being stopped by the police for exceeding the speed limit by 5 km/hour. In one scenario (given to half the respondents) the police officer was described as courteous, friendly, and giving an explanation for the stop. For the other half of the respondents, the police officer was described as rude, condescending, and not explaining the purpose of the stop. Once again, being treated in a procedurally unjust fashion led respondents to report more negative affect. In addition, they reported they would, in the future, be less likely to be careful to follow all road rules, and generally would be less likely to follow the law. However, once again, when negative affect was controlled for, the effect of procedural justice disappeared suggesting that being treated in a procedurally unfair manner leads people to be angry, etc., which in turn makes them less likely to follow the law in the future.

Conclusion: "Procedural justice appears to be consistently important for influencing both emotional reactions and compliance [with the law and the police].... By engaging with the public in a polite, respectful, and empathetic manner, police officers will be able to reduce negative sentiments and emotion directed at them, thereby increasing people's willingness to comply with them both immediately and in the future" (p. 269). "If the police wish to be able to effectively manage citizen behaviour and promote compliance with the law, the findings... suggest that they ought to treat people with procedural justice" (p. 270).

Reference: Barkworth, Julie M, and Kristina Murphy (2015). Procedural Justice Policing and Citizen Compliance Behaviour: The Importance of Emotion. *Psychology, Crime & Law, 21*(3), 254-273.

Variation across neighbourhoods in legal cynicism – i.e., lack of support for the legitimacy of laws and lack of confidence in the police – helps explain why some Chicago neighbourhoods maintained high homicide rates even when homicide rates elsewhere were decreasing.

Previous research has shown that residents of socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods with high rates of violent crime have low levels of tolerance for violence or crime. However, "while individuals may believe in the substance of the law, antagonism toward and mistrust of the agents of the law may propel some individuals toward violence simply because they feel they cannot rely upon the police to help them resolve grievances" (p. 1191), an argument similar to that made to explain the relative reduction, over time, of homicides by the elite (see *Criminological Highlights 1*(3)#3). Legal cynicism is part of the culture of a neighbourhood. This conceptualization of culture views it "not as values but as a repertoire of tools that ultimately serve as a guide for action" (p. 1195).

Residents of a neighbourhood "acquire culture relationally, through their interactions in social networks" (p. 1195). Thus, for example, "cynicism toward the law does not directly cause neighbourhood violence…." Instead, the culture of a neighbourhood may be one of mistrust of agents of the law, such that "individuals will resort to illegal violence to redress a problem instead of abiding by the letter of the law" (p. 1203).

This study examines the homicide rate of 342 neighbourhoods in Chicago, looking at characteristics of neighbourhoods rather than of individuals. In Chicago, in the early 1990s, there was, not surprisingly, a positive correlation between concentrated poverty of a neighbourhood and legal cynicism, but a small negative relationship between legal cynicism and tolerance for deviance.

The level of legal cynicism was positively related to the homicide rate in the late 1990s above and beyond the impact of concentrated poverty, tolerance for deviance and other neighbourhood characteristics. More importantly, although the neighbourhood homicide rate in the early 1990s was a predictor of the neighbourhood homicide rate in the late 1990s, legal cynicism (measured in the middle of the decade) remained a predictor of late-1990s homicide rates even after controlling for the earlier homicide rate. In fact, the level of legal cynicism of the people in the neighbourhood predicted the change in homicide rates from the early 1990s to the early 2000s: neighbourhoods in which the culture was one in which the law and police were not trusted tended to be those whose homicide rates remained high, while neighbourhoods not characterised by legal cynicism tended to have decreased homicide rates.

Conclusion: It is important to remember that 'legal cynicism' and 'tolerance for deviance or violence' are quite separate constructs. But "when the law is perceived to be unavailable – for example, when calling the police is not a viable option to remedy one's problems – individuals may instead resolve their grievances by their own means, which may include violence… In this sense, cultural frames have a constraining influence; cynicism constrains choice if individuals presume that the law is unavailable or unresponsive to their needs, thus pushing individuals to engage in their own brand of social control" (p. 1128).

Reference: Kirk, David S. and Andrew V. Papachristos (2011). Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistence of Neighbourhood Violence. *American Journal of Sociology, 116* (4), 1190-1233.

Young Black Americans' perceptions of criminal injustice depends on more than the nature of their own interactions with justice authorities.

Black Americans are more likely than others to perceive that they are treated in an unfair manner. But in addition, Black Americans living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods are especially more likely than others to have negative views of the justice system. A question raised by this paper is whether it is structural disadvantage *per se* that is important in understanding these neighbourhood and race differences or whether it is the moral and legal cynicism of the neighbourhood that is important in understanding perceptions of criminal injustice.

Over a period of 11 years, 689 African American youths (age 10-12 years old at the beginning of the study) and their families were interviewed 5 times. They were recruited from 39 neighbourhoods in two states. These neighbourhoods varied considerably at the beginning of the study in their degree of 'structural disadvantage' (e.g., proportion of families on public assistance, proportion unemployed). Moral and legal cynicism was measured for the neighbourhood when the youth was 19-21 years old by combining responses from those in the neighbourhood to 10 items such as "How important is it to obey the law?", "Behaving aggressively is often an effective way of dealing with someone who is taking advantage of you", or how 'wrong' it is to commit certain crimes such as stealing something, selling drugs. During these interviews, the parent and the youth were each asked if they had been treated unjustly or in a discriminatory manner by the police in the year before the interview.

When youths were 21-23 years old, their own perceptions of criminal injustice were assessed by asking them to indicate their degree of agreement/disagreement with statements such as "Police are more likely to stop and question Blacks unfairly than those in other racial groups"; "Courts are biased and unfair when it comes to deciding cases with Black suspects and White victims"; "Courts punish Blacks more harshly than Whites." Various control variables (e.g., sex, various measures of criminal justice involvement by the youth) were also included.

Structural disadvantage of the neighbourhood only predicted perceptions of criminal injustice when neighbourhood moral and legal cynicism were not included in the prediction model. Moral and legal cynicism did, however, predict perceptions of injustice. "It is not simply structural disadvantage that generates perceptions of injustice among African Americans. Rather disadvantage promotes collective cynicism [in the neighbourhood], which is associated with appraisals of biases in the criminal justice system" (p. 535). Both personal and vicarious (parental) negative interactions with the police were also associated with increased perceptions of injustice. In addition, "individuals who [directly or vicariously] experienced negative encounters [with the police] and also reside in neighbourhoods

characterized by high levels of moral and legal cynicism are [especially] likely to view the criminal justice system as being biased against them" (p. 536).

Conclusion: "For the state to secure voluntary compliance from the public, it is necessary for it to be perceived as morally credible" (p. 520). This paper suggests that the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of young Black Americans is undermined most dramatically when negative interactions with the police occur to those who live in neighbourhoods that can be characterized as already having high degrees of legal cynicism. These results are independent of individuals' record of offending, arrests or other criminal justice contact.

Reference: Berg, Mark T., Eric A. Stewart, Jonathan Intravia, Patricia Y. Warren, and Ronald L. Simons (2016). Cynical Streets: Neighbourhood Social Processes and Perceptions of Criminal Injustice. *Criminology, 54*(3), 520-547.

Police misconduct in highly disadvantaged neighbourhoods can lead to increases in violent crime.

"Conflict between the police and public in structurally disadvantaged neighbourhoods may undermine police legitimacy ... If members of disadvantaged communities perceive mistreatment and marginalization by the police, then they may rely on informal methods to redress conflict rather than seek police assistance. Such a response to compromised police legitimacy may lead to increases in violence... as some residents cease their cooperation with formal legal authorities" (p. 470).

In this study, data from 74 local police precincts in New York City for the 22 year period from 1975 through 1996 were examined. An index of structural disadvantage was created by combining data on the proportion of female headed households with children, the percent of black residents, the proportion of households receiving public assistance, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of residents with low educational achievement. Police misconduct was operationalized as the number of officers compulsorily separated from the department due to misconduct including the number of officers allowed to resign under "questionable circumstances" (e.g., while under suspension or after having been charged). The dependent measure was the violent crime rate.

The results are quite straightforward. Precincts were divided into low, high, and extreme (structural) disadvantage.

Within high and extreme disadvantage precincts, the level of police misconduct predicted the violent crime rate. The effect of police misconduct was higher in the extremely disadvantaged communities. There was no impact of police misconduct on violent crime rates in precincts characterized by low structural disadvantage.

Conclusion. The results of this study suggest that police misconduct can lead to increases in crime in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The findings are consistent with the view that formal institutions, as well as informal institutions, can be important determinants of the crime rate in certain neighbourhoods. "In [the poorest] communities, residents may feel the most marginalized and socially dislocated and they may respond the most adversely to (real or apparent) violations of procedural justice norms by the police, who

represent the most visible agents of official social control" ... These findings suggest the importance of police departments meeting procedural justice expectations, specifically in extremely disadvantaged communities" (p. 492).

Reference: Kane, Robert J. (2005) Compromised Police Legitimacy as a Predictor of Violent Crime in Structurally Disadvantaged Communities. *Criminology, 43* (2), 469-498.

The justice system is judged largely on whether it is perceived as being *fair* in the manner in which it uses its authority. Drawing from a number of different surveys, it appears that procedural fairness is more important than specific outcomes.

Background. "People often assume that the outcomes received when dealing with specific police officers and judges shape reactions to those encounters. In contrast... research consistently suggests that people actually react to their personal experiences primarily by judging the procedures used by the authorities" (p. 215). The manner in which people are treated, as well as whether they feel that decisions are made fairly appear to be of crucial importance. "People are willing to accept the decisions of police officers, judges, mediators, and other third party authorities when they think that those authorities are acting in ways they view as fair" (p. 216). Hence, the public's views of criminal justice institutions are linked more to perceived justice than to specific outcomes or utilitarian concerns.

This study suggests that confidence in the police and the courts is related less to judgments about cost, delay, and performance than it is to perceptions of procedural justice. The findings are drawn from a number of different sources and can be summarized as follows:

- A study of Chicago residents' views of the police and the courts compared the importance of the quality of services (competence) of these institutions with the quality of the treatment that citizens were perceived to receive (fairness). Both competence and fairness are seen as important, but "the primary influence [on the overall evaluations of the police and courts] is from the quality of the treatment" (p. 218). One's sense of obligation to obey the law is influenced by the perceived fairness of the institution, not by its performance.

- A study of high crime areas - predominantly minority neighbourhoods in Oakland, California - during a period of aggressive policing showed, once again, that the quality of police treatment of citizens (e.g., judgments about police honesty and respect for rights) rather than law enforcement performance (e.g., the impact of the police on crime) dominates the evaluations of the police, as well as residents' willingness to pay more taxes for increased police services.

- A (U.S.) national study of people's views of the courts found that "the primary influence on overall evaluations and overall ratings of performance [of the courts] come through judgments about the fairness of the outcomes... and the quality of the treatment they provide to members of the public" (p. 226).

- In another national study in the U.S., respondents who had been to court in the previous year were asked whether they felt that they would get a fair outcome and be treated justly if they were to go to court in the future. Ratings of the procedural fairness of their own experience were, in all cases, more important than their perception of having received the desired *outcome*.

Conclusion. In four different studies, it was found that the quality of the treatment which people receive, or perceive in the community, is the most important factor in determining people's views of criminal justice institutions. Although specific outcomes are important, they are not as decisive as procedural fairness. These findings were confirmed for both white and minority groups. Results such as these serve as a reminder that it is not just what the criminal justice institutions do that is important but how they are perceived as doing it.

Reference: Tyler, Tom R. Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What do Majority and Minority Group Members want from the Law and Legal Institutions? *Behavioural Sciences and the Law*, 2001, *19*, 215-235.

Citizens' level of satisfaction with the police depends primarily on how the police treat them.

There are a number of reasons for caring how the police are perceived by the community. One reason is obvious: "Positive views of the police make the work of the police easier and more effective" (p. 317). In addition, "The degree to which people view the police as legitimate influences whether they comply with police orders or requests. More generally, people accept the decisions of police when they believe the police have acted fairly and openly with them" (p. 317).

This study, then, examines what, in an encounter between a citizen and the police, determines how the police are perceived by citizens. The conclusions are drawn from a survey carried out in 2001 of 2513 citizens of Chicago, Illinois. Respondents were asked about their contacts with the police in the previous 12 months (e.g., who initiated contact and for what purpose or in what situation) and they were asked to assess the quality of that interaction. The likelihood of being stopped by the police (in a car or on foot) was related to gender (being male), age (being young), and race (being Latino, or more dramatically, being black). Not surprisingly, those whose encounters with the police were citizen initiated were more favourable toward the police than were those who experienced police-initiated encounters. Generally speaking, there was very little variation across racial groups, age, or gender in satisfaction with citizen-initiated encounters. In other words, for citizen initiated encounters, race, gender, and age had little effect on the ratings of the police on dimensions such as whether the police responded quickly or on time, whether the police listened to the citizen, whether the police explained

their actions adequately, and whether the police were polite and helpful. For police-initiated encounters, however, African-Americans and non-English speaking Latinos were less likely to be satisfied with the encounter than were whites in terms of dimensions such as whether the police were fair and polite.

For citizen-initiated encounters, overall satisfaction with the police was related to whether the citizen thought that the police had behaved well (e.g., had been helpful, polite, thorough in their explanations, etc.) and not to age or race. For police-initiated contact, there was a 'race' effect, but it was considerably smaller in magnitude than were the effects of the quality of the encounter itself (whether the police officers explained their actions, or whether they were perceived as fair and polite). The data would suggest, then, that the impact of race on ratings of the police is largely due to differential ratings of the quality of the police-initiated contact.

Conclusion. The findings suggest that the quality of police-citizen contacts can have important effects on how the police are seen by ordinary citizens. Giving citizens

an opportunity to explain their situation and communicate their views, fair and polite treatment by the police, each have a direct impact – on all demographic groups – on how the police are perceived. "Unlike many of the outcomes of policing, including safer streets and healthier communities, these are factors that recruitment, training, and supervision by police departments can assuredly affect… Process based reactions benefit the police, because they cannot always provide desirable outcomes, but it is almost always possible to behave in ways that people experience as being fair" (p. 318).

Reference: Skogan, Wesley (2005). Citizen Satisfaction with Police Encounters. *Police Quarterly, 8* (3), 298-321.

Negative experiences with the police have large negative impacts on the way in which the police are rated by ordinary citizens. Positive interactions with the police, however, have little, if any, impact.

Most police administrators would agree with the assertion that it is important that the public have confidence in the police. There are data that suggest that individual level factors (e.g., race and age), neighbourhood-level factors, as well as individual experiences with the police affect the way in which the police are evaluated. This paper explores the hypothesis that the relationship between how people feel that they have been treated by the police and their evaluations of the police are asymmetrical. That is, citizens may have expectations that they will be treated fairly and appropriately by the police which would mean that positive encounters with the police would have little (additional) impact on their evaluations of the police. On the other hand, a single bad experience with the police may "deeply influence people's views of [police] performance and even legitimacy" (p. 100).

Research on various types of encounters with the police suggests that citizens (e.g., victims) are less affected by the outcome of the encounter with the police than they are by the process – how they are treated by the police. If the public expects professional and respectful treatment from the police, it would follow that encounters that are consistent with this expectation would have relatively little impact. However, bad experiences with the police would be expected to have large, and lasting, impacts on people's evaluation of the police. Psychological research has suggested that "The lessons of bad things are learned more quickly, and forgotten more slowly, than the lessons of positive experiences" (p. 106).

In this study, residents of Chicago were surveyed and asked a number of questions about how good a job they thought their local police were doing on such matters as responding to community concerns, preventing crime, keeping order, and helping victims. They were also asked questions about interactions with the police and how satisfied they were with the way in which the police handled the issue that led them to have contact with the police.

Various factors known to affect evaluations of the police were "held constant" statistically: race, age, income, marital status, level of fear of crime, the perception of the extent of the local drug and gang problem, the perception of disorder and whether any recent interactions with the police were initiated by the citizen or the police. After taking account of these factors, positive experiences with the police had essentially no impact on confidence in the police. Negative experiences, however, had substantial impacts on reducing confidence in the police. This asymmetrical effect – positive interactions with the police having little if any impact on confidence in the police, and negative interactions with the police reducing dramatically the evaluations citizens give of the police – was replicated in seven other surveys – Seattle, New York, St. Petersburg (Florida), St. Petersburg (Russian Federation), Indianapolis, Washington, D.C., and an urban sample in England & Wales.

Conclusion. "For both police-initiated and citizen-initiated encounters [with the police], the impact of having a bad experience is four to fourteen times as great as that of having a positive experience. The coefficients associated with having a good experience – including being treated fairly and politely, and receiving service that was prompt and helpful – were very small and not statistically different from zero" (p. 100). It would appear that it is more important for police administrators interested in improving citizens' assessments of the police to focus on avoiding negative interactions with the public than on creating opportunities for positive interactions.

Reference: Skogan, Wesley G. (2006) Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police. *Policing & Society, 16* (2), 99-126.

Offensive language by police officers is at least as important as their behaviour in determining the way they are seen by ordinary citizens.

What are the important dimensions of misconduct by the police from the perspective of ordinary citizens? Traditionally, police misconduct in relation to interactions with citizens has been categorized as involving three dimensions: the use of unnecessary force (e.g., hitting or beating a citizen), abuse of authority (e.g., threats or the refusal of the officer to give his/her badge number/name), and discourtesy or the use of inappropriate language (e.g., racial slurs, insulting language). This paper examines the relative importance of these dimensions in determining how police are seen by ordinary members of the public.

Eleven hundred New York City residents were each read a set of short vignettes describing an interaction between a police officer and a citizen. The officer's language was described in neutral terms or in a range of different discourteous or obscene terms such as by calling the citizen a "fuckin' piece of trash" (p. 686) or using a racial slur. Abuse of authority was manipulated by simply stating that the officer threatened to arrest the citizen or engaged in a range of different forms of abuse such as "threatening to grab or kick the civilian", or "refusing to provide a name or badge number" (p. 686). The use of unnecessary force was injected into some scenarios by saying such things as the officer "punched the civilian" or "drew his or her gun and aimed it at the civilian" (p. 687). The event precipitating the citizen-police interaction was also described in various ways. Some were ambiguous (e.g., the police officer was described as simply stopping the car and asking the citizen for his or her driver's licence, etc.) while in other cases the citizen was described as having been observed committing an offence.

One might have expected that the rated seriousness of the misconduct would increase incrementally as one moved along a continuum from offensive language through abuse of authority to the use of unnecessary force. This was not the case. Independent of the reason for the encounter, the description of the civilian's response to the officer and various other factors, "a police officer's discourtesy or offensive language remained highly salient as an explanation of the respondent's evaluation of the seriousness of misconduct" (p. 691). Language, it seems, matters and it matters a lot. In particular, "unnecessary force in the presence of offensive language has a greater impact on… ratings" (p.692) than did abuse of authority (though abuse of authority did add significantly to the rated seriousness of the misbehaviour).

Conclusion: Offensive language "may be part of everyday speech [but] it carries a very different meaning when voiced by police officers" (p. 702) in an encounter with a citizen. Along with abuse of authority and use of unnecessary force, language turns out to be very important in shaping citizens' views of the police. At the same time, however, non-cooperative behaviour on the part of the citizen does lessen, somewhat, the rated seriousness of police misbehaviour. The mitigating impact, however, is small compared to effects of police misbehaviour. Though the public may, under some circumstances, tolerate police misconduct, "the public's tolerance for [police] misconduct in an encounter with a civilian does *not* extend to unnecessary use of force" (p. 703).

Reference: Seron, Carrroll, Joseph Pereira, and Jean Kovath. (2004). Judging Police Misconduct: "Street-Level" versus Professional Policing. *Law and Society Review, 38,* 665-710

Citizen satisfaction with the police is determined largely by how citizens are treated rather than by how successful the police are in locating or charging an offender.

These days, the police, as with other public service agencies, are expected to do more with less. Some police managers have suggested that if fewer resources translates into a reduced ability to 'get results' (e.g., locate an offender) the public will lose confidence in the police. The findings in this paper suggest that the police are more in control of how the public views them than they might have thought.

Previous research (e.g., *Criminological Highlights* V8N2#1, V8N5#5) has suggested that the quality of the interaction between police officers and members of the public has an important effect on how the police are rated, but that this effect is asymmetric: Encounters in which citizens believe police have not shown them appropriate respect have a much larger impact than positive encounters.

In one study, residents of 16 English neighbourhoods were interviewed in 2003/4 and again a year later. In citizen-initiated contacts that took place between the two interviews (in which citizens were victims of a crime or initiated contact with the police for any other reason), being satisfied with the interaction with the police had very little impact on whether citizens thought their local police were doing a good job. Being dissatisfied with the interaction with the police, however, was a strong predictor of reduced ratings of the police.

In a second study, using British Crime Survey data from 2008/9, victims whose victimizations came to the attention of the police were asked how satisfied they were with how the police handled their personal crime incident.

Respondents were asked about whether the police seemed to show interest in the victim's incident and whether the offender was identified and charged. For property crimes, victims were also asked whether the police recovered the stolen property.

"Respondents who felt that police did not show enough interest were much less likely to be satisfied… regardless of whether the offender had been identified and/or charged. Those who felt the police had shown enough interest, by contrast, were more likely to be satisfied… regardless of what had happened in relation to the offender" (p. 413). Outcomes did matter, but the positive impact of the outcome was considerably less in cases where police seemed uninterested in the case compared to cases where citizens thought police showed appropriate interest. "If officers did not show enough interest, there was no significant difference in the probabilities of satisfaction predicted for cases where the offender was identified and charged and those cases where the offender was not identified at all. However, if officers did show enough interest, knowing that a charge had been brought appeared to boost the chance of being very satisfied…" (p. 413).

Conclusion: Obviously, victims do care about the outcome of their cases. However, "a criminal justice outcome alone… appears less likely to result in overall satisfaction than good interpersonal treatment and a tailored response" (p. 416) on the part of the police. Hence, police officers or police organizations that focus solely on "getting a result" (p. 417) run the risk of losing the support of the public they serve. A policing style oriented toward procedural justice is likely to have a positive impact on public satisfaction. "Policy makers and police managers might do well to emphasize the key role played by the public both in helping to detect crime and in cooperating with the police to build and maintain social order" (p. 419). If the police find it is important to have public trust and cooperation to help them apprehend offenders, then the evidence would suggest that it would helpful for them to attend carefully to the nature of their interaction with victims and other citizens.

Reference: Myhill, Andy and Ben Bradford (2012). Can Police Enhance Public Confidence by Improving Quality of Service? Results from Two Surveys in England and Wales. *Policing & Society, 22* (4), 397-425.

The police have direct control over how favourably they are seen by crime victims. Although victims generally think less favourably about the police than non-victims, the police can mitigate this effect by taking victims' concerns seriously.

It has been suggested that there are at least three somewhat distinct components of the community's evaluation of the police: effectiveness in dealing with crime, fairness or integrity of the police, and police engagement with the community. Using measures of each of these somewhat separate components of the public's view of police, this paper examines the impact of different types of police-citizen contact on each of these constructs in a sample in London, England.

One of the most common reasons for citizen-initiated contact with the police is that the citizen was a victim of crime. The most important single determinant of citizens' assessment of the quality of the contact with the police was whether the police appeared to take the citizen's concerns seriously. Two other factors predicted citizen satisfaction with the specific contact they had with the police: whether the citizen believed that the police followed up on the call and whether the citizen thought that the time he or she had to wait for the police was reasonable.

Both citizen- and police-initiated contact with the police were related to lower ratings of police effectiveness, even when the citizen was, overall, satisfied with the quality of the particular encounter. Not surprisingly, people who had unsatisfactory recent contacts with the police were more likely to rate the police, generally, as being unfair and not involved with the community. But victims' contacts with police that were seen as favourable did have positive impacts on ratings of fairness and engagement of the police (compared to people who had not had recent contact with the police).

Perhaps the most important findings are those that suggest that individual police officers can enhance the overall ratings of the police. When crime victims believe that their concerns are being taken seriously by the police, they see police as not only being more engaged in the community, but also as more fair and effective. When the police follow up in any way with the crime victim, ratings of effectiveness and community engagement are higher.

Conclusion: The data suggest that individual officers can either enhance or damage perceptions that the public holds of the police. "While opinions about police effectiveness may be challenged by any contact – whether it is satisfactory or unsatisfactory - ideas about fairness and community engagement appear to be amenable to change in either a positive or a negative direction" (p. 41). "Fairness and community engagement … are the aspects of overall confidence [in the police] that are most related to personal treatment during the [police-citizen] encounter" (p. 42). Effectiveness in dealing with crime, on the other hand, is largely out of the control of the individual officer who interacts with the public, although police officers who communicate that the citizen's victimization is being taken seriously can have a positive impact even on this dimension of effectiveness.

Reference: Bradford, Ben, Jonathan Jackson, and Elizabeth A. Stanko (2009). Contact and Confidence: Revisiting the Impact of Public Encounters with the Police. *Policing & Society, 19* (1), 20-46.

People judge the legitimacy of the police by whether the police follow the law, whether the police have been procedurally fair in their dealings with citizens, the fairness of the outcome of encounters with the police, and the effectiveness of the police. The perceived fairness of the police predicts voluntary cooperation with them.

The willingness of citizens to volunteer information to the police about crime and disorder in their communities is seen generally as enabling the police to carry out their function (see, for example, *Criminological Highlights 12*(5)#2, *7*(1)#4, *4*(4)#1, *11*(4)#1).

People may obey police either because they consider the police to be legitimate, or because they are afraid of the costs of non-obedience to the police. From the police perspective, it is clearly preferable if ordinary citizens believe in the legitimacy of the police and comply with them because they think it is the right thing to do rather than because they are afraid of being punished if they don't. Previous research has suggested that "legality or lawfulness [is] the first and most basic level of legitimacy" (p. 108). But in addition, procedural justice – that decisions within the rule of law should be impartial, consistent, and should allow citizens to "make representations of their side of the case before decisions are made" (p. 108) – is also seen as important.

A survey of residents of London, England, was carried out in which people were asked questions related to police legitimacy. In addition, they were asked about their feelings of obligation to obey the police as well as their willingness to provide the police with information voluntarily. It would appear that there are four separate, but somewhat related, aspects of police

legitimacy: (1) Lawfulness: assessed by questions including "When the police deal with people in my neighbourhood, they always behave according to the law"; (2) Procedural fairness – e.g., "The police provide opportunities for unfair decisions to be corrected." (3) Distributive fairness – e.g., "People usually receive the outcomes they deserve under the law", and (4) Effectiveness – assessed by asking respondents how well the police address various kinds of crime.

Voluntary cooperation with the police (e.g., by offering to provide them with information) appears to be related to some extent with feelings of *obligation* to obey the police. But in addition, high ratings of the police on lawfulness, procedural fairness and distributive fairness were also associated with the citizens' willingness to voluntarily provide the police with crime-related information. For people who had experienced a criminal victimization in the previous 12 months, those who believed the police were generally effective in dealing with crime were more likely to indicate they were willing to cooperate with the police. For non-victims, however, the opposite relationship was found. It would

appear that non-victims thought it was less important for them to voluntarily cooperate with the police if the police were, without their help, already doing a good job.

Conclusion: Belief in the legitimacy of the police (acting lawfully, procedural and distributive fairness) affected people's willingness to cooperate voluntarily with the police. This effect was over and above the effect of any feelings that people had of legal obligation to help the police fight crime. Though these factors are, generally, important, the various factors that determine cooperation with the police vary across groups in society. Considering the population as a whole, then, cooperation with the police is likely to be highest if the police are seen as acting in a manner that is both lawful and fair.

Reference: Tankebe, Justice (2013). Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of Public Perceptions of Police Legitimacy. *Criminology, 51*(1), 103-135.

The willingness of members of the Muslim community in New York to work voluntarily with the police in combating terrorism is determined, in part, by how Muslims are treated by the police and others in the community.

As in some other countries since September 11, 2001, "Muslim American communities have become a focus for anti-terror policing efforts in the United States" (p. 366). Hence it is not surprising that there is interest in "what circumstances are associated with voluntary cooperation by Muslim Americans in anti-terror policing efforts and in particular, which policing strategies enhance or diminish that cooperation" (p. 366). This study addresses this issue with data from a 2009 survey of 300 randomly selected Muslim Americans living in the New York City area.

The study focuses in large part on issues surrounding procedural justice. Research on procedural justice suggests that people are more likely to comply with the police and cooperate with them when they believe that the police authorities are acting in a legitimate and fair manner. Previous research (*Criminological Highlights*, 4(4)#1, 7(1)#4) has demonstrated that the more police and other justice authorities are viewed as legitimate, the more likely it is that their rules and decisions are accepted.

Muslim Americans' views of police legitimacy in fighting terrorism were assessed by the level of agreement with statements such as "You should trust these law enforcement agents to make decisions that are good for everyone when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism" (p. 390). Police legitimacy in fighting terrorism was greatest for those respondents who saw the police as acting in a procedurally fair manner (e.g., making decisions based on facts rather than opinions, applying the law consistently, giving people a chance to express their views before making decisions). Police legitimacy was, however, also related to the extent to which respondents identified with being American and expressed support for U.S. policies in fighting terrorism.

Those respondents who indicated that they thought that the police acted in a procedurally fair manner within their (Muslim) communities were more likely to indicate their willingness to alert the police to possible terrorism threats. In addition, those respondents who believed that anti-terrorism policies had been created in a legitimate fashion (e.g., that the community had been given an opportunity to provide input and community views were considered) were more likely to cooperate with the police in averting terrorism and they were more willing to alert the police to possible terrorism activities. Those Muslim Americans who reported experiencing discrimination at school, work, or in dealing with authorities, were less likely to be willing to cooperate with the police or report possible terrorism activities to the police. Finally, those respondents who had strong identification with America (e.g., who agreed with the statement that "Being an American is important to the way I think of myself as a person") were more likely to be willing to alert the police.

Conclusion: Most New York Muslim respondents indicated that they would engage in cooperative actions if asked to do so by the police, and most indicated that they would report

possible terrorist related activities to the police. The variation that did exist in Muslims' willingness to combat terrorism appears to be in large part affected by the degree to which Muslims have had positive versus discriminatory interactions with others in American society. Those who felt excluded from American society through overt discrimination, for example, as well as those who reported that the police did not treat them fairly were less likely to be cooperative on terrorism matters. If the cooperation of the western Muslim communities is important, therefore, it appears that western societies have the opportunity to increase that cooperation in large part by examining and addressing aspects of their own treatment of Muslims in their communities.

Reference: Tyler, Tom R., Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Z. Hug (2010). Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A study of Muslim Americans. *Law & Society Review, 44*(2), 365-401.

Treating suspects fairly is important even in the war against terrorism.

A substantial amount of research suggests that the manner in which people are treated by the police is important in understanding how legitimate the police and other authorities such as the courts (*Criminological Highlights 11*(5)#1) are seen to be (*Criminological Highlights, 4*(4)#1, *7*(1)#4). More recently it has been shown that the willingness of members of the Muslim community in New York to work voluntarily with the police in combating terrorism is determined, in part, by how Muslims are treated by the police and others in the community (*Criminological Highlights 11*(4)#1). This paper explores the question of whether "procedural justice" (e.g., neutrality in decision making, trust in the motives of the police, and treatment with respect) is as important in responding to threats of terrorism and in dealing with Muslim groups as it is in responding to ordinary criminal activity.

Since 2001, policing strategies in the US have changed to include concern about terrorism in addition to ordinary crime. Furthermore, policing has often focused on a new group – Muslim Americans. Using data from four different New York City surveys, this study compares Muslim Americans' perceptions of the policing of terrorism to their perceptions of policing of ordinary crime. In addition, it examines non-Muslim views of police counterterrorism efforts. Hence it allows comparisons of the importance of procedural justice in two different domains (crime and anti-terrorism) as well as comparisons of those most affected by anti-terrorism policing (Muslim Americans) with those less likely to be targeted.

Looking at the willingness to cooperate with the police (e.g., in reporting dangerous or suspicious activities to the police and in encouraging members of the community to cooperate with the police), for all groups (Muslims, non-Muslim minorities, and whites), the perceived legitimacy of the police was related to willingness to cooperate for both ordinary policing and anti-

terror policing. Perceived legitimacy of the police – for all three groups – was influenced by how fair and professional the police were seen to be. But the effects of perceptions of legitimacy relate to more than just the perceptions of the treatment of one's own group: white respondents view the police as less fair if they target minority groups in addressing ordinary crime. Furthermore, "non-Muslims view the police as unfair and less legitimate if they target the Muslim community and if they treat Muslims disrespectfully" (p. 429). Suspicion of Muslims itself was not viewed as being unfair by Muslims or non-Muslim respondents, but targeting the Muslim community reduced the legitimacy of the police.

Conclusion: "The shift in policing from crime control to counterterrorism does not appear to have changed public expectations of police behaviour or to have altered the basis on which police are evaluated…" (p. 435). Procedural justice mechanisms are just as important for Muslim Americans as they are for non-Muslim minorities and for whites. "Even when police confront grave

threats, both minority and majority populations expect law enforcement officers to respect procedural justice values and are more likely to withhold their cooperation if they do not…. Non-Muslims, who rate the threat of terror as larger than do Muslims, are nonetheless sensitive to procedural justice in counterterrorism policing, particularly the targeting and harassment of Muslims" (p. 436). "Three elements of procedural justice – neutrality in decision making, trust in the motives of the police, and treatment with respect – remain central to the definition of procedural justice and its effect on legitimacy" (p. 437). This is just as true in dealing with terrorism as it is in responding to ordinary crime.

Reference: Huq, Aziz Z., Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer (2011). Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 17*(3), 419-430.

Even in situations in which citizens face terrorist threats and attacks, the legitimacy of the local police is determined, in large part, by whether the police are perceived to be treating people in a procedurally just fashion.

"Increasing public evaluations of the legitimacy of the police is considered one of the most important goals of policing in democratic countries" (p. 5). A number of studies have highlighted the importance of perceptions of procedural justice – the fairness and appropriateness of police interactions with ordinary citizens – in understanding public assessments of, and cooperation with, the police (*Criminological Highlights*, V4N4#1, V7N1#4, V11N4#1, V12N5#2). The suggestion is sometimes made, however, that in situations in which people feel under severe threat – e.g., acute crises or terrorism threats – it is police efficacy rather than fairness that is seen as important.

The data for this study come from a study of public attitudes in the jurisdictions of 6 Israeli police stations, one of which (Sderot) has been "a primary target for missile threats and attacks originating from the Gaza Strip" (p. 10). It was expected that "in situations of high threat and insecurity… concerns for safety [would] take priority over issues of fair processes such as respect, dignity and participation [the main 'pillars' of procedural justice]" (p. 11). The five other 'comparison' districts had not experienced recent security threats. Only members of 'majority communities' were included in the analysis (i.e., Israeli Arabs, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, and other minorities were excluded).

Police legitimacy – the main dependent variable – was assessed with four questions: "The police are guided by the public's well-being;" "The police carry out their job well;" "If a relative/friend was a victim of a crime I would encourage them to turn to the police;" and "I have trust in the Israeli police" (p. 15). Police performance/efficiency was operationalized with two questions: "The Police efficiently handle crime in my area of residence;"

and "Police presence in my area of residence is adequate" (p. 16).

Perceptions of procedural justice were measured with four questions: "The police allow citizens to express their opinion before making a decision…;" "The police explain their activities well…;" "The police treat all citizens equally;" and "Officers treat citizens they encounter with respect" (p. 15). Various other controls were also included (e.g., previous contact with the police, whether the respondent had been a crime victim, and demographic characteristics of respondents).

The results were quite straightforward. The performance/ efficiency of the police was important in both the 'high terrorism' area and in the comparison areas, but, as predicted "under conditions of threat, evaluations [of performance] play a significantly larger role in predicting police legitimacy than when there is no specific threat in the background" (p. 18). More interesting, however, is the fact that procedural justice was *equally* important in predicting police legitimacy in both the 'high threat' and the 'low threat' areas.

Conclusion: "The results of the present study suggest that the desire for procedural justice is an enduring, stable trait, regardless of the security situation. Under conditions of security threats, individuals do value police performance to a greater extent when forming evaluations of police legitimacy. However, there does not seem to be a zero-sum game between performance and procedural justice: under threat, while performance increases in importance, procedural justice does not decline in importance and indeed remains the primary antecedent of legitimacy, as is the case when there is no security threat in the background" (p. 19). In more mundane terms, the police cannot afford to minimize the importance of dealing with citizens in a procedurally just fashion just because the community is facing serious external threats.

Reference: Jonathan-Zamir, Tal and David Weisburd (2013). The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of Police Legitimacy: Findings from a Quasi-Experiment in Israel. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 50* (1), 3-32.

Being stopped by the police increases future offending.

There is a growing body of research suggesting that being processed by the criminal justice system can increase subsequent offending (see *The Effects of Imprisonment: Specific Deterrence and Collateral Effects. Research Summaries Compiled from Criminological Highlights* on our website) This study compares the impact on subsequent offending of being stopped by the police, or being stopped and arrested.

The concern, derived from labeling theory is that "a public label may lead to secondary deviance… through social exclusion and the weakening of social bonds" (p. 930), and "once the deviant label is applied and the process of social exclusion is set in motion, the labeled individual may begin to develop or adopt a deviant identity" (p. 931).

This study uses four waves of longitudinal data on 2,127 youths, collected in the context of a program evaluation, to evaluate the impact of police contact. Youths were interviewed each year for four years. Their propensity to offend was estimated on the basis of the first years' data. Police contact was assessed during the next two years and in the fourth interview, delinquency – the outcome variable - was measured. The number of stops for questioning was obtained from each youth as was the number of arrests.

In the third wave of data, school commitment was assessed as was youths' involvement with delinquent and non-delinquent peers. To assess 'deviant identity' youths were asked questions such as how guilty they would feel if they engaged in a range of different types of offences. On the basis of their contact with the police, youths were divided into three groups: those with no contact with

the police, those stopped (only) by the police, and those stopped and arrested. Then, on the basis of their answers to questions during the first wave of data collection (when they were 11-12 years old) they were matched on their apparent propensity to be stopped and/or arrested by the police. Though sets of youths with the same propensity to be stopped/arrested were created, only some were, in fact stopped or arrested by the police. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the police contact was, in a sense, randomly determined since the members of the three groups were matched with those in other groups who had the same 'propensity' to do whatever it was that would bring them into contact with the police.

The results showed that after matching youths on their propensities to experience police contact, those who were arrested were significantly more likely to engage in delinquencies than those who were only stopped, and those stopped were more likely to engage in delinquencies than those who had no police contact. Furthermore, there was a tendency for more police contact to reduce commitment to school, increase the likelihood that the youth would have delinquent friends, and reduce their feelings of guilt about offending.

Other analyses suggest that the impact of being stopped by the police on offending is caused, in part, by increased likelihood that the youth will have larger numbers of delinquent friends. But in addition, being arrested appears to increase delinquency through its effect on reducing commitment to school, reducing anticipated guilt about engaging in delinquency, and increasing the youth's belief that offending really does not hurt anyone.

Conclusion: Stop-and-frisk interactions between youths and police "may have the unintended consequence of increasing future delinquent involvement. Thus police practices of engaging in high rates of stops, many of which are 'unproductive' or 'innocent,' may be counterproductive" (p. 956). "For both youth who are stopped and youth who are arrested, delinquency amplification is partially explained by the attenuation of prosocial bonds, changes in deviant identity, and increased involvement with delinquent peers" (p. 956-7).

Reference: Wiley, Stephanie Ann, Lee Ann Slocum, and Finn-Aage Esbensen (2013). The Unintended Consequences of Being Stopped or Arrested: An Exploration of the Labeling Mechanisms Through Which Police Contact Leads to Subsequent Delinquency. *Criminology* 51(4) 927-966.

Contact with the police can increase the likelihood of future violent offending for those already involved in small amounts of violent crime, but not for those who, previously, were not involved in violent crime.

There is substantial evidence that for young people, contact with the youth court is more likely to increase future offending than to reduce it (see *Criminological Highlights 14*(6)#1). This paper examines the effect of contact with the police on subsequent offending, taking advantage of the fact that many youths who commit offences do not get apprehended for these offences.

In this study, boys in Rochester, NY, were interviewed every six months starting when they were approximately age 13 until they were about age 17. The focus of the study was on self-reported violent crime. Since most violent crime (e.g., fights between youths) does not come to the attention of the police, this was probably the best measure of involvement in violence for these youths. The measure used was the number of different kinds of violence (attacking someone with a weapon, throwing things at someone, robbery, etc.) the youth engaged in. Because the youths were interviewed regularly during this period of time, it was possible to classify different youths into different groups in terms of their involvement in crime. In this case, youths appeared to fall into three relatively distinct groups: those who reported close to no violence in early adolescence (39% of the sample), those involved in relatively little violence (49% of the sample) and those involved in a substantial amount of violence (11% of the sample). Not surprisingly, these three groups varied dramatically in how much police contact they had experienced before age 16.

Within each of the three groups, youths were identified who had and had not been picked up and formally questioned by the police for suspected involvement in crime between age 16 and age 17-18. Youths who had been in contact with the police were then matched with those who had not had police contact on a wide range of measures (using their predicted likelihood of having police contact based on their previous reported behaviour and other measures such as race, neighbourhood characteristics, family structure, peer associations, prior justice system contact, etc.). For the high offending group, separate from the other groups, however, acceptable matching was not possible. Hence it is not possible to look at the impact of police contact on this group. However, since this group would likely have had contact with the police earlier in their lives, it is likely that an additional police contact would not have much additional impact on them.

It appeared that contact with the police had very little, if any, impact on the non-offending group. For the low-offending group, however, there was an effect: police contact appeared to increase subsequent involvement in violence in the 1.5 years following the contact. "When individuals are successfully matched on 40 [variables], there is empirical evidence for a short-run labeling effect of the police contact treatment for the low offending… group" (p. 458-9).

Conclusion: The fact that police contact with youths who have, thus far in their lives, engaged in some, but not very much violence, has the effect of increasing subsequent violence suggests that "the police are [faced with] a most difficult task. [In responding to possible offending by these youths] police intervention may unintentionally make the offending problem worse in the short run" (p. 459). The effect of police contact was not found for the (previously) non-offending group, in part perhaps, because they show stronger attachment to parents and school and have fewer delinquent friends.

Reference: Ward, Jeffrey T., Marvin D. Krohn, and Chris L. Gibson (2014). The Effects of Police Contact on Trajectories of Violence: A Group-Based, Propensity Score Matching Analysis. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 29*(3), 440-475.

Being arrested by the police increases the likelihood that a youth will commit further offences and, quite independently, also increases the likelihood that the youth will be arrested again.

There is a substantial literature demonstrating that criminal justice processing does not generally decrease offending and, in fact, may increase it (see *Criminological Highlights* 11(4)#3). This paper seeks to understand the mechanism whereby the arrest of young people might increase their subsequent involvement in the justice system.

There are two straightforward mechanisms whereby the arrest of a youth might increase the youth's subsequent involvement in the justice system. First, arrest could stigmatize the youth which in turn could increase the youth's likelihood of offending. Second, arrest could make the youth more of a target for law enforcement in the future, regardless of the youth's rate of offending.

The study was carried out using data from a longitudinal study in Chicago, in which 12- and 15-year-olds were interviewed 3 times, with 2.5 year intervals between the 3 waves of interviews. Some of the youths were arrested between the 1st and 2nd wave. To determine the effect of arrest on subsequent offending and subsequent arrests, equivalent groups of youths were created on the basis of data collected at Wave 1 – prior to being arrested. Given that most youths commit offences, but most youths are not arrested, for most youths who were arrested (between Wave 1 and Wave 2) there were others who had the same propensity to be arrested (e.g., similar rates of self-report offending) but who weren't arrested.

Hence two equivalent groups were created: those arrested between the 1st and 2nd interview and those not arrested who were equivalent to the arrested sample (on 79 variables). Without matching, arrested and non-arrested youths are obviously different. However, for a matched group of 38 arrested youths and 111 non-arrested youths (each arrested youth was matched with up to 3 non-arrested youths), there were no important differences between the groups before the arrest.

By the time of the third interview, the self-report violent *offending* of the arrested group was considerably higher than that of the youths who had not experienced arrest (but were originally equivalent). The previously arrested group was also considerably more likely to have been *arrested* by the time of the third interview. However, offending as reported at Wave 3 was not predictive of re-arrest. Said differently, the two effects of the original arrest – increased subsequent *offending* and increased subsequent *arrest* by the police – are *not* related.

Conclusion: Being arrested increases subsequent violent offending. And it increases the likelihood of being rearrested. Hence it appears that being arrested makes the youth more likely to offend. But quite independent of offending rates, "a first juvenile arrest seems to increase subsequent law enforcement responses to those youth compared to other youth who offend at a comparable level but have managed to evade a first arrest. This could result from increased scrutiny of the individual's future behaviour, by police as well as others… as well as from reduced tolerance by police and actors of an arrestees' future transgressions" (p. 363).

Reference: Liberman, Akiva M., David S. Kirk, and Kideux Kim (2014). Labeling Effects of First Juvenile Arrests: Secondary Deviance and Secondary Sanctioning. *Criminology, 52,* 345-370.

Being arrested does not increase youths' perceptions that they will be caught in the future.

Deterrence theory assumes that in considering whether to commit an offence, people estimate their likelihood of being apprehended and the expected punishment they would receive if this occurs. But how do people know what their likelihood of being apprehended is? One might assume that to some extent it would depend on their own personal experiences. This study examines the impact of being arrested on youths' estimates of whether they would be arrested by the police if they chose to offend.

The objective certainty of being apprehended for offending is likely to be impossible for potential offenders to estimate. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that if they were to be apprehended, offenders would be likely to modify their perception of the likelihood that they would be apprehended in the future.

This study examines data from a panel study of American young people who were interviewed when they were 17-23 years old and again four years later. When first interviewed, they were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would be arrested (a) if they attacked someone, and (b) if they stole something worth more than $50. Four years later they were asked the same questions. The measure of interest was, essentially, the change in certainty. Respondents were also, at each point in time, asked to report any offences they had committed during the year prior to the interview. They were also asked to indicate the number of close friends whom they believed had offended. In the second interview, they were also asked if they had been arrested since the previous interview.

The main results are simple to summarize: the number of times the respondent was arrested between the two interviews was unrelated to the respondent's estimate of the change in the perceived certainty of apprehension. This was true for both theft and violence-related offences. In other words, being arrested did not change a person's view of the likelihood of arrest in the future. Furthermore, this lack of effect was found both for those with relatively high rates of offending prior to the first interview and those with relatively low rates of offending. The analyses included the young person's self-reported offending as a control. Those who reported a high rate of offending were *less* likely to think that they would be apprehended in the future. The explanation for this finding is simple: successful punishment avoidance appears to reduce perceived certainty of apprehension. But being apprehended does not affect one's perceived likelihood of being caught. Perhaps young people figure that they have learned from their mistakes and any "deterrent" impact is counteracted by the belief that they now know better what not to do.

Conclusion. "The finding that arrests do not affect certainty perceptions contradicts one of the central tenets of deterrence theory. Punished individuals should be less apt to recidivate at least partly because they increase their estimate of the certainty of punishment" (p. 20). This does not occur, at least with people of this age and when asking about ordinary offences. It would appear that being apprehended does not cause a youth to 'learn the lesson' that 'crime does not pay.'

Reference: Pogarsky, Greg, KiDeuk Kim, and Ray Paternoster (2005). Perceptual Change in the National Youth Survey: Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Offender Decision-Making. *Justice Quarterly, 22* (1), 1-29.

Formal processing of youths in the youth justice system does not reduce subsequent offending. If anything, youths processed formally are more likely to re-offend than those screened out of the formal system or processed informally.

Those making decisions about how to process young offenders often have choices on how to respond to these offenders – especially when youths have committed relatively minor offences. In Canada, police are required to consider measures other than court-based procedures and it is presumed that it is better for many young offenders to be dealt with outside of the formal justice system. To some extent, Canada's 2003 youth justice law has been successful in reducing the use of youth court (see *Criminological Highlights* 10(1)#1, 10(3)#1).

This paper reviews research on the impact of youth court processing on subsequent offending, comparing it to a non-youth-justice-system response to offending. It is limited to 'random assignment' studies in order to ensure that any findings cannot be attributed to pre-existing differences between the two groups of youths.

In all, 29 separate sets of findings, involving 7,304 youths, in studies published between 1973 and 2008 were located that met this very strict (random assignment) criterion. In each study, youths were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: normal court processing or some form of less formal processing. Across studies, the 'less formal processing' varied somewhat. What was important, however, was that by assigning the youths to treatment on a random basis, the two groups ('court processing' and 'no formal processing') can be considered to be equivalent. The authors looked at the longest follow-up period reported in each study (when more than one was reported). These follow-up periods were, on average about 12-13 months long (range 4 to 36 months).

Overall, court processing appeared to *increase* the likelihood that youths would be involved in at least some subsequent offending, though there were non-trivial differences across studies. For those 7 experiments that reported the total number of offences that the youth were involved in (instead of or in addition to simply whether the youth committed a subsequent offence), court processing also had a criminogenic effect. Youths processed by the courts were, on average, involved in more crime than those processed in other ways. Similar effects were found for severity: formal court processing of youths, if anything, increased the severity of subsequent offending.

These criminogenic effects are, however, very small. The studies were broken down in various ways (e.g., those carried out early in the period vs. later, whether the comparison involved the provision of services or the youth was not offered any services if diverted, etc.). None of the sub-sets of studies showed a significant crime-reducing impact of court processing.

Conclusion: A conservative conclusion would be that court processing does not reduce subsequent offending. "Given that the evidence indicates that there is no public safety benefit to [youth justice] system processing, and its greater costs when compared to release, even the most conservative cost-benefit analyses would favour release over [youth justice] system processing" (p. 38). Obviously some youths, because they have committed serious offences, will be brought to court in any jurisdiction and one cannot generalize the findings from these studies to those youth because these studies focused largely on youths charged with relatively minor offences. At the same time it should be noted that "the data from these studies do not support a policy of establishing [formal] diversion programs for juveniles who normally would not have been officially processed…." (p. 39).

Reference: Petrosino, Anthony, Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino, and Sarah Guckenburg (2010). Formal System Processing of Juveniles: Effects on Delinquency. The Campbell Collaboration. Oslo, Norway: www.campbellcollaboration.org

Contact with the formal juvenile justice system *increases* the level of criminal activity in early adulthood.

Background. The labelling perspective suggests that contact with the justice system increases the likelihood of further delinquency. One explanation for this effect is that formal contact with the justice system has a "negative impact on conventional opportunities… and leads to cumulative disadvantage in future life chances…" (p. 1288).

This study followed a sample of Rochester, New York, youths through adolescence until they were 21-22 years old. Youths were asked if they had been arrested or had other contact with the police and whether they had experienced other, more formal, juvenile justice intervention. When the youths were young adults, self-report offending records were obtained on seven relatively serious offences (e.g., robbery, attacks with a weapon, break and enter, car thefts) as well as the youth's involvement in drug sales.

The results demonstrated that a youth's likelihood of graduating from high school was lowered as a result of police or juvenile justice involvement even after controlling statistically for previous offending, parental poverty, and school ability (at age 12). A separate analysis found that "experiencing official [criminal justice] intervention in adolescence is significantly associated with reduced odds in favour of staying in school in a subsequent period" (p. 1301).   An analysis of self-reported criminal activity at age 19-20 demonstrated that police or juvenile justice intervention earlier in adolescence was associated with increased criminal behaviour in early adulthood. The effect of police or juvenile justice intervention "has stronger crime amplification effects among the disadvantaged [African American youths living in poverty]" (p. 1306). The effects of juvenile justice interventions on drug selling were quite similar: police or juvenile justice intervention increased the likelihood of drug selling at age 19-20. And again, "the effect of juvenile justice intervention on drug selling is stronger among those from impoverished family backgrounds" (p. 1306).

Looking at criminal involvement at age 21-22, it appears that an earlier intervention by the police increases crime rates generally through its effect of decreasing the likelihood of graduating from high school and increasing the likelihood of unemployment at age 19-21. Juvenile justice intervention appears to have a direct effect in increasing drug selling and general crime at age 21-22, but also has an indirect effect by way of decreasing the likelihood of graduating from high school which, in turn, increases the likelihood of unemployment at age 19-21.

Conclusion. It appears that police or juvenile justice intervention with young people has a reasonable likelihood of increasing the probability that the youth will, as a young adult, be involved in crime and/or drug selling. Generally speaking, these negative impacts on youths are more likely for those who come from impoverished backgrounds or are black. The argument, therefore, that it is important to apprehend and prosecute young people in order to hold them accountable for their actions should be questioned. These data suggest that for many youths – especially those from impoverished backgrounds – the best strategy may be to do as little as possible and wait for them to outgrow their criminal behaviour.

Reference: Bernburg, Jön Gunnar and Marvin D. Krohn (2003). Labelling, Life Chances, and Adult Crime: The Direct and Indirect Effects of Official Intervention in Adolescence on Crime in Early Adulthood. *Criminology, 41* (4), 1287-1318.

Arresting young people when they commit offences reduces the likelihood that they will graduate from high school.

In Canada in 2013, only about 45% of youths recorded as having been apprehended by the police for a criminal offence were formally charged. The rest, consistent with Part I of the *Youth Criminal Justice Act*, are dealt with more informally. Previous research suggests that being apprehended by the police as well as being formally processed by the justice system will, if anything, increase the likelihood of future offending (e.g., *Criminological Highlights, 14*(4)#5, *11*(4)#3).

This paper examines the impact of arresting a youth on the likelihood that the youth will successfully complete high school. Arrests in the US are common: it is estimated that in a year, 9 out of every 100 US youths age 10-17 are arrested (15 per 100 youths in Chicago are arrested). Given that most youths commit offences, "compared with incarceration, arrest is more 'random' or variable in the juvenile population…" (p. 37).

The study uses data from youths in Chicago collected in three waves starting in 1995-7 (when they were 12-15 years old) and ending in 2000-2. Data on school dropout were obtained from the Chicago public schools. Arrest records came from the Chicago and Illinois State Police. Only formal arrests were counted; informal "station adjustments" or warnings by police were not considered arrests. Previous research has demonstrated the simple effect: arrested youths are more likely to drop out of school than nonarrested students, but much of this effect is, almost certainly due to pre-existing individual, family, and neighbourhood differences between those arrested and those not. The challenge is to create two groups of students who, prior to the arrest of one group, were similar. This was done using 82 different variables (individual variables including self-report offending and race, family variables including family structure and home environment, and neighbourhood and school characteristics including concentrated poverty in the neighbourhood and school).

Most of the youths who were arrested were successfully matched on these 82 variables with youths who had not been arrested. Arrested youths were more likely to drop out of school than those matched youths who were not arrested (73% vs. 51%). A second analysis was carried out on those who graduated from high school or received equivalent educational certification to see if arrest affected enrolment in a four year post-secondary college program. 34% of the nonarrested group who graduated from high school (or equivalent) enrolled in a college program; only 18% of the arrested group who managed to graduate from high school (or equivalent) enrolled in a 4-year college program.

The effect of arrest was not mediated by changes in educational expectations or school attachment of the youth or supportive friends. It is possible, therefore, that the effect of arrest on high school dropout is mediated, instead, by "institutional responses and the increasingly punitive 'zero tolerance' educational climate…" (p. 55).

Conclusion: "Arrest in adolescence hinders the transition to adulthood by undermining pathways to educational attainment." (p. 54). Youths who are arrested are more likely to drop out of school than are equivalent youths who are not arrested while in high school. Given the effects of arrest on high school completion and on enrolment in 4-year post-secondary programs, juvenile arrest can, therefore, be viewed "as a life-course trap in the educational pathways of a considerable number of adolescents in contemporary American cities" (p. 55).

Reference: Kirk, David S. and Robert J. Sampson (2012). Juvenile Arrest and Collateral Educational Damage in the Transition to Adulthood. *Sociology of Education, 86,* 36-62.

Being arrested and taken to court reduces a youth's chances of finishing high school.

It is well known that youths who are heavily involved in crime are less likely to complete secondary school than are youths less involved in crime. In addition, of course, dropping out of school is an indicator of other difficulties such as poor school performance or misbehaviour in school.   From a policy perspective, however, one question that needs to be asked is whether involvement in the youth justice system– above and beyond involvement in crime – is likely to have an effect on a youth's likelihood of finishing school. Said differently, if two youths have similar offending and school backgrounds, and one happens to be apprehended for offending and taken to court, do the two youths have different likelihoods of successfully finishing high school?

By using data from an American longitudinal study, this study was able to estimate the causal relationship among these variables by following high school youths who, at age 16, had not been involved in the youth justice system. The youths' involvement in crime as well as the youths' records in school were assessed at that point and hence could be used as controls for what happened after age 16. When the youths were interviewed two years later, some had been arrested and taken to court, and by the time that the youths were 19 years old, some had dropped out of school. Because level of involvement in crime as well as school performance and misbehaviour in school (suspensions) could be controlled, it was possible to assess whether being arrested and being taken to court (independent of involvement in crime and performance in school) had an effect on the dropout rate.

Not surprisingly, youths who dropped out of high school were more likely to report various types of offending than did youths who completed school. Similarly, dropouts were more likely to report doing poorly in school, to have experienced poverty, and to have had various difficulties in school. However,
above and beyond these effects, being arrested by the police for an offence slightly decreased a youth's chances of graduating from high school. More importantly – independent of level of offending – being taken to court for the offence had an even greater impact on creating a high school dropout. Indeed, an analysis that contained only those youths for whom precise data could be inferred regarding when they dropped out suggests "that youths who are arrested, but who do not appear in court, actually experience no detrimental effects on their odds of high school graduation relative to non-arrested youths" (p. 474).   Other analyses suggest that "the effect of court involvement is more pronounced for those with less prior involvement in delinquency" (p. 474).

Conclusion. The data are most consistent with the finding that "First-time court appearance during high school is more detrimental for education outcomes than first-time arrest without a court appearance." This result is "consistent with one version of labelling theory [that] suggests that official sanctions stigmatize youths, inducing a deviant
self-concept" (p. 477). But it is also consistent with another labelling explanation that would suggest that the effect may be due to limitations on a youth's opportunities as a result of court involvement.   Finally, of course, court involvement could put a youth in contact with other offending youths. This study obviously focuses on the impact of arrest and court involvement on the likelihood of completing high school and not on future offending. Nevertheless, to the extent that a society values secondary school completion, it would seem that policies that limit the use of court for offending youths can be justified, in part, because they are likely to lead to higher secondary school completion rates.

Reference: Sweeten, Gary (2006).   Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement. *Justice Quarterly, 23* (4), 462-480.

Records of arrests by police *not* leading to convictions make it difficult to get a job.

Previous research has established that those with criminal records have a more difficult time getting entry level jobs than those without records – even in situations in which the potential employer doesn't know the nature of the record (*Criminological Highlights 6*(3)#2).

This study investigates the impact of non-conviction records on employment. Police, it seems, often keep records of contacts with citizens that do not lead to convictions; these records are disclosed, nevertheless, when 'criminal record checks' are required (see, for example, reports by the John Howard Society of Ontario http://www.johnhoward. on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ johnhoward-ontario-help-wanted. pdf and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association http://ccla.org/wordpress/ wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CCLA-NCD-Report.pdf). This study attempted to discover if those arrested but not charged "may still bear the mark of a criminal record" (p. 628). Previous research (*Criminological Highlights 14*(3)#1) has shown that arrests not leading to a conviction are very common and that punishments are imposed on those who are arrested even if there is no finding of guilt.

In this study, an experiment was carried out in which 300 applications were made, in person, to 150 employers for entry level jobs in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region. The jobs required no special skills or licenses. Half of the applications were made by Black males in their 20's; half were made by comparable Whites. In half of each group the applicant indicated to the potential employer that they "had been arrested, but never

convicted of a misdemeanour offence. It was minor and stupid on my part, and I wanted to be upfront about it in case it came up in a background check" (p. 633). If they were asked about details they provided them, indicating that it was for a disorderly conduct misdemeanour, involving a fight… "Nobody was actually hurt. I just acted irresponsibly, but I was young and that's all in the past" (p. 633).

The results suggest that a misdemeanour arrest had, overall, a small, but statistically significant, impact on whether the person was called back for an interview (or was offered the job). Those applying for the jobs noted, when they were in the workplace, whether there were non-white employees present in the workplace at the time of their application. Using the presence of non-white employees as an indicator of workplace 'diversity', it seems that Blacks with arrest records applying for jobs in diverse workplaces were not disadvantaged by their records. Why, then, was the effect of a misdemeanour arrest small? In interviews carried out independently with employers, 3 reasons were noted. First, many employers made 'personal' rather than solely 'on paper' assessments of the job applicants. Second, it seemed that many employers discounted the importance of the event leading to the arrest because of its minor, common nature. Third, some employers clearly distinguished between arrests

and convictions; and they interpreted the volunteering of an *arrest* record as showing good character.

Conclusion: When applying for entry level jobs, it would seem that people are slightly disadvantaged if they have a record of misdemeanour arrest. However, the effect is not large. Furthermore, the presence of an African-American in the workplace – which reduces the size of the effect of a low level record for other African-American – suggests the possibility that these employers are familiar with the fact that these non-conviction records do not predict workplace behaviour.

Reference: Uggen, Christopher, Mike Vuolo, Sarah Lageson, Ebony Ruhland, and Hilary K. Whitham. (2014). The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment. *Criminology, 52*(4), 627-654.

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Crime can be reduced by the collective action of those who live or work in local city blocks that have drug and disorder problems. The police can help by supporting groups on the block and by coordinating services that address non-crime problems on the block.

What can be done to reduce crime in an urban area? Those living in a neighbourhood have little direct control over who lives in their neighbourhood. Similarly, it is difficult for people to create "cohesive" or "caring" neighbours. But people can do some things to reduce crime in their neighbourhoods. Police statistics are sometimes used to identify "hot spots" -- where crime and disorder are likely to occur. Typically, these "hot spots" are single city blocks which acquire characteristics that are conducive to crime. And city blocks, even more than "neighbourhoods," turn out to be sensible sociological, as well as geographic, units to examine when attempting to prevent crime. For a crime to take place, one needs an offender (without controls) a victim (without protection) and an *appropriate* location.

This study identified city blocks in Oakland, California, that clearly had crime and disorder problems. On-site observations were made, and resident "place managers" were interviewed. "Place managers" are people who "live or work near problem places and who, by virtue of their proximity and interests, may have primary or personal responsibility to the street block" (p. 383). Typically four place managers per block were interviewed.

Implementing crime prevention strategies. City blocks were randomly assigned to receive special attention from a unit of the Oakland police. This unit worked with individual citizens, coordinated visits by other local government agencies (fire, public works, rodent control officers, utility companies, etc.) to ensure that all building, safety, etc., codes were enforced, as well as to ensure that owners of problematic properties were made aware of the problems (e.g., the selling of drugs). The "control" blocks got standard police patrols.

The results demonstrated two independent types of effects. First, "collective action" on the part of place managers -- meeting with community groups about problems, working with the police or community groups about problem areas, participating in a neighbourhood cleanup, participating in neighbourhood or block watch programs, etc., -- had positive effects. Signs of disorder were reduced. The number of people observed selling drugs was reduced on the blocks where there was more collective action taken by place managers. Second, above and beyond these effects, those areas targeted (on a random basis) for the police department's "special attention" in coordinating other city services, showed positive change on these same measures. Individual action by place managers (e.g., simply calling 911 or the drug hotline, talking to building managers or tenants) did *not* have a positive impact.

Conclusion: Collective action by place managers seemed to be effective in reducing crime and disorder as was support from the police in dealing with aspects of the block that made it an inviting site for problems. As the authors point out "place managers play an important role in controlling drug and disorder problems... and may be most effective when they are more socially integrated with their neighbours on the street block and when they are involved in collective, rather than individual, problem solving efforts" (p. 397). *Individual* actions, such as simply calling the police, did not seem to be effective. "Police efforts that build working relationships *with a core group* of place managers may have a greater likelihood of long term success than police building one-on-one working relationships with individual place managers." *Collective* neighbourhood actions appear to be important.

Reference: Mazerolle, Lorraine Green, Colleen Kadleck, and Jan Roehl. Controlling drug and disorder problems: The role of place managers. *Criminology*, 1998, *36* (2), 371-403.

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February 16, 2017

Mr. Andy Pringle, Chair
Toronto Police Services Board
40 College St.
Toronto, ON M5G 2J3

Dear Mr. Pringle:

Please refer to the attached report for consideration at the next meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board. This report provides an update on the Shared Services Project, of which the Toronto Police Service is an important stakeholder, and was adopted by City of Toronto Executive Committee on January 19, 2017.

In the meantime, if you or any of your staff have any questions about the project or the report, please contact:

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City of Toronto
416-392-8416
walker.young@toronto.ca

Yours truly,

Roberto Rossini
Deputy City Manager & Chief Financial Officer

Attachment

TORONTO

Update on the Shared Services Project

Date: December 20, 2016
To: Executive Committee
From: Deputy City Manager & Chief Financial Officer
Wards: All

SUMMARY

This report provides an update on the Shared Services Project, a project that aims to reduce duplication between the City and the Agencies and Corporations.

The Shared Services Project was launched in 2014 based on direction from City Council to implement the recommendations from the KPMG Shared Service Study which were broken down into eight short-term recommendations that were to be implemented and eight long-term recommendations that were to be implemented after further due diligence and analysis. In addition, the Shared Services Executive Steering Committee expanded the scope of the project to include six additional recommendations.

In 2014, the Executive Steering Committee and 15 working groups were formed. Each working group was given responsibility for a specific functional area and any related recommendations. The working groups responsible for short-term and additional recommendations were tasked with validating the recommendation and implementing the recommendation where shown to add value. The working groups responsible for the long-term opportunities were tasked with implementing the recommendation after performing a detailed analysis to determine if the recommendation adds value and creating a business case for approval by the Executive Steering Committee.

By the end of 2016, the Executive Steering Committee expects work to be complete on 17 (77%) of the 22 Shared Services recommendations. The remaining five opportunities are expected to be complete before 2020. Of the 17, work will be complete on:
- 100% (8 of 8) of the short-term opportunities,
- 50% (4 of 8) of the long-term opportunities, and
- 83% (5 of 6) of the opportunities added by the Executive Steering Committee.

It is estimated that the activities of the Shared Services working groups has resulted in cumulative efficiencies of approximately $37 million. The majority of these efficiencies have been realized in Fleet and IT and have been built into the budgets of each organization.

In addition, there have been many non-quantifiable benefits achieved including a substantial culture shift towards increased collaboration across all organizations and viewing of City and the Agencies & Corporations as one organization.

In 2017, work will continue on the long-term opportunities and the Executive Steering Committee will examine how to best analyse and prioritize opportunities to expand the project scope of the project into areas not considered in the KPMG Shared Services Study.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Deputy City Manager &Chief Financial Officer recommends that:

1. Executive Committee receive this report for information.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

There are no financial impacts arising from the recommendations contained in this report beyond what has already been approved in the current year's budget.

DECISION HISTORY

At its meeting on June 11, 12, and 13, 2013, in consideration of EX32.3 (*Results of the Shared Services Study - City Agencies*), Council directed staff to begin implementation of various short term shared services opportunities and to report back on a multi-year implementation plan for longer term shared services opportunities after consideration by the impacted Agency Boards.

EX32.3 (*Results of the Shared Services Study – City Agencies*) was considered by the Toronto Police Services Board on June 20, 2013 and by the Toronto Public Library Board on September 23, 2013. During its meeting, the Toronto Public Library Board endorsed the following principles for the Library's participation in shared services discussions:
- that Board governance and authority be recognized,
- that implementation of shared services programs be cost neutral to the Board and provide a return on investment,
- that Toronto Public Library have on-going participation of the planning and implementation of applicable shared services programs and there be on-going reporting back to the Board, and

- that Toronto Public Library maintain control over the collective bargaining function while continuing to work collaboratively with the City.

At its meeting on January 29, 2014, in consideration of EX37.1 (*2014 Capital and Operating Budgets*), City Council requested the Deputy City Manager & Chief Financial Officer to report back to City Council in July 2014 with options to accelerate the implementation of Shared Services opportunities in the KPMG Shared Services Efficiency Study to achieve potential cost savings ranging from $10 million to $15 million in 2014.

EX43.21 (*Update on the Shared Services Project*) was approved by Executive Committee on July 02, 2014 and was considered by the Toronto Police Services Board on June 19, 2014, Toronto Public Library Board and Toronto Parking Authority Board on June 23, 2014, Toronto Transit Commission Board on June 24, 2014, and the Exhibition Place Board of Governors on September 10, 2014. Despite accelerating the implementation of the shared services opportunities, the project team was not able to achieve potential cost savings ranging from $10 million to $15 million in 2014.

EX8.18 (*Update on the Shared Services Project*) was approved by City Council on September 30, 2015 and was considered by the Toronto Zoo Board of Management on September 10, 2015, the Toronto Public Library Board on September 21, 2015, the Toronto Transit Commission Board on September 28, 2015, the Toronto Parking Authority Board on October 22, 2015, the Toronto Board of Health on October 26, 2016, the Toronto Community Housing Board on December 03, 2015, the Exhibition Place Board of Governors on December 04, 2015, and the Toronto Police Services Board on December 17, 2015.

ISSUE BACKGROUND

In 2012, the City Manager identified eight corporate support services to review as a part of a Shared Service Study and retained KPMG to undertake the assignment. The corporate support services included were: information technology, internal audit, insurance & risk management, legal services, human resources/labour relations, procurement & materials management, real estate, and records management.

KPMG's study focused on the City's six largest Agencies with a view to expanding any resulting opportunities to additional City Agencies, where appropriate. The Agencies included were: Exhibition Place, the Toronto Parking Authority, the Toronto Police Service, Toronto Public Health, Toronto Public Library, and the Toronto Transit Commission. In 2015, the project scope was expanded to include Toronto Community Housing Corporation and Toronto Zoo.

City Council approved the implementation of sixteen opportunities and no further action on two opportunities. Eight opportunities were recommended to be implemented in the shorter term and reported out as required through the City's 2014/2015 budget process or to a standing committee or specific Agency Board. The remaining eight opportunities

were broad transformational directions to the City and its Agencies that require significant business process re-engineering, organizational change, and information technology investment to successfully implement. The City Manager referred these opportunities to the Deputy City Manager & Chief Financial Officer, in consultation with City Agencies, for further due diligence, planning, and the development of a five-year shared service implementation plan.

COMMENTS

1. Background

Background on Shared Services

Shared services is the redesign of corporate services with the goal to reduce duplication within and across business units and optimize processes. Shared services solutions are tailored to the functions and organizations involved and may or may not include a consolidation of services across organizations.

Since amalgamation, the City has used a shared services model to deliver corporate services to City divisions through the divisions in Cluster C and the City Manager's Office. The City Agencies, however, continue to manage and deliver some of their own corporate services, sharing services with the City in a way that is neither formalized nor standardized across organization. The Shared Services Project aims to improve this by expanding the shared services model to the City and the Agencies. The goal of the Shared Services Project is for the City and the Agencies to work collaboratively to identify and implement shared services opportunities that will achieve cost savings and service improvements.

Project Structure

In 2016, the number of Shared Services working groups increased from 15 to 17 with the addition of a Procurement Steering Committee and the IT Contract Management Working Group. As in previous years, the Executive Steering Committee provides oversight and direction for the overall Shared Services Project, while each working group has been given responsibility for specific recommendations. All teams have representation from all organizations and meet regularly. The working groups are listed below.

1. Change Management Working Group
2. Cooperative Purchasing Group
3. Facilities Management Working Group
4. Fleet Management Steering Committee
5. Health & Safety Working Group
6. Information Management Working Group
7. IT Steering Committee
8. IT Contracts Working Group
9. Internal Audit Working Group
10. Labour Relations Steering Committee
11. Learning Working Group
12. Payroll Working Group
13. Procurement Steering Committee
14. Quality Assurance Working Group
15. Real Estate Working Group
16. TPA/City Insurance Working Group
17. TTC/City Insurance Working Group

2. Status update

Project update

The Executive Steering Committee expects 17 (77%) of the 22 Shared Services recommendations to be complete by the end of 2016. The 5 (23%) remaining initiatives are longer-term initiatives that the Executive Steering Committee expect to be complete by 2020.

The number of initiatives increased from 21 to 22 in 2016 with the addition of the Real Estate Review. The Real Estate Review recommendations address the four original Shared Services initiatives listed below by consolidating all real estate, facilities management, and state of good repair activities into one organization.
1. Expand the City's provision of lessor services to TTC and TPA
2. Coordinate real estate contract and vendor management
3. Incorporate the agencies in the Facilities Transformation Project
4. Create a Real Estate Centre of Excellence

The structure and governance of this organization has still not been defined. For more information on the Real Estate Review, please see item EX16.4 (*City-Wide Real Estate Review*).

Many of the KPMG recommendations were specific in nature and did not cover all aspects of the functional areas examined. For this reason, although many of the KPMG recommendations are considered complete, work has not stopped on these areas. For most areas that are considered complete, the groups continue to meet regularly to:
- find additional ways to reduce duplication, find savings, and improve service and
- discuss and share best practices, discuss policy issues, and share information.

The Executive Steering Committee expects these groups to continue to meet regularly until all efficiencies have been found.

The table below outlines the status for each recommendation. When the status is not complete, a target completion year is given.

Recommendation	Status / Target Completion Year
Short-term Recommendations	
1 Share generic training and learning functions	Complete
2 Coordinate and standardize common Health and Safety functions	Complete
3 Enhance Agency use of the City's Internal Audit Division	Complete
4 Establish a Quality Assurance Centre of Excellence	Complete
5 Continue to rationalize the City stores and automate P2P processes	Included in 10

Recommendation	Status / Target Completion Year
Short-term Recommendations (continued)	
6 Provide the City's FOI online submission application to agencies	Complete
7 Expand the City's provision of lessor services to TTC and TPA	Included in 22
8 Insure the TTC and the TPA under the City's insurance	Complete
Long-term Recommendations	
9 Develop a labour relations and collective bargaining strategy	Complete
10 Share procurement of common goods and implement strategic sourcing	2020
11 Standardize HR information systems and share payroll administration	2020
12 Share common information technology infrastructure	2020
13 Rationalize information technology applications	2020
14 Coordinate real estate contract and vendor management	Included in 22
15 Establish a change management centre of excellence	Complete
16 Include the agencies in a plan to transition to managing digital records	Complete
Additional Recommendations	
17 Incorporate the agencies in the Facilities Transformation Project	Included in 22
18 Create a Fleet Management Centre of Excellence	Complete
19 Establish an IT Contract Management Centre of Excellence	Complete
20 Create an Internal Audit Centre of Excellence	Complete
21 Create a Real Estate Centre of Excellence	Complete
22 Implement the findings from the Real Estate Review	2020

A detailed update for each recommendation is provided in Appendix 1.

Benefits achieved

It is estimated that the activities of the Shared Services working groups has resulted in cumulative efficiencies of approximately $37 million. The majority of these efficiencies have been realized in Fleet and have been built into the budgets of each organization.

In addition, there are many non-quantifiable benefits that have been achieved, including the items below.

Increased collaboration: Formal and informal networks have been set-up across the organizations, which has led to a shift in attitude in all organizations – there is an increased awareness of initiatives in other organizations; an increased desire to work together across organizations and leverage work done; and working group members regularly rely on each other as a resource. This change in culture will lead to many

long-term benefits for all organizations, in both service improvements and cost efficiencies.

Appreciation for one organization: There has been a noticeable shift in attitude among the working group members to start thinking of the City and Agencies & Corporations as one organization rather than separate organizations. This shift has led to a greater desire for consistency, a drive to find overall as opposed to individual benefit, and an appreciation for each organization's business. Although not quantifiable, this change in culture will lead to many quantifiable benefits in the long run.

More information on benefits is provided in Appendix 3.

3. Next steps

Opportunities underway

The Shared Services opportunities listed below are long-term opportunities that need time to successfully implement. An update has been provided for each opportunity. More detailed information on these opportunities is provided in Appendix 1.

Information Technology
The Shared Services IT Steering Committee has approved a three-phase plan to examine and implement a shared services model for all areas of IT. Currently in Phase 2, Enterprise Partnership, the IT Steering Committee is examining short-term opportunities to save money and improve service while analysing service areas for opportunities to move to a shared services model. Phase 2 will be complete in 2018 and the implementation of a shared services model for the recommended areas will start in 2019.

Procurement
As part of the 2017 budget submission, the City will submit a business case on the implementation of a category management procurement model for the City divisions. Once this model has been implemented and tested at the City, the Procurement Steering Committee will create a plan to extend the model to the Agencies & Corporations. In the meantime, the Cooperative Purchasing Group has been working to maximize value from joint purchases among the City and the Agencies & Corporations.

Payroll
As recommended by KPMG, the City is modernizing their payroll systems. Once these projects are complete, the Payroll Working Group will assess opportunities to implement a shared services payroll model between the City and the Agencies & Corporations.

Real Estate Review
The City-Wide Real Estate Review was completed and the recommendations were approved by City Council on July 12, 2016 (see item EX16.4 (*City-Wide Real Estate Review*). Council approved the creation of a consolidated entity responsible for real

estate across the City and the Agencies & Corporations. An update report is planned for consideration by Council in the second quarter of 2017.

Additional opportunities

As mentioned previously, many of the KPMG recommendations were very specific in nature and did not cover all aspects of the functional areas examined. In addition, KPMG did not examine all areas for shared services opportunities. For this reason, in 2017, the Project Team will work with the Executive Steering Committee to decide how additional opportunities will be examined and analysed.

The Executive Steering Committee wants to ensure that added opportunities will be implemented successfully. Many of the organizations are already undergoing significant change and the Executive Steering Committee members want to ensure that additional Shared Services opportunities increase the success of, and are not at risk due to, existing initiatives.

The working groups for existing recommendations that are considered complete will continue to meet to identify and examine additional opportunities within their area.

Alignment with major initiatives

The Project Team is aware that there are many major initiatives underway at the City and the Agencies & Corporations and are ensuring that they maintain a dialogue with these teams to leverage their work and provide their assistance. Two of these major initiatives are the Toronto Police Service Transformational Taskforce and the Toronto Community Housing Transformation.

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Appendix 1: Detailed Status of Recommendations
Appendix 2: Summary of Cooperative Purchases
Appendix 3: Summary of Benefits

APPENDIX 1: Detailed Status of Recommendations

This appendix provides a detailed update on the status of each of the recommendations. Use the table of contents below to find each opportunity within the appendix.

Status of Short-Term Opportunities

Share Generic Training and Learning Functions

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager to commence implementation in 2014 and to report further as required:
a. Share generic training and learning functions

Status
Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because they small agencies are no longer offering their own general training and learning functions, but are accessing the City's course calendar and resources. Training operations for TTC and TPS vary vastly from the rest of the organizations, so they will continue to offer their own courses, but are sharing information with the other organizations for course development.

What has been done?
The group has completed a pilot program allowing employees from Exhibition Place, Toronto Community Housing, Toronto Parking Authority, Toronto Public Library, and Toronto Zoo to access the City's catalogue of training courses for a minimal fee. This pilot was successful and will be operationalized for 2017.

In addition, the City and the Agencies & Corporations have been sharing training content and materials, procuring services jointly, and developing training and materials jointly.

Next Steps
Although this recommendation is considered complete, the Learning Working Group will continue to work on a strategy to align to one learning management system between all organizations, which will facilitate sharing of information and common reporting.

Estimated Savings
Approximately $0.28 million in estimated cost avoidance from fewer contracts with external training vendors.

Coordinate and Standardize Common Health and Safety Functions

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager to commence implementation in 2014 and to report further as required:
b. Coordinate and standardize common health and safety functions

Status

Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because it has been determined that a model of enhanced collaboration would provide the best value. A current state assessment, a review of models, and an analysis of work to implement each model, showed that the cost to implement a consolidated model was too high for minimal benefit. In addition, due to Health & Safety legislation, accountability must remain with each separate organization which limits the ability to fully consolidate the function.

Instead, a model of enhanced collaboration including aligning policy, standardizing collaboration processes, and creating common metrics would add immediate value at little cost. As part of this model, the group will continually identify consolidation opportunities.

What has been done?
The Health & Safety Working Group formed in 2014 continues to meet regularly and work on identified opportunities.

The current state assessment and analysis completed by the group resulted in the roadmap for moving forward. The group decided that a shared services model would not add value since each organization takes a different approach to their model for delivery of service which would require the organizations to redesign the way they integrate health & safety into their core business. The cost to do this is expected to out-weigh any savings generated. However, the group has decided that there is value in increasing collaboration between all the organizations. A business case will be presented to the Shared Services Executive Steering Committee in 2016.

Increased Collaboration:
The group has developed tools to formalize a collaboration model. This enables standardization and common approaches towards the service delivery of health & safety, where feasible. In addition, this approach also sets in place fundamental foundational elements necessary for a shared service model. These elements would support a transition to a shared services model, if it makes sense and includes a business case.

The group continues to work together on:
- Increased information sharing around advisory bulletins;
- Capitalizing on e-learning modules related to health and safety;
- Developing a common approach to comply with new training standards;
- Developing a common approach to responding to legislative changes;
- Identifying common procurement related to health and safety; and
- Identifying common equipment needs and services
- Increased consultation and sharing of tools and practices

Next Steps
Before the end of 2016, the working group aims to:
- Operationalize the community of practice
- Complete a Terms of Reference

- Complete a Collaboration Protocol
- Establish a common portal to facilitate collaboration
- Work towards common workforce language
- Work towards establishing common metrics
- Roll-out the Global Harmonization System
- Work together to procure H&S services

Estimated Savings
Savings have not been determined. Cost avoidance has been achieved by conducting joint procurement. The Cooperative Purchasing Group is working on methodology to calculate cost avoidance/savings and will apply this to any Health & Safety related cooperative procurement. Other benefits are related to time saved through leveraging another organization's existing documents, forms, training and expertise.

Enhance the Use of the City's Internal Audit Division by Agencies

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager to commence implementation in 2014 and to report further as required:
  c. Enhance the use of the City's Internal Audit Division for compliance, assurance and business risk consulting services by Agencies that do not have their own audit resources

Status
Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because the Toronto Public Library, Exhibition Place, and Toronto Police Services Board have agreed to use the City's Internal Audit to perform various engagements.

Estimated Savings
Not yet determined.

Establish a Quality Assurance Centre of Excellence

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager to commence implementation in 2014 and to report further as required:
  d. Establish a Quality Assurance Centre of Excellence to leverage tools, templates and specialized skills, coordinate work plans and share best practices

Status
Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because the Quality Assurance Centre of Excellence was formed and met for its first regular meeting in May 2015. In 2016, the Quality Assurance Centre of Excellence was consolidated into Excellence Toronto.

Estimated Savings
None

Continue to rationalize the City Stores

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager to commence implementation in 2014 and to report further as required:
   e. Continue to rationalize the City stores and increase direct delivery of consumable goods and automate P2P (purchase to pay) processes

Status
Included in recommendation 10 - 'Share procurement of common goods and implement strategic sourcing'.

The City is in process of implementing an IT solution, warehouse management module, to automate product ordering and vendor payment. Ernst & Young is engaged to conduct a network assessment on both Corporate Stores and Divisional Stores to provide further direction with respect to rationalization and consolidation.

Update
This recommendation from KPMG's Shared Services Study related only to the City of Toronto and was consistent with recommendations from the Auditor General related to continuing to rationalize City Stores, increase direct delivery of products where appropriate and increase the use of technology. Rationalization of City Stores is a continual process of determining whether existing Stores should be closed, consolidated or expanded and whether new Stores should be opened.

The rationalization of City Stores began in 2006 with six Divisions in scope and a total of 7 Corporate Stores and 18 Divisional warehouses, for a grand total of 25 stores/warehouses. At the beginning of 2014, there were 4 Corporate Stores (60 Brant St, 320 Bering Avenue, 1050 Ellesmere Avenue and City Hall) and 3 Corporate Warehouses (Finch, Rivalda and Dohme). In 2014, two Corporate Stores (Brant and Bering) were consolidated and relocated to 799 Islington Avenue. The renovation at 799 Islington (approximately a 32,000 sq foot warehouse) was completed in August 2015 allowing PMMD to consolidate two Corporate warehouses (Rivalda and Dohme) into Islington leaving three Corporate Stores and one Corporate Warehouse.

City Divisions also have Divisional Warehouses, where the inventory is overseen/managed by PMMD but manned by staff from the respective City Division. At the beginning of 2016 the following Divisions had PMMD managed warehouses:
- Parks, Forestry and Recreation – 1 warehouse;
- Toronto Water – 3 warehouses;
- EMS – 1 warehouse;
- Toronto Fire – 1 warehouse.

	2006	2014	2015	2016
Divisional Warehouses	18	8	5	6
Corporate Warehouses	7	3	1	1
Corporate Stores	0	3	3	3
Total	25	14	9	10

Finally, PMMD has been working on an overall supply chain management technology solution. PMMD's Supply Chain Management Transformation Project will bring efficiencies to City stores through the development of an online catalogue and automation of paper forms.

Roadmap

As part of PMMD's Program Review, PMMD engaged Ernst & Young to conduct a network assessment on both Corporate Stores and Divisional Stores to provide further direction with respect to rationalization and consolidation. The final report from Ernst & Young in October is due in Q4 2016. PMMD will work with Divisions to determine the appropriate way to implement the recommendations of Ernst & Young, including incorporating any recommendation into the 2017 budget process as appropriate.

City provides FOI submission application to Agencies

Council Directive

City Council requests the City Clerk to provide as a best practice, the City's online submission application for Freedom of Information requests to interested Agencies when it becomes available.

Status

Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because the Agencies & Corporations are aware of the City's application to receive online FOI requests for City information.

What has been done?

The City purchased and implemented a module for the City's CLASS system, used extensively by Parks, Forestry, and Recreation for online registrations. This module was adapted for the FOI submission tool. A demonstration to the Agencies was provided in March 2015. The CLASS system is not used by Agencies and so the City's solution cannot be easily adopted. Also, *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* requirements do not allow requests for Agency records to be routed through the City.

Next Steps

Although this recommendation is considered complete, the Information Management working group continues to meet to examine other opportunities to reduce duplication.

Estimated Savings
None at this time.

Expand the City's provision of lessor services to the TTC and the TPA

Council Directive
City Council requests the Chief Corporate Officer to work with the Chief Executive Officers of the Toronto Transit Commission and Toronto Parking Authority regarding the possibility of the City providing lessor services to their Agencies.

Update
This opportunity has been included in the Real Estate Review – see the Real Estate Review section for an update.

Insure the TTC and the TPA under the City's insurance

Council Directive
City Council requests the City Manager and Deputy City Manager & Chief Financial Officer, to work with the Chief Executive Officers of the Toronto Transit Commission and Toronto Parking Authority, to insure the Toronto Transit Commission and the Toronto Parking Authority under the City's insurance for non-specialized policies and exclusive of claims, where the City is able to provide similar coverage for a lower cost and report further as required.

Toronto Parking Authority

Status
Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because the City and the TPA have agreed, in principle, to merge insurance programs if the City's insurance program can meet the TPA's services requirements and deliver a cost savings.

What has been done?
TPA and the City have been meeting since 2014 to discuss merging their insurance programs, but personnel changes at both the City and TPA had slowed the analysis of this opportunity. The TPA and the City are currently working on a service level agreement and, if the TPA's service requirements can be met at a cost savings, the programs will be merged when the TPA's insurance policy expires in 2017.

Next Steps
TPA still has some service concerns that the City needs to address. Before TPA's policy expires in 2017, a comprehensive partnership agreement will be negotiated that will address the TPA's concerns. In the unlikely event that a partnership agreement cannot be negotiated that addresses TPA's concerns, the projected cost savings are not

sufficient to outweigh the potential impacts to TPA's business and the programs will not be merged.

<u>Estimated Savings</u>
It is estimated that the TPA will save some money, but the amount will be determined based on the service levels negotiated and the impact on the City's risk profile.

Toronto Transit Commission

<u>Status</u>
Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because the City and the TTC have examined combining insurance programs and this was not possible because insurance companies that cover the risk associated with the City will not cover risks associated with rail. Since the majority of the TTC's coverage is related to rail, there would not be any savings or benefits from combining insurance programs.

<u>What has been done?</u>
TTC and the City's Insurance & Risk Management Division met multiple times to discuss this opportunity in 2014 and 2015. Since it was determined that there would be no benefit to combine insurance programs, the group decided to examine the potential for the City to insure its fleet through the TTC Insurance Company Ltd. (TTCICL.) For this option to be successful, a change to TTCICL must be approved by the Province.

In 2016, the TTC applied to the Provincial regulators for regulatory changes to allow the TTCICL to insure the City's fleet. This change is expected to save the City approximately $300,000 annually in fronting insurance paid to external insurance companies for vehicle pink slips.

<u>Next Steps</u>
Although the application to the Province has been made, the TTC and City have very little control over the process and must wait for the Financial Securities Commission of Ontario and the Ontario Ministry of Finance to make a decision on the application. A response to the application is expected in early 2017.

<u>Estimated Savings</u>
If approved, the City will save approximately $300,000 annually in insurance costs.

Status of Long-Term Opportunities

City-wide labour relations strategy

Council Directive
City Council authorizes the City Manager and the Executive Director, Human Resources to lead the development of a labour relations and collective bargaining strategy for the City and its Agencies going forward, in consultation with City Agencies, and report the strategy to the City's Employee and Labour Relations Committee for approval in principle.

Status
Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because the City and the Agencies & Corporations analysed KPMG's recommendation and determined that the value in developing a City-Wide Labour Relations Strategy would not be as great as suggested by KPMG.

The governance structure of the Boards, combined with the staggered collective agreement expiry dates, makes it impossible to have a one-size-fits-all labour relations and collective bargaining strategy. Any combined strategy would take a great deal of time and effort to develop, would have to be prepared at very high level in order to meet all organizations' needs, and would add very little value to the Boards and Council. However, the collaborative sharing of information, combined with the direct service agreements, create a successful framework for greater collaboration amongst the City and the Agencies & Corporations.

What has been done?
In 2014, the Shared Services Labour Relations Steering Committee was formed to identify ways to enhance labour relations and collective bargaining communication, while being mindful of the different governance structures and collective agreement expiry dates for all organizations involved.

The City has direct service agreements with, and performs bargaining on behalf of, the Exhibition Place Board of Governors, Toronto Police Services Board, and Toronto Zoo Board of Management. The table below sets out the expiry dates of the collective agreements and identifies which organization performs bargaining for each agreement.

Organizations / Union	Bargaining Year				Bargaining Performed by:
	2016	2017	2018	2019	
City of Toronto					
TPFFA Local 3888				●	City
CUPE Local 79 (4 agreements)				●	City

Organizations / Union	Bargaining Year				Bargaining Performed by:
	2016	2017	2018	2019	
TCEU (CUPE) Local 416				●	City
CUPE Local 2998				●	City
Toronto Public Library					
CUPE Local 4948				●	TPL
Toronto Community Housing Corporation					
CUPE Local 79				●	TCHC
Exhibition Place					
CUPE Local 2840	●				City
IBEW Local 353			●		City
CUPE Local 5116	●				City
IATSE Local 58		●			City
Painters & Allied Trades Local 46	●				City
Carpenters Local 27			●		City
Plumbers Local 46				●	City
LIUNA Labourers Local 506			●		City
Toronto Parking Authority					
TCEU Local 416		●			TPA
Toronto Zoo					
CUPE Local 1600		●			City
Toronto Transit Commission					
ATU Local 113			●		TTC
CUPE Local 2			●		TTC
IAMAW Lodge 235			●		TTC
CUPE Local 5089			●		TTC
Toronto Police Services Board					
Toronto Police Association (6 agreements)			●		City
Senior Officers' Organization (2 agreements)			●		External Counsel

Next Steps

The Shared Services Labour Relations Steering Committee will continue to meet regularly to share information and discuss collective bargaining strategies, best practices, and bargaining outcomes. This increased collaboration will lead to greater alignment between the organizations during collective agreement negotiations.

In addition, the Labour Relations Steering Committee and Executive Steering Committee will examine opportunities to enter into additional direct service agreements with Agency & Corporation Boards.

Estimated Savings
The Labour Relations and Executive Steering Committees agree that there are potential cost savings, particularly the avoidance of higher and rising future costs. However, given the complexity of the collective bargaining process in the public sector (specifically for those agreements that are subject to binding arbitration), cost savings will be hard to quantify and attribute solely to Shared Services.

Standardize HR information systems and share payroll administration

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager for further due diligence and consultation with City Agencies and report back to Executive Committee with a multi-year shared service implementation plan and after consideration by Boards of affected City Agencies:
   a. *Standardize human resource information systems and share payroll and benefits administration*

Update
The City's Pension, Payroll, and Employee Benefits Division (PPEB) completed a Program Review of operations, including a complete review of its end-to-end business process, in 2013. Based on the results of this review, PPEB embarked on three major IT infrastructure projects - the Employee and Management Self Service Portal (ESS/MSS); an Enterprise Time, Attendance and Scheduling Management program (eTime – Scheduling) and a major update to SAP as it relates to payroll (eTime – Time Entry/Recording). The ESS/MSS project commenced in March 2014 and launched to all City employees in 2016. The eTime - Time Entry/Recording (formerly CATS) project commenced in June 2015 and went live for all divisions across the City on Sept 14, 2016. The eTime – Scheduling (previously TASS) project commenced in June 2015 for 2 pilot divisions (Toronto Paramedic Services and Parks, Recreation & Forestry) and will go-live in for the rest of the City in November 2016.

It was recommended by both the consultant who conducted the Program Review and KMPG that before the City examines shared services opportunities in depth it must upgrade its IT infrastructure and modernize its end-to-end processes. As a result, the focus will continue over the next year to implement the 3 capital projects and review its business process and organizational structure to prepare the foundation for shared services.

In addition, the TTC started an implementation of SAP in 2016. Since this will significantly impact the way the TTC manages and processes payroll, it is recommended that any initiative be deferred until this implementation is complete and working well.

The City and Agencies, however, felt that mutual benefit could be gained by creating a community of practice to share best practices and examine any potential shared services opportunities. This group has been meeting regularly and has started with creating a common payroll reporting framework.

Roadmap
Shared Services will be considered once the City has completed their process of modernizing their payroll systems and the TTC has completed its installation of SAP.

The community of practice will continue to meet to share best practices, review all collective agreements and business requirements, and determine potential shared services opportunities, given the differences in each Agency's business.

Establish a Change Management Centre of Excellence

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager for further due diligence and consultation with City Agencies and report back to Executive Committee with a multi-year shared service implementation plan and after consideration by Boards of affected City Agencies:
   f. *Establish a change management centre of excellence to support the implementation of shared services and other major City change initiatives.*

Status
Complete – this recommendation is considered complete because the Centre of Excellence model, governance, staffing, and funding has been approved and implementation has started.

What has been done?
The City added one full-time permanent change management consultant position to the complement of the Shared Services Project Team and this position has led the Change Management Working Groups.

These groups have completed work on Centre of Excellence structure, governance, and staffing. In addition, the groups have started work on the creation of change management tools and assessments, an online portal, a change curriculum, and a vendor roster.

Roadmap
This recommendation is considered complete. The business case for the Change Management Centre of Excellence has been approved by the Executive Steering Committee. In 2017, work on the training tools, curriculum, and vendor roster will continue.

Estimated Savings

Not yet quantified.

Share procurement of common goods & implement strategic sourcing

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager for further due diligence and consultation with City agencies and report back to Executive Committee with a multi-year shared service implementation plan and after consideration by boards of affected City agencies:
   a. *Share procurement of common goods and services and implement strategic sourcing*

Update & Roadmap

Development of Strategic Sourcing in Procurement
Category Management is the process of managing key spend categories (goods and services grouped into categories) strategically across the organization with the goal of lowering total cost of ownership. Category Management is:
   • Strategic, requiring data from multiple sources and key performance indicators to track against with more information on the market itself;
   • Collaborative, requiring cross functional teams to work together on the strategy under a defined governance process; and
   • Process driven, requiring the process to be reviewed iteratively as learning of the category grows.
Category Management is different and broader than Strategic Sourcing. Category Management includes category strategies, category governance, usage and spend management, category spend performance management and supplier performance management. Strategic Sourcing is an element that results from category strategy. It is an event or a series of events to secure a vendor or vendors to provide the goods or services who will then be supervised under Category Management.

Implementing category management in procurement was the main recommendation from the KPMG Shared Services Study. The recommendation was for the City of Toronto to implement category management by re-organizing its Purchasing and Materials Management Section first. Once that was done, the next step would be to bring the Agencies into the strategic category management model.

In order to do this, the City's Purchasing and Materials Management Division (PMMD) has embarked on a program review that will review its service delivery and organizational structure and set out an implementation plan that will move to a category management model. PMMD retained Ernst & Young who have provided a final report setting out a road map and business case for implementing category management. PMMD will report to Government Management Committee in Q4, 2016 on the overall strategy for PMMD based on the Ernst & Young recommendations and the Treasurer

will submit a business case on the implementation of category management as part of the Office of the Treasurer's 2017 budget submission for Council's consideration.

<u>Cooperative Purchasing Group</u>

As noted above, the main recommendation from KPMG's Shared Services Study was for the City to implement category management. In the interim, while work is being done to assess how the City would implement category management, the City of Toronto and the Agencies and Corporations are working collaboratively to identify common procurement opportunities through the monthly Cooperative Purchasing Group (CPG meetings). Appendix 2 provides a list of the purchases done jointly with one or more Agencies and/or where an Agency has piggy-backed off the City's contract.

The next steps the CPG is working on include continuing to identify joint procurement opportunities, implementing and tracking the cost saving and other metrics established by the CPG, reviewing the processes and legal terms to determine standardization amongst the Agencies where possible, and comparing procurement opportunities against the Provincial Vendor of Record (VOR) system.

Share common information technology infrastructure

This section is a summary of all IT-related opportunities: IT Infrastructure, IT Applications, and IT Contracts.

Introduction
In 2014, PwC was engaged to perform an assessment of the City and Agency & Corporation IT infrastructure to identify shared services opportunities, develop a roadmap to implement the opportunities, and estimate expected benefits for each opportunity.

PwC completed their engagement in 2015 and their report recommended the three-phase approach shown below. In 2016, the IT Steering Committee expanded this approach to all three IT areas (infrastructure, applications, and contracts) and customized the roadmap to accelerate savings, allow for greater risk mitigation, and build-in periodic progress and maturity assessments.
1. <u>Phase 1 – Setting the Foundation</u>: In this phase, a project team is recruited, a governance structure is created and approved, and other foundational items are completed to facilitate the organizations to work together effectively.
2. <u>Phase 2 – Enterprise Partnership</u>: In this phase, the organizations work together to align policy, standardize processes, consolidate procurement, and build business cases for which services should move to a consolidated shared services model.
3. <u>Phase 3 – Managed Services</u>: In this phase, all opportunities that were identified to move to a consolidated shared services model would transition.

The IT Steering Committee has learned from other public-sector shared services implementations and has adopted a scalable approach that formally engages all key

stakeholders in order to reduce the risk of overlooking service level requirements. Due to this, the IT Steering Committee decided to meet more regularly and discuss any issues of importance to the organizations. This has increased dialogue between the organizations, led to greater alignment, and has increased awareness of common barriers, such as fundamental policy changes, that need to be overcome to realize the benefits of shared services.

In addition to exploring opportunities to increase collaboration, this increased dialogue has enabled organizations to explore skipping Enterprise Partnership and moving directly to Managed Services, if best for their situation.

IT Shared Services Funding
Since 2014, the IT Shared Services activities have been funded through the City's capital budgets for the Data Centre and Application Rationalization projects. However, the City's 2017 budget submission will include an IT Shared Services-specific capital budget request.

When the Shared Services Project started in 2014, there was no budget to fund IT Shared Services activities. Since the City's CIO and the Shared Services Project Team felt that work on the IT opportunities would lose momentum if they had to wait for a new budget cycle, the City's CIO decided to fund the IT Shared Services activities from existing projects that were related to Shared Services. If the City's CIO had not made this funding available they would have missed many shared services opportunities and benefits.

The ability to assess and implement managed services will be challenging without dedicated resources for each organization. Lack of sufficient dedicated resources has been flagged as a project risk by KPMG, PwC, the Shared Services Project Team, and the IT Steering Committee. To address this, the IT Steering Committee has directed the IT Shared Services Team to quantify resource needs when identifying opportunities for immediate action and completing business cases for Managed Services.

Update & Roadmap
The table below provides an update on all activities. More detail for each of the three areas is below the table.

Phase 1: Setting the Foundation	
Status:	Complete
Estimated Cost:	$300,000
Actual Cost:	$252,245
Activities:	- Establish core program management team - Create governance and terms of reference adopted
Decision: Are we ready for Enterprise Partnership?	
Comments:	Yes - the IT and Executive Steering Committees have endorsed the recommended approach.
Phase 2: Enterprise Partnership	
Status:	Started, planned to be complete by end of 2018
Estimated Cost:	$2.6-5.5 million (PwC estimates)
Estimated Benefit:	$2.0-4.0 million/year (PwC estimates)
Activities:	- Identify short-term opportunities that will realize benefits - Develop a process to move organizations directly to Phase 3, as appropriate - Standardize processes - Rationalize infrastructure, applications, and contracts - Analyze and quantify benefits and costs for each opportunity - Create business cases for, and reassess key organizations' readiness to, move to Phase 3
Comments:	Enterprise Partnership is estimated to deliver approximately 50% of the benefits of a full consolidation with significantly lower risk. The IT Steering Committee recommended undertaking sufficient analysis to ensure that costs and benefits are validated.
Decision: Do we move to Managed Services?	
Comments:	The IT and Executive Steering Committees will decide if a business case justifies moving some or all organizations to Managed Services.
Phase 3: Managed Services	
Status:	Starting in 2019
Estimated Cost:	To be determined during Enterprise Partnership
Estimated Benefit:	To be determined during Enterprise Partnership
Activities:	Consolidation of non-core IT functions
Comments:	Based on the results of Enterprise Partnership, the decision will be made whether to move to a consolidation.

In addition, the IT Steering Committee held a workshop to identify opportunities that are expected to lead to great benefits for all organizations and would be easy to implement. These items are listed in the table below and will be further analysed in 2017.

Opportunity	Participating Organization							
	TPS	TPL	TCH	TPA	EP	Zoo	CoT	TTC
Office 365 Subscription Service	N/A	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Cloud Computing	N/A	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Standardized Mobile Device Management System	●	●	●	●	N/A	N/A	●	●
Telephony – Voice over IP (VoIP)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Common Components/Application Programming Interface (API)	N/A	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Shared Customer Relationship Management (CRM) System	N/A	●	N/A	●	N/A	●	●	●
Common Data Governance Framework	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Global IT Policies/Standards/Procedures	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

N/A – Not applicable

Common Infrastructure

Update
In 2016, the IT Steering Committee identified the best services as candidates for shared services. For the majority of organizations, IT infrastructure plans were focused on maintaining a state of good repair, but for TPL and TPS, there was an added focus on introducing new technologies that would help their organizations innovate or respond to changes in their industries.

Roadmap
Based on results of the IT shared services opportunity identification workshop, the IT Steering Committee will focus on the opportunities identified above and assessing any high-impact, easily implementable opportunities. These opportunities align to the nine infrastructure areas listed below:
1. Data Centre Services
2. Desktop Services
3. Enterprise Backup
4. Internet Services
5. IT Services Desk
6. Messaging and Telephony
7. Network Services
8. Platform Infrastructure
9. Storage Services

The costs, benefits, and organizational readiness for implementation of identified opportunities are currently being assessed and implementations will start in 2017. Opportunities that are assessed to have high probability of realizing large service improvements or cost savings will be prioritized.

In 2017, the IT Steering Committee will adopt the PwC recommendation to reassess organizational readiness for, and impact of, the nine IT infrastructure areas so that business cases can be made to move to Phase 3, Managed Services for qualifying infrastructure services.

Application Rationalization

Update
The first step towards rationalizing applications is to create an inventory of applications across all organizations. Although many organizations have developed application inventories, not all organizations are ready to launch cross-organizational Application Rationalization initiatives. For example, as part of larger transformation initiatives, both TCHC and TPS underwent third party assessments of their IT functions and Strategic Plans. It would not be prudent to start an application rationalization initiative until the larger transformation decisions are made.

TTC completed an application rationalization as part of their move to SAP. In addition, the City and TTC have established the foundation for a common, shared SAP environment.

The City completed an application inventory and has started eliminating duplicate or out-dated applications. As part of this process, the City leveraged research from a third party research firm to develop a framework for Application Rationalization. This framework is being shared with the IT shared services stakeholders and will be used when the larger project is launched.

Roadmap
Before the end of 2016, application rationalization workshops will be held to assess whether a common application rationalization framework can be adopted. Since a shared IT Infrastructure facilitates the rationalization of applications, this will be considered in the workshops.

Pending the adoption of a common IT Application Rationalization approach the City and Agencies are focused on exploring application rationalization opportunities as software approaches its end-of-life and needs to be upgraded or replaced.

Similarly for ERP systems opportunities to move to a common SAP platform will be considered as Agencies' ERP systems reach their end-of-life. In cases where the size and needs of an Agency do not warrant implementing SAP, opportunities for alternate, common platforms will be explored.

IT Contract Management

Update
The IT Contracts Working Group was formed in 2016 and includes IT procurement stakeholders from the City, EP, TCHC, TPA, TPS, TTC and the Zoo. This group adopted the same Governance and Terms of Reference that was approved by the IT Steering Committee and has endeavoured to identify collaborative procurement opportunities and analyze the benefits of a Contract Management Centre of Excellence.

In 2016, the IT Contracts Working Group completed the activities listed below:
- Reviewed current IT contracts
- Reviewed existing IT Contracts to find immediate areas of collaboration
- Created a master list of IT Contracts for all organizations

In addition, the group initiated the activities listed below.
- Assessment of opportunities for joint procurements, including developing a selection, categorization, and prioritization methodology
- Analysis of the benefits association with an IT Contract Management Centre of Excellence

Roadmap:
In 2017, the IT Contracts Working Group will focus on the activities listed below.
- Consolidate new or existing common IT procurements
- Maintain the IT contracts master list
- Complete a current state assessment, including organizations' IT procurement maturity
- Assess the benefits of, and framework for, establishing an IT Contract Management Centre of Excellence

Rationalize information technology applications

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager for further due diligence and consultation with City Agencies and report back to Executive Committee with a multi-year shared service implementation plan and after consideration by Boards of affected City Agencies:
   a. Rationalize information technology applications

Update
See the Common IT Infrastructure Section for an update.

Coordinate real estate contract and vendor management

Council Directive
City Council refers the following shared service opportunities to the City Manager for further due diligence and consultation with City Agencies and report back to Executive Committee with a multi-year shared service implementation plan and after consideration by Boards of affected City Agencies:
   e. Coordinate real estate contract and vendor management through an information technology platform

Update

This opportunity has been included in the Real Estate Review – see the Real Estate Review section for an update.

Include the Agencies in a plan to transition to managing digital records

Council Directive
City Council requests the City Clerk, in consultation with the City Manager and the Chief Information Officer, to include in the Information Management Strategy for the City, a plan to transition to managing digital records and phased-in implementation to include City Agencies.

Status
Complete - This recommendation is considered complete because the Agencies & Corporations
- are included in the plan for the development of the Information Strategy;
- have already initiated digital information management initiatives.

What has been done?
The Working Group determined that any plan to transition to managing digital records and to phase in implementation was substantially dependent on aligning and coordinating purchasing and infrastructure management strategies between the City and its agencies and corporations. Only after these are clarified will the partners be able to develop a meaningful plan.

Roadmap
Although this recommendation is considered complete, the Information Management Working Group members exchange information about plans and initiatives already in flight in their various organizations to benefit from experience and opportunities wherever possible. In addition, the City plans to deploy a pilot Enterprise Document / Records Management Solution (EDRMS) in 2017. The EDRMS will enable the City to continue assisting Agencies with managing their physical records and develop expertise and experience that will benefit Agencies in managing digital records.

Estimated Savings
None at this time. Once the transition to digital records implementation plan is determined then savings may be identified. However, avoiding duplication of effort and leveraging of the City's expertise and resources is an immediate benefit to the Agencies and Corporations.

Status of Additional Opportunities

Incorporate the Agencies in the Facilities Transformation Project

Council Directive
None - this opportunity was added by the Shared Services Executive Steering Committee.

Update
This opportunity has been included in the Real Estate Review – see the Real Estate Review section for an update.

Establish a Fleet Management Centre of Excellence

Council Directive
None - this opportunity was added by the Shared Services Executive Steering Committee.

Status
Complete – this recommendation is considered complete because the Fleet Management Steering Committee (FMSC) was expanded in 2014 to include all the Agencies & Corporations who operate their own fleet services. The FMSC replaced the Executive Fleet Management Co-ordinating Committee, which was established in 2007 based on Council Directive. The FMSC is led by the City's Fleet Services Division and provides a service perspective of leading practices to approve, evaluate and oversee fleet management, service improvements and operational compliance.

What has been done?
All fleet shared services activities are coordinated through the FMSC. The FMSC meets quarterly to discuss issues of concern, best practices, and opportunities to save money and improve service. Some of these opportunities are listed below.
- Green Fleet Plan: In 2014, the City, TTC, and TPS developed the City of Toronto Consolidated Green Fleet Plan (2014-2018).
- Bulk Fuel Purchases: In 2015, FMSC activities were responsible for the coordination of bulk fuel purchases. In addition, TTC and City collaboration resulted in the TTC transitioning to a different type of fuel. Both of these activities resulting in significant savings.
- Expanded use of City Fuel Sites: In 2015, the City expanded access to its fuel sites to the TPA and before the end of 2016, the TTC will have moved all of its non-revenue fleet (500 vehicles and 400 pieces of equipment) to using the City's fuel sites. Prior to this, both the TPA and the TTC non-revenue fleet used commercial filling stations. In addition, the TTC is installing Vehicle Identification Boxes (VIBs) on their non-revenue fleet allowing them to access the wireless fuel integration technology. For TPA and TTC, these moves have lowered the cost of fuel,

increased security and controls over the fuelling process, and freed resources to focus on their core business.

- Ontario Provincial Driver Certification Program (DCP): The DCP enables City staff to train, issue and renewal classified provincial licenses and endorsements for its employees. The ability to share training materials and resources will result in maintaining a service standard that will be consistent across the organization as well as ensuring compliance with federal, provincial and city policies and guidelines.
- Synergies in Procurement: Fleet Services maintains the library of vehicle and equipment specifications. The ability to share common procurement activities creates values in areas such as quality, cost and compliance with objectives such the procurement of green vehicles.

Roadmap
Although this recommendation is complete, the FMSC continues to meet regularly to find opportunities to collaborate and focus on the implementation of leading practices for city wide fleet services to improve efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of services.

Benefits
- Approximately $18.3 million in cost avoidance from joint fuel hedging
- Approximately $13.0 million cost avoidance from joint bulk fuel purchases
- Efficiencies from increased information-sharing and collaboration

Establish an IT Contract Management Centre of Excellence

Council Directive
None - this opportunity was added by the Shared Services Executive Steering Committee.

Update
See the Common IT Infrastructure Section for an update.

Establish an Internal Audit Centre of Excellence

Council Directive
None - this opportunity was added by the Shared Services Executive Steering Committee.

Status
Complete – this opportunity is considered complete because this group is meeting quarterly to share best practices and examine opportunities to increase collaboration since 2014.

Establish a Real Estate Centre of Excellence

Council Directive
None - this opportunity was added by the Shared Services Executive Steering Committee.

Update
This opportunity has been included in the Real Estate Review – see the Real Estate Review section for an update.

Implement the Findings of the City-Wide Real Estate Review

Council Directive
None - this opportunity was added by the Shared Services Executive Steering Committee.

Update
Council approved the City-Wide Real Estate Framework report in April 2015. The City's Chief Corporate Officer engaged an external consultant to perform a city-wide real estate review in 2015 and the results of the review were presented to Council on July 12, 2016 in consideration of item EX16.4 (*City-Wide Real Estate Review*).

The Real Estate Review recommendations address the four original Shared Services initiatives listed below by consolidating all real estate, facilities management, and state of good repair activities into one organization.
1. Expand the City's provision of lessor services to TTC and TPA
2. Coordinate real estate contract and vendor management
3. Incorporate the agencies in the Facilities Transformation Project
4. Create a Real Estate Centre of Excellence

Roadmap
The project team is working with an external consultant and expects to report to Council in the spring of 2017.

APPENDIX 2: Summary of Cooperative Purchases

The graph below summarizes the joint contracts in place from 2010 to August 2016.

Joint Contracts in Place

Year	Joint Contracts
2010	15
2011	20
2012	54
2013	138
2014	218
2015 (Aug)	265
2016 (Aug)	388

The table below identifies the cooperative purchases completed to date (either through a joint procurement where Agency requirements are built into the City's call before issuance or through piggy-backed procurement where an Agency entered into a contract with the City's vendor after award) and identify future opportunities identified. These tables do not include cooperative purchases with organizations outside the City of Toronto – for example, the Toronto Police Service regularly purchases jointly with other policing organizations at the provincial and federal levels.

Cooperative Purchases Completed

	Cooperative Purchase Title
1	Antifreeze
2	ASL Interpreting Services for Meetings
3	Auctioneering Services
4	Automotive Suspension Parts
5	Banking
6	Batteries
7	Benefit Consultants (Actuarial Valuation – Non-Pension Benefits)
8	Benefit Consulting Services
9	Bicycle Rings
10	Bicycle Rings- Installation & Removal
11	Bio Hazardous Waste Containers and Disposal Services
12	Brokerage Services
13	Bus Services
14	Chain Link Fencing

Cooperative Purchase Title
15   Cisco Network Equipment
16   Collections
17   Crushed Stone Aggregates, Sand & Gravel
18   Data Network Services
19   Design, Fabrication and Installation of Signage
20   Desktops/Notebooks/Tablets
21   Doors & Maintenance
22   Electrical Supplies
23   Employee & Pensioner Health Benefits
24   Envelopes
25   E-Print Devices
26   Executive and Senior Management Recruitment Services
27   External Audit Services
28   Fasteners
29   Fertilizers
30   Fine Paper
31   Fire Alarm Monitoring
32   Fire Extinguisher Maintenance
33   Fire Hydrant Maintenance
34   Flags
35   Fleet Parts & Inventory Management
36   Fuel
37   Fuel Site Maintenance & Repair
38   Garbage Bags
39   Graffiti Removal
40   Grass Seeds and Mixtures
41   Hardware and Accessories for TTC's Cellular 2-Way Push to Talk Devices
42   Headsets
43   Hydro & Natural Gas
44   Ice Melt Products
45   Industrial Supplies
46   Information Technology Specialist Roster
47   Insurance Adjusting Services
48   Janitorial Supplies
49   Lamp Recycling
50   Lamps & Ballasts
51   Lube Oils
52   Maintenance & Operation of Electrical Traffic Control
53   Media Storage Services
54   Metals
55   Mobile Welding and Fabrication Services
56   Motorola Radios
57   Moving Services
58   New Signal Installation

	Cooperative Purchase Title
59	Over The Phone Interpretations
60	Painting Services
61	Personal Care Products
62	Pest Control
63	Picnic Tables
64	Plumbing Supplies
65	Print & Online Advertising
66	Pumps and Electrical Motors
67	Purchasing Card (P-Card)
68	Radio & Voice Logging Infrastructure
69	Rental of Mops & Cloths
70	Repairs and Replacement of Truck Exhaust Systems
71	Rock Salt
72	RSA Tokens
73	Rust Control Undercoating
74	Safety Footwear
75	Servers & Warranty
76	Signal Equipment Maintenance
77	Springs & Suspensions
78	Stationary
79	Sun Servers
80	Support & Maintenance of Cisco Network Equipment
81	Tire Repairs, Installation and Road Service for On and Off-Road Vehicles
82	Toner
83	Traffic Sign Brackets
84	Training Courses
85	Transit Shelters
86	Translation Services Proofreading, Formatting and Revision Services
87	Truck Chassis
88	Uniform Rental & Cleaning
89	Various Lumber
90	Various Paint Products
91	Various Paper Wipes, Towels, Toilet Paper and Paper Products
92	Various Work Gloves
93	Vehicle Maintenance (e-tests)
94	Vehicles
95	Veritas Licenses and Maintenance
96	Walk Off Mats
97	Waste Oil Removal
98	Watches (25 years of service)
99	Welding Gases
100	Wide Area Network (WAN) Services and Network Cabling
101	Wireless Telecommunication Services & Equipment
102	Provincial VOR - Cell Phones

Cooperative Purchase Title
103 Provincial VOR - Car Share Services
104 Provincial VOR - Courier Services
105 Provincial VOR - Executive and Senior Management Recruitment Services
106 Provincial VOR - Office seating and Furniture
107 Provincial VOR - Laser Printer/ Fax Toner Cartridges
108 Provincial VOR - Office Products
109 Provincial VOR - Uniform Dress Shirts
110 Provincial VOR - Uniform Shirts
111 Provincial VOR - Wireless Goods and services

Appendix 3: Summary of Benefits

The following three pages contains a table that summarizes benefits identified through the work of the Shared Services Working Groups.

This list should not be considered an exhaustive list of benefits – many benefits are hard to capture.

These tables do not include benefits achieved through partnerships with organizations outside of the City of Toronto – for example, the Toronto Police Service regularly partners with other policing organizations at the provincial and federal levels.

Function / Benefit	Efficiency *		Organizations Involved								Comments
	Hours	$,000	City	EP	TCH	TPA	TPS	TPL	TTC	Zoo	
Facilities Management	-	-									
Facilities operations services			•				•				TPS engaged the City as their sole service provider
Energy and Environment services			•	•						•	The Zoo and Exhibition Place use the City's Environment & Energy services
Miscellaneous services			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations share information, tools, and resources
Financial Planning	-	-									
Financial Planning Services			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	The City provides Financial Planning services
Fleet Services	1,820	26,693									
Fleet Management SC			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the Fleet Management Steering Committee
Fleet management services			•		•			•			TCH & TPL engaged the City as their sole service provider
Fleet contracts			•	•	•	•	•		•	•	All organizations can access the City's contracts instead of issuing their own
TPS Fuel Sites			•				•				Certain City vehicles access the TPS fuel sites
City Fuel Sites			•	•	•	•		•	•	•	All organizations have access to the City's fuel sites
Fleet Management IS	1,820	388	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Emergency Support Function (ESF) has been established amongst Agencies
Emergency Support Function			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
Joint fuel purchases		8,000	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Movement of TTC to lower-cost fuel and savings from a joint purchase
Joint fuel hedging		18,300	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Hedging provides budget certainty for organizations involved.
Joint vehicle purchases			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
Training	5		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations collaborate on training opportunities
Human Resources	350	-									
Labour Relations											
Labour Relations Steering Committee			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the LR Steering Committee
Bargaining Services			•	•			•			•	EP, TPS, and Zoo have engaged the City to provide bargaining services
Labour Relations Services			•	•							EP engaged the City to provide all LR Services
Learning & Training											
Learning Working Group			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the Learning Working Group
Fraud Prevention Course	40		•	•							Used the City's course instead of developing own
Consultants	10		•	•							Used the City's list instead of issuing own call
Ethics Course	40		•						•		Customized the City's course instead of developing own
Health & Safety											
Health & Safety Working Group			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the H&S Working Group
Training			•	•		•	•		•	•	All organizations collaborate on training
Policy framework	40		•					•			Customizes the City's policies instead of developing own
Documents and advisories	20		•					•			Access to the City's Intranet saves time looking up documents
eTraining modules.	200		•				•		•		
Ergonomic Services			•			•	•	•	•	•	Joint call for assessment services
Working at Heights training			•			•	•	•	•	•	Collaboration on approach

Function / Benefit	Efficiency* Hours	Efficiency* $,000	City	EP	TCH	TPA	TPS	TPL	TTC	Zoo	Comments
Information Management	**1,000**	**170**									
Information Management WG			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the Working Group
Records classification & retention	1,000		•	•							Adopted the City's standards instead of developing own
Records management services			•			•	•		•		The City provides records storage services
FOI Request Services			•							•	
Archives Services			•						•		
Archives Software			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	The City provides records storage services software
Miscellaneous services			•	•	•	•	•		•		
Document management system		170	•	•						•	Using the City's Document Management System instead of developing own
Information Technology	**-**	**7,817**									
IT Steering Committee			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the IT Steering Committee
IT Contract Management WG			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the Working Group
Data Centre Services			•		•						Sharing data centre services
Infrastructure & application support			•		•					•	The City provides infrastructure & application support to TCH and Zoo
911 Platform			•				•				TPS provides a common platform 911 calls and communications
ISP Services		317	•					•			City leveraged the TPL's Cogego Internet Service Provider contract
ISP Services			•					•			1,000% increase in bandwidth
TRIP Radio Services			•		•		•		•		TPS provides radio infrastructure
SAP Services			•				•				City provides SAP services to TPS
SAP Implementation Support			•								City and TTC are collaborating on SAP implementations
Email Migration			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Standardization of the email system used by the City and Agencies.
Email infrastructure			•			•				•	City provides email service to TPA and Zoo
Geospatial Federal GFX Program			•				•	•			Contributing to building online Canadian Base Map
Digital Maps			•				•				TPS uses City's digital maps
Open data platform			•								TTC leverages City's open data platform
Enterprise License - Geospatial			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Purchasing this software centrally has cost savings potential
SAP Licencing		7,500	•				•		•		TTC leveraged City's SAP contract
Insurance & Risk Management	**-**	**2,500**									
Insurance Working Group			•	•	•	•	•		•		Full insurance & risk management services
Insurance Services			•	•	•	•	•	•		•	Full insurance & risk management services
Miscellaneous services			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Miscellaneous services provided upon request
TTC Coverage of City vehicles		1,500	•						•		Pending Provincial approval to expand TTCICL to insure City vehicles
TPA/City Insurance Consolidation		1,000	•			•					Estimated savings over 5 years
Internal Audit	**-**	**-**									
Internal Audit Working Group			•		•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations with IA functions participate
Internal Audit Services			•	•	•	•	•	•		•	City performs work for Agencies when requested
Joint purchase of licences			•		•	•	•	•	•		

Function / Benefit	Efficiency * Hours	Efficiency * $,000	City	EP	TCH	TPA	TPS	TPL	TTC	Zoo	Comments
Legal	-	-									
Full legal services			•	•						•	
Real estate legal services			•	•	•	•			•	•	
Municipal law services			•			•		•			
Legal counsel			•				•				For the TPS Board
Employment & Human Rights			•				•				
Parking Services	-	-									
Parking services	14,000	558	•		•	•		•	•		TPA provides parking services for multiple organizations
Procurement											
Procurement Steering Committee			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the Procurement Steering Committee
Cooperative Purchasing Group			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations participate in the CPG
Joint procurement	14,000	558	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Agencies save time issuing separate calls for common goods
Full Procurement Services			•	•			•				City provides full purchasing services
City Stores Services			•		•	•	•		•	•	City provides stores services
Real Estate	-	-									
Real Estate Review			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	All organizations are involved in recommendation implementation
	17,170	37,738									

* Efficiency amounts are a sum of all potential efficiencies, including the items listed below.
  - Savings (both annual and one-time)
  - Cost avoidance (both annual and one-time)
  - Reduced Workload (both annual and one-time)

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 7, 2017

To: Chair and Members
           Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
           Chief of Police

Subject: Special Constable Appointments and Re-Appointment

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board approve the appointment of the individuals listed in this report as special constables for the Toronto Community Housing Corporation, subject to the approval of the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Under Section 53 of the *Police Services Act of Ontario*, the Board is authorized to appoint and re-appoint special constables, subject to the approval of the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services. Pursuant to this authority, the Board now has agreements with the University of Toronto (U of T), Toronto Community Housing Corporation (T.C.H.C.) and Toronto Transit Commission (T.T.C.) governing the administration of special constables (Min. Nos. P571/94, P41/98 and P154/14 refer).

The Service has received a request from the Toronto Community Housing Corporation to appoint the following individuals as special constables:

Table 1Name of Agency and Special Constable Applicant

Agency	Name
Toronto Community Housing Corporation	Morgan Caleb RAMSDEN-MCDONALD (Appointment)
Toronto Community Housing Corporation	Christopher Ramsey ROSS (Appointment)
Toronto Community Housing Corporation	Gurmeet SINGH (Re- Appointment)
Toronto Community Housing Corporation	Jonathan Edward WORRELL (Appointment)

Discussion:

The special constables are appointed to enforce the *Criminal Code of Canada, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Trespass to Property Act, Liquor Licence Act* and *Mental Health Act* on their respective properties within the City of Toronto.

The agreements between the Board and each agency require that background investigations be conducted on all of the individuals who are being recommended for appointment or re-appointment as special constables. The Service's Employment Unit completed background investigations on these individuals and there is nothing on file to preclude them from being appointed as special constables for a five year term.

The Toronto Community Housing Corporation have advised the Service that the above individuals satisfy all of the appointment criteria as set out in their agreement with the Board. The agency's approved strength and current complement is indicated below:

Table 2 Name of Agency, Approved Strength and Current Number of Special Constables

Agency	Approved Strength	Current Complement
Toronto Community Housing Corporation	112	99

Conclusion:

The Toronto Police Service continues to work together in partnership with the agencies to identify individuals who may be appointed as special constables who will contribute positively to the safety and well-being of persons engaged in activities on T.T.C., T.C.H.C. and U of T properties within the City of Toronto.

Deputy Chief of Police, James Ramer, Specialized Operations Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have with respect to this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 1, 2017

To: Chair and Members
                Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
                Chief of Police

Subject: Semi- Annual Report: Write-off of Uncollectible Accounts Receivable Balances July to December 2016

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

The write-off amount of $5,818 in the second half of 2016 reduced the allowance for uncollectible accounts to $200,725. The adequacy of this amount is analyzed annually as part of the year end accounting process. Any adjustment required to this balance will be included in operating expenses in the year the adjustment is made.

Write-offs for the second half of 2016 represent 0.14% of the year end Accounts Receivable balance and 0.01% of revenues for the year, excluding grants. Industry standards dictate that 0.06% of total sales is considered low while 0.20% of total sales is considered ideal.

Background / Purpose:

At its meeting of May 29, 2003, the Board approved Financial Control By-law 147. Part IX, Section 29 – Authority for Write-offs, delegates the authority to write-off uncollectible accounts of $50,000 or less to the Chief of Police and requires that a semi-annual report be provided to the Board on amounts written off in the previous six months (Min. No. P132/03 refers).

The purpose of this report is to provide the Board with information on the amounts written off during the period of July 1 to December 31, 2016.

Discussion:

External customers receiving goods and/or services from Toronto Police Service (Service) units are invoiced for the value of such goods or services. The Service's Accounting Services (Accounting) unit works closely with divisions, units and customers to ensure that some form of written authority is in place with the receiving party prior to work commencing and an invoice being sent. Accounting also ensures that accurate and complete invoices are sent to the proper location, on a timely basis.

Accounts Receivable Collection Process - Paid Duty Customers

In March 2014, the billing process and terms of payment for paid duty customers were changed as a result of the implementation of the Paid Duty Management System (P.D.M.S.). The new system changed the business process followed when booking and paying for paid duty requests. The Service now pays the officers directly, and bills the paid duty customer for the services provided along with the administration fee and any applicable vehicle and/or equipment rentals. To mitigate the increased risk of non-collection, most customers are required to provide a deposit or pre-pay in advance of the paid duty event.

As at this reporting period, paid duty customers have an aggregate credit balance of $2.2 M recorded on the Service's balance sheet representing prepayments for officers, administrative fee, and vehicle/equipment rentals for paid duty events scheduled to occur at a future date.

Accounts Receivable Collection Process - Non-Paid Duty Customers

Customers other than those requesting paid duties are given a 30 day payment term for all invoices and receive monthly statements showing their outstanding balances if the 30 day term is exceeded. In addition, they are provided with progressively assertive reminder letters for every 30 days their accounts remain outstanding. Accounts Receivable staff makes regular telephone calls requesting payment from customers. Customers with large outstanding balances have an opportunity to make payment arrangements with Accounting to ensure collection is maximized. In addition, the Service offers several payment options, including paying through VISA and MasterCard, to facilitate the payment process for our customers.

Customers are sent a final notice when their accounts are in arrears for more than 90 days. They are provided with a ten day grace period, from receipt of the final notice, to make a payment on their account before the balance is sent to an outside agency for collection. The Service's collection agency, obtained from a joint procurement process with the City, has been successful in collecting many accounts on behalf of the Service. However, in situations where amounts are small, company principals cannot be located, organizations are no longer in business or circumstances indicate that no further work is warranted, the collection agency will recommend write-off.

Amounts written off during the July 1 to December 31, 2016 period:

During the six month period of July 1 to December 31, 2016, four accounts totalling $5,818 were written off, in accordance with By-law 147. The write-offs relate to Marihuana Grow Operation (MGO) clean-up cost recovery fees and employee receivables.

Marihuana Grow Operation invoices ($1,765):

The amount written off consists of one item, representing the original cost recovery amount approved by City Council and associated interest. The by-law governing cost recovery associated with marihuana grow operations gives the Service latitude to determine the "owner" of the establishment, and where the grow operation is located. There are three possible definitions for owner:

1. The individual whose name is on the title for the property;
2. The tenant occupying the property; or
3. The property management organization, acting as an agent on behalf of the titled individual.

In this case, the responsibility for the grow operation was determined to lie with the tenant of the establishment in which the grow operation was located. Given the latitude allowed by the by-law and exercised by the Unit Commander of the Service's Drug Squad, the tenant was invoiced the cost recovery amount. The Service followed its normal collection procedures; however, the amount could not be collected.

As a result, this account was forwarded to the Service's collection agency, which spent several months attempting to collect the outstanding balances. The collection agency followed their standard collection process which includes finding the principal where required, sending payment demand letters and investigating the individual's ability to pay. However, despite these efforts, collection proved difficult as the individual associated with each account could not be located or was unresponsive to the request for payment. The collection agency advised that the amounts were not significant enough to warrant legal action, that payment was unlikely, and therefore recommended write-off.

Employee Receivables ($4,053):

Three employee receivables were written off during the second half of 2016. Two employee receivables, totalling $3,997 were residual value remaining after the former members accepted the payment plan arranged by the Service.

For the first case, the former member was overpaid by $5,604 for vacation entitlement and lieu pay down that he was not entitled to. This member was approved by the Unit to take vacation and lieu entitlements which put him on an unpaid leave of absence, he then resigned. Initially, this member paid the Service by credit card, but after two payments which totalled $1,868, credit card charges were declined on several attempts.

This member moved to Vancouver, and the balance remaining of $3,736 was written off. However, this account has been forwarded to the Service's collection agency.

For the second case, the former member was overpaid by $784 for sick leave that he was not entitled to. Similar to the first case, the Service was able to process two payments which totalled $523, but after those charges, the credit card was declined on several attempts. The balance remaining of $261 was written off.

The third case was for a former Crossing Guard who was overpaid by $56 due to incorrect hours entered on the individual's timesheet. A letter was sent to this member advising of the overpayment, however, there was no response. The amount is not large enough to warrant taking legal action, as the costs of such action would outweigh the funds collected, even if the individual exhibited an ability to pay.

Payroll and Benefits Administration continue to work with Service units to refine processes and controls that will mitigate the risk of overpaying employees, which can be evidenced by the significant reduction in write-offs in this category.

Conclusion:

In accordance with Section 29 – Authorization for Write-offs, of By-law 147, this report provides information to the Board on the amounts written off by the Service during the period from July 1 to December 31, 2016.

For all receivables, action within the Service's control has been taken to reduce the risk of amounts owing to the Service from becoming uncollectible and to more aggressively pursue amounts owing, in accordance with the Service's Accounts Receivable collection procedures.

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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July to Dec 2016 AR write-offs.docx

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 23, 2017

To: Chair and Members
               Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
               Chief of Police

Subject: Annual Report 2016: Use of Conducted Energy Weapons

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

At its meeting of March 8, 2005, the Board directed the Chief of Police to provide an annual report to the Board on the use of Conducted Energy Weapons (C.E.W.) within the Toronto Police Service (Min. No. P74/05 refers).

On March 27, 2008, the Board directed the Chief of Police to provide a report that outlined a revised format for future annual reports on the use of C.E.W.s (Min. No. P60/08 refers). This response was provided at the September 18, 2008 Board meeting and outlined the format for future reports (Min. No. P253/08 refers):

- Incidents of C.E.W. Use
- Division of C.E.W. Use
- C.E.W. Users
- C.E.W. Incident Description
- Subject's Condition at Time of C.E.W. Use
- Subject's Behaviour/Threat Level
- Subject Description
- Subject's Age
- Cycles

- Number of C.E.W.s Used
- C.E.W. Effectiveness
- Other Force Option Used Prior to C.E.W. Use
- Injuries/Deaths
- Civil Action
- Officer Training

To provide more information to the Board and the public, a number of Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) procedures and (reporting) forms were updated in the 2009 reporting period. These additional categories continue to be captured for this board report and include:

- Subject Apprehended Under the *Mental Health Act (M.H.A.)*
- Subject Believed Armed
- Subject Confirmed Armed

There have been no changes to T.P.S. Procedure 15–09, "Conducted Energy Weapon" since the 2015 reporting period.

At its meeting on March 3, 2011, the Board recommended that future annual reports include an appropriate explanation of unintentional discharges of the C.E.W. This information has been included in this report. It also recommended that the Board receive statistical data from previous years for the purpose of trend identification (Min. No. P56/11 refers). This additional information is found in Appendix "B".

In 2015, Corporate Risk Management began tracking and reporting on the effectiveness of C.E.W. use on emotionally disturbed persons. A chart entitled C.E.W. Effectiveness on E.D.P.s incorporates this information for the 2016 reporting period.

This report provides a review of C.E.W. use by T.P.S. officers for the period of January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, formatted into the applicable categories. It consists of two components: an explanation of terminology and information regarding the classification of data, and charts containing the aggregate data. A comprehensive breakdown of C.E.W. use for 2016 is appended to this report as Appendix "A".

Discussion:

As of December 31, 2016, a total of 568 Taser X-26s and X-2s were issued to members of the Emergency Task Force (E.T.F.), uniform front line supervisors and supervisors of high-risk units such as Emergency Management and Public Order, Intelligence Services, Organized Crime Enforcement (including Hold-Up and Drug Squad) and the Provincial Repeat Offender and Parole Enforcement (R.O.P.E.) and Fugitive Squad.

In accordance with Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (Ministry) standards and T.P.S. procedure, the C.E.W. is only used in full deployment or drive stun

mode (direct application) when the subject is assaultive as defined by the *Criminal Code.* This includes threatening behaviour if the officer believes the subject intends and has the ability to carry out the threat, or where the subject presents an imminent threat of serious bodily harm or death which includes suicide threats or attempts. Therefore, direct application of the device is only utilized to gain control of a subject who is at risk of causing harm, not to secure compliance of a subject who is merely resistant. In 2016, T.P.S. officers used demonstrated force presence (indirect application) in 56.8% of the incidents.

Incident

The incident refers to a specific event where one or more C.E.W.s were used. In 2016, the weapon was used 324 times during 292 incidents involving as many as 1605 subjects. The data include several incidents where demonstrated force presence was used against groups of as many as 1000 subjects (see page 9).

Division

This chart refers to the division within Toronto or to the location outside Toronto where T.P.S. members used a C.E.W.

Division / Municipality of C.E.W. Incident

Division	#	%
11	16	5.5
12	25	8.6
13	9	3.1
14	30	10.3
22	10	3.4
23	12	4.1
31	13	4.5
32	5	1.7
33	10	3.4
41	18	6.2
42	14	4.8
43	15	5.1
51	40	13.7
52	28	9.6
53	13	4.5
54	24	8.2
55	9	3.1
Barrie	1	0.3
Total	292	100

C.E.W. Users

Of the total number of T.P.S. officers issued C.E.W.s in 2016, front line supervisors accounted for approximately 73.2% of C.E.W. use. The chart below specifies the type of assignment for each C.E.W. user.

C.E.W. User

Unit	#	%
Frontline Supervisor	237	73.2
Emergency Task Force	85	26.2
High-Risk Units	2	0.6
Emergency Management and Public Order	0	0.0
Total # of C.E.W.s Used	324	100

C.E.W. Incident Description

The chart below indicates the type of incident that officers were responding to where the C.E.W. was used. A description of the incident is based on the initial call for service received by the attending officers. This information is collected from the Use of Force Report (U.F.R. Form 1) that must be completed subsequent to each C.E.W. use, as mandated by T.P.S. Procedures 15-01, "Use of Force" and 15-09, "Conducted Energy Weapon".

Incident Types

Incident	#	%
Assault Related	21	7.2
Break and Enter	6	2.1
Disturbance - Other	35	12.0
Domestic Disturbance	21	7.2
Drug Related	7	2.4
Emotionally Disturbed Person	63	21.6
Homicide	0	0.0
Prisoner Related	35	12.0
Robbery	7	2.4
Theft	0	0.0
Traffic	7	2.4
Unintentional Discharge	6	2.1
Unknown Trouble	6	2.1
Wanted Person	10	3.4
Warrant Related	14	4.8
Weapons Call	54	18.5
Total Incident #	292	100

Subject Condition at Time of C.E.W. Use

Officers often interact with subjects who are under the influence of drugs and / or alcohol, or experiencing a variety of mental health issues as well as any combination thereof. Officers are requested to categorize their perception of the condition of the subject at the time of C.E.W. use. An officer's perception is based on experience, knowledge and training. This information was summarized from applicable sections of the Conducted Energy Weapon Use Report (TPS Form 584) as follows:

- Emotionally Disturbed Person

  Subjects identified as being emotionally disturbed include those perceived to be suffering from a mental disorder or emotional distress and includes persons in crisis. A person in crisis is defined as a person who suffers a temporary breakdown of coping skills, but remains in touch with reality.

- Alcohol

  A subject believed to be under the influence of alcohol.

- Drugs

  A subject believed to be under the influence of drugs.

The chart below indicates a subject's condition as identified by the reporting officer on a Conducted Energy Weapon Use Report. The "No Apparent Influences" category refers to situations where an officer did not believe that there were any external factors affecting the subject's behaviour and includes 6 unintentional discharges, 5 group incidents and 3 dog incidents

Subject Condition

Condition	#	%
Alcohol Only	46	15.8
Drugs Only	18	6.2
Drugs + Alcohol	14	4.8
Emotionally Disturbed Persons (E.D.P.)	90	30.8
E.D.P. + Alcohol	12	4.1
E.D.P. + Drugs	28	9.6
E.D.P. + Drugs + Alcohol	12	4.1
No Apparent Influences	72	24.7
Total	292	100

The "No Apparent Influences" category includes five of the six group incidents. In one group, officers believed that subject behaviour was consistent with alcohol use. Of the 292 incidents of C.E.W. use, 30.8% involved subjects whom officers believed were emotionally disturbed. The figure increases to 48.6%, when incidents involving persons

who were perceived to be suffering from the combined effects of emotional disturbance/mental disorder and alcohol and/or drugs are included. Out of 292 incidents, 142 involved subjects described as emotionally disturbed or emotionally disturbed and under the influence of drugs and or alcohol.

T.P.S. training emphasizes that before a C.E.W. is used against any subject, officers should consider de-escalation as a first priority whenever feasible. Other operational considerations include disengagement, distance, time, cover, concealment and the use of other force options when appropriate.

Mental Health Act Apprehension

This indicates that the subject was apprehended under the *M.H.A.* and transported to a psychiatric facility for assessment. Out of 292 incidents, 85 or 29.1% resulted in apprehensions under the *M.H.A.*

The data do not capture the results of the assessment and so further caution is warranted against concluding that those apprehended were, in fact, suffering from a mental disorder at the time.

Finally, it must be remembered that the C.E.W. was only used in response to the subject's behaviour and not because of the subject's condition.

The chart below specifies C.E.W. uses where subjects were apprehended under the *M.H.A.* The "Not Applicable" category refers to six unintentional discharges, six group incidents and three uses on dogs.

Subject Apprehended Under the M.H.A.

Apprehension	#	%
Yes	85	29.1
No	192	65.8
Not Applicable	15	5.1
Total	292	100

Subject's Behaviour/Threat Level

Subject behaviour during a C.E.W. incident is described in the context of the Ontario Use of Force Model (2004) under the following categories:

- Passive Resistant

  The subject refuses, with little or no physical action, to cooperate with an officer's lawful direction. This can assume the form of a verbal refusal or consciously contrived physical inactivity.

- Active Resistant

  The subject uses non-assaultive physical action to resist an officer's lawful direction. Examples would include pulling away to prevent or escape control, or overt movements such as walking or running away from an officer.

- Assaultive

  The subject attempts to apply, or applies force to any person, or attempts or threatens by an act or gesture to apply force to another person, if he / she has, or causes that other person to believe upon reasonable grounds that he / she has, present ability to effect his / her purpose. Examples include kicking and punching, but may also include aggressive body language that signals the intent to assault.

- Serious Bodily Harm or Death

  The subject exhibits actions that the officer reasonably believes are intended to, or likely to, cause serious bodily harm or death to any person, including the subject. Examples include assaults with a weapon or actions that would result in serious injury to an officer or member of the public, and include suicide threats or attempts by the subject.

The 2004 Ontario Use of Force Model is used to assist officers in determining appropriate levels of force and articulation. It represents the process by which an officer assesses, plans, and responds to situations that threaten public and officer safety. The assessment process begins in the centre of the model with the situation confronting the officer. From there, the assessment process moves outward and addresses the

subject's behaviour and the officer's perception and tactical considerations. Based on the officer's assessment of the conditions represented by these inner circles, the officer selects from the use of force options contained within the model's outer circle. After the officer chooses a response option the officer must continually reassess the situation to determine if his or her actions are appropriate and or effective or if a new strategy should be selected. The whole process should be seen as dynamic and constantly evolving until the situation is brought under control.

The below chart refers to subject behaviour in situations where a C.E.W. was used. The "Not Applicable" category refers to unintentional discharges.

Subject Behaviour

Behaviour	#	%
Passive Resistant	28	9.6
Active Resistant	27	9.2
Assaultive	157	53.8
Serious Bodily Harm/Death	74	25.3
Not Applicable	6	2.1
Total Incident #	292	100

In situations where a subject is displaying passive or active resistance, T.P.S. procedure prohibits officers from using a C.E.W. in any manner other than a demonstrated force presence. In all but one case of passive and active resistance, only demonstrated force presence was used. One supervisor used a C.E.W. on an actively resistant party and the use of his C.E.W. was suspended pending participation in a full two-day C.E.W. course. A Uniform Disciplinary Report (TPS 960) was also initiated by the supervisor's Unit Commander.

In 53.8% of incidents, officers perceived the subject's behaviour as assaultive and in 25.3% of the incidents officers believed the behaviour was likely to cause serious bodily harm or death. Upon further review, some of the incidents were life-saving events such as suicide attempts and others that invariably prevented subject and officer injury.

In one case, for example, an emotionally disturbed male was threatening suicide. When officers attended, they located the male sitting on the couch holding a large butcher knife which was pointed at his own throat. The subject was directed to put the knife down and after several requests he complied. The subject was apprehended under the *M.H.A.* without sustaining any injuries.

In another case, divisional officers attended a domestic assault call where a male had already attacked his girlfriend and had slashed another male with a knife. Officers arrived and learned that the girlfriend was barricaded in the house with the suspect who was now also armed with a gun. After failed attempts to de-escalate the situation, and threats by the male that he was going to kill his girlfriend, officers breached the door. The male charged officers and a C.E.W. was fully deployed. The male was safely taken into custody. A replica handgun was found along with numerous knives.

Subject Believed Armed

In over 53% of the incidents, officers believed that the subject was armed. An officer may believe that a subject is armed based on a number of factors, including: visual confirmation; subjects' verbal cues / behaviour; information from witnesses or dispatchers; or other indirect sources. The chart below indicates whether an officer believed the subject was armed. The "Not Applicable" category refers to unintentional discharges.

Subject Believed Armed

Believed Armed	#	%
Yes	157	53.8
No	129	44.2
Not Applicable	6	2.0
Total Incident #	292	100

Subject Confirmed Armed

In 29.1% of the incidents, officers confirmed the presence of a weapon.

Officers are trained to continually assess, plan and act based on a number of factors including the potential that subjects may be armed. The belief that a subject is armed or the presence of a weapon, however, does not, by itself, justify the direct application of a C.E.W. However, when this is combined with the belief that the subject is assaultive or likely to cause serious bodily harm or death, the officer is justified in directly applying the C.E.W. The chart below indicates the number of times that subjects were confirmed to be armed. The "Not Applicable" category refers to unintentional discharges.

Subject Confirmed Armed

Armed	#	%
Yes	85	29.1
No	201	68.8
Not Applicable	6	2.1
Total Incident #	292	100

Subject Description

This chart categorizes subjects by their gender – 89.7% of subjects were male. Also recorded is C.E.W. use on animals and use on multiple subjects. In 2016, there were six group incidents and three incidents involving dogs. The data include two incidents where demonstrated force presence was used against large groups of 1000 and 300 subjects. These incidents involved front line personnel attempting to effect arrests in the presence of assaultive crowds and in one case required a city-wide call for assistance. In each situation, a supervisor used the C.E.W. as a demonstrated force

presence and the C.E.W. was successful in controlling the crowd safely. The "Not Applicable" category refers to unintentional discharges.

Subject Description

Description	#	%
Male	262	89.7
Female	15	5.1
Animal	3	1.0
Multiple Subjects	6	2.1
Not Applicable	6	2.1
Total Incident #	292	100

Age of Subject

The C.E.W. has been used on a variety of age groups. The below chart categorizes C.E.W. use on various age groups. The highest percentage of subjects was between 21 and 35 years of age (combined 46.3%). The "Not Applicable" category refers to six unintentional discharges, six group incidents and three uses on dogs.

Age of Subject

Age	#	%
<10	0	0.0
10 to 15	1	0.3
16 to 20	28	9.6
21 to 25	46	15.8
26 to 30	46	15.8
31 to 35	43	14.7
36 to 40	33	11.3
41 to 45	32	11.0
46 to 50	18	6.2
51 to 55	16	5.5
56 to 60	7	2.4
>60	7	2.4
Not Applicable	15	5.1
Total Incident #	292	100

There were four incidents in 2016 where C.E.W.s were used to control potentially harmful situations involving young people who were 15 and 16 years of age. Of the four situations, three involved the use of the C.E.W. as a demonstrated force presence. One situation was a 'person gone berserk' radio call where a youth had been armed with a knife. A full deployment was used when he became assaultive towards officers. The next chart gives brief description of each of these incidents.

16 Years and Under Summary

Age	C.E.W. Use	Description
16	Demonstrated Force Presence	Foot pursuit. Four subjects had drugs and a knife.
16	Demonstrated Force Presence	Wanted person call. During arrest male became violent.
16	Demonstrated Force Presence	Person gone berserk. Male wanting to hurt himself and kill officers.
15	Full Deployment	Person gone berserk. Male possibly armed with a knife.

Types of Use

There are three ways to use the C.E.W.:

    (1)   Demonstrated Force Presence

        The C.E.W. is un-holstered and / or pointed in the presence of the subject, and / or a spark is demonstrated, and / or the laser sighting system is activated. This mode is justified for gaining compliance of a subject who is displaying passive or active resistance and under certain conditions, may be effective in situations where a subject is assaultive or presents the threat of serious bodily harm or death.

    (2)   Drive Stun Mode

        This term, coined by the manufacturer, describes when the device is placed in direct contact with the subject and the current applied; the probes are not fired. Due to the minimal distance between the contact points on the C.E.W., drive stun is primarily a pain compliance mode. This mode is only justified to gain control of a subject who is assaultive or where the subject presents an imminent threat of serious bodily harm or death.

    (3)   Full Deployment

        Probes are fired at a subject and the electrical pulse applied. In this mode, the device is designed to override the subject's nervous system and affect both the sensory and motor functions causing incapacitation. As with drive stun, this mode is only justified to gain control of a subject who is assaultive or where the subject presents an imminent threat of serious bodily harm or death.

Subjects under the influence of drugs and emotionally disturbed persons often have a higher pain tolerance. Most intermediate force options such as the baton, OC spray and empty hand strikes, rely on the infliction of pain to gain control of the subject; however, C.E.W.s are designed to incapacitate for a brief period of time until the subject is secured. Under these circumstances, C.E.W.s are often more effective than other

intermediate force options. The chart below indicates the number of times a C.E.W. was used as a demonstrated force presence, in drive stun mode, and as a full deployment. The full deployment category includes six unintentional discharges.

Types of Use

Use	#	%
Demonstrated Force Presence	166	56.8
Drive Stun Mode	19	6.5
Full Deployment	107	36.6
Total # of C.E.W. Incidents	292	100

Demonstrated force presence was used 56.8% of the time. Full deployment was the next highest method used. C.E.W.s are most effective when used in full deployment because this promotes neuromuscular incapacitation and gives officers the opportunity to secure the subject with handcuffs. However, since the conducting wires are fragile, contact during full deployment can be broken allowing the subject to break free so officers might have to resort to drive stun mode to maintain control of the subject. In cases where full deployment and drive stun were used in combination, the number was recorded as a full deployment.

Unintentional Discharge

Unintentional discharges occur when the probes are fired from the C.E.W. cartridge due to officer error or device malfunction. In 2016, there were six unintentional discharges. In all instances, frontline supervisors inadvertently discharged the probes while spark testing the C.E.W. All of these instances occurred at a proving station. Discipline is determined by the individual officer's Unit Commander. In three of the six incidents, a Police Service or Conduct Report was initiated by the officer's Unit Commander resulting in a unit-level resolution. In the other three incidents, a verbal reprimand was deemed appropriate. Spark testing is required at the start of their tour of duty for the following reasons:

- To verify that the C.E.W. is working.
- To verify that the batteries are performing and are adequately charged.
- To condition the C.E.W. because the devices are more reliable when energized on a regular basis.

No injuries resulted from the unintentional discharges and the incidents were properly reported. In each case the officers received remedial training.

Number of Cycles

During training and recertification, officers are instructed to apply the current only as long as it takes to gain control of the subject. Control is achieved when the subject is placed in restraints, such as handcuffs, and is no longer considered a threat. After the initial application of a single cycle, an officer is asked to re-assess the subject's

behaviour before continued or renewed application of the current is used. The following chart reports whether single or multiple cycles were used. A complete cycle is five seconds in duration. A partial cycle of less than five seconds can occur when the C.E.W. is manually disengaged or the power is shut off. For the purpose of this report, partial cycles are recorded as a single cycle.

Cycles

Type	#	%
Single Cycle	57	17.6
Multiple Cycle	88	27.2
Demonstrated Force Presence Only	179	55.2
Total C.E.W. Usage	324	100

Number of C.E.W.s Used per Incident

If it has been determined to be reasonably necessary, officers may use more than one C.E.W. at an event if the first one is ineffective. Of the 27 events where more than one C.E.W. was used, 19 involved team responses by the E.T.F. Seven involved frontline supervisors and one involved a frontline supervisor and the E.T.F. 16 of the 27 incidents of multiple C.E.W. use involved situations where subjects were threatening serious bodily harm or death to themselves or others and 10 incidents involved assaultive behaviour. One multiple use involved demonstrated force presence due to passive resistance. The chart below summarizes the number of C.E.W.s used during each incident. In the five situations where three C.E.W.s were used, all involved an E.T.F. response.

Number of C.E.W.s Used Per Incident

Number	#	%
One C.E.W.	265	90.8
Two C.E.W.s	22	7.5
Three C.E.W.s	5	1.7
Four C.E.W.s	0	0.0
Five C.E.W.s	0	0.0
Total Incident #	292	100

C.E.W. Effectiveness

Effectiveness is measured by the ability of officers to gain control of a subject while utilizing a C.E.W. in compliance with Ministry and T.P.S. standards and training. For T.P.S. officers issued with a C.E.W., its use has been shown to be 88.4% effective for 2016. Ineffectiveness has been associated with shot placement, poor conduction (e.g. the subject was wearing heavy clothing), or situations where the subject failed to respond to the demonstrated force presence of the C.E.W. C.E.W. effectiveness is outlined in the chart below. The "Not Applicable" category refers to unintentional discharges.

C.E.W. Effectiveness

Effectiveness	#	%
Effective	258	88.4
Not Effective	28	9.6
Not Applicable	6	2.0
Total	292	100

C.E.W. Effectiveness on Emotionally Disturbed Persons

In 2015, Corporate Risk Management began tracking and reporting on the effectiveness of C.E.W. use on E.D.P.s. The below chart includes the 142 incidents where the involved subjects were described as emotionally disturbed or emotionally disturbed and under the influence of drugs and or alcohol. It should be noted that over half (73) of the 142 incidents involved the use of C.E.W.s as a demonstrated force presence only.

C.E.W. Effectiveness on E.D.P.s

Effectiveness on E.D.P.s	#	%
Effective	125	88.0
Not Effective	17	12.0
Total	142	100

Other Use of Force Option Used (Prior to C.E.W. Use)

C.E.W.s are one of several force options that a police officer can employ. Officer presence and tactical communications, while not strictly considered force options, are typically used at C.E.W. incidents. Other force options used prior to C.E.W. deployment are listed in the following table and include physical control and firearms used as a display of lethal force.

It is important to note that force options are not necessarily used or intended to be used incrementally or sequentially. Events that officers are trained to deal with can unfold rapidly and are often very dynamic. Officers are trained to use a variety of strategies to successfully de-escalate volatile situations; however, there is no single communication method, tool, device, or weapon that will resolve every scenario. The C.E.W. is issued to T.P.S. supervisors who are often called to the scene by primary response officers who have already made attempts to resolve a situation without success. For this reason, responding supervisors often use the C.E.W. instead of resorting to other force options, but this is the result of careful deliberation by the officers involved. The data show that C.E.W. users chose other force options first in 10.6% of encounters. This supports the fact that officers are using a cautious approach in choosing the appropriate force option to gain control of situations. The below chart indicates, what, if any, other force option was utilized by the C.E.W. equipped officer prior to their using a C.E.W.

Other Force Option Used Prior to C.E.W. Use

Other Force Option	#	%
Firearm Display	9	3.1
Firearm Display and Physical Control	1	0.3
Physical Control	21	7.2
None	261	89.4
Total	292	100

Injury

When deployed in drive stun mode, the C.E.W. may leave minor burn marks on the skin where the device makes contact. When the C.E.W. is fully deployed, the subject may receive minor skin punctures from the darts. As each of these injuries is anticipated when the C.E.W. is used, they are not included under the classification of "injury" for the purposes of this report. The more notable risk is a secondary injury from a fall. Subjects will often immediately collapse to the ground upon direct deployment and since the major muscles are locked, they will not be able to break the fall. Officers are trained to consider the best location and environment when using the C.E.W. and to use caution as part of their decision-making process.

In 2016, there were six minor injuries directly related to C.E.W. use. Several of these injuries consisted of cuts to the head, chin and lip as well as a swollen eye. In one instance, a male scraped his knuckles and wrist from a fall. In another instance, a man suffered a fractured orbital bone from a fall after a full deployment. All subjects received medical attention for their injuries. The chart below indicates that only 2.0% of C.E.W. use results in subject injury.

Injuries Caused by C.E.W. Use

	#	%
Injuries	6	2.0
No Injuries	286	98.0
Total	292	100

In the last five years, the T.P.S. has averaged 3.4 injuries per year that were directly attributed to C.E.W. use. The negligible number of injuries each year indicates that officers are taking environmental factors and dart placement into consideration prior to use.

Deaths

There were no deaths directly associated with C.E.W. use by officers of the T.P.S. in 2016.

Civil Action

There were two civil actions initiated in 2016 against the T.P.S. as a result of C.E.W. use. In the last five years, the T.P.S. has had an average of 2.4 C.E.W. related law suits initiated per year.

Training

All C.E.W. training is conducted by a Ministry-certified use of force instructor on the specific weapon used and approved by the T.P.S. For initial training, authorized T.P.S. officers received 16 hours of training which is four hours more than the provincial standard. This training includes theory, practical scenarios, and a practical and written examination. The additional four hours focuses on judgement training, decision making and de-escalation which is conducted in accordance with the guidelines established by the Ministry. Recertification training takes place at least once every 12 months, in accordance with Ministry guidelines and *Ontario Regulation 926* of the *Police Services Act.* While there were no significant training issues in 2016, three officers were given refresher training by Armament Section staff. All three instances were in relation to the most appropriate mode of use given subject behaviour.

Conclusion:

This report summarizes the frequency and nature of C.E.W. use by the T.P.S. The five-year historical comparison of data indicates relatively stable use of C.E.W.s. This demonstrates that officers are using good judgement under difficult circumstances and they are making appropriate decisions to use only the force necessary to resolve tense and dangerous situations. The T.P.S. is confident that the C.E.W. is an effective tool that has helped avoid injuries to the public and police officers. Consequently, the T.P.S. believes that through proper policy, procedures, training, and accountability, the C.E.W. is an appropriate use of force option that can help maintain public and officer safety.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to respond to any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

MS:jt

Attach. (2)
Filename: 2016 C.E.W. annual report

Appendix A
2016 Conducted Energy Weapon Incidents

CEW USER	SUBJECT BEHAVIOUR	CEW USAGE
F - Frontline Supervisor **E** - Emergency Task Force **H** – High Risk Unit	**PR -** Passive Resistant **AR -** Active Resistant **AS -** Assaultive **SBHD** - Serious Bodily Harm / Death	**DFP** - Demonstrated Force Presence **DSM -** Drive Stun Mode **FD** - Full Deployment

OTHER FORCE OPTIONS USED PRIOR TO CEW USE	SUBJECT CONDITION	SUBJECT DESCRIPITON	MISCELLANEOUS
F – Firearm **B** - Baton / Impact weapon **PC** - Physical Control **CS** - CS Gas **OC** - OC Spray **AR -** ARWEN	**AL –** Alcohol **D – D**rugs **EDP -** Emotionally Disturbed Person **NA** – Not Applicable	**M** - Male **F** – Female **ANI** - Animal **G** - Group	**S** - Single Cycle **M** - Multiple Cycle **Y** - Yes **N** - No **NA** - Not Applicable **UK** - Unknown

CEW INCIDENT	DIVISION OF INCIDENT	CEW USERS	INCIDENT DESCRIPTION	SUBJECT CONDITION	MHA APPREHENSION	SUBJECT BEHAVIOUR	SUBJECT BELIEVED ARMED	SUBJECT CONFIRMED ARMED	SUBJECT DESCRIPTION	AGE	USAGE	CYCLES (single/multiple)	NUMBER OF CEWs USED	CEW EFFECTIVE	INJURIES PER 105	TRAINING ISSUE	OTHER FORCE OPTIONS USED PRIOR TO CEW	De-escalation Techniques
1	13	F	Robbery	NA	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	37	FD	S	1	N	N	N	FA	UK
2	12	F	Unknown Trouble	EDP	Y	PR	N	N	M	17	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
3	33	F	Drug Related	D	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	22	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
4	22	F	EDP	D + EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	31	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
5	51	F	Assault	AL + D	N	AS	N	N	M	51	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
6	32	F	Domestic	AL + EDP	N	AS	Y	N	M	24	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
7	55	F	EDP	D + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	39	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
8	41	F	Break and Enter	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	37	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
9	54	F	Prisoner Related	AL + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	54	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
10	53	F	Search Warrant	D	N	AS	N	N	M	52	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
11	52	F	Other Disturbance	D + EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	26	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
12	14	F	Domestic	AL	N	AS	Y	N	M	34	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
13	55	F	Prevent Suicide	AL + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	76	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
14	33	F	Traffic	NA	N	PR	N	N	M	18	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
15	14	E	Weapons Call	NA	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	20	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	FA	Y
16	31	F	EDP	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	28	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
17	43	F	Drug Related	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	49	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
18	22	F	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	55	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
19	11	F	Domestic	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	22	FD + DSM	M	2	Y	Y	N	None	Y
20	23	F	Traffic	D	N	PR	Y	Y	M	36	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
21	22	E	Suicide	AL + D + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	51	FD	S	3	N	N	N	None	Y
22	22	F	EDP	D	N	AS	N	N	M	25	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
23	41	E	Wanted Person	EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	27	FD	M	2	Y	N	N	None	Y

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CEW INCIDENT	DIVISION OF INCIDENT	CEW USERS	INCIDENT DESCRIPTION	SUBJECT CONDITION	MHA APPREHENSION	SUBJECT BEHAVIOUR	SUBJECT BELIEVED ARMED	SUBJECT CONFIRMED ARMED	SUBJECT DESCRIPTION	AGE	USAGE	CYCLES (single/multiple)	NUMBER OF CEWs USED	CEW EFFECTIVE	INJURIES PER 105	TRAINING ISSUE	OTHER FORCE OPTIONS USED PRIOR TO CEW	DE-ESCALATION TECHNIQUES
24	52	F	Threaten Suicide	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	22	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
25	52	F	Unknown Trouble	AL + EDP	Y	SBHD	N	N	M	37	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
26	51	F	Weapons Call	AL	N	AS	Y	N	M	37	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
27	23	F	Other Disturbance	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	37	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
28	51	F	Break and Enter	NA	N	AR	Y	N	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
29	51	F	Other Disturbance	D + EDP	N	PR	N	N	M	45	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
30	54	F	Domestic	AL	N	PR	Y	N	M	32	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
31	52	F	Prisoner Related	NA	N	AS	N	N	F	31	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
32	53	F	Wanted Person	NA	NA	SBHD	Y	Y	NA	NA	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
33	43	E	Search Warrant	NA	NA	SBHD	Y	Y	NA	NA	DFP	NA	1	Y	NA	N	None	Y
34	23	F	Weapons Call	D	N	AR	Y	N	M	28	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
35	43	F	EDP	AL + D	Y	AS	N	N	M	23	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
36	13	E	Wanted Person	AL + D	N	AS	N	N	M	35	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
37	14	F	Other Disturbance	AL	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	35	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
38	31	E	Cell Extraction	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	32	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
39	43	E	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	PR	N	N	M	34	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
40	13	E	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	45	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
41	14	F	Other Disturbance	AL + D	N	AS	Y	N	M	52	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
42	14	E	Weapons Call	AL + EDP	N	AS	Y	Y	M	53	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
43	12	F	Domestic	AL + D + EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	18	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
44	52	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	35	DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
45	14	F	Weapons Call	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	38	DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
46	51	F	Assist PC	AL	N	AS	Y	N	M	22	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
47	33	E	Weapons Call	EDP	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	21	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
48	52	F	Prisoner Related	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	43	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
49	52	F	Prisoner Related	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	43	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
50	33	F	Sexual Assault	NA	N	PR	Y	Y	M	24	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	FA	Y
51	52	F	Weapons Call	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	50	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
52	55	F	Wanted Person	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	52	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
53	14	F	Unknown trouble	D	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	28	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
54	31	E	Search Warrant	NA	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	18	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	FA	Y
55	12	F	EDP	AL + D + EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	31	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
56	31	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	36	DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
57	53	E	Weapons Call	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	22	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
58	14	F	Other Disturbance	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	49	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y

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59	41	F	Robbery	NA	N	PR	Y	N	M	20	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
60	54	F	Domestic	NA	N	AR	Y	N	M	20	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
61	22	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	48	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
62	14	E	Weapons Call	AL + D + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	27	FD	M	3	Y	N	N	PC	Y
63	14	E	Weapons Call	AL + D + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	28	FD + DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
64	11	F	Serious Injury	AL	N	AS	N	N	F	32	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
65	42	F	Other Disturbance	EDP	N	PR	Y	N	M	38	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
66	14	F	EDP	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	44	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
67	54	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	18	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
68	54	E	Search Warrant	NA	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	31	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
69	52	F	Other Disturbance	AL	N	AS	Y	N	M	21	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
70	41	F	Prisoner Related	AL + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	60	DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
71	33	F	Domestic	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	38	DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
72	55	F	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	N	M	42	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
73	22	H	Drug Related	D	N	AS	N	N	M	43	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
74	14	F	Assault	NA	N	AS	Y	Y	M	32	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
75	41	F	Foot Pursuit	AL + D	N	AS	Y	N	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
76	12	F	Drug Related	D	N	AR	Y	Y	M	16	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
77	14	F	Wanted Person	EDP	N	AS	Y	Y	F	32	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
78	51	F	Assault	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	45	DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	PC	UK
79	52	F	Prisoner Related	AL + D	N	AS	N	N	M	43	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
80	51	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	19	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
81	51	F	Assist PC	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	43	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
82	11	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	36	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
83	51	F	Search Warrant	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	28	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
84	12	F	Domestic	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	57	DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
85	43	F	Other Disturbance	EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	28	FD	M	1	N	N	N	None	Y
86	32	E	Weapons Call	NA	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	31	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	FA + PC	UK
87	11	F	Unknown Trouble	EDP	Y	AS	Y	N	M	56	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
88	12	F	Prisoner Related	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	43	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	PC	Y
89	42	F	EDP	D + EDP	N	AS	Y	Y	M	19	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
90	23	E	Search Warrant	D	N	AS	Y	N	M	23	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	PC	UK
91	42	F	Domestic	AL + EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
92	54	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	17	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
93	31	F	EDP	D + EDP	Y	AR	N	N	M	24	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y

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94	14	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	PR	Y	N	M	31	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
95	31	F	Domestic	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	22	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
96	54	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	19	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
97	55	F	Assault	AL + D	N	AS	N	N	F	22	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
98	12	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	SBHD	Y	Y	F	22	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	FA	Y
99	51	F	Assault	AL + D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	F	20	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	PC	UK
100	12	F	Domestic	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	28	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	PC	UK
101	51	F	Robbery	D	N	AR	Y	N	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
102	33	E	EDP	D + EDP	Y	PR	Y	N	M	34	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
103	52	F	Weapons Call	D + EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	33	FD	M	2	N	N	N	None	Y
104	41	F	Suicide	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	66	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
105	23	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	29	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
106	43	E	Weapons Call	AL + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	54	FD	M	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
107	14	F	Break and Enter	AL	N	AS	Y	N	M	32	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
108	14	F	Other Disturbance	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	25	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
109	43	F	Other Disturbance	NA	N	AS	Y	Y	F	24	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
110	54	F	Assault	EDP	N	AR	N	N	F	27	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
111	52	F	Assault	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	25	DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
112	52	F	Prisoner Related	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	25	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
113	51	F	Address Check	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	41	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
114	51	F	Search Warrant	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	36	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
115	41	F	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	25	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
116	52	F	Weapons Call	AL	N	PR	Y	Y	M	53	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
117	51	F	Traffic	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	35	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	PC	UK
118	42	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	28	DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
119	12	F	Wanted Person	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	16	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
120	41	E	Search Warrant	NA	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	40	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
121	51	E	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	66	FD	M	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
122	52	F	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	31	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
123	51	F	Weapons Call	AL + D + EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	17	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
124	51	F	Other Disturbance	D + EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	45	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
125	52	E	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	32	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
126	52	E	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	31	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
127	54	F	Unknown Trouble	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	42	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
128	54	F	Other Disturbance	EDP	Y	AS	Y	N	F	17	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y

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129	13	E	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	57	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
130	43	F	Prisoner Related	AL	N	AR	N	N	M	48	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
131	54	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	25	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
132	31	E	Trespass to Property	EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	42	FD	S	1	N	N	N	None	UK
133	52	F	Other Disturbance	AL	NA	AS	N	N	NA	NA	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
134	12	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	N	M	39	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
135	13	F	Assault	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	21	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
136	14	F	Domestic	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	35	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
137	14	F	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	34	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
138	54	F	Assault	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	44	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
139	23	F	Weapons Call	D	N	PR	Y	N	M	53	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
140	42	F	Assault	D + EDP	N	AR	N	N	M	24	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
141	53	F	Robbery	NA	N	AS	Y	Y	M	43	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
142	51	F	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	32	FD + DSM	M	1	N	N	N	None	UK
143	51	F	Break and Enter	AL + D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	40	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
144	51	F	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AR	N	N	M	20	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
145	42	F	Domestic	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	27	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
146	31	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	29	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
147	13	F	Prisoner Related	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	33	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	y
148	33	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	33	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
149	12	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	39	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
150	14	E	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	60	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
151	14	F	Wanted Person	NA	N	AR	N	N	M	42	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
152	54	E	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	41	FD + DSM	M	2	Y	Y	N	None	Y
153	53	E	EDP	D + EDP	Y	SBHD	N	N	M	53	FD	S	2	N	N	N	None	Y
154	22	F	Domestic	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	PC	Y
155	33	F	Weapons Call	EDP	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	47	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
156	41	F	Break and Enter	NA	N	PR	N	N	M	47	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
157	43	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	24	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
158	41	F	Weapons Call	AL + D	N	AS	Y	Y	F	22	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
159	51	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	39	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
160	42	E	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	50	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
161	12	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AR	N	N	M	29	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
162	54	F	Other Disturbance	NA	N	AR	Y	N	M	31	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
163	12	F	Domestic	NA	N	PR	Y	N	M	77	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y

CEW INCIDENT	DIVISION OF INCIDENT	CEW USERS	INCIDENT DESCRIPTION	SUBJECT CONDITION	MHA APPREHENSION	SUBJECT BEHAVIOUR	SUBJECT BELIEVED ARMED	SUBJECT CONFIRMED ARMED	SUBJECT DESCRIPTION	AGE	USAGE	CYCLES (single/multiple)	NUMBER OF CEWs USED	CEW EFFECTIVE	INJURIES PER 105	TRAINING ISSUE	OTHER FORCE OPTIONS USED PRIOR TO CEW	DE-ESCALATION TECHNIQUES
164	41	F	Weapons Call	AL + D	N	AS	Y	N	M	34	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
165	51	F	Weapons Call	D	N	AS	Y	Y	M	38	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
166	32	E	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	21	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
167	42	F	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	F	25	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
168	52	F	Assault	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	21	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
169	23	F	Unintentional	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	FD	S	1	Y	NA	N	NA	NA
170	43	E	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	PR	N	N	M	35	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
171	51	F	Other Disturbance	D	N	AS	N	N	M	33	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
172	53	F	Assault	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	19	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
173	14	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	50	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
174	55	E	Weapons Call	AL	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	56	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
175	43	F	Domestic	NA	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	31	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
176	14	F	Weapons Call	D + EDP	N	AS	Y	Y	M	41	FD + DSM	M	1	N	Y	N	None	UK
177	42	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	28	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
178	42	F	Other Disturbance	AL + D + EDP	Y	AS	N	N	F	21	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	PC	UK
179	54	E	Search Warrant	NA	NA	SBHD	Y	N	NA	NA	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
180	43	E	Search Warrant	NA	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	21	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	FA	UK
181	22	F	Weapons Call	AL	N	AS	Y	Y	M	43	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
182	23	E	EDP	D + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	N	M	29	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
183	52	F	Break and Enter	AL	N	AS	Y	N	M	54	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
184	13	F	Weapons Call	EDP	Y	AS	Y	N	M	40	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
185	54	F	Other Disturbance	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	42	DFP	NA	2	N	N	N	None	Y
186	52	F	Prisoner Related	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	20	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
187	11	E	Warrant	AL + D	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	46	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
188	51	F	Drug Related	NA	N	AR	Y	N	M	38	FD	S	1	Y	N	Y	None	UK
189	53	F	EDP	D + EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	45	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
190	14	E	Cell Extraction	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	F	38	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
191	53	F	Suspicious Person	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	24	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
192	14	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	45	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
193	11	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	27	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
194	14	F	Assault	NA	NA	AS	N	N	NA	NA	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
195	14	F	Weapons Call	NA	NA	SBHD	Y	N	NA	NA	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
196	11	E	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	27	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
197	42	F	Robbery	D	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	18	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
198	51	F	Domestic	AL	N	AS	Y	Y	M	35	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
199	52	F	Domestic	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	38	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y

Appendix A
2016 Conducted Energy Weapon Incidents

CEW INCIDENT	DIVISION OF INCIDENT	CEW USERS	INCIDENT DESCRIPTION	SUBJECT CONDITION	MHA APPREHENSION	SUBJECT BEHAVIOUR	SUBJECT BELIEVED ARMED	SUBJECT CONFIRMED ARMED	SUBJECT DESCRIPTION	AGE	USAGE	CYCLES (single/multiple)	NUMBER OF CEWs USED	CEW EFFECTIVE	INJURIES PER 105	TRAINING ISSUE	OTHER FORCE OPTIONS USED PRIOR TO CEW	DE-ESCALATION TECHNIQUES
200	11	F	Prisoner Related	EDP	Y	AR	N	N	M	48	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
201	31	F	Weapons Call	EDP	N	PR	Y	Y	M	21	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
202	14	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	32	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
203	54	F	Robbery	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	42	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
204	12	E	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	36	FD	S	2	Y	N	N	None	UK
205	41	F	Prisoner Related	NA	N	AR	N	N	M	35	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
206	41	E	Wanted Person	EDP	N	AS	Y	N	M	45	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
207	51	F	Other Disturbance	AL + D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	26	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
208	43	E	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	N	M	33	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
209	51	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	50	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
210	12	E	Cell Extraction	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	50	FD	M	3	Y	N	N	None	Y
211	BARRIE	H	Drug Related	NA	N	SBHD	N	N	M	27	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
212	52	F	EDP	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	43	FD	M	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
213	33	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AR	N	N	M	19	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
214	51	F	Liquor Licence Act	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	30	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
215	52	E	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	43	FD	M	3	Y	N	N	None	Y
216	41	F	Wanted Person	NA	N	SBHD	N	N	M	23	FD	S	1	N	N	N	None	UK
217	52	F	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	30	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
218	12	F	Assault	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	63	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
219	41	E	Prisoner Related	AL	N	AR	N	N	M	29	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
220	53	F	Weapons Call	AL	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	20	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	FA	Y
221	53	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	PR	Y	N	M	20	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
222	51	F	Unintentional	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	FD	S	1	Y	NA	N	NA	NA
223	55	E	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	PR	N	N	M	40	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
224	54	E	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	27	DFP	NA	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
225	23	F	Weapons Call	AL + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	40	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
226	51	F	Other Disturbance	D	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
227	12	F	Assault	AL + D	Y	AS	N	N	M	46	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
228	52	F	Other Disturbance	AL	N	AS	Y	Y	M	26	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
229	51	F	Fight	D + EDP	Y	AR	Y	N	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
230	43	E	Search Warrant	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	40	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	FA	UK
231	23	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	Y	M	40	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
232	54	F	Traffic	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	48	FD	M	1	N	Y	N	PC	UK
233	42	F	Trespass to Property	EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	47	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK

Appendix A
2016 Conducted Energy Weapon Incidents

CEW INCIDENT	DIVISION OF INCIDENT	CEW USERS	INCIDENT DESCRIPTION	SUBJECT CONDITION	MHA APPREHENSION	SUBJECT BEHAVIOUR	SUBJECT BELIEVED ARMED	SUBJECT CONFIRMED ARMED	SUBJECT DESCRIPTION	AGE	USAGE	CYCLES (single/multiple)	NUMBER OF CEWs USED	CEW EFFECTIVE	INJURIES PER 105	TRAINING ISSUE	OTHER FORCE OPTIONS USED PRIOR TO CEW	DE-ESCALATION TECHNIQUES
234	43	F	Unknown Trouble	EDP	N	AS	Y	N	M	18	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
235	12	E	Wanted Person	NA	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	30	FD	M	2	Y	N	N	None	UK
236	55	F	EDP	AL + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	N	M	29	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	Y
237	14	F	Stolen Auto	D	N	AS	N	N	M	17	FD + DSM	M	1	N	Y	N	None	UK
238	51	F	Weapons Call	EDP	N	AS	Y	Y	M	47	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
239	53	F	Prisoner Related	AL	N	PR	N	N	M	33	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
240	52	F	Unintentional	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	FD	S	1	Y	NA	N	NA	NA
241	13	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	43	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
242	41	E	Assault	NA	N	PR	N	N	M	25	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
243	12	F	Prisoner Related	AL + EDP	N	AS	N	N	F	22	DSM	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
244	55	E	EDP	EDP	Y	PR	Y	N	M	35	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
245	53	E	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	N	M	53	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
246	14	F	Other Disturbance	NA	NA	AS	Y	N	NA	NA	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
247	54	F	Domestic	AL	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	37	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
248	12	F	Weapons Call	AL + D + EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	31	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
249	31	E	Animal Related	NA	NA	SBHD	Y	Y	NA	NA	FD	M	1	Y	NA	N	None	NA
250	41	E	EDP	D + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	N	M	52	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	FA	UK
251	31	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	58	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
252	13	E	Prisoner Related	D	N	AS	N	N	M	30	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
253	23	F	Other Disturbance	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	23	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
254	51	F	Weapons Call	EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	26	FD	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
255	42	F	Unintentional	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	FD	S	1	Y	NA	N	NA	NA
256	14	F	Weapons Call	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	27	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
257	33	F	Unintentional	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	FD	S	1	Y	NA	N	NA	NA
258	51	F	Weapons Call	D	N	PR	Y	Y	M	27	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
259	11	F	Other Disturbance	NA	NA	SBHD	Y	Y	NA	NA	FD	M	1	Y	NA	N	None	UK
260	32	F	Theft of Vehicle	AL + D	N	AR	N	N	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
261	42	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	N	N	M	16	DFP	NA	2	N	N	N	None	UK
262	11	F	Weapons Call	NA	N	PR	Y	N	M	23	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
263	22	F	Traffic	AL	N	AR	Y	N	M	24	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
264	31	F	Unintentional	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	FD	S	1	Y	NA	N	NA	NA
265	32	E	EDP	EDP	Y	AS	Y	N	F	55	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
266	52	E	Prisoner Related	EDP	N	AR	Y	N	M	26	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
267	12	E	EDP	AL + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	40	FD	M	3	Y	Y	N	None	Y
268	54	F	EDP	D + EDP	N	PR	N	N	M	24	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y

Appendix A
2016 Conducted Energy Weapon Incidents

CEW INCIDENT	DIVISION OF INCIDENT	CEW USERS	INCIDENT DESCRIPTION	SUBJECT CONDITION	MHA APPREHENSION	SUBJECT BEHAVIOUR	SUBJECT BELIEVED ARMED	SUBJECT CONFIRMED ARMED	SUBJECT DESCRIPTION	AGE	USAGE	CYCLES (single/multiple)	NUMBER OF CEWs USED	CEW EFFECTIVE	INJURIES PER 105	TRAINING ISSUE	OTHER FORCE OPTIONS USED PRIOR TO CEW	DE-ESCALATION TECHNIQUES
269	51	F	Drug Related	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	29	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
270	12	F	EDP	EDP	Y	AR	Y	N	M	34	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
271	54	F	EDP	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	27	FD	M	1	Y	Y	Y	None	UK
272	53	E	Domestic	AL + D + EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	36	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
273	12	F	Weapons Call	D + EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	26	FD	S	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
274	54	E	Assault	EDP	N	AR	N	N	M	33	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
275	11	F	Weapons Call	AL + D	N	SBHD	Y	N	M	25	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
276	11	F	Warrant	NA	N	AR	N	N	M	39	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
277	51	F	Domestic	AL + D	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	23	FD + DSM	M	1	Y	Y	N	None	UK
278	11	F	Weapons Call	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	83	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
279	31	E	Search Warrant	NA	N	AS	Y	N	M	22	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
280	12	F	Weapons Call	AL	N	AR	Y	Y	M	66	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
281	12	F	EDP	EDP	Y	SBHD	Y	Y	M	41	FD	M	2	Y	N	N	None	Y
282	22	F	EDP	EDP	Y	PR	N	N	M	42	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
283	54	F	Weapons Call	AL	N	AR	Y	N	M	48	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
284	51	F	Prisoner Related	D + EDP	N	AS	N	N	M	21	FD	S	1	Y	Y	Y	None	Y
285	11	F	Weapons Call	AL	N	PR	Y	Y	M	29	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
286	51	F	Weapons Call	EDP	Y	PR	Y	N	M	18	DFP	NA	1	N	N	N	None	Y
287	51	E	Weapons Call	D + EDP	N	SBHD	Y	Y	M	23	FD	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK
288	41	F	Hold Up	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	44	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
289	11	F	Prisoner Related	AL	N	AS	N	N	M	37	DFP	NA	1	Y	N	N	None	Y
290	51	F	Assault	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	34	FD	S	1	Y	Y	N	PC	UK
291	23	F	Other Disturbance	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	15	FD	M	1	N	N	N	None	UK
292	11	F	LLA Investigation	NA	N	AS	N	N	M	23	DSM	M	1	Y	N	N	None	UK

Appendix "B"
2012 to 2016 C.E.W. Trends

The following is a comparison between similar categories of C.E.W. incidents from 2012 to 2016.

C.E.W. Incidents by Division

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
Division	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
11	12	4.7	11	5.7	9	4.4	16	6.0	16	5.5
12	17	6.7	7	3.6	19	9.3	14	5.3	25	8.6
13	19	7.5	15	7.8	10	4.9	10	3.8	9	3.1
14	24	9.4	8	4.2	21	10.2	21	7.9	30	10.3
22	2	0.8	10	5.2	6	2.9	9	3.4	10	3.4
23	10	3.9	11	5.7	17	8.3	12	4.5	12	4.1
31	8	3.1	12	6.3	12	5.9	17	6.4	13	4.5
32	11	4.3	10	5.2	10	4.9	7	2.6	5	1.7
33	11	4.3	12	6.3	12	5.9	12	4.5	10	3.4
41	16	6.3	12	6.3	13	6.3	17	6.4	18	6.2
42	14	5.5	12	6.3	11	5.4	17	6.4	14	4.8
43	19	7.5	7	3.6	13	6.3	16	6.0	15	5.1
51	17	6.7	19	9.9	14	6.8	27	10.2	40	13.7
52	20	7.8	15	7.8	11	5.4	31	11.7	28	9.6
53	8	3.1	5	2.6	0	0	5	1.9	13	4.5
54	22	8.6	14	7.3	11	5.4	18	6.8	24	8.2
55	22	8.6	8	4.2	16	7.8	15	5.7	9	3.1
Durham	1	0.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Peel	1	0.4	1	0.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Barrie	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	0.3
Simcoe	1	0.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Kitchener	N/A	N/A	2	1.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Waterloo	N/A	N/A	1	0.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Hamilton	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	0.4	N/A	N/A
Total	**255**	**100**	**192**	**100**	**205**	**100**	**265**	**100**	**292**	**100**

The divisions and municipalities where C.E.W. incidents have occurred over the past five years do not yield any notable patterns.

C.E.W. Users

User	2012 #	%	2013 #	%	2014 #	%	2015 #	%	2016 #	%
Front Line Supervisor	185	67.8	163	80.7	162	71.4	207	68.3	237	73.2
Emergency Task Force	74	27.1	37	18.3	62	27.3	88	29.0	85	26.2
High-Risk Units	13	4.8	2	1.0	3	1.3	8	2.7	2	0.6
Emergency Management and Public Order	1	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total # of C.E.W. Users	273	100	202	100	227	100	303	100	324	100

During each of the past five years, frontline supervisors (F.L.S.) have accounted for approximately 68 to 81% of C.E.W. use followed by E.T.F. officers at approximately 18 to 29%. This is anticipated since F.L.S.s attend most scenes prior to the E.T.F. After consultation with constables and after assessing a situation, F.L.S.s would only request the E.T.F. if required. High-risk units include supervisors from units as such as Intelligence, Organized Crime Enforcement, Hold-Up, Drug Squad, and Provincial R.O.P.E. and Fugitive Squad. It should be noted that this is the first year that this chart reflects the total number of **users** each year instead of the total number of **incidents**. All five years have been amended to accurately reflect the C.E.W. User charts on page four of the corresponding reports.

Subject Behaviour

Behaviour Type	2012 #	%	2013 #	%	2014 #	%	2015 #	%	2016 #	%
Passive Resistant	29	11.4	26	13.5	16	7.8	23	8.7	28	9.6
Active Resistant	39	15.3	29	15.1	23	11.2	25	9.4	27	9.2
Assaultive	136	53.3	85	44.3	86	42.0	125	47.2	157	53.8
Serious Bodily Harm/Death	44	17.3	49	22.5	70	34.1	87	32.8	74	25.3
Not Applicable	7	2.7	3	1.6	10	4.9	5	1.9	6	2.1
Total	255	100	192	100	205	100	265	100	292	100

Assaultive behaviour continues to be the predominant subject threat facing officers followed by serious bodily harm or death. Assaultive behaviour increased from 47.2% in 2015 to 53.8% in 2016. The percentage of incidents involving subjects who displayed passive or active resistance remained fairly stable in the last two reportable periods rising slightly from 18.1% in 2015 to 18.8% in 2016.

Subject Description

Subject	2012 #	%	2013 #	%	2014 #	%	2015 #	%	2016 #	%
Male	221	86.7	171	89.1	170	82.9	231	87.2	262	89.7
Female	17	6.7	15	7.8	16	7.8	23	8.7	15	5.1
Animal	6	2.4	2	1.0	4	2.0	0	0.0	3	1.0
Multiple	4	1.6	1	0.5	5	2.4	6	2.3	6	2.1
Not Applicable	7	2.7	3	1.6	10	4.9	5	1.9	6	2.1
Total	**255**	**100**	**192**	**100**	**205**	**100**	**265**	**100**	**292**	**100**

For the past five years, between 82 and 90% of C.E.W. incidents involved male subjects. On average, only 1.78% of use is on multiple subjects.

Subject Condition

Condition	2012 #	%	2013 #	%	2014 #	%	2015 #	%	2016 #	%
Alcohol Only	40	15.7	31	16.1	18	8.8	44	16.6	46	15.8
Drugs Only	10	3.9	14	7.3	8	3.9	11	4.2	18	6.2
Drugs + Alcohol	11	4.3	8	4.2	8	3.9	9	3.4	14	4.8
Emotionally Disturbed Persons (E.D.P.)	82	32.2	51	26.6	79	38.5	81	30.6	90	30.8
E.D.P. + Alcohol	18	7.1	13	6.8	14	6.8	11	4.2	12	4.1
E.D.P. + Drugs	3	1.2	6	3.1	11	5.4	20	7.5	28	9.6
E.D.P. + Drugs + Alcohol	8	3.1	9	4.7	4	2.0	9	3.4	12	4.1
Not Applicable	83	32.5	60	31.3	63	30.7	80	30.2	72	24.7
Total	**255**	**100**	**192**	**100**	**205**	**100**	**265**	**100**	**292**	**100**

Incidents where the officer believed the subject was suffering from an emotional disturbance or mental health disorder or in combination with drugs or alcohol increased from 121 in 2015 to 142 in 2016. As a percentage however, use of C.E.W.s on emotionally disturbed persons as a demonstrated force presence remained relatively stable.

Age of Subject

Age	2012 #	%	2013 #	%	2014 #	%	2015 #	%	2016 #	%
<10	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
10 - 15	3	1.2	2	1.0	3	1.5	1	0.4	1	0.3
16-20	24	9.4	31	16.1	24	11.7	27	10.2	28	9.6
21-25	53	20.8	38	19.8	43	21.0	53	20.0	46	15.8
26-30	34	13.3	22	11.5	35	17.1	49	18.5	46	15.8
31-35	34	13.3	27	14.1	27	13.2	31	11.7	43	14.7
36-40	20	7.8	18	9.4	12	5.9	28	10.6	33	11.3
41-45	17	6.7	16	8.3	17	8.3	21	7.9	32	11.0
46-50	23	9.0	16	8.3	13	6.3	18	6.8	18	6.2
51-55	17	6.7	10	5.2	5	2.4	17	6.4	16	5.5
56-60	10	3.9	4	2.1	5	2.4	5	1.9	7	2.4
>60	2	0.8	2	1.0	2	1.0	5	1.9	7	2.4
N/A	18	7.1	6	3.1	19	9.3	10	3.8	15	5.1
Total	**255**	**100**	**192**	**100**	**205**	**100**	**265**	**100**	**292**	**100**

Persons between 21 and 35 years of age represent the highest category in C.E.W. incidents. During the last five years, there have been a total of 10 incidents of C.E.W. use reported on subjects between 10 and 15 years of age. Many of these cases involved youths who were believed to be armed with offensive weapons and or threatening suicide.

16 Years and Under 5 Year Summary

Subject Age	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
10	0	0	0	0	0
11	0	0	0	0	0
12	0	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	0	0	0
14	1	0	1	0	0
15	2	2	2	1	1
16	4	3	0	2	3

The five year summary chart above includes incidents where C.E.W.s were used on young people who were 16 years of age or younger. Of the 22 incidents that are included, 18 or 81.8 percent involved situations where the C.E.W. was used as a demonstrated force presence only.

Incidents of C.E.W. Use

Type of Use	2012 #	2012 %	2013 #	2013 %	2014 #	2014 %	2015 #	2015 %	2016 #	2016 %
Demonstrated Force Presence	131	51.4	107	55.7	118	57.6	142	53.6	166	56.8
Drive Stun Mode	32	12.5	20	10.4	19	9.3	26	9.8	19	6.5
Full Deployment	92	36.1	65	33.9	68	33.2	97	36.6	107	36.6
Total	**255**	**100**	**192**	**100**	**205**	**100**	**265**	**100**	**292**	**100**

The percentage of C.E.W. use as a demonstrated force presence has remained above 50% for the last five years and in 2016 it was 56.8%. This indicates that officers are using only as much force as necessary to gain control of subjects.

C.E.W. Effectiveness

	2012 #	2012 %	2013 #	2013 %	2014 #	2014 %	2015 #	2015 %	2016 #	2016 %
Effective	213	83.5	173	90.1	177	86.3	232	87.5	258	88.4
Not Effective	35	13.7	16	8.3	18	8.8	28	10.6	28	9.6
Unintentional Discharges	7	2.7	3	1.6	10	4.9	5	1.9	6	2.0
Total	**255**	**100**	**192**	**100**	**205**	**100**	**265**	**100**	**292**	**100**

The average effectiveness of the C.E.W. over the last five years has been 87.2%.

Number of C.E.W.s Used per Incident

# of C.E.W.s	2012 #	2012 %	2013 #	2013 %	2014 #	2014 %	2015 #	2015 %	2016 #	2016 %
One C.E.W.	241	94.5	183	95.3	191	93.2	240	90.5	265	90.8
Two C.E.W.s	11	4.3	8	4.2	8	3.9	15	5.7	22	7.5
Three C.E.W.s	2	0.8	1	0.5	5	2.4	8	3.0	5	1.7
> Three C.E.W.s	1	0.4	0	0	1	0.5	2	0.8	0	0.0
Total	**255**	**100**	**192**	**100**	**205**	**100**	**265**	**100**	**292**	**100**

In the last five years, the overwhelming majority of C.E.W. incidents continue to involve the use of one C.E.W. The incidents where more than one C.E.W. was used remain relatively stable. In 2016, seven of the incidents involving the use of two C.E.W.s can be attributed to frontline supervisors. One incident involving the use of three C.E.W.s was by a frontline supervisor in conjunction with E.T.F. officers and was a prolonged threatening suicide call. All remaining incidents where more than one CEW was used were uses by the E.T.F.

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 2, 2017

To: Chair and Members
 Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
 Chief of Police

Subject: 2016 ANNUAL HATE/BIAS CRIME STATISTICAL REPORT

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:
 1) The Board receive the following report for information; and,
 2) The Board forward a copy of this report to the City of Toronto Executive
 Committee for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendations contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

The Toronto Police Service Intelligence Services – Hate Crime Unit (H.C.U.) has collected statistical data and has been responsible for ensuring the thorough investigation of hate/bias crime offences since 1993.

The Toronto Police Service (the Service) Hate/Bias Crime Statistical Report is an annual report that provides statistical data about criminal offences that are committed against persons or property and are motivated by the victim's race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or other similar factor within the City of Toronto. The report also provides an overview of the hate/bias crimes in 2016, as well as the various education, training and community outreach initiatives that were undertaken by the H.C.U. and other units within the Service.

Discussion:

The year 2016 was characterized by strengthened relationships with community partners, education and a commitment to encouraging public reporting of hate/bias crime.

In 2016, there was an 8% increase in the number of reported hate/bias crimes compared to 2015. There are a number of factors that can affect fluctuation in the number of hate/bias crimes and the community groups that were victimized. These factors include international events, community educational programs, hate/bias crime training, and increased reporting. The most prevalent hate/bias occurrences were for the offences of mischief to property, assault, and criminal harassment. Assault and criminal harassment were all occurrences that were unprovoked by the victims. As in past years, these kinds of offences occurred in a variety of different locations including private dwellings, public park/streets, schools and on public transportation.

In 2016, the H.C.U. continued to be an active partner of the provincial Hate Crime Extremism Investigative Team (H.C.E.I.T.). The H.C.E.I.T. consists of members from 15 Ontario police services that receive provincial funding for the joint collection and sharing of information, enforcement and education of hate/bias crimes.

Throughout the year, the H.C.U. consulted with community organizations and representatives for the purposes of education, negotiation, mediation for public order and safety, and to address community concerns specific to hate/bias crimes. Moreover, the H.C.U. collaborated with the Service's Divisional Policing Support Unit (D.P.S.U.), Muslim and L.G.B.T.Q. Liaison Officers with regard to outreach in the respective communities. The partnership between the H.C.U. and D.P.S.U. provides local and national education on the subject of hate/bias crimes and discrimination to local government and social agencies, community leaders and police officers.

Conclusion:

This report provides the Board with a comprehensive statistical overview of the hate/bias crimes reported and investigated in the City of Toronto throughout 2016.

Deputy Chief James Ramer, Specialized Operations Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

MS/kb

Hatecrimereport.doc

Executive Summary

The Toronto Police Service Hate/Bias Crime Statistical Report is an annual report that provides statistical data about criminal offences that are committed against persons or property and are motivated by the victim's race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or other similar factors within the City of Toronto.

The report explains the mandate of the Toronto Police Service Hate Crime Unit (H.C.U.) and the methodology that is used by the H.C.U. to collect the statistical data. The data is based on hate/bias crimes that were reported to the Toronto Police Service, the Service between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016.

The report also provides an overview of the training and education that was provided to the Service's police officers with respect to hate/bias crimes in 2016, as well as the various community outreach initiatives that were undertaken by the H.C.U. and other units within the Service.

In 2016, there was an increase in the total number of hate/bias crimes occurrences reported to the Service. In comparison to 2015, the number of reported occurrences increased from 134 to 145 representing a difference of approximately 8%. Over the past ten years, between 2007 and 2016, the average number of reported hate/bias crimes is approximately 141 per annum.

The number of arrests related to hate/bias crimes in 2016 decreased from 19 persons arrested in 2015 to 11 persons arrested in 2016. As in previous years, the number of arrests for hate/bias motivated offences was attributed to allegations of mischief to property (i.e. graffiti) in circumstances where there was little or no suspect description available. These occurrences frequently transpired without the victim or any witnesses present. These factors significantly added to the challenges in investigating hate/bias motivated offences and arresting suspects.

The three most targeted groups since 2006 have been the Jewish community, the Black community and the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer (L.G.B.T.Q.) community. In 2016, the Jewish community, followed by the L.G.B.T.Q. community, the Black community, and the Muslim community were the most victimized groups. The three most reported criminal offences motivated by hate/bias in 2016 were mischief to property, assault and criminal harassment. The Jewish community was the most victimized group for mischief to property occurrences; the L.G.B.T.Q. community was the most victimized group for assault occurrences; and the Muslim community was the most victimized group for criminal harassment occurrences.

There are a number of factors that can affect fluctuation in the number of reported hate crimes and the community groups that are victimized. These factors include international events, community educational programs, hate crime training, and increased reporting.

When more than one identifiable group (i.e. Catholic and Ukrainian) was targeted in an incident the occurrence was categorized as multi-bias. In 2015, 10 of the 134 hate/bias occurrences were categorized as multi-bias. In 2016, 14 of the 145 hate/bias occurrences were categorized as multi-bias.

In 2014, the Canadian Center for Justice Statistics (C.C.J.S.) published the Hate Crime Consultations and Recommendation Report. One of the recommendations made in this report was for police services to report hate/bias crimes targeting members of the Transgender community under either the sex and/or gender category for the purpose of comparability across jurisdictions. For the purpose of uniform crime reporting across Canada, the Service adopted the C.C.J.S. recommendation. Hate/bias crimes targeting members of the Transgender community have been categorized under the sex category since the 2014 report. Prior to 2014, the Toronto Police Service Annual Hate/Bias Crime Statistical Report categorized hate/bias crimes against members of the Transgender community under the sexual orientation category.

Since the publication of the first Hate/Bias Crime Statistical Report in 1993, hate/bias crimes have been most commonly motivated by the following five factors: race, religion, sexual orientation, multi-bias, and nationality.

Toronto Police Services Board Report

February 13, 2017

To: Chair and Members
              Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
              Chief of Police

Subject: Annual Report: 2016 Parking Enforcement Unit – Parking Ticket Issuance

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that:

(1) the Board receive the following report; and

(2) the Board forward a copy of this report to the City of Toronto Government Management Committee, for its meeting of April 3, 2017, to be considered in conjunction with the City of Toronto 2017 Parking Ticket Activity Report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendations contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

This report provides information on the Parking Enforcement Unit (P.E.U.) achievements, activities and annual parking ticket issuance during the year 2016 (Appendix A refers).

Discussion:

The P.E.U. reports annually on parking ticket issuance by Parking Enforcement Officers (P.E.O.s), Municipal Law Enforcement Officers (M.L.E.O.s) and Police Officers. The City of Toronto requests this information for use during the annual budget process.

In 2014 and 2015, the City made significant changes to the parking program which expanded the activities of P.E.U. These initiatives included:

- Implementation of a 10 minute bylaw exemption for pay and display parking;
- Implementation of an enhanced rush hour parking enforcement initiative with increased hours of operation;
- Increases in various parking fines, including rush hour routes (from $60 to $150);
- Implementation of a habitual offender towing program;
- Implementation of dedicated zones for courier parking with an interim solution still pending recommendations from the City's curb-side management study;
- Continuation of bicycle lane and cycle track expansion; and
- Implementation of on street Pay-by-Cell (mobile payments) by the Toronto Parking Authority (T.P.A.) in October 2016.

The launch of Pay-by-Cell for on street paid parking has been in continuous operation since commencing in October 2016. The initiative offers the public a convenient option to pay for parking using a mobile device, and as such, is achieving motorist compliance in on-street parking areas. The T.P.S. and the T.P.A. worked together to successfully launch this project.

Rush hour enforcement initiatives, bylaw changes and fine increases have an impact on public behaviour and appear to be achieving increased motorist compliance with some of the municipal parking bylaws. These issues, in combination with deployment strategies aimed at supporting City anti-congestion initiatives, also have a related impact to enforcement numbers and the types of tickets issued. It is important to note that many of these initiatives are more time consuming which detracts from general patrol time availability. Continuing this achievement of increased compliance to the parking regulations, in support of safety, traffic flow and congestion related initiatives, is dependent on maintaining a high visibility of uniformed P.E.O.s in the field.

In spite of the program expansion, the P.E.U. delivered on key accomplishments through the provision of operational support to the Toronto Police Service (Appendix A refers) and interoperability with some very successful City initiatives which will be further discussed in the City's Annual Parking Ticket Activity Report.

Annual Parking Ticket Issuance:

Preliminary information indicates total parking ticket issuance is estimated to be 2,268,110 in 2016, which is an increase of 84,587 over 2015 issuance numbers. Total parking ticket issuance includes tags issued by P.E.O.s, M.L.E.O.s, and police officers. The final parking ticket issuance numbers will be presented by the City of Toronto, Parking Ticket Operations in its 2016 Annual Parking Ticket Activity Report, once all data is captured and reconciled.

The following is a breakdown of the parking ticket issuance estimates by group:

Table 1: Parking Tag Issuance Summary 2016

Group	Tags Issued
Parking Enforcement Unit	2,031,212
Municipal Law Enforcement Officers	226,829
Police Officers	10,069
Total Parking Tag Issuance	2,268,110*

*Preliminary numbers – final numbers to be reported by City of Toronto after complete data capture and reconciliation.

Calls for Service:

The P.E.U. responded to 158,021 calls for parking related service from members of the public which is up by 6.5% over the previous year. The attendance to these calls by civilian P.E.O.s alleviates pressure on the T.P.S. as a whole and allows police officers to focus on core policing duties.

Rush Hour Offences and Bicycle Lanes:

In 2016, the P.E.U. issued 80,101 rush hour offence tickets for the rush hour peak period bylaw in support of the congestion and traffic flow initiatives. Further, a total of 17,913 vehicles were towed from rush hour routes. The P.E.U. issued 8,040 bike lane offence tags in support of safe cycling in the City. For bike-lane offences, tags increased by 10.4% or 755 tags over the previous year.

Habitual Offender Towing:

The City defines a habitual offender as a vehicle that has three or more parking tickets that have been outstanding, with no action taken, in excess of 120 days. P.E.O.s towed a total of 10,162 vehicles under this initiative, including 9,544 Ontario plates and 618 out of province plates. The City reports that this enforcement initiative has continued to positively affect their collection rates for parking tickets.

Towing, Vehicle Relocations and Stolen Vehicle Recovery:

Members of the P.E.U. were responsible for towing a total of 37,096 vehicles, including 1,155 that were without properly registered plates. In 2016, the number of vehicles towed decreased by 13.3% or 5,667 tows over the previous year (2015) which had a large increase 89.8% from 2014. Overall towing numbers increased from prior years as a result of initiatives for rush hour enforcement and the habitual offender towing program. A total of 2,569 vehicles were relocated to assist with T.T.C. subway closures, snow removal, forestry operations, the clearing of parade routes and special events management. P.E.O.s also recovered 874 stolen vehicles, in support of T.P.S. crime management initiatives.

Accessible Parking:

The P.E.U. retained 1,350 Accessible Parking Permits for investigation of possible misuse. This shows an increase of 27.7% or 293 more permits retained over 2015. The P.E.U. laid 1,122 Highway Traffic Act charges in this regard, an increase of 22.9% or 209 more charges over 2015. These efforts are in support of maintaining the integrity of the Accessible Parking Program and ensuring parking spaces are available for use by members of the public who have valid Accessible Parking Permits.

Training:

The P.E.U. trained and certified 636 new M.L.E.O.s. The M.L.E.O.s work for agencies providing parking enforcement on private property. All of the fine revenue derived from the issuance of these parking tickets goes directly to the City of Toronto.

T.T.C. Subway Closures:

The Unit provided parking management and traffic route monitoring during T.T.C. subway closures in 2016 in order to keep the traffic moving. Parking prohibition signs were posted during these closures and 622 vehicles were relocated. A total of 28 weekend closure events were attended.

Conclusion:

The P.E.U. continues to contribute positively to the achievement of the goals and priorities of the T.P.S. by:

• ensuring the safe and orderly flow of traffic;
• ensuring enforcement is fair and equitable to all;
• providing a visible uniform presence on the streets;
• ensuring positive outreach to the community through public awareness campaigns and education programs; and
• ensuring interoperability with other T.P.S. units and City of Toronto departments.

The parking ticket issuance for 2016 is estimated to be 2,268,110 which is an increase of 84,587 over 2015 issuance numbers. The City of Toronto will report the final parking ticket issuance numbers in its 2016 Annual Parking Ticket Activity Report once all data are captured and reconciled.

Rush hour enforcement initiatives, bylaw changes and fine increases have an impact on public behaviour and appear to be achieving increased motorist compliance with some of the Municipal parking bylaws. This, in combination with deployment strategies aimed at supporting City anti-congestion initiatives, also has a related impact to enforcement numbers and the types of parking tickets issued. Continuing this achievement of increased compliance to the parking regulations, in support of safety, traffic flow and congestion related initiatives, is dependent on the deployment of highly visible P.E.O.s in the field.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have concerning this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

Appendix "A"

Parking Enforcement Unit	2014	2015	2016
Parking Ticket Issuance – P.E.O.s	2,292,607	1,970,137	2,028,334
Parking Ticket Issuance – P.E.O.s, M.L.E.O.s, P.C.s	2,498,660*	2,183,523*	2,268,110*
Processable Ticket Rate P.E.O.s	99.8%	99.8%	99.8%
Absenteeism (Short-term sick)	2.8%	3.5%	3.8%
Calls for service received	149,061	148,357	158,021
Stolen Vehicles Recovered	724	721	874
Stolen Autos Recovered - Street Sweeper	562	552	669
Stolen Autos Recovered – P.E.O.s	162	169	205
Hours Spent on Stolen Vehicles Recovered	699	852	994
Stolen Plates Recovered	40	33	67
Hours Spent on Stolen Plates Recovered	36	40	77
Vehicles Scanned by Street Sweeper	3,892,330	4,565,143	5,277,656
Vehicles Towed	21,995	42,763	37,096
Habitual Offenders Towed	548	15,681	10,162
Assistance to T.P.S. Units			
Unplated Vehicles Towed	516	793	1,155
Directed Patrol Requests from Other Police Units	101	52	85
Arrest Assists	15	24	15
Assaults	16	29	37
Language Interpretations	53	46	35
Hours Spent on Language Interpretations	140	105	67
Disabled Permits Retained	823	1,057	1,350
Disabled Permits Cautioned	57	34	94
H.T.A Charges (Disabled Permits)	650	913	1,122
Special Events	88	106	200
Hours Spent On Special Events	972	1,500	8,633
Vehicle Relocations	2,301	2,793	2,569

*Preliminary numbers – final numbers to be reported by City of Toronto after complete data capture and reconciliation.

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 1, 2017

To: Chair and Members
               Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
               Chief of Police

Subject: Annual Report - 2016 Proof of Claim Documents Filed on Behalf of the Toronto Police Services Board

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

At its meeting of December 15, 2011, the Board delegated authority to the Chief of Police, or his designate, to act on its behalf in all situations where a Proof of Claim must be signed and returned to the Trustee in Bankruptcy within a specified period of time, in order to allow the Toronto Police Service's (Service) claim against customers to be considered as part of any consumer proposal or bankruptcy proceedings (Min. No. P334/11 refers).

At that meeting, the Board requested the Chief of Police to report annually in the years in which this delegated authority was exercised.

Discussion:

Annual report - Proof of Claim:

During 2016, there was no Proof of Claim document submitted by the Service on behalf of the Board in relation to a bankruptcy notice.

Update on Parktoria:

At its meeting of March 17, 2016, the Board received a report for the 2015 Proof of Claim submitted by the Service on behalf of the Board relating to Parktoria Technologies, Ltd. (Parktoria) (Min. No. P50/16 refers). The Service was one of 90 unsecured creditors claiming for the Parktoria's net deficit of $449,324 as at April 2015.

The Service filed a claim of $114,120 representing a loss on prepaid software service and maintenance support. In 2016, the Service received a dividend cheque of $49,118 representing 45% of our claim from Bowra Group Inc. (Bowra), the Trustee in the bankruptcy of Parktoria. Subject to the approval of the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Bowra further advised that the Service may be entitled to another 10% of proven claim less applicable levy and discharge fees.

Conclusion:

This report provides an update to the Board on matters relating to the Proof of Claim documents submitted by the Service on behalf of the Board in relation to a bankruptcy notice.

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command will be in attendance to answer any questions the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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2016 proof of claims.doc

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 1, 2017

To: Chair and Members
              Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
              Chief of Police

Subject: Annual Report: 2016 Uniform Promotions

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

At its meeting on May 29, 2003, the Board approved giving standing authority to the Chair, Vice Chair, or their designates, to sign, authorize and approve all uniform promotions to the ranks of Sergeant and Staff /Detective Sergeant. The Board further approved receiving a summary report at its February meeting each year on the promotions made to these ranks in the previous year (Min. No. P136/03 refers). Also at its meeting on March 22, 2007, the Board requested that future employment equity statistics provide an analysis of the success rate of female and racial minority officers in the promotional process by comparing the number of such officers at all stages of the process with the number of those who were promoted (Min. No. P124/07 refers).

Discussion:

In 2016, the Chief of Police announced a moratorium on promotions. Prior to this announcement, 25 Police Constables were promoted to the rank of Sergeant in 2016. All of the Police Constables were promoted from the 2015 Sergeant eligibility list. Furthermore, 11 Sergeants/Detectives were promoted to the rank of Staff /Detective

Sergeant in 2016. All were promoted from the Staff/Detective Sergeant 2015 eligibility list.

Appendix 'A' lists the number of members promoted to the rank of Sergeant during 2016. Appendix 'B' lists the number of members promoted to the rank of Staff /Detective Sergeant during 2016.

At the Board meeting on February 24, 2016, an employment equity analysis was submitted for the 2015 Sergeant and 2015 Staff /Detective Sergeant promotional processes indicating the breakdown of gender and of visible minorities (Min. No. P27/16 refers).

An employment equity analysis for the members promoted in 2016 to the rank of Sergeant (see Appendix C) and rank of Staff / Detective Sergeant (see Appendix D) which concluded in 2015 is attached:

- One hundred and fifty-one members were placed on an eligibility list for promotion to the rank of Sergeant in 2015. Twenty-five of those members were promoted in 2016 – 40% of whom were visible minorities and aboriginals, and female members made up approximately 8%.

- Forty-one members were placed on an eligibility list for promotion to the rank of Staff/Detective Sergeant in 2015. Eleven were promoted in 2016 - 18% of whom were visible minorities and aboriginals, and female members made up approximately 36%.

All members have been promoted in accordance with Service Procedure 14-10 entitled "Uniform Promotional Process – Up To and Including the Rank of Inspector" which was approved by the Board (Min. No. P49/01 refers). In addition, the members have been the subject of an extensive vetting process that included background checks conducted through Professional Standards, Diversity & Inclusion, Legal Services and Labour Relations.

Conclusion:

This report lists the number of members of the Toronto Police Service who were promoted to the ranks of Sergeant and Staff /Detective Sergeant during the year 2016, along with an employment equity analysis of the promotion.

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command, will be in attendance to respond to any questions that the Board may have in regards to this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

Filename: Annual Uniform Promotions 2016-Public.docx

Appendix A

Promotions to the rank of Sergeant in 2016

Number Promoted	Effective Date
8	2016.02.08
1	2016.02.22
3	2016.03.07
11	2016.03.21
2	2016.04.04
Total: 25	

All promotions to the rank of Sergeant have a one year probationary period.

Appendix B

Promotions to the rank of Staff / Detective Sergeant in 2016

Number Promoted	Promoted to Rank	Effective Date
1	Staff Sergeant	2016.02.08
1	Detective Sergeant	2016.02.08
4	Staff Sergeant	2016.03.21
2	Detective Sergeant	2016.03.21
2	Staff Sergeant	2016.04.04
1	Detective Sergeant	2016.04.04
Total: 11 7 promotions 4 promotions	 Staff Sergeant Detective Sergeant	

Appendix C

Employment Equity Results – 2016 Promotion to the rank of Sergeant

2015 Sgt. Promotional Process- Diversity						
	Eligible	Applied	Wrote Exam	Interviewed	Successful	Promoted 2016
Aboriginal	54	6	3	2	2	1
Black	213	49	43	17	9	2
Multi-Racial	92	14	13	8	2	0
Central & S. American	55	6	6	3	1	0
West Asian/N. African	67	22	18	14	6	3
Asian	517	89	80	39	23	4
Caucasian	1408	151	128	79	31	5
Non Respondent	1299	280	254	147	77	10
Total Members	3705	617	545	309	151	25

Eligible

Interviewed

Successful

Promoted 2016

Gender Results – 2016 Promotion to the rank of Sergeant

2015 Sgt. Promotional Process- Gender					
	Eligible	Wrote Exam	Interviewed	Successful	Promoted 2016
Male	3002	466	261	128	23
Female	703	79	48	23	2

2015- Sgt. Process- Eligible

19%

81%

■ Male
■ Female

2015- Sgt. Process- Interviewed

16%

84%

■ Male
■ Female

2015- Sgt. Process- Successful

15%

85%

■ Male
■ Female

2015- Sgt. Process- Promoted in 2016

8%

92%

■ Male
■ Female

Appendix D

Employment Equity Results-2016 Promotion to the Rank of Staff Sergeant

2015 S/Sgt. Promotional Process- Diversity						
	Eligible	Applied	Wrote Exam	Interviewed	Successful	Promoted 2016
Aboriginal	3	3	2	1	1	0
Black	27	25	23	4	1	1
Multi-Racial	2	2	1	0	0	0
West Asian/N. African	1	1	1	1	1	0
Asian	21	17	14	4	2	1
Caucasian	3	2	2	2	0	0
Non Respondent	214	199	176	73	36	9
Total Members	**271**	**249**	**219**	**85**	**41**	**11**

Eligible

Interviewed

Successful

Promoted 2016

Gender Results – 2016 Promotion to the rank of Staff Sergeant

2015 S/Sgt. Promotional Process- Gender					
	Eligible	Wrote Exam	Interviewed	Successful	Promoted 2016
Male	222	181	61	26	7
Female	49	38	24	15	4

2015- S/Sgt. Process- Eligible

- Male 82%
- Female 18%

2015- S/Sgt. Process- Interviewed

- Male 72%
- Female 28%

2015- S/Sgt. Process- Successful

- Male 63%
- Female 37%

2015- S/Sgt. Process Promoted in 2016

- Male 64%
- Female 36%

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 1, 2017

To: Chair and Members
              Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
              Chief of Police

Subject: Annual Report: 2016 Secondary Activities

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

At its meeting on February 11, 1993, the Board requested that the Chief of Police submit a semi-annual report on Secondary Activities (Min. No. C45/93 refers). At the March 21, 1996 meeting, the Board requested that all further semi-annual reports on secondary activities include the number of new applications for secondary activities, how many were approved or denied on a year-to-date basis, as well as the total number of members engaged in secondary activities at the time of the report (Min. No. P106/96 refers). At its meeting on October 26, 2000, the Board passed a motion that future reports regarding secondary activities be provided to the Board on an annual basis rather than semi-annual (Min. No. P450/00 refers). At its meeting on February 22, 2001, the Board requested that future annual reports regarding secondary activities include a preamble that describes the Service's policy governing secondary activities (Min. No. P55/01 refers).

Service Procedure 14-25 – Secondary Activities:

Service Procedure 14-25 was reviewed, revised and published on February 8, 2016 (attached as Appendix "A"). Members are required to submit an Application for Secondary Activity on Form TPS 778 for approval by the Chief of Police if the member believes the activity may place them in a conflict with Section 49(1) of the *Police Services Act* (*P.S.A.*). Service Procedure 14-25 does not provide a list of activities that may be considered to contravene Section 49(1) of the *P.S.A.* Approval to engage in a secondary activity is granted, provided the secondary activity does not contravene the restrictions set out in Section 49(1) of the *P.S.A.*

Police Services Act Provisions – Secondary Activity:

Section 49(1) states:

49(1) A member of a police force shall not engage in any activity:
(a) that interferes with or influences adversely the performance of his or her duties as a member of the police service, or is likely to do so;
(b) that places him or her in a position of conflict of interest, or is likely to do so;
(c) that would otherwise constitute full-time employment for another person; or
(d) in which he or she has an advantage derived from employment as a member of a police force.

The Chief may also deny applications for secondary activity for the following reasons:

(1) Where the applicant has demonstrated a history of poor attendance or poor performance;
(2) Where the secondary activity might bring discredit upon the member's reputation as an employee or upon the reputation of the Toronto Police Service;
(3) Where it involves the use of programs, lesson plans, technology, materials, equipment, services or procedures which are the property of the Service.

The Chief of Police exercises his discretion, on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether an application is likely to contravene the restrictions set out in Section 49(1) of the *P.S.A.* Members whose applications are approved are required to sign an agreement which outlines the terms and conditions of the approval.

A "member", as defined in the *P.S.A.*, means a police officer, and in the case of a municipal police force includes an employee who is not a police officer. Therefore, both uniform and civilian employees are considered members covered under Section 49(1) of the *P.S.A.*

Auxiliary police officers are not covered under Section 49(1) of the *P.S.A.* or Service Procedure 14-25. Auxiliary police officers are volunteers, not employees of the Service.

The purpose of this report is to provide the number of members who have been approved for secondary activities in 2016.

Discussion:

During 2016, there were 32 new applications received from members requesting approval to engage in secondary activities. Of these 32 applications, 30 were approved and considered to not be in conflict with Section 49(1) of the *P.S.A.* Of the remaining two applications that were received in 2016, one was denied, and one was incomplete and returned to the member but was not subsequently resubmitted to Labour Relations for consideration. There are no outstanding applications to be processed.

The 2016 Annual Report on New Applications for Secondary Activity details the type of secondary activities requested, broken down by the number of applications received from uniform and civilian members.

2016 Annual Report

New Applications for Secondary Activity		
Type of Activity	**Number of Uniform Applications**	**Number of Civilian Applications**
Arts/Media		1
Business Services	5	4
Emergency Services	3	
Food and Beverage		
Health & Wellness	1	1
Political		
Real Estate	5	1
Residential Services		
Retail	1	1
Security		2
Social Services		
Sports Instructor	1	1
Teacher/Lecturer	2	3
TOTAL:	18	14

Given that members are only required to seek approval to engage in secondary activities when they believe the activity may place them in a conflict with Section 49(1) of the *P.S.A*, it is not possible to report the total number of members engaged in secondary activities.

Conclusion:

Members are required to request the approval of the Chief of Police to engage in secondary activities if the member believes the activity may place them in a conflict with Section 49(1) of the *P.S.A*.

The chart below outlines the number of approved applications for uniform and civilian members to engage in secondary activities for the last ten years. These members may or may not still be engaging in these activities.

Approved Secondary Activity Applications 2007 to 2016			
Year	Uniform	Civilian	Total
2007	44	8	52
2008	31	7	38
2009	30	8	38
2010	10	19	29
2011	13	20	33
2012	11	18	29
2013	14	7	21
2014	11	16	27
2015	16	19	35
2016	16	14	30

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

MS:DJ:aa

Annual Report - 2016 Secondary Activities.doc

APPENDIX A

14 – 25   Secondary Activities

| New | ☐ | Amended | ☐ | Reviewed – No Amendments | X |

| Issued: | R.O. 2016.02.08–0158 |

| Replaces: | R.O. 2015.02.12–0156 |

Rationale

Members may participate in secondary activities, provided such activities do not contravene Service Governance or S. 49 of the *Police Services Act* (PSA) entitled "Restrictions on secondary activities". This Procedure governs the process for requesting permission to participate in a secondary activity where participation in the secondary activity may contravene the PSA.

Governing Authorities

| Provincial | Police Services Act |

Associated Service Governance

Number	Name
TPSB Policy	Secondary Activities
Chapter 13	Conduct
18–19	Paid Duties

Forms

Number	Name	Authorization Level
TPS 649	Internal Correspondence	Member
TPS 778	Application for Secondary Activity	Chief of Police

Definitions

- Member
- Secondary Activity

Procedure

The Chief of Police shall have sole discretion to determine whether a member is permitted to engage in a secondary activity for which the member has applied for approval, with or without restrictions. Members

shall comply with the decision of the Chief of Police. The Chief of Police may rescind the decision permitting a secondary activity at any time if a member refuses to comply with a restriction imposed on the activity.

Members shall not engage in any secondary activity that adversely affects the performance of their duties as a member of the Toronto Police Service (Service).

Member

1.	Members shall submit a TPS 778 to their Unit Commander prior to engaging in a secondary activity which may contravene S. 49 of the PSA.

> **NOTE:** While members are not required to apply for approval to engage in a secondary activity unless the member believes that participation in the activity may contravene S. 49 of the PSA, members are expected to disclose the activity where any doubt exists. Non-disclosure in a case where disclosure was appropriate may lead to a conduct investigation.

2.	Members shall re-submit a TPS 778 when engaged in a previously approved secondary activity

- when the nature or scope of a secondary activity has changed and it may now contravene S. 49 of the PSA

- when the secondary activity changes in nature/scope of commitment (e.g., hours per week)

- when the member is reclassified from a civilian to a uniform position, or vice versa

- when the member is promoted or transferred to a position with different duties, including a permanent acting position

3.	Members shall not engage in any secondary activity while reported off duty due to sickness or injury.
4.	Members may engage in a secondary activity when suspended from duty with or without pay.
5.	When engaged in a paid secondary activity while suspended from duty with pay shall report all monetary benefits earned from the paid secondary activity during the period of suspension on a TPS 649 to the Unit Commander – Labour Relations.

> **NOTE:** Members shall contact Labour Relations for specific details on how this information is to be reported. Pursuant to ss. 89(7) of the PSA, while suspended from duty with pay, the member shall have their pay reduced by the amount of the monetary benefit earned from a paid secondary activity earned during the period of suspension.

Unit Commander

6.	Upon receipt of a TPS 778 shall

- review and complete the aplicable section

- ensure the TPS 778 is forwarded to the Unit Commander – Labour Relations

Unit Commander – Labour Relations

7.	Upon receipt of a TPS 778 shall

	• review the request in consultation with Professional Standards Support, as required

	• ensure the original TPS 778 is forwarded to the Office of the Chief, with recommendations

8.	Upon receipt of a signed TPS 778 from the Office of the Chief shall ensure it is forwarded to the member.

9.	Upon receipt of a TPS 649 pertaining to the monetary benefits earned from a paid secondary activity while suspended from duty with pay shall ensure it is forwarded to the Unit Commander – Accounting Services for processing.

Toronto Police Services Board Report

February 10, 2017

To: Chair and Members
              Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
              Chief of Police

Subject: Auxiliary Members – Termination of Appointments: January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that:
  (1) The Board terminate the appointments of 50 Auxiliary members who are identified in Appendix 'A' as they are no longer available to perform their duties due to resignation, retirement, or death; and
  (2) The Board notify the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional services about the termination of appointments of these 50 Auxiliary members.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendations contained in this report.

Background / Purpose:

Auxiliary members are governed by the *Police Services Act* (*P.S.A.*); Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1990; Policing Standards Guidelines; Board Policy T.P.S.B. A1-004; Toronto Police Service Governance; Standards of Conduct; and Service Procedure 14-20 entitled, "Auxiliary Members."

Under sections 52(1) of the *P.S.A.*, the Board is authorized to appoint and suspend, or terminate the appointment of Auxiliary members, subject to the approval of the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services (Minister) and with respect to the suspension or termination of the appointment of an Auxiliary member, section 52(2) of the *P.S.A.* states:

"If the Board suspends or terminates the appointment of an Auxiliary member of the police force, it shall promptly give the Solicitor General written notice of the suspension

or termination."

Discussion:

The terminations of appointments of the 50 Auxiliary members consist of 47 Auxiliary Police Constables, 2 Auxiliary Sergeants and 1 Auxiliary Inspector.

Conclusion:

In accordance with section 52(2) of the *P.S.A.,* please find the names of the 50 Auxiliary members set out in Appendix 'A', whose appointments were terminated during the period between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016, as they are no longer available to perform their duties due to resignation, retirement or death.

Deputy Chief Michael Federico, Community Safety Command, will be in attendance to answer to any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

Filename: Board Report – Aux Retirement Jan-Dec 2016.doc

APPENDIX "A"

AUXILIARY TERMINATIONS OF APPOINTMENTS
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2016 - DECEMBER 31, 2016

NO	SURNAME	G1	RANK	BADGE	UNIT	DATE	REASON
1	ASCANO	Reymundo	PC	51275	41	2016.01.12	Resignation
2	PARASSAKIS	Theodore Dino	PC	51874	DPSU	2016.01.15	Resignation
3	MONTAGUE	Zachary	PC	51832	14	2016.01.18	Resignation
4	MANLEY	Thomas	Insp	50262	DPSU	2016.01.22	Resignation
5	MIHALCEA	Anton	PC	51251	32	2016.02.05	Resignation
6	SMITH	Naomi	PC	51623	32	2016.02.09	Resignation
7	ESCOBAR-BELTRAN	Alfredo	PC	51785	22	2016.02.19	Resignation
8	GOULDING	David	PC	51387	43	2016.02.27	Resignation
9	KASSAM	Rahim	PC	51732	53	2016.02.29	Resignation
10	WOLBA	Veronica	PC	51714	43	2016.03.03	Resignation
11	LLOYD	Carys A	SGT	51345	52	2016.03.22	Resignation
12	MEDINA	Cesar	PC	51619	22	2016.03.22	Resignation
13	WARIKOO	Rajiv	PC	51749	52	2016.03.23	Resignation
14	CIRINNA	Giacomo	PC	51595	53	2016.03.30	Resignation
15	CURRELL	David	PC	51778	11	2016.03.31	Resignation
16	GOODMURPHY	Matthew	PC	51821	14	2016.04.10	Resignation
17	SALERNO	David	PC	51704	Marine	2016.04.10	Resignation
18	QAURTLY-FRIAR	Jonathan	PC	51681	Marine	2016.04.12	Resignation
19	RAYMOND	Carol	SGT	51091	43	2016.04.12	Resignation
20	GORDON	Alasdair	PC	51667	11	2016.05.27	Resignation
21	GREBER	Michelle	PC	51709	32	2016.05.27	Resignation
22	JEYARAJAH	Jayathepen	PC	51771	41	2016.06.07	Resignation
23	COUTINHO	Americo	PC	51807	22	2016.06.11	Resignation

24	KIM	Gina	PC	51435	32	2016.06.17	Resignation
25	FERREIRA	Ashley	PC	51765	41	2016.06.20	Resignation
26	GAN	Yuxuan	PC	51799	52	2016.06.20	Resignation
27	FERREIRA	Lisa	PC	51561	12	2016.06.30	Resignation
28	RIAR	Paranpreet	PC	51724	22	2016.07.05	Resignation
29	KHAN	Fatima	PC	51809	22	2016.07.20	Resignation
30	MULE	Olivia	PC	51728	Marine	2016.08.02	Resignation
31	DAVEY	Kenny	PC	51567	31	2016.08.12	Resignation
32	CYRUS	Nigel	PC	51631	55	2016.08.26	Resignation
33	MOODY	Michael	PC	51706	23	2016.09.17	Resignation
34	VAUGHAN	Bryan	PC	51746	41	2016.09.20	Resignation
35	ZHONG	Minle	PC	51730	53	2016.09.21	Resignation
36	ROBERTSON	Erin	PC	51373	33	2016.09.22	Resignation
37	KHADIM	Ajmal	PC	51791	54	2016.09.23	Resignation
38	MARTIN	Alexander	PC	51647	14	2016.10.03	Resignation
39	MORTON	Marcus	PC	51375	53	2016.10.26	Resignation
40	WELLS	Kendell	PC	51697	23	2016.10.27	Resignation
41	DARROCH	Henry	PC	51636	54	2016.11.06	Resignation
42	SAEED	Syed	PC	51660	31	2016.11.15	Resignation
43	SUSANANDAN	Seyon	PC	51773	51	2016.11.16	Resignation
44	CLARKE	Lindsay	PC	51795	23	2016.11.28	Resignation
45	NITHIYANANTHAN	Satsabesh	PC	51430	42	2016.11.28	Resignation
46	IQBAL	Rahila	PC	51829	32	2016.12.09	Resignation
47	SANDHU	Manpreet	PC	51887	33	2016.12.18	Resignation
48	HE	Yi Chen	PC	51522	33	2016.12.23	Resignation
49	SHAIKH	Ebrahim	PC	51620	12	2016.12.30	Resignation
50	TOOR	Inderpreet	PC	51659	12	2016.12.30	Resignation

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 1, 2017

To: Chair and Members
            Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
            Chief of Police

Subject: Labour Relations Counsel and Legal Indemnification: Cumulative Legal Costs from January 1 - December 31, 2016

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

The expenses outlined in this report are funded from the Legal Reserve (Reserve). In preparing the 2017 operating budget request, the Service took into account the balance of the Reserve and historical spending for legal costs in determining the required reserve contributions for 2017 that would maintain the financial health of the Reserve.

Background / Purpose:

At its meeting on April 16, 2015, the Board approved a motion to amend the Legal Indemnification policy to indicate that future reports will be submitted annually (as opposed to semi-annually), to coincide with the reporting of labour relations matters. (Min. No. P102/15 refers).

Discussion:

During the period of January 1 to December 31, 2016, 152 invoices for external labour relations counsel services totalling $191,572 were received and approved for payment by the Manager of Labour Relations. Four invoices totalling $8,889 were received and approved for payment to arbitrators presiding over grievances.

During the same period, 102 accounts from external counsel relating to legal indemnification were paid totalling $1,540,283. Four accounts from external counsel in relation to inquests were paid in the amount of $457,653, and no accounts were submitted for payment of a civil action suit.

Conclusion:

For the period of January 1 to December 31, 2016, the total legal costs for labour relations counsel services, arbitrators, legal indemnification claims and claims relating to inquests are totaled $2,198,397, and are broken down in the chart below.

Number	Type of Account Paid	2015 Costs Incurred
152	Payments for Labour Relations Counsel: 38 payments for labour relations counsel $79,163 1 payment for bargaining (T.P.A. & S.O.O.) $1,505 113 payments for W.S.I.B. case management $110,904	$191,572
4	Arbitration Costs related to Grievances: $8,889 4 payments for grievance activity	$8,889
102	Legal Indemnifications	$1,540,283
4	Inquests	$457,653
0	Civil Actions	$0
	Total Costs for 2016	**$2,198,397**

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

MS:DJ:dop

Board Report – Annual Report – 2016 Labour Relations Counsel and Legal Indemnification Costs.docx

Toronto Police Services Board Report

February 3, 2017

To: Chair and Members
             Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
             Chief of Police

Subject: Annual Report: 2017 Filing of Toronto Police Service Procedures

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive this report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

At its meeting on January 16, 2014, the Board approved a new Board policy entitled "Filing of Toronto Police Service Procedures" (Min. No. P5/14 refers). This Board policy directs, in part, that:

5. *On an annual basis, the Chief of Police will file with the Board for its information, the complete index of Service procedures, noting those procedures which arise from Board policies; and*
6. *Such filing will take place as part of a report submitted to the Board and included on a regular public meeting agenda.*

Discussion:

Professional Standards Support – Governance has reviewed all Service procedures for the purpose of updating the index of Service procedures. The attached Appendix A contains the complete index and notes those procedures which arise from Board policies. This index is current as of January 31, 2017. Any Service procedure governed by Board policy references the specific Board policy within the Associated Service

Governance section of the procedure.

Conclusion:

The attached Appendix A contains the complete index of Service procedures, noting those which arise from Board policies.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

MS: kc

Filename: 2017 Filing Service Procedures.docx

Attachments:

Appendix A – Index of Service Procedures

Appendix A – Index of Service Procedures

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
01-01	Arrest	YES
01-02	Search of Persons	YES
01-02 Appendix B	Risk Assessment – Level of Search	YES
01-02 Appendix C	Trans Persons	YES
01-02 Appendix D	Handling Items of Religious Significance	NO
01-03	Persons in Custody	YES
01-03 Appendix A	Medical Advisory Notes	YES
01-03 Appendix B	Cell and Prisoner Condition Checks	YES
01-03 Appendix C	Designated Lock-ups	YES
01-03 Appendix D	Booking Hall/Detention Area Monitoring	YES
01-03 Appendix E	Lodging of Trans Persons	YES
01-03 Appendix F	Privacy Shields	YES
01-05	Escape from Police Custody	YES
01-07	Identification of Criminals	YES
01-08	Criminal Code Release	NO
01-08 Appendix A	Appearance Notice (Form 9)	NO
01-08 Appendix B	Promise To Appear (Form 10)	NO
01-08 Appendix C	Recognizance Entered Into Before an Officer in Charge (Form 11)	NO
01-08 Appendix D	Undertaking Given to an Officer in Charge (Form 11.1)	NO
01-09	Criminal Summons	NO
01-10	Provincial Offences Act Releases	NO
01-15	Bail Hearings and Detention Orders	YES
01-15 Appendix A	Show Cause Brief	NO
01-15 Appendix B	Guidelines for Bail Conditions	NO
01-15 Appendix C	Guidelines for the Commencement of Revocation of Bail Process	NO
01-17	Detention Order (Provincial Offences Act)	NO
02-01	Arrest Warrants	YES
02-01 Appendix A	List of Arrest Warrant Forms	NO
02-01 Appendix B	Arrest Warrant Forms	NO
02-01 Appendix C	Forms to Obtain Bodily Substances, Prints or Impressions	NO
02-02	Warrants of Committal	NO
02-10	National Parole Warrants	YES
02-11	Provincial Parole Warrants	YES
02-12	Ontario Review Board Warrants and Dispositions	YES

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
02-13	Child Apprehension Warrants	YES
02-14	Civil Warrants	NO
02-14 Appendix A	Civil Warrant – Response	NO
02-15	Returning Prisoners on Warrants Held by Toronto Police Service	NO
02-15 Appendix A	Approval to Return Person in Canada on Criminal Code Warrants Held by Toronto Police Service	NO
02-15 Appendix B	Approval to Return Person on Warrants Held by Toronto Police Service	NO
02-17	Obtaining a Search Warrant	YES
02-18	Executing a Search Warrant	YES
02-19	Report to a Justice/Orders for Continued Detention	NO
02-19 Appendix A	Report to a Justice (Form 5.2) – Distribution Chart	NO
03-03	Correctional Facilities	YES
03-03 Appendix A	Correctional Facilities Admitting & Visiting Hours	NO
03-04	Outstanding Charges/Warrants of Committal for Incarcerated Persons	NO
03-05	Withdrawal Management Centres	NO
03-06	Guarding Persons in Hospital	YES
03-07	Meal Provision for Persons in Custody	YES
03-08	Community Correctional Centres & Community Residential Facilities	NO
03-09	Bail Reporting	NO
04-01	Investigations at Hospitals	NO
04-02	Death Investigations	YES
04-03	Use of Photo Line-Ups for Eyewitness Identification	NO
04-05	Missing Persons	YES
04-06	Building Checks and Searches	YES
04-07	Alarm Response	NO
04-09	American Sign Language and Language Interpreters	YES
04-10	Passports	NO
04-11	Persons Seeking Asylum	NO
04-12	Diplomatic and Consular Immunity	NO
04-12 Appendix A	Identity Cards	NO
04-12 Appendix B	Summary of Law Enforcement Measures	NO
04-13	Foreign Nationals	NO
04-14	Regulated Interactions	YES
04-15	Obtaining Video/Electronic Recordings from the Toronto Transit Commission	YES
04-16	Death in Police Custody	YES

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
04-17	Rewards	NO
04-18	Crime and Disorder Management	YES
04-18 Appendix A	Guidelines for Divisional Crime Management	YES
04-18 Appendix B	Guidelines: Problem Solving	YES
04-18 Appendix C	Community Partnerships	YES
04-18 Appendix D	Divisional Deployment	YES
04-18 Appendix E	Crime Analysis	YES
04-18 Appendix F	Strategy Management – Business Intelligence & Analytics	YES
04-18 Appendix G	Duties of a Police Officer – Subsection 42(1) *Police Services Act*	NO
04-19	Surveillance	YES
04-20	Electronic Surveillance	YES
04-21	Gathering/Preserving Evidence	YES
04-22	Polygraph Examinations	NO
04-23	Marine Response	YES
04-24	Victim Impact Statements	YES
04-25	Foreign Inquiries/Investigations/Extradition Requests	YES
04-26	Security Offences Act	YES
04-27	Use of Police Dog Services	YES
04-28	Crime Stoppers	NO
04-29	Parolees	YES
04-30	Scenes of Crime Officer (SOCO)	YES
04-31	Victim Services Toronto	YES
04-32	Electronically Recorded Statements	YES
04-32 Appendix A	Guidelines for the Sworn Statement Caution (KGB Caution)	NO
04-33	Lawful Justification	NO
04-34	Attendance at Social Agencies	NO
04-35	Source Management – Confidential Source	YES
04-35 Appendix A	Source Management – Payment Requests	NO
04-35 Appendix B	Source Management – Crown Letters	YES
04-36	Agents	YES
04-36 Appendix A	Agents – Crown Letters	YES
04-37	Witness Assistance & Relocation Program (WARP)	YES
04-38	Intelligence Services	YES
04-39	Joint Forces Operations	YES
04-40	Major Incident Rapid Response Team	NO
04-41	Youth Crime Investigations	YES

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
04-41 Appendix A	Class of Offences and Recommended Dispositions	NO
04-41 Appendix B	STOP – Serious Teen Offender Program	NO
04-41 Appendix C	Under 12 – Centralized Services Protocol	NO
04-42	Non-Emergency Primary Report Intake	NO
04-43	Burial Permits	NO
04-44	Undercover Operations	YES
04-45	Internet Facilitated Investigations	NO
04-46	Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)	YES
04-46 Appendix A	Site Selection Process - CCTV/RDCCTV	NO
Ch. 5 Appendix A	Excerpt from Guideline LE–029 – Preventing or Responding to Occurrences Involving Firearms	NO
05-01	Preliminary Homicide Investigation	YES
05-01 Appendix A	Investigation Questionnaire: Pediatric Injury	NO
05-01 Appendix B	Investigation Questionnaire for Sudden Unexpected Deaths in Infants	NO
05-02	Robberies/Hold-ups	YES
05-03	Break and Enter	YES
05-04	Domestic Violence	YES
05-05	Sexual Assault	YES
05-05 Appendix A	Third Party Records	YES
05-06	Child Abuse	YES
05-06 Appendix A	Subsections 72(1)(1.1)(2)(3) of the *Child and Family Services Act*	NO
05-06 Appendix B	Centre for Forensic Sciences - Police Submission Guidelines	NO
05-07	Fire Investigations	NO
05-08	Criminal Writings	YES
05-09	Tampering or Sabotage of Food, Drugs, Cosmetics or Medical Devices	NO
05-10	Threatening/Harassing Telephone Calls	YES
05-11	Fail to Comply/Fail to Appear	NO
05-12	Counterfeit Money	NO
05-13	Breach of Conditional Sentence	NO
05-14	Immigration Violations	NO
05-15	Asset Forfeiture Investigations	YES
05-16	Hate/Bias Crime	YES
05-17	Gambling Investigations	YES
05-18	Fraudulent Payment Cards	YES
05-19	Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System	YES
05-21	Firearms	YES

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
05-22	Abuse of Older or Vulnerable Persons	YES
05-22 Appendix A	Older and Vulnerable Person Abuse Investigations – Contact Information	YES
05-23	Financial Crime Investigations	YES
05-24	Child Exploitation	YES
05-25	Pawnbrokers and Second Hand Dealers	YES
05-26	Child Abductions	YES
05-27	Criminal Harassment	YES
05-27 Appendix A	Specialized Criminal Investigations – Sex Crimes – Behavioural Assessment Section	NO
05-27 Appendix B	Excerpt from LE–028 – Criminal Harassment	NO
05-28	Gang Related Investigations	NO
05-29	Sex Offender Registry	YES
05-30	Major Drug Investigations	YES
05-31	Human Trafficking	YES
05-32	Kidnapping	YES
06-01	Commencing POA Proceedings	YES
06-02	Withdrawal of a Provincial Offences Act Charge	NO
06-03	Prosecuting Business Establishments	NO
06-04	Emotionally Disturbed Persons	YES
06-04 Appendix A	Quick Reference Guide for Police Officers – Emotionally Disturbed Persons	NO
06-04 Appendix B	Designated Psychiatric Facilities	NO
06-05	Elopees and Community Treatment Orders	YES
06-06	Apprehension Orders	YES
06-07	Restraining Orders	YES
06-08	Orders for Exclusive Possession of a Matrimonial Home	NO
06-09	Animal Control	NO
06-10	Landlord and Tenant Disputes	NO
06-11	Licenced Premises	YES
06-12	Municipal Licensing & Standards/Toronto Licensing Tribunal	NO
07-01	Transportation Collisions	YES
07-02	Fail to Remain Collisions	YES
07-03	Life Threatening Injury/Fatal Collisions	YES
07-04	Railway Collisions	YES
07-04 Appendix A	Rail Accident Protocol	NO
07-04 Appendix B	Canadian Rail Incident Investigation Guideline	NO
07-05	Service Vehicle Collisions	YES
07-06	Ability Impaired/Over 80 – Investigation	YES

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
07-06 Appendix A	Ability Impaired/Over 80 Summary Chart	NO
07-06 Appendix B	Quick Chart – Administrative Suspensions & Impoundments under the HTA	NO
07-07	Ability Impaired/Over 80 – Hospital Investigation	YES
07-08	Approved Screening Device	YES
07-08 Appendix A	Approved Screening Device Summary Chart – First Breath Analysis	NO
07-08 Appendix B	Second Breath Analysis Instructions	NO
07-09	Breath Interview	NO
07-10	Speed Enforcement	YES
07-11	Impounding/Relocating Vehicles	YES
07-11 Appendix A	Divisional Chart for Forensic Exam Vehicle Impound	NO
07-12	Theft of Vehicles	YES
07-12 Appendix A	Letter of Direction	NO
07-13	Unsafe Vehicles	YES
07-14	Parking Infraction Notice	NO
07-15	Drug Recognition Expert Evaluations and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing	YES
07-18	RIDE Program	YES
07-19	Suspended/Disqualified Driving	NO
07-19 Appendix A	Administrative Suspensions & Impoundments Under the HTA	NO
07-20	Licence Plates/Accessible Parking Permits	NO
08-01	Employee and Family Assistance Program (EFAP)	YES
08-02	Sickness Reporting	NO
08-03	Injured on Duty Reporting	NO
08-04	Members Involved in a Traumatic Critical Incident	NO
08-04 Appendix A	Critical Incident Stress Handout	NO
08-04 Appendix B	Guidelines for the Support and Assistance of Affected Members	NO
08-04 Appendix C	Critical Incident Response Team / Peer Support Volunteers Flow Chart	NO
08-05	Substance Abuse	NO
08-06	Hazardous Materials, Decontamination and De-infestation	YES
08-07	Communicable Diseases	YES
08-08	Central Sick Leave Bank	NO
08-09	Workplace Safety	YES
08-10	External Threats Against Service Members	NO
08-11	Workplace Violence	YES
08-12	Workplace Harassment	YES

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
08-13	Workplace Accommodation - Medical	YES
09-01	Property – General	YES
09-02	Property – Vehicles	YES
09-03	Property – Firearms	YES
09-04	Narcotics and Drugs	YES
09-05	Property – Liquor	YES
09-06	Property of Persons in Custody	YES
Ch. 10 Appendix A	Incident Management System Organizational Chart	YES
Ch. 10 Appendix B	Containment & Perimeter Control	YES
10-01	Emergency Incident Response	YES
10-02	Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials	NO
10-03	Bomb Threats and Explosions	YES
10-03 Appendix A	Explosive Device Safe Standoff Distance Chart	NO
10-04	Nuclear Facility Emergencies	NO
10-04 Appendix A	Notification Protocols	NO
10-04 Appendix B	Nuclear Safety Status Zones	NO
10-05	Incidents Requiring the Emergency Task Force	YES
10-06	Medical Emergencies	NO
10-07	Industrial Accidents	NO
10-08	Chemical / Biological / Radiological / Nuclear Agents Events	YES
10-09	Evacuations	NO
10-10	Emergencies and Pursuits on TTC Property	YES
10-11	Clandestine Laboratories and Marihuana Grow Operations	NO
10-12	Counter–Terrorism	YES
10-13	Threats to School Safety	NO
10-14	Public Health Emergencies/Pandemic Response	YES
11-01	Emergency Management & Public Order Response	YES
11-03	Police Response at Labour Disputes	YES
11-04	Protests and Demonstrations	YES
11-05	Major Disturbances at Detention Centres	NO
11-06	Labour Disputes at Detention Centres	YES
11-07	Special Events	YES
11-08	Use of Mounted Section	NO
12-01	Confidential Crown Envelope	NO
12-02	Court Attendance	NO
12-03	Use of Affidavits	NO

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
12-04	Unserved Criminal Summons	NO
12-05	Request to Withdraw Criminal Charge	NO
12-06	Coroner's Inquest	NO
12-08	Disclosure, Duplication and Transcription	NO
12-09	Request for Adjournment	NO
12-10	Re-laying Charges and Appeal Notices	NO
12-11	High Risk Security Court Appearances	YES
Ch. 13 Appendix A	Unit Level Criteria / Conduct Penalties	YES
Ch. 13 Appendix B	Chief's Advisory Committee	NO
Ch. 13 Appendix C	Progressive Discipline	NO
Ch. 13 Appendix F	Notification for Legal Indemnification Time Limit	YES
Ch. 13 Appendix G	Expunge Police Services Act Conviction	YES
13-01	Awards	YES
13-02	Uniform External Complaint Intake/Management	YES
13-03	Uniform Internal Complaint Intake/Management	NO
13-04	Uniform Unit Level Discipline	YES
13-05	Police Services Act Hearings	YES
13-06	Uniform Complaint Withdrawal	NO
13-07	Policy/Services Provided Complaints	YES
13-08	Uniform Suspension from Duty	NO
13-09	Civilian Complaint and Discipline Process	YES
13-10	Civilian Suspension from Duty	NO
13-11	Unsatisfactory Work Performance	NO
13-12	Legal Indemnification	YES
13-13	Civil Documents	YES
13-14	Human Rights	YES
13-16	Special Investigations Unit	NO
13-17	Memorandum Books and Reports	YES
13-18	Anonymous Reporting of Discreditable Conduct	YES
13-19	Breath Test for Service Members	NO
13-20	Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities	YES
14-01	Skills Development and Learning Plan - Uniform	YES
14-02	Evaluations, Reclassifications and Appraisals	YES
14-02 Appendix A	Appraisal Process – Uniform	YES
14-02 Appendix B	Evaluation Process - Civilian	YES
14-03	Probationary Constable / Field Training	YES

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
14-04	Acting Assignments	NO
14-06	School Crossing Guards	NO
14-07	Changes to Uniform and Civilian Establishment	YES
14-08	Request to Fill Established Positions and Hire Part-Time or Temporary Staff	NO
14-09	Civilian Transfer, Reclassification and Promotion	YES
14-10	Uniform Promotion Process – up to & Including the Rank of Inspector	YES
14-11	Uniform Promotion Process to S/Inspector, Superintendent & S/Superintendent	YES
14-12	Voluntary Lieu Time Donations	NO
14-13	Contract Persons & Consultants	YES
14-14	Termination of Employment	NO
14-15	Secondments	YES
14-17	Detective Classification and Plainclothes Assignment	NO
14-18	Internal Support Networks (ISN)	YES
14-19	Workplace Accommodation - Non Medical	YES
14-20	Auxiliary Members	YES
14-21	WPPD – Senior Officers	NO
14-22	Conflict of Interest Involving Related Members	NO
14-23	Attendance at Special Activities	NO
14-24	Police Officers Reclassified to Civilian Senior Officer Positions	NO
14-25	Secondary Activities	YES
14-26	Leaves of Absence	YES
14-27	Bereavement Leave & Funeral Entitlements	NO
14-28	Attendance at Competitions or Events	YES
14-29	Change in Personal Information	NO
14-30	Re-Employment of Former Members and Lateral Entries	YES
14-30 Appendix A	Criteria: Hiring Levels and Training Requirements	YES
14-31	Members Serving on Boards/Committees	YES
14-32	Crime Prevention	YES
14-33	Social Functions & Community Events	YES
14-34	Transfer – Police Officer	NO
14-35	Special Constables	NO
14-36	Participation in a Learning Opportunity	NO
15-01	Use of Force	YES
15-01 Appendix A	Provincial Use of Force Model	NO
15-01 Appendix B	Provincial Use of Force Model Background	NO

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
	Information	
15-02	Injury/Illness Reporting	YES
15-03	Service Firearms	YES
15-04	C-8 Rifle	YES
15-05	Shotgun	YES
15-06	Less Lethal Shotguns	YES
15-07	Use of Authorized Range	NO
15-08	MP5 Submachine Gun	YES
15-09	Conducted Energy Weapon	YES
15-10	Suspect Apprehension Pursuits	YES
15-11	Use of Service Vehicles	YES
15-12	Inspection of Service Vehicles and Equipment	YES
15-13	Requests for Loan Vehicles	NO
15-14	Fuel and Oil	YES
15-15	Shared Equipment	YES
15-16	Uniform, Equipment and Appearance Standards	YES
15-16 Appendix A	Uniformed Command Officers and Uniformed Senior Officers	NO
15-16 Appendix B	Police Constable to Staff Sergeant	NO
15-16 Appendix C	Uniformed Civilian Members	NO
15-16 Appendix D	Auxiliary Members and Volunteers	YES
15-16 Appendix E	Officers – Specialized Functions	NO
15-16 Appendix F	Appearance Standards – Officers and Civilian Uniformed Members	NO
15-16 Appendix G	Wearing of Decorations and Medals	NO
15-16 Appendix H	Wearing of Name Badges	YES
15-17	In–Car Camera System	NO
15-18	Secure Laptop	NO
15-19	Soft Body Armour	NO
16-01	Service and Legislative Governance and Legal Agreements	YES
16-01 Appendix A	Routine Order Approval and Publication Process	NO
16-03	Forms Management	NO
16-06	Audit and Quality Assurance Process	YES
16-06 Appendix A	Process for Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services Inspections of the Toronto Police Service	YES
16-06 Appendix B	City of Toronto Auditor General Report and Follow-up Recommendation Process	YES
16-06 Appendix C	City of Toronto Internal Audit Division Report and Follow-up Recommendation Process	YES

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
16-07	Collection and/or Use and/or Reporting of Statistics Related to Prohibited Grounds	YES
17-01	News Media	YES
17-01 Appendix A	Sample News Release	NO
17-03	Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act	NO
17-04	Community/Public Safety Notification	YES
17-04 Appendix A	Disclosure of Personal Information	YES
17-04 Appendix B	Occurrences where Public Warning/Notification and Consultation with BAS be Considered	YES
17-04 Appendix C	Protocol for Public Notification	YES
17-05	Correspondence and File Management	YES
17-05 Appendix A	Unit Commander File Index	YES
17-06	CPIC Purge List	YES
17-07	BOLOs and FYIs	YES
17-08	Use of Special Address System	YES
17-09	Use of the Service Image	YES
1710	Internet	NO
17-11	Toronto Police Service Intranet (TPSnet)	NO
17-12	Service Communication Systems	YES
17-13	Social Media	NO
18-01	Covert Credit Cards	NO
18-02	Transfer of Funds	NO
18-03	Requests for Goods and/or Services	NO
18-04	Third Party Claims for Damage to or Loss of Private Property	NO
18-05	Reimbursement for Damaged or Soiled Personal Items and Clothing	NO
18-06	Flashroll	NO
18-07	329 Fund	YES
18-08	Donations	YES
18-09	Service Seminars	NO
18-10	Collection of Overpayments	NO
18-11	Lieu Time – Negative Balance	NO
18-12	Membership in Professional and Occupational Associations	NO
18-13	Authorization and Expense Reimbursement for Service Business Travel	NO
18-13 Appendix A	Authorization Limits and Required Signatures	NO
18-13 Appendix B	Expense Allowances	NO
18-14	Authorization and Expense Reimbursement for Service Training	NO

Procedure Number	Procedure Name	Governed by Board Policy
18-14 Appendix A	Authorization Limits and Required Signatures	NO
18-14 Appendix B	Expense Allowances	NO
18-15	Shared Resources	NO
18-16	Use of Revenue	NO
18-17	Corporate Credit Cards	NO
18-17 Appendix A	Expenditures Authorized for Payment with a Corporate Credit Card	NO
18-18	Business Expenses	NO
18-18 Appendix A	Examples of Appropriate Business Expenses	NO
18-19	Paid Duties	NO
18-20	Paid Duties at Commercial Filming Locations	NO
19-01	Fire Safety Plans	NO
19-02	Service Facilities	YES
19-02 Appendix A	Notice	NO
19-02 Appendix B	Parking Access - Personal Vehicles	NO
19-03	Police Headquarters	NO
19-03 Appendix A	Parking Access - Private Vehicles of Members	NO
19-09	Off Site Police Facilities	NO
19-10	Unit Operational Continuity Plan	YES

Table 1 Index of Service Procedures

Toronto Police Services Board Report

February 8, 2017

To: Chair and Members
           Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
           Chief of Police

Subject: Response to City Council Motions – Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that:

   (1) the Board receive this report for information; and

   (2) the Board forward a copy of this report to the City Manager.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendations contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

At its meetings on December 9 and 10, 2015, Toronto City Council (Council) reaffirmed its commitment that the City of Toronto should provide all Torontonians, including undocumented Torontonians, access to City services without proof of citizen status.

At its meeting on February 24, 2016, the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) received a report entitled "City Council Motions – Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians" (Min. No. P31/16 refers). This report summarized the motions adopted by Council at its meetings of December 9 and 10, 2015, of which 4 motions were directed to the Toronto Police Service (Service) (See attached – Appendix A "TPSB Meeting Minute P31/2016").

Discussion:

The Service's primary mandate is not the enforcement of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (I.R.P.A.). The Service only takes an interest in I.R.P.A. violations when it overlaps with the Service's mission to keep Toronto the best and safest place to be.

The Service is aware that other government agencies use immigration information to support their mandates. It is not for the Service to make comment on their use of this information or on any broader public policy issues outside of the Service's mandate.

Response to the City Council Motions:

Motion #1

> *City Council direct City divisions, agencies and corporations (including the Toronto Police Service) to review their approaches to customer service and direct staff to use the Access T.O. resource materials to ensure they provide accurate and helpful customer service consistent with Council's commitment to access to City services for undocumented Torontonians.*

The Service recognizes the importance of delivering an excellent customer experience when the community requires police services. To that end, the Service established a Customer Service Excellence Unit in 2014 in part to assist in identifying areas for improvement with a focus on instilling a customer oriented culture within the Service.

The Service also recognizes that customer service training is important for improving service to the community. Components of customer service best practices are currently included in the In-Service Training Program which is mandatory for all police officers. Improved customer service has been implemented through the Transformational Task Force recommendations.

The Toronto Police College (T.P.C.) incorporates training on the delivery of professional and bias free service. A one day course entitled "Fair and Impartial Policing" was mandatory for all police officers in 2015. Further, specific training on immigration status is addressed in the "Sexual Assault Investigators" and "Domestic Violence Investigators" courses. In these, training directs members to conduct investigations regardless of immigration status and not to ask the immigration status of victims and witnesses of crime unless there are bona fide reasons to do so. All course content reinforces professional, appropriate, and respectful behaviour standards.

The Service makes available comprehensive pamphlets and websites to inform community members on city policing. Additionally, the Service regularly refers community members to the Access T.O. website so they can benefit from City services.

All members of the community have access to bias-free policing services, regardless of their immigration status. The Service will continue to assist all persons looking for City support services by directing them to the Access T.O. website. The Service will reinforce this commitment to all members by way of a Routine Order issued by the Chief of Police.

Motion #2a

> *City Council request the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to work with the Toronto Police Service to clarify and articulate police procedures to ensure victims and witnesses of crime will not be asked about their immigration status.*

Various pieces of Service Governance direct members not to ask the immigration status of victims and witnesses of crime. The Board policy entitled "Victims and Witnesses without Legal Status" has provided the direction for Service Governance on this topic. This Board policy has been adopted in both the Standards of Conduct (Standards) and Service Procedures. Further, Service Governance Definitions makes clear the bona fide reasons for asking a person about their immigration status. The following are the related Standards of Conduct, and Procedures:

1. Standards of Conduct

The Standards outline the ethical behaviour expected of all members. The Standards are interpreted as being in addition to, and not in derogation of, any power, jurisdiction, or authority that may be exercised under the provisions of any statute or regulation.

Section 1.35 entitled "Persons Without Status" directs that:

> *Victims and witnesses of crime shall not be asked their immigration status, unless there are bona fide reasons to do so.*

2. Service Procedures

Service Procedures are written direction from the Chief of Police setting out the mandatory and discretionary actions and processes for all members of the Service.

Service Procedures 04-31 entitled "Victim Services Toronto" and 05-04 entitled "Domestic Violence" directs that:

> *Victims and witnesses of crime shall not be asked their immigration status, unless there are bona fide reasons to do so.*

Motion #2b

> *City Council request the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to work with the Toronto Police Service to clarify and articulate the bona fide law enforcement reasons that would require the Toronto Police Service to ask about immigration status.*

The Service maintains a listing of Governance Definitions that are prepared and maintained in consult with Service subject matter experts and which apply to all Service Governance. The term "bona fide reasons" has been defined in Service Governance Definitions to mean:

- a victim or witness who may possibly require or may seek admission into the Provincial Witness Protection Program;
- a Crown Attorney requesting information for disclosure purposes;
- information that is necessary to prove essential elements of an offence, or;
- investigations where the circumstances make it clear that it is essential to public or officer safety and security to ascertain the immigration status of a victim or witness.

The term "bona fide reasons" is referenced in Standards of Conduct 1.35, Procedure 04-31 "Victim Services Toronto", and Procedure 05-04 "Domestic Violence".

Motion #2c

> *City Council request the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to work with the Toronto Police Service to clarify and articulate police mechanisms to encourage victims and witnesses of crime to come forward without fear of exposing their status.*

The Service relies on members of the community to report crimes in order to help keep Toronto the best and safest place to be. To that end, the Service uses Governance, Communications Services policies, training initiatives, social media engagement, and Crime Stoppers Toronto to encourage victims and witnesses of crime to come forward without fear of exposing their immigration status.

1. Service-wide Governance

Please refer to the previous response in Motion 2a.

2. Communications Services Policies

Communications Services facilitates access to emergency services for the public and creates calls for service for police officer response. As part of the commitment to

ensuring public access to emergency services, Communications Services does not ask callers for their immigration status and does not disclose information to the Canada Border Services Agency (C.B.S.A.). This commitment is confirmed in Communications Services Unit Specific Policy C05-04 which directs members as follows:

> *Victims and witnesses of crime shall not be asked their immigration status, unless there are bona fide reasons to do so.*

Communications Services continues to dispatch over 800,000 events per year since 2011, and continues to increase the use of the Language Line Services for callers requiring service in a language other than English. These numbers demonstrate the community's continued confidence in contacting the police for service without fear.

3. Training Initiatives

The Divisional Policing Support Unit (D.P.S.U.) is committed to developing, enhancing, and maintaining community partnerships through the practical application of community mobilization principles. In that regard, internal training, external presentations, information sessions, and community outreach programs are made available by D.P.S.U. A variety of community policing topics are covered, including contacting the police without fear. Similar sessions are available to officers working specifically in a community capacity, including: Neighbourhood Officers, Crime Prevention Officers, Community Relation Officers, School Resource Officers, Community School Liaison Officers, and members of the Mobile Crisis Intervention teams.

Through D.P.S.U., the Service is active in the *Furthering Our Community by Uniting Services* (F.O.C.U.S.) Toronto initiative. The F.O.C.U.S. initiative brings together existing community agencies to reduce crime, victimization, and improve community resiliency and well-being. Currently, the Service is engaged in 4 F.O.C.U.S. tables through 14, 23, 42, and 51 Divisions.

Further, the Service has created the Community Police Academy. This 8-week course, in conjunction with Humber College, teaches members of the public about policing in Toronto, community safety, and crime prevention. The Academy seeks to inform the community about policing and to impart an understanding of how the public can partner with the Service to keep communities safe. Information about the Community Police Academy can be found on the Service's home page at https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/police-academy/.

4. Social Media Engagement

The Service has created a central information website to provide reliable links to resources for victims and witnesses of crime. This site, entitled "T.P.S. Connects" (available at http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tpsconnects/), contains links to support

victims and witnesses of crime, and aims to encourage the community to contact police without fear.

5. Crime Stoppers Toronto

Crime Stoppers Toronto is a partnership between the public, police and media that provides the community with a proactive program for people to assist the police anonymously to solve crimes.

Motion #3a

> *City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Chief of Police, Toronto Police Service to provide data on the number of times a person was investigated, reported or arrested on an offence related to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (I.R.P.A.).*

The Service attended over a combined total of 1.7 million calls for service and vehicle stops, and generated over 747,000 general occurrences (G.O.'s) for 2014 – 2016. A total of 684 G.O.'s note the I.R.P.A. as a significant component, representing 0.09% of all G.O.'s and 0.04% of all calls for service and vehicle stops over 2014-2016. The majority of these stem from investigations into an unrelated offence or infraction, whereby the I.R.P.A. infraction is discovered as a secondary component because of investigation into the initial offence. The initial investigation type attributed to these G.O.'s include: vehicle stop, arrest, check address, unknown trouble, domestic, wanted person, and unwanted guest.

Further, of the G.O.'s noting an I.R.P.A. component, 25% are attributed to enforcement by the Repeat Offenders Parole Enforcement, Bail & Parole, and Fugitive Squad units. These units work with the C.B.S.A. to execute existing warrants and to locate persons wanted under the I.R.P.A. The criminal backgrounds of persons arrested under the I.R.P.A. have included:

- major frauds
- drugs
- assaults
- firearms
- robberies
- sexual assaults
- murder

Overall, the following scenarios detail why the I.R.P.A. may be listed as one of the violations within a G.O. and why an officer may contact the C.B.S.A. to obtain immigration information:

- bona fide reasons exist to determine a person's immigration status;
- an arrested person readily admits they are in Canada without status;
- the execution of an existing warrant, or;
- immigration details arise through the lawful course of an investigation.

Motion #3b

City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Chief of Police, Toronto Police Service to report on the implications of developing a protocol between the Toronto Police Service and the Canadian Border Security Agency regarding sharing of personal information including a person's immigration and/or residence status.

The sharing of personal information between the Service and the C.B.S.A. is governed by the *Police Services Act* (P.S.A.), the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (M.F.I.P.P.A.), and the I.R.P.A. As a result of the existing legislative and regulatory framework, and the obligation to support the mandate of law enforcement agencies like the C.B.S.A., the Service is duty-bound to share information with the C.B.S.A. As such, a protocol between the Service and C.B.S.A. is not required.

The P.S.A. and M.F.I.P.P.A. both provide authorization for police officers to proactively assist the C.B.S.A. with personal information about persons under investigation, charged and/or convicted of serious *Criminal Code* (C.C.) and *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act* (C.D.S.A.) violations. The I.R.P.A. directs when police officers are legally obliged to act as peace officers under the Act and the reasons for which a person might be found inadmissible.

1. Police Services Act (P.S.A.)

The P.S.A. (ss. 5 O. Reg. 265/98) permits disclosure of personal information between police and the C.B.S.A. as follows:

5. (1) A chief of police or his or her designate may disclose any personal information about an individual if the individual is under investigation of, is charged with or is convicted or found guilty of an offence under the Criminal Code (Canada), the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Canada) or any other federal or provincial Act to,
(a) any police force in Canada;
(b) any correctional or parole authority in Canada; or
(c) any person or agency engaged in the protection of the public, the administration of justice or the enforcement of or compliance with any federal or provincial Act, regulation or government program. O. Reg. 265/98, s. 5 (1).

5. (2) Subsection (1) applies if the individual is under investigation of, is charged with or is convicted or found guilty of an offence under the Criminal Code (Canada), the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Canada) or any other federal or provincial Act and if the circumstances are such that disclosure is required for the protection of the public, the administration of justice or the enforcement of or compliance with any federal or provincial Act, regulation or government program. O. Reg. 265/98, s. 5 (2).

2. Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (M.F.I.P.P.A.)

The M.F.I.P.P.A. (S. 32 (f) and S. 32 (g)) permits disclosure of personal information between police and the C.B.S.A. as follows:

32. An institution shall not disclose personal information in its custody or under its control except,
(f) if disclosure is by a law enforcement institution,
>   *(i) to a law enforcement agency in a foreign country under an arrangement, a written agreement or treaty or legislative authority, or*
>   *(ii) to another law enforcement agency in Canada;*
(g) if disclosure is to an institution or a law enforcement agency in Canada to aid an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result

3. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (I.R.P.A.)

The I.R.P.A. (S. 82.2, S. 142, and S. 143) governs when police officers are legally obliged to act, as peace officers under the Act, as follows:

82.2 (1) A peace officer may arrest and detain a person released under section 82 or 82.1 if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has contravened or is about to contravene any condition applicable to their release.

82.2 (2) The peace officer shall bring the person before a judge within 48 hours after the detention begins

142. Every peace officer and every person in immediate charge or control of an immigrant station shall, when so directed by an officer, execute any warrant or written order issued under this Act for the arrest, detention or removal from Canada of any permanent resident or foreign national.

143. A warrant issued or an order to detain made under this Act is, notwithstanding any other law, sufficient authority to the person to whom it is addressed or who may receive and execute it to arrest and detain the person with respect to whom the warrant or order was issued or made.

Further, the I.R.P.A. provides the fact basis for those persons who might be found inadmissible to Canada. The Service is interested and responsive to the following reasons for inadmissibility detailed in the I.R.P.A. (S. 34-37):

- security
- human or international rights violations
- serious criminality
- organized criminality

Finally, the Service, as a member of the law enforcement and public security community, respects and supports the mandate of other law enforcement agencies, like the C.B.S.A.

Through this collective grouping of legislation and the obligation to support the C.B.S.A.'s mandate, the Service is duty-bound to share personal information with the C.B.S.A. The Service is satisfied that the existing legislative and regulatory framework is adequate to ensure a lawful and bias-free relationship with the C.B.S.A. with regards to information sharing.

Motion #3c

> *City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Chief of Police, Toronto Police Service to review Service Procedure 02-01 to made [sic] a distinction between immigration warrants and other arrest warrants, in order to ensure the access without fear policy is implemented appropriately.*

Procedure 02-01 entitled "Arrest Warrants" has been amended to include specific direction to members on the handling of immigration warrants and contains reference to the applicable sections under the I.R.P.A.

Motion #4a

> *City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Chief of Police to consider expanding the existing "Don't Ask" provision as follows: expand "Don't Ask" beyond victims and witnesses to include all encounters with police unless there is a warrant for the person's arrest or unless there has been an arrest.*

All Service Governance related to the existing "Don't Ask" provision is governed by the Board policy entitled "Victims and Witnesses without Legal Status", approved by the Board at its meeting on May 18, 2006 (Min. No. P140/06 refers). This Board policy was developed through extensive stakeholder consultation with the community, Service subject matter and legal experts, external North American policing agencies, the Ministry of the Attorney General, the C.B.S.A., the Toronto District School Board, and

both the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.

There are limitations to expanding the "*Don't Ask"* provision to *Persons of Interest, Suspects,* and *Accused* due to the nature of their status in an investigation and it's bearing on their progress through the criminal justice system. Officers gather extensive information on these classifications of persons related to the facts of an arrest, investigation, and related significant events. Gathering of this information is consistent with: the direction contained within Service Governance; training provided by the Ontario Police College, Canadian Police College, and the T.P.C., and; Judicial expectations, including Crown and Defence counsel, Judges and Justices of the Peace, and members of the Jury.

These classifications of persons are defined as follows:

- *Person of Interest* - a person whose background, relationship to the victim, or the opportunity to commit the offence(s) warrants further investigation, but no evidence currently exists to suggest culpability in the commission of the offence.

- S*uspect* - a person of interest whom investigators believe had culpability in the commission of the offence(s) based on the evidence.

- *Accused* - a person who has been charged with a Criminal offence (or Criminal Code or Other Federal Statute Offence).

During the course of an investigation, it may become known if a person has contravened the I.R.P.A. For example, in the case of a motor vehicle stop, the interaction with the driver begins with an infraction observed by the officer. The driver has an obligation under the Highway Traffic Act (H.T.A.) to identify themselves. During the initial phase of the interaction the driver would be classified as a *person of interest* or *suspect*. The driver will be classified as an *accused* if charges are laid following the investigation. The officer has an obligation to thoroughly investigate, including checking the vehicle licence plate and driver information in both Service and multi-agency data systems, such as the Canadian Police Information Centre (C.P.I.C). During this data check, details about the vehicle and the driver become known to the officer, including any I.R.P.A. warrants issued by the C.B.S.A. If the data check shows the driver to have an outstanding arrest warrant under the I.R.P.A. the officer is duty-bound to notify the C.B.S.A.

Notwithstanding the above, there is another group of persons known as *Uninvolved. Uninvolved* persons have no verified involvement in an ongoing investigation that would lead an officer to believe they are a victim, witness, person of interest, suspect, or accused. It is reasonable to extend the *'Don't Ask'* provision to *uninvolved* persons. The Service will work with the Board to update related policies and Governance.

Motion #4b

> *City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Chief of Police to consider expanding the existing "Don't Ask" provision as follows: undertake a review of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy with a view to including a "Don't Tell" component, where immigration status information of an individual, if ascertained, would not be shared with Canadian Border Services Agency or other Federal Immigration enforcement bodies voluntarily unless related to a criminal offence.*

All Service Governance related to the existing "Don't Ask" provision is governed by the Board policy entitled "Victims and Witnesses without Legal Status", approved by the Board at its meeting on May 18, 2006 (Min. No. P140/06 refers).

The authority for police to "Tell" is established by legislation and allows the disclosure of personal information under certain conditions. In that regard, the sharing of personal information between the Service and the C.B.S.A. or other federal immigration enforcement bodies is governed by the P.S.A., the M.F.I.P.P.A., and the I.R.P.A. This is detailed in the response to Motion 3b.

The Service consulted with the C.B.S.A. and has been informed that the C.B.S.A. relies on the on-going support of police agencies to assist in achieving its mandate. The C.B.S.A., by virtue of existing legislation and its mandate, is to be informed of persons who violate the I.R.P.A. To carry out its mandate, the C.B.S.A. requires police agencies to share information when aware that the C.B.S.A. has interest in a person the police agency has made contact with. Any I.R.P.A. warrant issued by the C.B.S.A. is made known to police agencies through C.P.I.C. Once this information becomes known, the police agency is duty-bound to notify the C.B.S.A.

Conclusion:

Council reaffirmed its commitment that the City of Toronto should provide all Torontonians, including undocumented Torontonians, access to City services without proof of citizen status. The Board received a report entitled "City Council Motions – Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians" which summarized the related motions adopted by Council.

The Service has prepared this report, in consult with service subject matter experts, in response to the motions adopted by Council. The Service agrees to reinforce its commitment to directing community members to the Access T.O. website through a Routine Order issued by the Chief of Police. The Service further agrees to expand the "Don't Ask" provision to *uninvolved* persons. The Service is satisfied with the current legislative and regulatory provisions that direct information sharing between the Service and the C.B.S.A.

The Service's primary mandate is not the enforcement of the I.R.P.A. The Service only takes an interest in I.R.P.A. violations when it overlaps with the Service's mission to keep Toronto the best and safest place to be.

The Service is committed to providing bias-free policing to all members of the community, regardless of immigration status.

Deputy Chief Mike Federico, Community Safety Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

MS:kc

Undocumented Torontonians.docx

Attachments

Appendix A – TPSB Meeting Minute P31/2016

Appendix A – TPSB Meeting Minute P31/2016

THIS IS AN EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE PUBLIC MEETING OF THE TORONTO POLICE SERVICES BOARD HELD ON FEBRUARY 24, 2016

#P31. **CITY COUNCIL MOTIONS – ACCESS TO CITY SERVICES FOR UNDOCUMENTED TORONTONIANS**

The Board was in receipt of the following report February 01, 2016 from Andy Pringle, Chair:

Subject: CITY COUNCIL MOTIONS – ACCESS TO CITY SERVICES FOR UNDOCUMENTED TORONTONIANS

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Chief of Police be requested to report to the Board with respect to the motions contained in the appended City Council item.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications arising from the Board's consideration of this report.

Background/Purpose:

The Board is in receipt of the appended report entitled "Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians" which was considered by City Council on December 9 and 10, 2015.

Discussion:

In consideration of the above-mentioned report, City Council adopted a number of motions intended to ensure that the City of Toronto provides all Torontonians, including undocumented Torontonians with access to City services without proof of citizen status.

Conclusion:

I recommend that the Board request that the Chief of Police report to the Board with respect to the motions in the appended City Council item

cont…d

The Board was also in receipt of the following:

- correspondence dated February 23, 2016 from the Board of Directors of The Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples; and

- correspondence (undated) signed by 38 representatives of the Latin American community.

Copies of the foregoing correspondence are on file in the Board office.

Mr. Karl Gardner, No One is Illegal, was in attendance and delivered a deputation to the Board with respect to the foregoing report. A written submission provided Mr. Gardner is on file in the Board office.

The Board approved the following Motions:

1. THAT the Board approve the foregoing report;
2. THAT the Board receive the correspondence from The Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples and representatives of the Latin American community; and
3. THAT the Board receive Mr. Gardner's deputation and written submission.

Moved by: C. Lee

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January 29, 2016

Andy Pringle
Chair
Toronto Police Services Board
40 College Street
Toronto, ON M5G 2J3

Dear Chair Pringle:

Re: Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians

On December 9 and 10, 2015, City Council reaffirmed its commitment that the City of Toronto should provide all Torontonians, including undocumented Torontonians, access to City services without proof of citizen status. Further, Council adopted the following:

1) City Council direct City divisions, agencies and corporations (including the Toronto Police Service) to review their approaches to customer service and direct staff to use the Access T.O. resource materials to ensure they provide accurate and helpful customer service consistent with Council's commitment to access to City services for undocumented Torontonians.

2) City Council request the Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration to work with the Toronto Police Service to clarify and articulate:
   a) Police procedures to ensure victims and witnesses of crime will not be asked about their immigration status;
   b) the bona fide law enforcement reasons that would require the Toronto Police Service to ask about immigration status; and
   c) Police mechanisms to encourage victims and witnesses of crime to come forward without fear of exposing their status; and
   d) to report back to Community Development and Recreation Committee in first quarter 2016.

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toronto at your service

3) City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Chief of Police, Toronto Police Service to:
   a) provide data on the number of times a person was investigated, reported or arrested on an offence related to the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA);
   b) report on the implications of developing a protocol between the Toronto Police Service and the Canadian Border Security Agency regarding sharing of personal information including a person's immigration and/or residence status; and
   c) review Service Procedure 02-01 to made a distinction between immigration warrants and other arrest warrants, in order to ensure the access without fear policy is implemented appropriately.

4) City Council request the Toronto Police Services Board to request the Chief of Police to consider expanding the existing "Don't Ask" provision as follows:
   a) expand "Don't Ask" beyond victims and witnesses to include all encounters with Police unless there is a warrant for the person's arrest or unless there has been an arrest; and
   b) undertake a review of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy with a view to including a "Don't Tell" component, where immigration status information of an individual, if ascertained, would not be shared with Canadian Border Services Agency or other Federal Immigration enforcement bodies voluntarily unless related to a criminal offence.

5) City Council revise the City's Access TO website by deleting "Policing services" from the list of available City services and replace it with "Emergency Services (911).

For additional detail on these decisions, see
http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2015.CD8.4.

City staff look forward to working with the Toronto Police Services Board and the Chief of Police, Toronto Police Service, to respond to these Council directions and strengthen customer service for undocumented Torontonians. Chris Brillinger, Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration (cbrillin@toronto.ca or 416-392-5207) will be in contact with your office to discuss next steps.

Sincerely,

(Original signed by)

Peter Wallace
City Manager

Copy: Mark Saunders, Chief, Toronto Police Service
Joanne Campbell, Executive Director, Toronto Police Services Board
Giuliana Carbone, Deputy City Manager, Cluster A
Chris Brillinger, Executive Director, Social Development, Finance and Administration

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 2, 2017

To: Chair and Members
                    Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
                    Chief of Police

Subject: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Suicide Prevention Mental Health Support for First Responders

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Board receive this report for information.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation in this report.

Background / Purpose:

In considering the report from the Board of Health on Suicide Prevention in Toronto, City Council, at its meeting of February 10, 2015, adopted the recommendation, with amendments, that the City Manager, in consultation with the Fire Chief and General Manager, Fire Services, the Chief, Toronto Paramedic Services and the Toronto Police Services Board report to the Executive Committee on adjustments to existing training programs and services to support suicide prevention among first responders, including but not limited to building awareness, treating and reducing the stigma of mental illness and help-seeking for post-traumatic stress disorder (P.T.S.D.) without impacting operating budgets.

In order to respond to City Council's request, City staff oversaw the preparation of a report to the City Executive Committee on the programs and supports Toronto Fire Services, Toronto Paramedic Services and the Toronto Police Service (Service) have or are putting in place.   Along with Fire and Paramedic Services, the Service responded to the City's request for information so that City staff could prepare a consolidated report to the Executive Committee.

The purpose of this report is to advise the Board that the attached consolidated report (see appendix A), was provided to the City's Executive Committee for their information at their March 7, 2017 meeting. The report provides a summary of ongoing initiatives

and planned actions for the prevention of P.T.S.D. among the City's first responders, as well as actions taken and planned to ensure compliance with new Provincial legislation.

Discussion:

The Service has programs and supports in place aimed at preventing P.T.S.D. Recent efforts within the Service have focused on reviewing best practices as well as identifying and addressing any gaps identified as a result of assessments and reviews.

The Service also has and continues to strive to develop mental help programs and initiatives that give Service members different options that they can access to seek the help they and their families need, depending on their comfort level.

The various programs that the Service has or is putting in place are outlined below. These include both reactive and proactive programs, as well as education initiatives to increase awareness and reduce the stigma around mental health. More detail on each of the Service's programs is included in the attached City report, along with the programs Fire Services and Paramedic Services have in place.

Commitment to the Psychological Health:

In December 2015, the Chief and the Board Chair jointly endorsed a statement of commitment to the Psychological Health of Service members, both uniform and civilian. The Statement describes the Service's commitment to care for its members throughout their careers by providing a range of resources and supports. The Service has been developing a plan to continually promote this commitment and the resources available to our members, and to show our unwavering support to address and destigmatize this critical health issue.

Wellness Program:

In some areas identified as "high risk" for psychological consequences due to the nature of their work, members participate in a structured Wellness Program that consists of annual (or biannual) appointments with a Service psychologist. At present, wellness programs are provided to members in Units such as: the Child Exploitation Section of Sex Crimes; the Technological Crimes sub-section of Intelligence; the Forensic Identification Unit; the Emergency Task Force; civilian members of Communication Services; Homicide Investigators, Cold Case and Major Case Management, Early Career Officers; and all members who have served as part of an overseas mission, both as a Canadian Forces reserve member and through secondment to the International Peace Operations Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Psychological Services:

While consultation services are available through the Service's Psychological Services, depending on the comfort level of individuals, members in need of more extended treatment services are encouraged to contact the Service's Employee and Family Assistance Program (E.F.A.P.). Alternatively, members may choose to see a psychologist in the community, whose services are reimbursed through the Board's extended health benefits. The psychologists in Psychological Services can assist members to find an appropriate psychologist in a community near them.

The E.F.A.P. program offers confidential and professional support, guidance, and counselling (and referrals when required) for personal challenges including:

- Marriage Problems
- Trauma – P.T.S.D.
- Family Problems
- Parenting Support
- Stress Related Problems
- Gambling
- Bullying and Harassment
- Depression/Anxiety
- Alcohol/Drug Use
- Eldercare
- Emotional Issues
- Work-related Issues
- Life Transition including retirement

In addition, the following are some of the resources currently available to Service members:

- Peer Support Volunteers
- Critical Incident Response Team
- Inter-Faith Chaplaincy Program

Training and Education:

The Service's goal is to promote a cultural shift which supports greater acceptance of the importance of psychological health, and to reduce the stigma surrounding mental health issues and help-seeking. To this end, the Service is moving forward with:

- annual mandatory in-service training that is provided to all police officers, which includes a wellness lecture focused on suicide risk identification and responses.
- the delivery of the Road to Mental Readiness (R.2.M.R.) anti-stigma training program to all Service members.

The Service has also developed various education/training programs for its members, new recruits and their families, newly promoted supervisors as well as 9-1-1 communication operators and new peer support/critical incident response team members.

Conclusion:

The key program elements to support mental health for first responders are common among Police, Fire and Paramedic Services. However, some are customized and implemented to respond to their particular organizational needs. For example, the Psychological Wellness Program provides proactive interventions to support uniform and civilian members who have been identified as at high psychological risk as a result of the specific demands of their job. In addition, the Critical Incident Response Team provides immediate peer support and access to resources for members who have been involved in potentially traumatic events. A significant strength of current programming is the range of opportunities for support available to members and their families, with options available to meet members at their own level of comfort.

The consolidated City report (Appendix A) summarizes the prevention and intervention programs, training and support initiatives under the categories of Leadership and Commitment, Employee Assistance Programs, Training and Other Supports and Next Steps/Planned Actions, for the City's first responders.

The Service is committed to the psychological wellness of its members and has developed a number of programs/procedures designed to ensure attention to the mental health and wellness of members in the workplace.   However, the proper resourcing of the Service's mental health wellness program continues to be a challenge that must be addressed. The Service will be dealing with this issue and recommending necessary action as part of its human resources strategy, which is scheduled to be introduced in mid-2017.

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions from the Board.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

/AH

File name: ptsd and suicide prevention mental health support for first responders.docx

TORONTO

REPORT FOR ACTION

Post-traumatic Stress Disorder & Suicide Prevention Mental Health Support for First Responders

Date: February 13, 2017
To: Executive Committee
From: City Manager and Executive Director, Human Resources
Wards: All

SUMMARY

As directed by City Council, this report provides a summary of ongoing initiatives and planned actions for the prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among the City's first responders in Toronto Fire Services, Toronto Paramedic Services and Toronto Police Service, as well as actions taken and planned to ensure compliance with new Provincial legislation.

The Ministry of Labour estimates that first responders are at least twice as likely as the general population to suffer from PTSD due to the risk of frequent exposure to traumatic stressors in the course of their duties. This is consistent with the information in the November 2014 Suicide Prevention in Toronto report from the Medical Officer of Health. That report highlighted that occupational groups whose members are subject to frequent traumatic events and critical incidents are vulnerable to poor mental health including anxiety, depression, PTSD, substance abuse and suicide risk.

On April 6, 2016 the Ontario Government passed the Supporting Ontario's First Responders Act. This new legislation creates a presumption that PTSD, diagnosed in first responders, is work-related. The Act requires the development of PTSD prevention plans by employers of workers who are covered by the presumption.

Toronto Fire Services, Toronto Paramedic Services and Toronto Police Service were consulted in the preparation of this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The City Manager recommends that:

1. Executive Committee receive this report for information.

FINANCIAL IMPACT

There are no financial impacts to this report.

The Deputy City Manager and Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this report and agrees with the financial impact statement.

DECISION HISTORY

At its meeting of February 10, 2015, in considering the Suicide Prevention in Toronto report from the Board of Health, City Council adopted the recommendation, with amendments, that the City Manager, in consultation with the Fire Chief and General Manager, Fire Services, the Chief and General Manager, Toronto Paramedic Services and the Toronto Police Services Board report to the Executive Committee on adjustments to existing training programs and services to support suicide prevention among first responders, including but not limited to building awareness, treating and reducing the stigma of mental illness and help-seeking for PTSD without impacting operating budgets.

(February 10, 2015) Report from the Board of Health - Suicide Prevention in Toronto
http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistroy.do?item=2015.OM3.1

COMMENTS

The November 2014 Suicide Prevention in Toronto report from the Medical Officer of Health references studies showing that occupational groups whose members are subject to frequent traumatic events and critical incidents are vulnerable to poor mental health including anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse and suicide risk. This is consistent with the more recent information from the Ministry of Labour (MOL). The MOL estimates that first responders are at least twice as likely as the general population to suffer PTSD and that is due to the risk of frequent on-duty exposure to traumatic stressors. The human and economic costs associated with traumatic stress are significant and include increased absenteeism, increased use of medical services, health deterioration and even suicide. Research suggests that PTSD results in more suicide attempts than all other anxiety disorders.

On April 6, 2016 the Ontario Government amended the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act (WSIA) with the passage of Bill 163 titled Supporting Ontario's first Responders Act. The legislation creates a presumption that PTSD diagnosed in first responders is work-related. Once a first responder is diagnosed with PTSD by either a psychiatrist or psychologist, the claims process to be eligible for WSIB benefits is expedited, without the need to prove a causal link between PTSD and a workplace event. The presumption allows for faster access to WSIB benefits, resources and timely treatment.

Employers, labour groups and mental health experts share the view that prevention is critical. There is general agreement that PTSD can be prevented or mitigated given appropriate proactive training, supports and timely treatment.

Employers of workers covered under the PTSD presumption are directed to provide the Minister of Labour with information on their workplace post-traumatic stress disorder prevention plans by April 23, 2017. The MOL, through its Public Services Health and Safety Association has developed an employer's resource guide consistent with comprehensive mental health strategies that include actions for prevention, intervention and recovery, and return-to-work.

Elements for prevention include recognizing, assessing and controlling the hazard, developing policies and procedures, outlining roles and responsibilities and incident reporting procedures.

The goal is to integrate PTSD prevention and proactive resiliency training into the overarching health and safety strategy that actively works to prevent harm to a worker's mental health. Intervention focuses on actions that can be taken to improve a situation. This includes ensuring that workers know how to report psychological injuries when they occur and that supports are in place.

Finally, recovery and return-to-work are important aspects of preventing further injury. Clearly established roles and responsibilities are required to support workers through this process, including an understanding of how to accommodate a worker who is recovering from PTSD.

The recommended framework is in keeping with the City's Psychological Health and Safety Policy and includes the following key elements:
- A statement of commitment to promote mental health and psychological well-being actions to prevent harm to a worker's psychological health
- Actions to enhance mental health knowledge at all levels and eliminate stigma
- Actions aimed at primary prevention in which changes are made to conditions that may contribute to psychological health problems
- Actions aimed at intervention in which psychological health problems are identified and addressed at an early stage through training and provision of Employee Assistance and Employee Health and Rehabilitation
- Actions to support access to psychological treatment and accommodations to stay at work or return-to-work.

Each of Toronto Fire Services, Toronto Paramedic Services and Toronto Police Services have programs and supports in place aimed at preventing PTSD. Within each organization recent efforts have focused on reviewing best practices as well as identifying and addressing any gaps identified as a result of assessments and reviews. The key program elements to support mental health for first responders are common among Police, Fire and Paramedics, however customized and implemented to respond to their particular organizational needs.

Below is a summary of prevention and intervention programs, training and support initiatives under the categories of Leadership and Commitment, Employee Assistance Programs, Training and Other Supports and Next Steps/Planned Actions.

Toronto Fire Services

Leadership and Commitment Statement

- Toronto Fire Services (TFS) Fire Chief and Toronto Professional Firefighters' Association (TPFFA) President issued a joint statement in February 2015 committing support to TFS staff who may be in personal crisis. Resources include professional assistance and crisis counselling services.
- Employee wellness (physical and mental) is imbedded in the TFS 2015-2019 Master Fire Plan and will be operationalized in the Transformational Plan with a detailed action plan on key objectives to be developed and implemented.

Employee Assistance and other Programs/Procedures

- TPFFA/TFS Employee Assistance Program Critical Incident Stress Team (EAP/CIS)
  - The program is staffed by a volunteer committee of active and retired Toronto Fire Services' employees. The program exists to anticipate, recognize and respond to the concerns and needs of staff (active or retired) and their families in the areas of health, welfare and quality of life. The program is independent of both Management and the Association while maintaining a respectful working relationship with both organizations
  - Through peer counselling and referral consulting, the Employee Assistance Program addresses physical, emotional, financial, legal and spiritual concerns at the request of an individual. The program recognizes the individual's right to self-determination, respect and their ultimate personal responsibility
  - When initiated through the chain-of-command, a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Team will activate the appropriate structured group intervention, twenty-four hours per day, three-hundred-and-sixty-five days per year.
- Corporate Employee Assistance Program (EAP)
  The City's EAP offers confidential short-term counselling, information and referral services to members of the Toronto Public Service and eligible family members. The program is designed to provide direct access to experienced professionals who can help to resolve problems before they affect employee health, personal life or job performance including personal, relationships, legal and financial counselling.
- Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH)
  TFS has a fee for service agreement with CAMH. This provides TFS employees suffering from acute distress with direct and immediate access to CAMH interventions, supports and counselling. This program is aimed at providing emergency intervention for suicide risks and has been very successful to date.
- TFS Chaplains
  Chaplaincy service is a key component in managing Critical Incident Stress and employee assistance programs. Chaplains provide TFS personnel with a foundation of emotional, physical and social health and regularly provide onsite services and one-on-one counselling and support.

Four chaplains are on call twenty-four hours a day, seven days per week and offer on-scene support, particularly at major incidents. They have an in-depth knowledge of the stresses created by working the emergency services environment.

Education/Training and Additional Supports

- Training includes:
  - Annual mental health and wellness seminars with a focus on physical fitness, mental health and nutrition.
  - Annual *Stand Down for Safety Week* provides training and education to staff regarding various wellness topics for example "Movement Matters" addressing the importance of movement for injury prevention and long-term health and "No firefighter Stands Alone" providing awareness of mental health and the support programs available to staff.
- Additional supports include:
  - Comprehensive benefits packages
  - Internal Health and Safety reviews
  - Mental Health Working Group

Next Steps/Planned Actions

- Key objectives in the Transformational Plan include:
  - Development and implementation of a comprehensive mental health and PTSD prevention plan.
  - Explore the introduction of the IAFF/IAFC Wellness Fitness Initiative.
- Identify and secure the funding required to roll-out Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR) Training to all staff and provide reference materials in all TFS work locations.
- In 2015, an employee mental health needs assessment was conducted with CAMH. The CAMH Needs Assessment will be used to develop and implement a comprehensive wellness program. Key focus areas include:
  - Staff Selection and Training: Mental health assessments/screening, ongoing mental health check-ups, education delivered by qualified professionals, family education
  - Supervisor Education: Supervisor education in mental health and wellness, prevention and management
  - Peer Support: Peer support model with defined roles, dedicated resources/personnel for peer support, thorough training for peer support workers
  - Facilitate Administration Supports (TFS): Sick leave policies that support mental health needs, 24hr follow up and check-in after significant calls, team debriefs
  - Systems Supports (beyond TFS): Crisis teams available for onsite response, 24 hr hotline, Corporate EAP staff; Collection and monitoring of data related to traumatic events, feedback from staff, monitoring WSIB claims related to mental health.

Toronto Paramedic Services

Leadership and Commitment Statement

- In July 2015, the Chief of Toronto Paramedic Services committed to all staff his active support for a review by the Office of the Ombudsman on how the Division

handles operational stress injuries and PTSD. The Chief encouraged paramedic staff who might be suffering from operational stress injuries to take advantage of the wide-range of existing support programs available.

- In November 2015, the Ombudsman issued her report Making the Strong Stronger, and identified that Toronto Paramedic Services had all the components of a strong plan but those components needed to be coordinated.
- The Chief wrote to all staff and outlined the Division's commitment to implementing the Ombudsman's recommendations. A series of "next steps", including training and consultation were provided.
- In November 2016, the Chief communicated to all staff about the upcoming implementation of the Psychological Health & Wellness Plan and providing an update on the status of Division's response to the Ombudsman's recommendations.
- In February 2017, the Chief and Deputy Chiefs formally announced the launch of the comprehensive, Toronto Paramedic Services' Psychological Health and Wellness Plan committing to work with all staff to provide a work environment that was psychologically and physically healthy and safe.
- The Plan is focused on prevention, reduction of stigma, timely intervention, post-incident support and available resources.
- The Plan was endorsed by the Ombudsman, the Unions and Divisional Health and Safety Advisory Committee members.
- A number of procedures in the Plan focus attention on the psychological health and wellness of employees, including:
  - Procedure for Notification of the Peer Resource Team and Staff Psychologist
  - Procedure for Notification of Peer Resource Team for Stress Related Absences
  - Protocol for Maintaining Contact with Absent Employees.

Employee Assistance and Other Programs/Procedures

- Toronto Paramedic Services has had an in-house, volunteer, Peer Resource Team (PRT) since the late 1980s and a dedicated in-house Staff Psychologist position since 1986.
  - The 31-member volunteer Peer Resource Team is made up of paramedics, dispatchers, support and management staff who are available to respond to critical incidents or provide general support to other employees.
  - The Staff Psychologist's role includes education, program consultation and staff referrals.
- The City's Employee Assistance Programs (EAP) are also available to assist staff and their families.
- In 2016, observation shifts were arranged for all City EAP counsellors to increase their knowledge of Paramedic and Emergency Medical Dispatcher (EMD) work to better understand their psychological stressors.
- An extensive list of additional resources was developed for staff, including on-line access to self-assessing/monitoring tools as well as listings of mental health resources in employees' own communities.
- Protocols were developed for pre-emptive Peer Support notifications based on types of calls attended to by frontline responding staff (i.e., Paramedics and EMDs).
- In-house Chaplains are available upon request by any staff.

- A Divisional **mental** health webpage containing the full Psychological Health and Wellness Plan, and links to its many resources, was set up for staff in support of the existing Wellness webpage.
- Access to psychological support resources was simplified and communicated to staff to ensure widespread awareness.
- Toronto Paramedic Services continues to work with Human Resources Disability Management staff to ensure that:
  - All employees who are absent due to stress are contacted regularly, and
  - Leadership staff routinely receive reports of staff who are off on long-term illness to ensure organizational contact is maintained and support offered when absent from work due to physical or stress related factors.

Education/Training and Additional Supports

- All management staff have been updated on the City's Mental Health and Wellness policy through continuing education sessions.
- In 2016, peer-led Psychological First Aid training was provided for all staff as part of continuing education sessions.
- Additional crisis training was provided to Peer Resource Team members.
- In 2016, 24 frontline and management staff were trained as trainers for delivery of the industry-specific Road to Mental Readiness program. These trainers delivered the Road to Mental Readiness and anti-stigma training for all management staff.
- All new Paramedic and EMD recruits now receive peer-led Psychological First Aid training, Road to Mental Readiness and anti-stigma training.
- In 2017, all staff, eligible family members and retirees were given access to FeelingBetterNow®, an on-line tool for wellness assessment and monitoring that was customized for Paramedic Services.

Next Steps/Planned Actions

- Peer-led, Road to Mental Readiness and anti-stigma training is being provided to all other staff during continuing education sessions in early 2017.
- Building on the prior training, peer-led suicide intervention training is scheduled for inclusion in all staff continuing education sessions in 2018. This suicide prevention training has also been added to the curriculum for all new Paramedics and EMDs.
- Processes are underway to acquire third party, best-practice enhanced training programs (Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training and suicideTALK) for PRT members with plans for delivery to additional key staff.

Toronto Police Services

Leadership and Commitment Statement

- The Chief of the Toronto Police Service (TPS/Service) and the Chair of the Toronto Police Services Board have signed a joint "Statement of Commitment to the Psychological Wellness of Toronto Police Service Members". This statement has been approved and endorsed by the Toronto Police Services Board and is displayed prominently in all TPS units and facilities.

Employee Assistance and other Programs/Procedures

- The TPS has developed a number of procedures designed to ensure attention to the psychological health and wellness of members in the TPS workplace including:
  - Injured on Duty, Workplace Accommodation and Central Sick Bank
  - Substance Abuse, Bereavement and Employee and Family Assistance Program
  - Members involved in traumatic critical incidents;
    this procedure includes two appendices that provide information regarding the impact of involvement in critical incident events and guidelines for family regarding how to support affected members.
- Peer Support Volunteers/Critical Incident Response Team
  - A team of 88 peer support volunteers (both uniform and civilian) are embedded throughout the Service
  - Peers have been trained to provide peer support both on a day-to-day basis and after the occurrence of traumatic critical incidents, with specific training in the identification of suicide risk and effective response.
- Critical Incident Response
  In conjunction with response from the peer support team, psychological debriefings with a mental health professional are conducted after critical incident events, with follow-up support and intervention provided.
- Employee and Family Assistance Programs (EFAP)
  - Free counselling available 24/7, every day of the year
  - Available to all Service members and their dependents, as well as retired members.
- Consultation with Service Psychologist
  - All members are welcome to attend a consultation visit (or visits) with an in-house psychologist
  - Visits are used to provide direct clinical interventions to members during periods of emotional or psychological crisis, including addressing issues related to suicide risk and the provision of linkages to appropriate care and support
  - Consultation also is provided to Unit Commanders/Supervisors on issues relating to the psychological health of members, including the determination of suicide risk and effective response.
- Extended Healthcare Benefits provide coverage for the reimbursement of counselling and other psychological services provided by community care-providers.
- Medical Advisory Services, Occupational Health and Safety
  The Medical Advisory Service provides disability management and return to work supports for members who have sustained occupational stress injuries related to the demands of the job.
- Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams
  Members of the Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams receive training on a variety of mental health issues, including mental health dynamics within the work environment and suicide prevention training.
- Inter-Faith Volunteer Chaplaincy Program
  Clergy members representing the Toronto Faith Community are assigned to Service divisions and are available to provide support and intervention to members from a faith-based perspective.
- Psychological Wellness Program

The Psychological Wellness Program is a pro-active initiative designed to improve and sustain psychological health by fostering the development of effective strategies for coping with stress through the enhancement of members' psychological strength and resilience. Wellness visits are scheduled at least annually with members of teams who engage in activities that place them at risk for the development of operational stress injury, including suicidal ideation

- During 2015, over 500 uniform and civilian members were eligible to attend a wellness visit
- In 2015/2016, the Psychological Wellness Program was expanded to include a pilot project involving police officers from three divisions who are new to the job and learning to cope with its emotional demands.
- Internal Support Networks
  Volunteer self-support networks have been established to help specific, self-identified groups share information and experiences and to provide mentoring and guidance to assist members in their personal and professional development.

Education/Training and Additional Supports

- All new recruits and their families attend a Family Day at the Toronto Police College prior to graduation. The agenda includes a Wellness talk regarding the psychological impact of the job and resources for support to officers and their families
- Mental health awareness and suicide prevention training is provided to all newly promoted supervisors
- Members of the Critical Incident/Peer Support Team have been provided with formal suicide prevention/intervention training including safe TALK (LivingWorks) and Mental Health First Aid (Mental Health Commission of Canada)
- Regular training is provided to Communication (9-1-1-) Operators and new Peer Support/Critical Incident Response team members regarding topics related to mental health, including suicide risk identification and response.

Next Steps/Planned Action

- In 2017, the annual mandatory in-service training provided to all police officers will include a Wellness lecture focused on suicide risk identification and response, and linkage to Service resources
- TPS is moving forward with the delivery of the Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR) anti-stigma training program developed by the Mental Health Commission of Canada. This training will be provided to all Service members, both uniform and civilian. Members attending the primary level of the R2MR program will also receive safeTALK, a suicide intervention skills program developed by LivingWorks.

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SIGNATURE

Kerry Pond
Executive Director of Human Resources

Peter Wallace
City Manager

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 7, 2017

To: Chair and Members
              Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
              Chief of Police

Subject: Vendor of Record for the Transforming Corporate Support Capital Project

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

1) the Board approve Katalogic Inc. as the vendor of record to provide business and project management services as well as technical development/support services for the Service's Transforming Corporate Support project, commencing on April 1, 2017 and ending March 31, 2020, with the option to renew for two one-year terms at the Chief's discretion; and

2) the Board authorize the Chair to execute all required agreements and related documents on behalf of the Board, subject to approval by the City Solicitor as to form.

Financial Implications:

Funding ($6.5 Million) for Transforming Corporate Support (T.C.S.) capital project, which includes enhancement of the Service's PeopleSoft/Oracle Human Resource Management System (H.R.M.S.), was approved as part of the Toronto Police Service's (Service) 2017 - 2026 capital program (Min. No. P244/16 refers).

The $6.5M is estimated to cover all costs associated with the project, including the purchase of required hardware, software and initial licensing costs, professional and/or consulting services, plus any internal costs that the Service may incur for premium pay and internal backfilling purposes.

The recommended vendor's hourly rates will remain fixed during the first three years of the contract. It is estimated that approximately $2.8M will be required for the vendor's services over that period.

While the Service will carefully manage the actual services acquired, the cost of these services will be dependent on level and type of services and expertise required. This will be impacted by the amount of internal resources the Service is able to assign to the project, given the need for Service staff to continue to provide required day to day services and work on other projects. In addition, the inability to fill vacant positions during the current civilian hiring moratorium could also affect the level of services the Service will need to procure from the recommended vendor as well as other outside contractors, in order to successfully deliver and implement the T.C.S. project.

The vendor will work with the Service to further define the resources, timelines and funding required for specific project deliverables, based on the T.C.S. blueprint and in accordance with the strategic priorities of the Service. This will be linked closely with the modernization of human resource services and the implementation of the Transformational Task Force recommendations.

Background / Purpose:

Prior to the 2017-2026 capital budget process, the Service's approved capital program included the H.R.M.S. upgrade project, as well as a separate project to enable the upgrade of the Service's time and attendance system, known as the Time and Resources Management System (T.R.M.S.) project.

As a result of initial work undertaken to assess the system for an upgrade, it became very evident that a consolidated cradle-to-grave human resource information system was required by the Service. Opportunities were identified that would benefit and modernize the delivery of human resource and payroll support services. These included:

- centralizing and optimizing H.R.M.S. related administrative services;
- the redesign of policy, governance, processes and technical enhancements through the implementation of new functionality such as employee and manager self-service, e-Performance, benefit administration (including retirees), position management, timekeeping, analytics and dashboards; and
- the correction and stabilization of core H.R.M.S. functionalities to address structural issues that were identified during the assessment.

As a result, the Service requested and the Board approved the T.C.S. project as part of the Service's 2017-2026 capital program (Min. No. P244/16 refers). City Council subsequently approved the Board-approved capital program at its February 2017 meeting.

Implementation of this project will enable an overall solution for the effective management of time and people across the Service, which will result in scheduling, deployment, time tracking, human resources information and payroll administration being combined into one system. Consolidating the two systems into one will result in

lower support and maintenance costs, as well as an environment that promotes continuous improvement and provides information for increased accountability.

It will also enable the execution of the three year T.C.S. blueprint. This plan will modernize the H.R.M.S. system environment/landscape, as well as provide the tools required to execute the human resource strategy and performance/talent management, as recommended by the Transformational Task Force.

The purpose of this report is to obtain Board approval to engage a qualified vendor that will provide a wide range of services, such as project management, technical and development support to enable the successful implementation of this project.

Discussion:

The first phase of the project, which commenced under the H.R.M.S. upgrade capital project, will be completed by March 31, 2017, and has resulted in:

- an upgrade to Version 9.2 of the system;
- rebranding the HRMS to "Member Gateway", with a new look and feel;
- simplifying, streamlining and providing a more user friendly online recruitment process;
- members being provided the ability to self-register on-line, with their supervisor's approval, for Toronto Police College courses, including the system sending out alerts and notifications via email to members about upcoming licenses that are due for renewal;
- providing supervisors/managers with the ability to approve their respective members training requests on-line; and
- members being able to print their own salary letters on-line.

In addition to the foregoing system enhancements and enablers, the first phase also:

- completed a full business process review, system fit gap analysis and infrastructure assessments;
- performed a detailed evaluation of system customization and interface inventories; and
- developed a multi-year blue print, consisting of the three final phases, for the T.C.S. project.

In order to implement phases two to four of the T.C.S. blueprint, on January 18, 2017, the Service issued a Request for Proposal (R.F.P.) #1202718-17 for required professional services. The R.F.P. covered for the following:

- Implementation services and expertise for the final three blueprint phases
- Resources for necessary work to enhance the system

- Project management and technical support services throughout the project duration

The R.F.P. was advertised on MERX, an electronic tendering service, designed to advertise opportunities for the procurement of goods and services worldwide. The R.F.P. closed on February 10, 2017.   Twenty one vendors downloaded the R.F.P., and two vendors submitted proposals.

The R.F.P. contained the necessary Service background information, including the high level phases of the blueprint, with a scope of work that outlined expectations for the implementation of the project, as well as planned and unplanned production support.

The Service was looking for a vendor that had experience with other public sector organizations and resources that could offer technical support prior and post implementation. The R.F.P. respondents provided information regarding their experience/qualifications in other public sector implementations including technical support experience, demonstrated experience/qualifications of their key personnel, and an outline of approach/methodology associated with the delivery of what was expected.

The proposals were evaluated based on the criteria identified in the R.F.P. to provide the professional and other services required for the duration of the project.

Conclusion:

Based on the results of the evaluation of submissions obtained through an open procurement process, Katalogic Inc. is the recommended proponent, having submitted a proposal that meets all of the criteria and specifications in the R.F.P., and achieving the highest score.

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command will be in attendance to answer any questions from the Board.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 1, 2017

To: Chair and Members
                Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
                Chief of Police

Subject: 2016 Capital Budget Variance Report for the Toronto Police Service, Period Ending December 31, 2016

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that:

1) the Board receive the following report; and

2) the Board forward a copy of the following report to the City's Deputy City Manager and Chief Financial Officer for information and for inclusion in the City's overall variance report to the City's Budget Committee.

Financial Implications:

Toronto City Council, at its meeting of February 17, 2016, approved the Service's 2016-2025 Capital program at a net amount of $21.6 Million (M) for 2016, and a net total of $243M for 2016-2025. The net available funding in 2016 was $36.7M, which included the 2015 carry forward of $15.1M. The revised Council approved program (Attachment A) was approved by the Toronto Police Services Board (Board) at its meeting of April 20, 2016 (Min. No. P82/16 refers).

During 2016, City of Toronto Facilities Management transferred $483 Thousand (K) towards two projects - 52 Division renovation ($400K) and the 4th Floor headquarters upgrade ($83K). As a result, the revised net capital budget for 2016 is $22.1M, and the net available funding in 2016 is $37.2M.

From a net debt perspective, the Toronto Police Service (Service) incurred total expenditures of $14.5M compared to $37.2M in available funding (a spending rate of 39%). The spend rate on a gross basis is 48%. The under-expenditure for 2016 is $22.7M, $20.9M of which will be carried forward to 2017. The estimated remaining $1.8M is attributable to the Facilities Realignment ($1.5M debt portion of funding) and

the Time and Resource Management System (T.R.M.S.) ($300K) projects, and will be returned back to the City, due to the City's one year carry forward rule.

The low spend rate is the result of some projects and spending being put on hold until the final Transformational Task Force (T.T.F.) report was approved by the Board, and the recommendations and work to be performed were known with more certainty.

The Workstation, Laptop and Printer Lifecycle project, funded from the Service's Vehicle and Equipment Reserve, will be underspent by $1.1M due to lower negotiated pricing. This amount will be returned back to the reserve.

Background / Purpose:

Attachment A provides the Board and Council approved Capital program.

Attachment B provides the capital variance report, which outlines the status of projects as at December 31, 2016.

Discussion:

Summary of Capital Projects:

Attachment B provides a status summary of the on-going projects from 2015 as well as projects that started in 2016. Any significant issues or concerns have been highlighted below in the "Key Highlights/Issues" section of this report.

Key Highlights/Issues:

As part of its project management framework, the Service uses a colour code system (i.e. green, yellow or red) to reflect the health status of capital projects. The overall health of each capital project is based on budget, schedule and scope considerations. The colour codes are defined as follows:

- Green – on target to meet project goals (scope/functionalities), and on budget and schedule;

- Yellow – at risk of not meeting certain goals, some scope, budget and/or schedule issues, and corrective action required; and

- Red – high risk of not meeting goals, significant scope, budget and/or schedule issues, and corrective action required.

The following provides summary information on key projects within the 2016-2025 Capital program. Summary information includes status updates as at the time of writing this report.

Facilities Realignment (formerly 54 Division Facility) ($38.6M)

Current Status - **Red**

Previous Variance Report Status - **Red**

This project originally provided funding for the construction of a new 54 Division facility, which was intended to replace a retrofitted light industrial structure, that has been occupied by the Service since 1973.

The project cash flow assumed land acquisition in 2015 and the start of construction in 2016. However, the Board put the start date of this project on hold, and the existing capital project was maintained in the program until a final decision was made.

The final T.T.F. report recommends a modernized policing model for the City of Toronto, which includes a leaner facilities footprint, consistent with the previous strategy of the Service.

From the available $7M funding, $0.5M was spent in 2016 for a service demand analysis that will help with the development of the facility realignment plan. The remaining amount of $6.5M was returned back to the City due to the City's one year carry forward rule. The funding source for the $6.5M is $5M in developmental charges (D.C.) and $1.5M debt funding.

Funds for amalgamation of 54 and 55 Divisions are built into the 2017- 2026 capital program request.

Peer to Peer Site (Disaster Recovery Site) ($19.9M)

Current Status - **Yellow**

Previous Variance Report Status - **Yellow**

This project provides funding for a new peer to peer data centre facility. The Service's current peer to peer data centre is co-located with the City's main data centre in a City-owned and managed facility. The current location has significant space and power requirement issues which impact both the City and the Service. As a result, this mission-critical operation is at risk because the Service is subject to limitations in the existing facility which impair current operations and future growth requirements. In addition, the current line-of-sight distance from the primary site is seven kilometers, which is significantly less than the industry minimum standard of 25 kilometers for disaster recovery sites. The Board's approval of this project was based on an in-depth analysis of the various options by an independent third party engaged by the Service.

The contract for architectural design and consulting services specializing in data centre development was awarded to M.M.M. Group, based on Board approval at its July 15, 2015 meeting (Min. No. P191/15 refers).

A recommended site was brought forward to the project Steering Committee and communicated to the Board on March 17, 2016 (Min. No. C59/16 refers). City Real Estate completed their negotiations with the land owner and fulfilled their due diligence process. The real estate transaction closed on December 5, 2016.

The contract for the construction manager was awarded to Eastern Construction Company Limited at the Board's July meeting (Min. No. 182/16 refers). The schematic design was approved by the Project Steering Committee in September. The consultant has applied for site plan approval in mid-December. Since this may impact the issuance of building permits and construction schedule, the project status remains at Yellow. The project team is currently in the construction and tender document stage.

From the available funding of $4.6M in 2016, $840K will be carried forward to 2017.

Human Resources Management System Upgrade ($1.9M)

Current Status - **Green**

Previous Variance Report Status - **Red**

Funding for the Human Resource Management System (H.R.M.S.) project was initially approved for a technical upgrade of the Oracle PeopleSoft human resource and payroll system, with some enhanced functionality. Work began on this project in September, 2015. Business process reviews were conducted, which involved documenting the "as is" state for business processes related to human resources management and system administration, identifying pain points and opportunities for increased efficiencies, policy and program development, and performing a fit-gap analysis between the existing Version 9.1 of the system and the new Version 9.2.   This work allowed the Service to create a four year blueprint and plan development that moved from tweaks of processes, functionality and people skills, to a full transformation of how Corporate Services Command performs and supports human resource management across the organization.

The technical upgrade of the Service's H.R.M.S., along with changes to existing payroll and benefits business processes, was successfully implemented mid-December 2016. Training was delivered to all impacted units prior to the rollout of PeopleSoft Version 9.2, and post live operational support is ongoing to assist members with the transition to the new streamlined processes. The centralization of administrative services, which was unable to move forward at this time has been deferred, moving the overall project status from red to green.

The examination of existing processes and the identification of opportunities to gain efficiencies will continue throughout the project's four-year blueprint, which is designed to streamline business processes and capitalize on human resource savings that may be achieved with the automation of manual processes and the implementation of enhanced system interoperability. The overall project objective encompasses the transformation of human resource management within Corporate Services Command and across the organization, in concert with the goals of the Transformational Task Force to enable and support the modernization of the police service.

The implementation of Oracle's PeopleSoft Enterprise Recruiting and external eRecruit functionality in January 2017 simplifies the application process for members of the public who wish to apply for external job postings via the internet. Internally, recruiters

and hiring managers can now manage these applications and hiring processes online, reducing the need for tracking via manual spreadsheets and hard copy paper resumes and documents.

The project team is preparing for the implementation of a streamlined Training Administration process to facilitate online self-enrolment and supervisory approval for courses offered at the Toronto Police College. For licensed courses and certifications, the system will generate email alerts at designated timeframes to notify members that they must enrol in a particular course to ensure that existing licenses or certifications do not expire. The development of a managers' dashboard will aid supervisory personnel in monitoring the mandatory requirements and skills development of members within their respective units.

From the available funding of $1.7M in 2016, $525K will be carried forward to 2017. Additional funding has been incorporated into the Service's 2017 – 2026 capital program, which will support the longer-term blueprint for the Transforming Corporate Support project.

Time and Resource Management System ($4.1M)

Current Status - **Yellow**

Previous Variance Report Status - **Yellow**

Capital funding for the Service's T.R.M.S. was initially approved for an upgrade of the existing time and attendance reporting application to maintain vendor support. However, since the implementation of the application in 2003, the Service's requirements with respect to time keeping, scheduling, exception reporting, and information management to support deployment decisions has become much more complex. Senior managers have therefore reviewed the original business case for the T.R.M.S. upgrade, taking into consideration other available options to ascertain the most value added alternative solution.

To facilitate interoperability and centralized real-time human resources data, as well as reduce the costs associated with the support and maintenance of multiple applications and system upgrades, the Service has procured Oracle's PeopleSoft Enterprise Time and Labour module. The move towards full integration of human resources information supports the goals of the T.T.F. to manage personnel in a more efficient and cost effective manner. Further, the efficient deployment of personnel is sustained with a modernized timekeeping system that can meet the sophisticated needs and strategic objectives of a large organization comprised of uniform and civilian members.

The implementation of Oracle's PeopleSoft Time and Labour module will allow the Service to collapse future system upgrades into one project and supports the transition towards full integration of human resources information. Of the $600K available funding, $308K was utilized to procure the PeopleSoft Time and Labour module.   The remaining $292K will be returned back to the City due to the one year carry forward rule.

Enterprise Business Intelligence ($10.2M)

Current Status - **Yellow**

Previous Variance Report Status - **Red**

E.B.I. system solution represents a set of methodologies, processes, architectures, and technologies that transform raw data into consistent, reliable and useful information used to enable effective strategic, tactical, and operational insights and analysis, as well as decision-support information. Police services such as Edmonton, Vancouver, New York and Chicago have E.B.I. solutions.

This project directly supports the T.T.F. goals and recommendations related to evidence-based decisions, analytics and data governance. As the Service continues its modernization initiatives, there is an increasing requirement for improved capabilities related to data, information and analysis. The E.B.I project will enhance the Service's ability to leverage data-driven, analytical insights that will be used to centralize decision supporting information across all organizational systems.

The Service currently utilizes dozens of application systems, with each database individually structured and requiring manual data manipulation to support business processes and analysis. This information environment is inadequate to effectively support the Service's objectives for efficient delivery of modernized public safety services within Toronto. The Service requires an integrated analytical and business intelligence platform to support efficient police officer deployment, performance management, policy evaluation, crime analysis and prevention, and justification of expenditures.

This project will transform the Service's raw data from key databases into a useful and reliable source of information within a corporate data warehouse, and build an integrated business intelligence and analytical platform. The resulting consolidated information will be made widely available across the Service, allowing all members to make better evidence-based decisions. The use of E.B.I. is a critical component for intelligence-led public safety and support activities, which will enable more cost-effective and value-added policing and public safety actions.

In 2015, the project team developed the E.B.I. framework and reference architecture, developed data modeling and build requirements for both business and technological needs. Due to the rigorous process associated with hiring consultants with the right knowledge, experience and skill sets, project start times were delayed. Subsequently, the Service has been engaged in the comprehensive process of selecting the right technology and product. The related technology has been identified in detail through the Request for Proposal (R.F.P.) process.

The R.F.P. for the E.B.I. solution was issued and a recommendation for contract award was approved at the April 20, 2016 Board meeting (Min. No. P85/16 refers). I.B.M, the successful vendor, completed a technology assessment which confirmed the fit of leveraging the I.B.M. Crime Information Warehouse (C.I.W.) proprietary asset, as outlined in their R.F.P. response. Funds for the integration of data sources into the

C.I.W. are provided for in the approved E.B.I. capital project budget. However, as the Service was not certain as to who (other external contractors, Service staff or I.B.M., or a combination of the foregoing) would actually do the work, it was not included in I.B.M.'s response to the R.F.P. In October 2016, the Service determined that having I.B.M. perform this work would allow the Service to leverage I.B.M.'s data integration service team, based on their expertise with the C.I.W. product, in order to bring identified business data into the C.I.W. On November 17, 2016, the board approved a contract award to I.B.M. Canada Ltd. for the supply of data integration services for the implementation of the E.B.I. Solution (Min. No. P265/16 refers). As a result, the status of this project changed from Red to Yellow.

The status of this project has been changed to Yellow as the project team is currently working with I.B.M. on the detail work plan that will outline key deliverables along with milestone schedule. It will remain yellow until the delivery schedule is agreed between I.B.M. and the Service. The Board will continue to be kept apprised of the status of this project, through the variance reporting process.

From the available funding of $6.2M, $3M will be carried forward to 2017.

Radio Replacement Project ($40.0M)

Current Status - **Yellow**

Previous Variance Report Status - **Yellow**

The Service's current communication radios were replaced over the period of 2006 to 2012. Although the lifecycle for these radios is ideally seven years, the Service has decided to replace these radios every ten years to reduce capital costs. While the extension of this lifecycle to ten years has resulted in some incremental operating costs, there is still an overall cost benefit to the Service. At this point, this project does not include any anticipated changes from the T.T.F., as they are not known at this time. The number of radios required within the Service will be adjusted during the term of the project in response to current operational requirements, the decline in uniform members and the T.T.F. recommendations, as appropriate.

In an attempt to reduce the number of radios and produce cost savings, an engineering study to determine the technical viability, potential efficiencies and an examination of the blocking effect of the vehicle when using handheld radios rather than mobile radios within police vehicles, has been completed. As a result of this study, it has been concluded that there is significant communications risk in the use of portable radios within a vehicle. Therefore, the Service has decided to continue the use of mobile radios in all primary response vehicles.   The Service, in conjunction with Toronto Fire Services, Toronto Paramedic Services and the City of Toronto, is drafting a Request for Proposal for the purchase of radios over the next several years. A contract award is anticipated to be completed in the 3rd quarter of 2017.

Given the size of this project, the services of two external subject matter experts have been acquired through a Request for Services procurement process. A fairness

commissioner is also being requested to monitor this project, and ensure the procurement process is fair and transparent.

Of the $14.1M available funds, $14M will be carried forward to 2017.

State of Good Repair ($3.7M available funds in 2016 – ongoing)

Current Status – **Yellow**

Previous Variance Report Status - **Yellow**

By definition, S.O.G.R. funding is used to maintain the safety, condition and customer requirements of existing bricks and mortar buildings. However, the Service has developed a work-plan for use of these funds to optimize service delivery and enhance efficiencies for both buildings and technology improvements.

In early 2016, the Service's backlog list of building projects was prioritized, a work-plan established and resources allocated to address priority projects and available funding. However, some projects were delayed, in anticipation of the T.T.F. recommendations on facility realignment and as a result the project status remains Yellow.

From the available funding of $3.7M, $1.3M will be carried forward to 2017.

52 Division Renovation ($9.3M)

Current Status - **Green**

Previous Variance Report Status - **Yellow**

This project provides funding for the 52 Division facility renovations to correct building deficiencies and create better usable space.

The project start was delayed due to the lack of resources in the Service's Facilities Management unit. Since taking over, the assigned Project Coordinator has accelerated the plan and managed to maintain the project on budget. The project is nearing substantial completion and the renovated facility is currently fully occupied and operational. The project deficiencies and closeout documents are in progress.

It should be noted that through collaboration with the City of Toronto, City Facilities Management has contributed $568K ($42K in 2015 and $526K in 2016) towards the project to cover the cost of City-identified S.O.G.R. items, such as elevator modernization and building envelope repairs. In addition, City Council, at its September 19, 2016 meeting, has also approved a transfer of $400K to enable the replacement of the chiller, boilers and upgrade to the existing cooling tower. The transfer of funds and co-ordination of work created cost efficiencies and minimized disruption to divisional staff and the community.

The project is in its final deficiency correction phase with substantial completion expected by the first quarter of 2017.

From the available funding of $5.7M in 2016, $734K will be carried forward to 2017 for deficiencies and final holdbacks.

Vehicle and Equipment Lifecycle Replacements

Projects listed in this category are funded from the Vehicle and Equipment Reserve (Reserve), which is in turn funded through annual contributions from the Service and Parking Enforcement operating budgets. The Reserve has no impact on the Capital Program and at this time, does not require debt funding. Items funded through this Reserve include the regular replacement of vehicles and information technology equipment.

The projected under-expenditure for 2016 is $9.6M, $8.5M of which will be carried forward to 2017 as these funds are still required to complete lifecycle projects.

The projected under-spending is primarily due to:

- $1.1M carryforward for Vehicle Lifecycle – delivery of some vehicles were delayed due to manufacturer's build dates.
- $1.6M carryforward for Furniture Lifecycle – the Service's furniture vendor declared bankruptcy and a new vendor has not been selected.
- $2M carryforward for I.T. Business Resumption – since the Service is building a Peer to Peer facility, lifecycle of Business Resumption is slowed down in order to make the move easier and more cost effective.
- $2.1M carryforward for In-Car Camera (I.C.C.) – I.C.C. lifecycle purchase was deferred until the I.C.C. software systems were successfully upgraded to the latest version. Only the latest version could support both the older and newest I.C.C. units.
- $1.1M for Workstation, Laptop and Printer Lifecycle project – this amount was not required due to a lower negotiated cost for printers. This amount will be returned back to the Vehicle and Equipment Reserve.

Projects completed in 2016:

Projects are declared complete when all deliverables have been met. Projects are declared closed when all outstanding payments have been made, any deficiencies have been addressed, and a close-out report has been submitted to the Board (generally, one year after project completion). At that time, the Service blocks any further spending for these projects on its financial system, and advises the City that the project is complete and should be closed.

The Integrated Records and Information System Implementation (I.R.I.S.) project closed in 2016 (June 17, 2016 meeting – Min. No. P143/16). The City's Deputy City Manager/Chief Financial Officer is being advised through a copy of this report so that the City can also close this project in its files.

Conclusion:

As of December 31, 2016, the Service incurred total expenditures of $14.5M compared to $37.2M in available funding from net debt. This resulted in an under-expenditure of $22.7M, $20.9 of which will be carried forward to 2017. The remaining balance of $1.8M will be returned to the City.

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command will be in attendance to answer any questions from the Board.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Attachment A
Council Approved 2016-2025 Capital Program Request ($000s)

Project Name	Plan to end of 2015	2015 CF	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total 2016-2020 Request	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total 2021-2025 Forecast	Total 2016-2025 Program	Total Project Cost
Projects In Progress																
State-of-Good-Repair - Police			2,326	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	18,326	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	20,000	38,326	38,326
H.R.M.S. Upgrade	1,485		550	0	0	0	380	930	1,105	0	0	0	0	1,105	2,035	3,520
Peer to Peer Site (Disaster Recovery Site) *	3,879		1,000	4,000	7,759	3,500	0	16,259	0	0	0	0	0	0	16,259	20,138
Facilities Realignment	7,000		0	0	1,600	21,421	8,387	31,408	217	0	0	0	0	217	31,625	38,625
T.R.M.S. Upgrade	600		0	1,500	2,022	0	0	3,522	0	630	1,500	2,022	0	4,152	7,674	8,274
Business Intelligence	2,336		4,069	3,811	0	0	0	7,880	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,880	10,216
Electronic Document Management (Proof of Concept)	50		450	0	0	0	0	450	0	0	0	0	0	0	450	500
Total, Projects In Progress	**15,350**	**0**	**8,395**	**13,311**	**15,381**	**28,921**	**12,767**	**78,775**	**5,322**	**4,630**	**5,500**	**6,022**	**4,000**	**25,474**	**104,249**	**119,599**
Upcoming Projects																
Radio Replacement	0		14,141	3,050	3,460	2,452	4,949	28,052	6,074	4,544	42	1,026	226	11,912	39,964	39,964
41 Division (includes land)	0		0	0	395	9,561	19,122	29,078	9,850	0	0	0	0	9,850	38,928	38,928
TPS Archiving	0		50	50	650	0	0	750	0	0	0	0	0	0	750	750
32 Division - Renovation	0		0	1,200	4,790	5,990	0	11,980	0	0	0	0	0	0	11,980	11,980
Parking West				5,600	1,800	2,200		9,600							9,600	9,600
13 Division (includes land)	0		0	0	0	0	372	372	8,645	18,500	11,411	0	0	38,556	38,928	38,928
A.F.I.S. (next replacement)	0		0	0	0	3,053	0	3,053	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,053	3,053
Property & Evidence Warehouse Racking										0	1,040			1,040	1,040	1,040
Expansion of Fibre Optics Network	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	881	0	4,785	6,385	0	12,051	12,051	12,051
22 Division - Renovation	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,000	5,300	0	8,300	8,300	8,300
Relocation of P.S.U.	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	500	5,400	5,148	2,000	0	13,048	13,048	13,048
Relocation of F.I.S.	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,649	12,653	17,302	17,302	60,525
Total, Upcoming Capital Projects:	**0**	**0**	**14,191**	**9,900**	**11,095**	**23,256**	**24,443**	**82,885**	**25,950**	**28,444**	**25,426**	**19,360**	**12,879**	**112,059**	**194,944**	**238,167**
Total Debt Funded Capital Projects:	**15,350**	**0**	**22,586**	**23,211**	**26,476**	**52,177**	**37,210**	**161,660**	**31,272**	**33,074**	**30,926**	**25,382**	**16,879**	**137,533**	**299,193**	**357,766**
Total Reserve Projects:	**199,590**	**0**	**16,734**	**26,349**	**30,925**	**28,237**	**24,235**	**126,480**	**22,963**	**25,418**	**31,585**	**28,317**	**24,505**	**132,788**	**259,268**	**458,857**
Total Gross Projects	**214,940**	**0**	**39,320**	**49,560**	**57,401**	**80,414**	**61,445**	**288,140**	**54,235**	**58,492**	**62,511**	**53,699**	**41,384**	**270,321**	**558,461**	**816,624**
Funding Sources:																
Vehicle and Equipment Reserve	(199,590)		(16,734)	(26,349)	(30,925)	(28,237)	(24,235)	(126,480)	(22,963)	(25,418)	(31,585)	(28,317)	(24,505)	(132,788)	(259,268)	(458,857)
Funding from Development Charges	(21,476)		(1,000)	(2,931)	0	(12,775)	(5,410)	(22,116)	(6,380)	(9,688)	(11,971)	(5,415)	(578)	(34,032)	(56,148)	(77,624)
Total Funding Sources:	**(221,066)**		**(17,734)**	**(29,280)**	**(30,925)**	**(41,012)**	**(29,645)**	**(148,596)**	**(29,343)**	**(35,106)**	**(43,556)**	**(33,732)**	**(25,083)**	**(166,820)**	**(315,415)**	**(536,481)**
Total Net Debt-Funding Request:	**(6,126)**		**21,586**	**20,280**	**26,476**	**39,402**	**31,800**	**139,544**	**24,892**	**23,386**	**18,955**	**19,967**	**16,301**	**103,502**	**243,046**	**280,143**
5-year Average:								27,909						20,700	24,305	
City Target:			31,892	35,231	31,991	27,978	31,800	158,892	17,322	9,310	18,581	22,581	16,360	84,154	243,046	
City Target - 5-year Average:								31,778						16,831	24,305	
Variance to Target:			10,306	14,951	5,515	(11,424)	0	19,348	(7,570)	(14,076)	(374)	2,614	59	(19,348)	0	
Cumulative Variance to Target			25,257	30,772	19,348	19,348			11,778	(2,298)	(2,672)	(59)	0			
Variance to Target - 5-year Average:								3,870						(3,870)	0	

*Note: Project lost funding at the end of 2015 which is not reflected in total project cost.

2016 Capital Budget Variance Report as at December 31, 2016 ($000s)

Project Name	Carry Forward from 2015	2016 Budget	Available to Spend in 2016	2016 Projection	Year-End Variance - (Over)/Under	Carry Forward to 2017	Funds Returned to the City	Total Project Budget	Total Project Cost (Projects)	Project Variance - (Over)/Under	Comments	Overall Project Health
Debt-Funded Projects												
Facility Projects:												
Facilities Realignment (includes land)	7,000.0	0.0	7,000.0	448.1	6,551.9	0.0	6,551.9	38,625.0	32,073.1	6,551.9	Please refer to the body of the report.	Red
TPS Archiving	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	50.0	-	700.0	700.0	-	Project will be completed in 2017.	Yellow
Information Technology Projects:												
Peer to Peer Site	3,629.0	1,000.0	4,629.0	3,788.8	840.2	840.2	-	19,924.3	19,924.3	-	Please refer to the body of the report.	Yellow
HRMS Upgrade	1,125.0	550.0	1,675.0	1,149.8	525.2	525.2	-	1,934.6	1,934.6	-	Please refer to the body of the report.	Green
TRMS Upgrade	600.0	0.0	600.0	307.8	292.2	0.0	292.2	4,122.0	3,829.8	292.2	Please refer to the body of the report.	Yellow
Enterprise Business Intelligence	2,174.1	4,069.0	6,243.1	3,206.8	3,036.3	3,036.3		10,216.0	10,216.0	-	Please refer to the body of the report.	Yellow
Electronic Document Management (Proof of Concept)	50.0	450.0	500.0	226.3	273.7	273.7	-	500.0	500.0	-	Project will be completed in 2017.	Yellow
Radio Replacement	0.0	14,141.0	14,141.0	86.8	14,054.2	14,054.2	-	39,964.0	39,964.0	-	Please refer to the body of the report.	Yellow
Replacements / Maintenance / Equipment Projects:												
State-of-Good-Repair - Police	1,800.0	1,883.0	3,683.0	2,335.8	1,347.2	1,347.2	-	n/a	n/a	-	Please refer to the body of the report.	Yelow
52 Division Renovations	4,736.0	926.0	5,662.0	4,928.3	733.6	733.6	-	9,268.0	9,268.0	-	Please refer to the body of the report.	Green
Total Debt-Funded Projects	**21,114.1**	**23,069.0**	**44,183.1**	**16,478.5**	**27,704.5**	**20,860.4**	**6,844.1**					
Lifecycle Projects (Vehicle & Equipment Reserve)												
Vehicle Replacement	1,470.1	6,021.0	7,491.1	6,414.5	1,076.6	1,076.6	-	n/a	n/a	n/a	Please refer to the body of the report.	Green
IT-Related Replacements	8,027.2	9,037.0	17,064.2	10,590.7	6,473.5	5,377.7	1,095.8	n/a	n/a	n/a	Please refer to the body of the report.	Green
Other Equipment	1,301.5	1,676.0	2,977.5	919.7	2,057.9	2,039.3	18.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	Please refer to the body of the report.	Green
Total Lifecycle Projects	**10,798.9**	**16,734.0**	**27,532.9**	**17,924.9**	**9,608.0**	**8,493.7**	**1,095.8**					
Total Gross Expenditures:	**31,913.0**	**39,803.0**	**71,716.0**	**34,403.4**	**37,312.5**	**29,354.1**	**7,939.9**	*Percent spent:*		*48.0%*		
Less other-than-debt funding:												
Funding from Developmental Charges	(5,973.4)	(1,000.0)	(6,973.4)	(1,973.4)	(5,000.0)	0.0	(5,000.0)	n/a	n/a	n/a		
Vehicle & Equipment Reserve	(10,798.9)	(16,734.0)	(27,532.9)	(17,924.9)	(9,608.0)	(8,493.7)	(1,095.8)	n/a	n/a	n/a		
Total Other-than-debt Funding:	**(16,772.3)**	**(17,734.0)**	**(34,506.3)**	**(19,898.3)**	**(14,608.0)**	**(8,493.7)**	**(6,095.8)**					
Total Net Expenditures:	**15,140.7**	**22,069.0**	**37,209.7**	**14,505.1**	**22,704.5**	**20,860.4**	**1,844.1**			**39.0%**		

Total Project Budget is adjusted for returned funds to the City in previous years

Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 1, 2017

To: Chair and Members
             Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
             Chief of Police

Subject: Toronto Police Service 2017-2026 Capital Program Request - Revised

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that:

(1) the Board approve the Toronto Police Service's 2017-2026 Capital Program with a 2017 net request of $17.5 Million (excluding cash flow carry forwards from 2016), and a net total of $224.3 Million for 2017-2026, as detailed in Attachment B; and

(2) the Board forward a copy of this report to the City's Deputy City Manager and Chief Financial Officer for information.

Financial Implications:

The Toronto Police Service's (Service) 2017-2026 Capital Program, as revised by the Council, is $8.2 Million (M) below the Board-approved amount.

The ten-year Council-approved program includes $6M in reduced cash flow adjustments made by City Finance to the Facility Realignment project and $4.7M to the State of Good Repair (S.O.G.R.) project, as well $2.6M in funding for the Parking Handheld Administrative Penalty System (A.P.S.) project from the existing debt target.

Table 1 below provides a summary of the Service's revised 2017-2026 Capital Program, as compared to the City's affordability target.

Additional detail on the original Board-approved and revised debt-funded program can be found in Attachments A and B respectively.

Table 1. Summary of 2017-2026 Capital Program Request ($Ms)

Description	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	5-Year Total	2022-2026 Total	2017-2026 Total
Total On-Going and New projects	24.5	23.9	43.7	45.1	31.1	168.3	103.1	271.3
Reserve-funded projects	22.3	20.9	33.1	24.3	21.6	122.2	129.5	251.6
Total Gross projects:	46.8	44.8	76.7	69.5	52.6	290.4	232.6	523.0
Funding from Reserves	-22.3	-20.9	-33.1	-24.3	-21.6	-122.2	-129.5	-251.6
Funding from Developmental charges	-7.0	-2.9	-3.5	-13.8	-4.1	-31.4	-15.7	-47.1
NET DEBT FUNDING:	17.5	21.0	40.1	31.3	26.9	136.9	87.4	224.3
CITY DEBT TARGET:	21.4	24.3	39.4	31.8	24.9	141.8	90.6	232.5
Variance to target "(over)/under"	3.9	3.4	(0.7)	0.5	-2.0	5.0	3.2	8.2

Background / Purpose:

The purpose of this report is to advise the Board of changes made, through the City budget review process, to the Service's Board-approved 2017-2026 capital program.

Discussion:

At it's meeting of October 20, 2016, the Board approved the Service's 2017-2026 capital program request at $19M in 2017 and $232.5M for 2017- 2026, as detailed in Attachment A (Min. No. P244/16 refers).

As part of the City's budget process, the Board-approved capital program is reviewed by City Finance staff, the City's Budget Committee, the City's Executive Committee and ultimately City Council. Through this process, the City committees and City Council are provided with both the Board-approved program, and the City's capital budget Analyst notes.

For the 2017-2026 capital program, the Analyst notes included recommendations to reduce the Service's Board-approved capital program by $8.2M, as summarized below.

S.O.G.R. Project:

City Finance staff advised Service staff that costs, such as small electrical, lock and handyman repairs, are not considered eligible costs under the S.O.G.R. project in the capital program.   As a result, $475,000 (K) per year for a total of $4.7M was removed from the 2017-2026 Capital Program. These expenditures will be funded from the

operating budget to the extent that funding can be reprioritized to meet these requirements.

Facilities Realignment Project:

City Finance staff also reduced the Facility Realignment project by $6M on the premise that the Service no longer requires the funding for a new facility for Parking West and only requires funding for the renovation of an existing facility or facilities.

Parking Handhelds - Administrative Penalty System (A.P.S.) Project

Based on a Council decision at its July 2016 meeting, the City is changing the governance and administrative requirements to establish an A.P.S. for parking violations (i.e. parking tickets) which will include an Administrative Penalty Tribunal. This change is effective May 15, 2017.

Moving to an A.P.S. program for parking violations will require one-time start-up costs of approximately $2.2M to enable the use of digital photography, plus $350K for new parking tag books. City Finance staff originally requested that this amount be included below the line in the Service's capital budget, while the funding source was being reviewed for the additional requirement. After their review, City staff determined that the $2.55M required be accommodated by the Service within its current debt target, and added it to the Service's 2017 capital program.

Other Changes:

There were also cash flow adjustments made to the Radio Replacement project from 2017 to 2018 and 2019 and to the Enterprise Business Intelligence (E.B.I.) project from 2017 to 2018. However, the total project costs remain the same.

Conclusion:

City Council approved the Service's 2017-2026 capital at a net amount of $17.5M for 2017 (excluding cash flow carry forwards from 2016), and a net total of $224.3 for 2017-2026, which is below the Board-approved amount by $8.2M. This change was the result of adjustments made by City Finance staff and approved through the City budget review process.

As a result, the Board is requested to approve the revised 2017 – 2026 Capital Program that was approved by City Council.

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command will be in attendance to answer any questions from the Board.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.

Chief of Police

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Filename: 2017_2026_capital_approval_revised.doc

2017-2026 Capital Program Request ($000s) - Board Approved

Project Name	Plan to end of 2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total 2017-2021 Request	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	Total 2022-2026 Forecast	Total 2017-2026 Program	Total Project Cost
Projects In Progress															
State-of-Good-Repair - Police		4,875	4,875	4,875	5,005	4,400	24,030	4,875	4,875	4,875	4,875	4,875	24,375	48,405	48,405
Transforming Corporate Support (TRMS & HRMS) *	2,535	2,500	2,100	1,500	400		6,500				0	0	0	6,500	9,035
Peer to Peer Site (Disaster Recovery Site) *	4,665	4,000	7,759	3,500	0	0	15,259	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,259	19,924
Facility Realignment *	7,000	5,000	5,195	37,572	36,042	20,012	103,821	23,900	19,059	7,200	0	20,288	70,447	174,268	174,268
Enterprise Business Intelligence	6,405	3,811	0	0	0	0	3,811	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,811	10,216
TPS Archiving	50		650	0	0	0	650	0	0	0	0		0	650	700
Radio Replacement	14,141	2,531	3,460	2,452	4,949	6,074	19,466	4,544	42	1,026	226		5,838	25,304	39,445
Total, Projects In Progress	**34,796**	**22,717**	**24,039**	**49,899**	**46,396**	**30,486**	**173,537**	**33,319**	**23,976**	**13,101**	**5,101**	**25,163**	**100,660**	**274,197**	**301,993**
Upcoming Projects															
Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW)	0	750	0	0	0	0	750	0	0	0	0	0	0	750	750
Body Worn Camera - Initial phase	0	500	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	500
AFIS (next replacement)	0	0	0	3,053	0	0	3,053	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,053	3,053
Property & Evidence Warehouse Racking	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,040	0	0	0	1,040	1,040	1,040
Total, Upcoming Capital Projects:	**0**	**1,250**	**0**	**3,053**	**0**	**0**	**4,303**	**0**	**1,040**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1,040**	**5,343**	**5,343**
Total Gross Debt Funded Capital Projects:	**34,796**	**23,967**	**24,039**	**52,952**	**46,396**	**30,486**	**177,840**	**33,319**	**25,016**	**13,101**	**5,101**	**25,163**	**101,700**	**279,540**	**307,336**
Total Reserve Projects:	**212,902**	**22,300**	**20,884**	**33,062**	**24,335**	**21,575**	**122,156**	**24,145**	**20,598**	**37,234**	**24,646**	**22,870**	**129,493**	**251,648**	**464,551**
Total Gross Projects	**247,698**	**46,267**	**44,923**	**86,014**	**70,731**	**52,061**	**299,996**	**57,464**	**45,614**	**50,335**	**29,747**	**48,033**	**231,193**	**531,188**	**771,886**
Funding Sources:															
Vehicle and Equipment Reserve	(212,902)	(22,300)	(20,884)	(33,062)	(24,335)	(21,575)	(122,156)	(24,145)	(20,598)	(37,234)	(24,646)	(22,870)	(129,493)	(251,648)	(464,551)
Funding from Development Charges	(21,476)	(5,000)	(3,194)	(13,512)	(5,140)	(9,145)	(35,991)	(5,204)	(5,308)	0	0	(578)	(11,090)	(47,081)	(68,557)
Total Funding Sources:	**(234,378)**	**(27,300)**	**(24,078)**	**(46,574)**	**(29,475)**	**(30,720)**	**(158,147)**	**(29,349)**	**(25,906)**	**(37,234)**	**(24,646)**	**(23,448)**	**(140,583)**	**(298,729)**	**(533,108)**
Total Net Debt-Funding Request:	**13,320**	**18,967**	**20,845**	**39,440**	**41,256**	**21,341**	**141,849**	**28,115**	**19,708**	**13,101**	**5,101**	**24,585**	**90,610**	**232,459**	**238,779**
5-year Average:							28,370						18,122	23,246	
City Target:		21,411	24,345	39,402	31,800	24,891	141,849	23,386	18,956	19,967	16,301	12,000	90,610	232,459	
City Target - 5-year Average:							28,370						18,122	23,246	
Variance to Target:		2,444	3,500	(38)	(9,456)	3,550	0	(4,729)	(752)	6,866	11,200	(12,585)	0	0	
Cumulative Variance to Target			5,944	5,906	(3,550)	0		(4,729)	(5,481)	1,385	12,585	0			
Variance to Target - 5-year Average:							0						0	0	
Other Projects - Below the line															
Total Other projects - Below the line	0	2,550	0	0	0	0	2,550	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,550	2,550
City Target	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Variance from Target	0	(2,550)	0	0	0	0	(2,550)	0	0	0	0	0	0	(2,550)	(2,550)

* These projects have returned funding to the City due to one year carry forward rule. These amounts are not reflected in the total project cost.

2017-2026 Capital Program Request ($000s) - Council Approved

Project Name	Plan to end of 2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total 2017-2021 Request	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	Total 2022-2026 Forecast	Total 2017-2026 Program	Total Project Cost
Projects In Progress															
State-of-Good-Repair - Police		4,400	4,400	4,400	4,530	3,925	21,655	4,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	4,400	22,000	43,655	43,655
Transforming Corporate Support (TRMS & HRMS) *	2,535	2,500	2,100	1,500	400		6,500				0	0	0	6,500	9,035
Peer to Peer Site (Disaster Recovery Site) *	4,665	4,000	7,759	3,500	0	0	15,259	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,259	19,924
Facility Realignment *	7,000	7,000	3,195	27,561	35,247	21,061	94,064	17,028	17,740	14,066	12,459	12,906	74,199	168,263	168,263
Enterprise Business Intelligence	6,405	2,811	1,000	0	0	0	3,811	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,811	10,216
TPS Archiving	50		650	0	0	0	650	0	0	0			0	650	700
Radio Replacement	14,141		4,779	3,664	4,949	6,074	19,466	4,544	42	1,026	226		5,838	25,304	39,445
Total, Projects In Progress	34,796	20,711	23,883	40,625	45,126	31,060	161,405	25,972	22,182	19,492	17,085	17,306	102,037	263,442	291,238
Upcoming Projects															
Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW)	0	750	0	0	0	0	750	0	0	0	0	0	0	750	750
Body Worn Camera - Initial phase	0	500	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	0	0	0	500	500
Parking Handheld APS		2,550	0				2,550						0	2,550	2,550
AFIS (next replacement)	0	0	0	3,053	0	0	3,053	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,053	3,053
Property & Evidence Warehouse Racking	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,040	0	0	0	1,040	1,040	1,040
Total, Upcoming Capital Projects:	0	3,800	0	3,053	0	0	6,853	0	1,040	0	0	0	1,040	7,893	7,893
Total Gross Debt Funded Capital Projects:	34,796	24,511	23,883	43,678	45,126	31,060	168,258	25,972	23,222	19,492	17,085	17,306	103,077	271,335	299,131
Other than debt expenditure (Draw from Reserve)															
Total Reserve Projects:	212,902	22,300	20,884	33,062	24,335	21,575	122,156	24,145	20,598	37,234	24,646	22,870	129,493	251,648	464,551
Total Gross Projects	247,698	46,811	44,767	76,740	69,461	52,635	290,414	50,117	43,820	56,726	41,731	40,176	232,570	522,984	763,682
Funding Sources:															
Vehicle and Equipment Reserve	(212,902)	(22,300)	(20,884)	(33,062)	(24,335)	(21,575)	(122,156)	(24,145)	(20,598)	(37,234)	(24,646)	(22,870)	(129,493)	(251,648)	(464,551)
Funding from Development Charges	(21,476)	(7,000)	(2,931)	(3,539)	(13,801)	(4,120)	(31,391)	(5,204)	(9,908)	0	0	(578)	(15,690)	(47,081)	(68,557)
Total Funding Sources:	(234,378)	(29,300)	(23,815)	(36,601)	(38,136)	(25,695)	(153,547)	(29,349)	(30,506)	(37,234)	(24,646)	(23,448)	(145,183)	(298,729)	(533,108)
Total Net Debt-Funding Request:	13,320	17,511	20,952	40,139	31,325	26,940	136,867	20,768	13,314	19,492	17,085	16,728	87,387	224,254	230,574
5-year Average:							27,373						17,477	22,425	
City Target:		21,411	24,345	39,402	31,800	24,891	141,849	23,386	18,956	19,967	16,301	12,000	90,610	232,459	
City Target - 5-year Average:							28,370						18,122	23,246	
Variance to Target:		3,900	3,393	(737)	475	(2,049)	4,982	2,618	5,642	475	(784)	(4,728)	3,223	8,205	
Cumulative Variance to Target			7,293	6,556	7,031	4,982		7,600	13,242	13,717	12,933	8,205			
Variance to Target - 5-year Average:							996						645	820	

* These projects have returned funding to the City due to one year carry forward rule. These amounts are not reflected in the total project cost.

March 1, 2017

To: Chair and Members
                Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
                Chief of Police

Subject: Toronto Police Service – 2017 Operating Budget Request – Revised

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that:

(1) the Board approve a revised 2017 Toronto Police Service (Service) net operating budget of $1,004.5 Million ($1,127.8 Million gross), as a result of changes made by the City Budget Committee and approved by City Council, and which represents a decrease of $0.2M or 0.02% over the 2016 net approved operating budget; and

(2) the Board forward a copy of this report to the City's Deputy City Manager and Chief Financial Officer for information.

Financial Implications:

The Board approved 2017 operating budget was reduced by $2.1Million (M) as a result of an adjustment made by the City's Budget Committee at its January 24, 2017 meeting, which was subsequently approved by the City's Executive Committee and City Council.

This reduction is based on the assumption that the Service will receive grant funding from the Province that is greater than what the Service included in its revenue estimates when the Board approved the budget in October 2016.

In late December 2016, following the Board's approval of the Service's 2017 operating budget request, the Service was invited to apply for a new transitional grant, offered by the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (M.C.S.C.S.), titled the Policing Effectiveness and Modernization (P.E.M.) grant. It is anticipated that the grant funding the Service will receive from the P.E.M. grant, will result in an increase to the Service's overall revenue estimates.

Background / Purpose:

The purpose of this report is to provide the Toronto Police Service's Board (Board) with the Service's revised 2017 operating budget, for approval.

Discussion:

At the Board meeting held on October 20, 2016, the Chief presented a 2017 operating budget request of $1,002.7M, a $2.0M or 0.2% decrease over the 2016 operating budget. The operating budget request assumed that the transfers to the City of the Lifeguard program and the Crossing Guard program would take place in 2017.

Impact from the Deferral of Transfer of the School Crossing Guard and Lifeguard Programs:

At that meeting, the Board approved the following Motion (Min. No. P242/16 refers):

> *THAT the Chief of Police continue to operate the Lifeguard and School Crossing Guard programs under the current operational model for a transition period of up to one year, no later than July 2018, to allow for the transfer of the programs to the appropriate responsible body for the September 2018 to June 2019 school year. That the Board request the City to fund the programs during the transition period from non-program revenue until the transition date, at which time, the cost and revenue should be transferred to the budget of the responsible body to be determined by the City and resulting from consultation between the City Manager and the Chief of Police;*

The impact of the Board motion was to increase the Service's original operating budget request by $3.8M, to reinstate the budgets for the Lifeguard and School Crossing Guard programs. This resulted in a revised 2017 net operating budget request of $1,006.6M for the Service, an increase of $1.8M or 0.2% over the 2016 net approved budget.

Impact of Recently Announced P.E.M. Grant:

In late December 2016, the M.C.S.C.S. announced the availability funding under a new Policing Effectiveness and Modernization (P.E.M.) grant. Under this new transitional grant, funds are to be used to support modernization initiatives that improve the efficiency and effectiveness of community safety and policing services.   As the objective of the grant program is to fund modernization initiatives, the Service will apply for initiatives that align with the Transformational Task Force's (T.T.F.) direction and assist the Service in implementing the recommendations in the T.T.F. report.

As a result of the P.E.M. grant announcement, at its meeting on January 24, 2017, the City's Budget Committee approved the following motion:

> *"Reduce to [sic] the Toronto Police Service's 2017 Preliminary Operating Budget by $2.1 million net to reflect the confirmation of $8.5 million in provincial funding, which will reduce the 2017 Operating Budget for the Toronto Police Service to $1,004.4 million."*

The Service's revised 2017 net operating budget of $1,004.5 M was subsequently approved by City Council at its meeting on February 15, 2017.

Conclusion:

The 2017 net operating budget of $1,002.7M, approved by the Board in October 2016, has been increased by $3.8M as a result of the deferral of the transfer of the School Crossing Guard and Lifeguard programs, and decreased by $2.1M for the increased revenue anticipated from the recently announced P.E.M. grant by M.C.S.C.S.

These changes result in a revised 2017 net budget request of $1,004.5M, a decrease of $0.2M or 0.02% over the 2016 net approved operating budget.

Mr. Tony Veneziano, Chief Administrative Officer, Corporate Services Command will be in attendance to answer any questions from the Board.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.

Chief of Police

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

January 13, 2017

To: Chair and Members
           Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
           Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation: Firearms Injury to Mr. Peter Logaridis

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is notified of an incident involving serious injury or death, provincial legislation directs that a chief of police shall conduct an administrative investigation.

Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11(1) states:

"The chief of police shall also cause an investigation to be conducted forthwith into any incident with respect to which the S.I.U. has been notified, subject to the S.I.U.'s lead role in investigating the incident."

Section 11(2) of the Regulation states:

"The purpose of the chief of police's investigation is to review the policies of or services provided by the police force and the conduct of its police officers."

Section 11(4) of the Regulation states:

"The chief of police of a municipal police force shall report his or her findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the S.I.U. director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the S.I.U.'s investigation to the Attorney General, and the board may make the chief of police's report available to the public."

Upon conclusion of their investigation, the S.I.U. provides the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) with a letter. The S.I.U. does not provide the T.P.S. with a copy of the report that was provided to the Attorney General.

Discussion:

On January 7, 2015, Mr. Peter Logaridis entered the Handy Variety Store on Sherbourne Street. Mr. Logaridis, who is known to the storeowner, asked for a package of cigarettes on credit. The storeowner refused to extend credit to Mr. Logaridis, in response; Mr. Logaridis pointed a black handgun at the storeowner's temple and demanded the cigarettes. The storeowner complied with the demand but Mr. Logaridis left without taking the cigarettes. The storeowner contacted the T.P.S. and provided them with a description of the suspect and his direction of travel.

A police officer from 51 Division observed a male matching Mr. Logaridis' description enter a pharmacy on Bloor Street East. After confirming the description of the suspect, the officer requested the assistance of other units.

Several officers arrived at the scene and positioned themselves at the various entrance points to the pharmacy.

Numerous officers entered the pharmacy; they took up positions of cover and evacuated employees and patrons from the premises. Mr. Logaridis could be seen standing near the pharmacy counter, brandishing the handgun. The handgun later proved to be a replica firearm.

All of the officers directed Mr. Logaridis to *"drop the gun"*. He refused to comply with the officers' instructions.

Mr. Logaridis advanced on two officers with the firearm pointed directly at the officers. Once again, both officers directed Mr. Logaridis to drop the gun. He refused to comply with their demands.

One officer, fearing for the safety of himself and the other officers, discharged one shot from his Service pistol, striking Mr. Logaridis in the left leg. Mr. Logaridis simply said "ouch" and continued to point the firearm at the officers.

The officer discharged his Service pistol for a second time, striking Mr. Logaridis in the lower left abdominal area. Mr. Logaridis fell to floor with the gun landing only a short distance away.

The officers approached Mr. Logaridis and provided medical attention while awaiting Toronto Paramedic Services (Paramedics). Paramedics transported Mr. Logaridis to hospital where he received treatment for the gunshot wounds. He later recovered from his injuries.

The S.I.U. was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. had designated one officer as subject officer; eleven other officers were designated as witness officers.

In a letter to the Service dated August 31, 2015, Acting Director Joseph Martino of the S.I.U. advised that the investigation was complete and no further action was contemplated.

Summary of the Service's Investigation:

Professional Standards Support (P.S.S.) and Professional Standards Investigative Unit conducted an investigation pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11.

P.S.S. examined the use of force in relation to the applicable legislation, service provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.S.S. investigation reviewed the following Service procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest)
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons)
- Procedure 04-21 (Gathering/Preserving Evidence)
- Procedure 05-02 (Robberies/Hold-ups)
- Procedure 05-21 (Firearms)
- Procedure 08-03 (Injured on Duty Reporting)
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies)
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Procedure 13-17 (Memorandum Books and Reports)
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury / Illness Reporting)
- Procedure 15-03 (Service Firearms)
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System)

The P.S.S. investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Police Services Act* Section 113 (Special Investigations)

- Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 9 (Discharge Firearm)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 14.2 (Use of Force Qualifications)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 14.5 (Use of Force Report)

The P.S.S. investigation determined that Service's policies and procedures associated with the applied use of force were found to be lawful, in keeping with current legislation and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

February 14, 2017

To: Chair and Members
                   Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
                   Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation: Firearms Injury to Mr. Daniel Duarte-Alvarez

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is notified of an incident involving serious injury or death, provincial legislation directs that a chief of police shall conduct an administrative investigation.

Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11(1) states:

"The chief of police shall also cause an investigation to be conducted forthwith into any incident with respect to which the S.I.U. has been notified, subject to the S.I.U.'s lead role in investigating the incident."

Section 11(2) of the Regulation states:

"The purpose of the chief of police's investigation is to review the policies of or services provided by the police force and the conduct of its police officers."

Section 11(4) of the Regulation states:

"The chief of police of a municipal police force shall report his or her findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the S.I.U. director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the S.I.U.'s investigation to the Attorney General, and the board may make the chief of police's report available to the public."

Upon conclusion of their investigation, the S.I.U. provides the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) with a letter. The S.I.U. does not provide the T.P.S. with a copy of the report that was provided to the Attorney General.

Discussion:

On April 16, 2015, members of Intelligence Services were in the area of Jane Street and Driftwood Avenue conducting an unrelated investigation; the officers were working in a plainclothes capacity.

At 1745 hours, an officer heard the sound of automatic gunfire coming from the area of Driftwood Avenue. Seconds later, the officer saw a black Hyundai Accent come to an abrupt stop near a pathway which leads to a nearby townhouse complex. Several male suspects ran from the townhouse complex and entered the vehicle which then fled the parking lot at a high rate of speed. The officer broadcasted their observations and other team members began to follow the vehicle as it headed northbound on Jane Street.

The officers followed the suspect's vehicle as it travelled into York Region and then made its way back into the Rexdale area. The officers assessed the area and stopped the vehicle.

The driver remained in the vehicle and surrendered to officers. One suspect fled from the vehicle but was immediately arrested. Two more suspects, one later identified as Mr. Daniel Duarte-Alvarez, also fled from the vehicle.

One of the officers could see that one of the fleeing suspects had a gun in his hand. Mr. Duarte-Alvarez and the second male fled into the backyard of an address on Elmhurst Drive; the second suspect was arrested without incident.

The officers located Mr. Duarte-Alvarez hiding in a large cedar hedge, located at another home on Elmhurst Drive. Mr. Duarte-Alvarez was holding a handgun that was pointing directly at the officer. The officer shouted out "gun, gun, gun…police don't move!" Mr. Duarte-Alvarez charged towards the officer, who was only five feet away. The officer stepped aside and discharged two rounds at Mr. Duarte-Alvarez.

Mr. Duarte-Alvarez fell to the ground and the gun fell from his hand. The officer shouted out for assistance, began first aid and requested Toronto Paramedic Services

(Paramedics). The officer secured the firearm and placed Mr. Duarte-Alvarez under arrest.

Paramedics arrived and transported Mr. Duarte-Alvarez to hospital where he was admitted and treated for two gunshot wounds. Mr. Duarte-Alvarez recovered from his injuries.

The S.I.U. was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. designated one officer as a subject officer; nine other officers were designated as witness officers.

In a letter to the T.P.S. dated January 22, 2016, Director Tony Loparco of the S.I.U. advised that the investigation was complete and no further action was contemplated.

The S.I.U. published a media release which is available at: **www.siu.on.ca**.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation:

Professional Standards Support (P.S.S.) conducted an investigation pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11.

P.S.S examined the use of force in relation to the applicable legislation, service provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.
.
The P.S.S. investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest)
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody)
- Procedure 05-21 (Firearms)
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies)
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Procedure 13-17 (Memorandum Books and Reports)
- Procedure 15-01 (Use of Force)
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting)
- Procedure 15-03 (Service Firearms)
- Procedure 15-11 (Use of Service Vehicles)

The P.S.S. investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Police Services Act* Section 113 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers respecting investigations by the Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 14.2 (Use of Force Qualifications)

The P.S.S. investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with the applied use of force were found to be lawful, in keeping with current legislation and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

January 23, 2017

To: Chair and Members
                Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
                Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation: Custody Injury to Youth 2016-A

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is notified of an incident involving serious injury or death, provincial legislation directs that a chief of police shall conduct an administration investigation.

Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11(1) states:

"The chief of police shall also cause an investigation to be conducted forthwith into any incident with respect to which the S.I.U. has been notified, subject to the S.I.U.'s lead role in investigating the incident."

Section 11(2) of the Regulation states:

"The purpose of the chief of police's investigation is to review the policies of or services provided by the police force and the conduct of its police officers."

Section 11(4) of the Regulation states:

"The chief of police of a municipal police force shall report his or her findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the S.I.U. director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the S.I.U.'s investigation to the Attorney General, and the board may make the chief of police's report available to the public."

Upon conclusion of their investigation, the S.I.U. provides the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) with a letter. The S.I.U. does not provide the T.P.S. with a copy of the report that was provided to the Attorney General.

Discussion:

On June 5, 2015, at about 2300 hours, several uniform members of 51 Division were working a Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (T.A.V.I.S.) callback assignment in 51 Division. They were on general patrol in the area of Bleeker Street.

The officers observed a group of youths sitting outside of the address and one male, later identified as Youth 2016-A (2016-A), was smoking a cigarette. There was a clearly posted City of Toronto bylaw regulation sign indicating – *"No Smoking within 9 meters of the entrance / exit."* There was also an open bottle of beer nearby and when the officers engaged 2016-A about his behavior, he became agitated and verbally aggressive towards the officers.

They noted an odour of an alcoholic beverage from his breath and the officers believed that he was intoxicated in a public place.

The officers placed 2016-A under arrest for being intoxicated in a public place contrary to the *Liquor License Act,* and attempted to handcuff him. Once one handcuff was applied by an officer, 2016-A attempted to flee from the officer by running away. The officer still had control of one side of the handcuff and was able to hold on and maintain control of 2016-A until other officers arrived to assist. After a brief and violent struggle, 2016-A was subdued and placed under arrest. 2016-A remained verbally aggressive towards the officers and began to spit at them.

During the search of 2016-A, incident to his arrest, a retractable baton, a pair of weighted gloves and white surgical mask were located on his person. He was transported to 51 Division for further investigation and processing on several charges. His mother was notified of the event, charges and the fact that he would be held in custody until he was sober enough to be released.

2016-A maintained his aggressive behavior once lodged in the cells. Cell video recordings show that he was punching the cell door and walls. Injuries that were recorded indicated that 2016-A had suffered scrapes to his back and abrasions to his wrists from the application of the handcuffs.

2016-A was released from custody at 1000 hours on June 6, 2015. He was driven home and was released into the custody of his mother.

On June 7, 2015, counsel for 2016-A sent an e-mail to the T.P.S. advising; "*that he had been contacted by a young man because his hand was fractured due to an officer stepping on his handcuffed arms-in respect of an incident at Bleeker Street.*"

The family or counsel for 2016-A would not provide any medical evidence in respect to the injuries that were alleged to have been suffered other than by verbal reporting of the injuries.

The S.I.U. was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. designated one officer as subject officer; five other officers were designated as witness officers.

In a letter to the T.P.S. dated January 28, 2016, Director Tony Loparco of the S.I.U. advised that the investigation had been completed, the file had been closed and no further action was contemplated.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation:

Professional Standards Support (P.S.S.) conducted an investigation pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11.

P.S.S. examined the applied use of force in relation to the applicable legislation, service provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.S.S. investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest)
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons)
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody)
- Procedure 06-04 (Emotionally Disturbed Persons)
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies)
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Procedure 13-17 (Memorandum Books and Reports)
- Procedure 15-01 (Use of Force)

The P.S.S. investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Police Services Act* Section 113 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers respecting investigations by the Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 14.2 (Use of Force Qualifications)

The P.S.S. investigation determined that the T.P.S. policies and procedures associated with the applied use of force were found to be lawful, in keeping with current legislation and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

March 16, 2017

To: Chair and Members
                 Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
                 Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Mr. Sean Gill.

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is notified of an incident involving serious injury or death, provincial legislation directs that a chief of police shall conduct an administrative investigation.

Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11(1) states:

"The chief of police shall also cause an investigation to be conducted forthwith into any incident with respect to which the S.I.U. has been notified, subject to the S.I.U.'s lead role in investigating the incident."

Section 11(2) of the Regulation states:

"The purpose of the chief of police's investigation is to review the policies of or services provided by the police force and the conduct of its police officers."

Section 11(4) of the Regulation states:

"The chief of police of a municipal police force shall report his or her findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the S.I.U. director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the S.I.U.'s investigation to the Attorney General, and the board may make the chief of police's report available to the public."

Upon conclusion of their investigation, the S.I.U. provides the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) with a letter. The S.I.U. does not provide the T.P.S. with a copy of the report that was provided to the Attorney General.

Discussion:

On June 11, 2015, officers from 52 Division responded to an alarm call at business premises located on College Street. As the officers arrived on scene, they observed two male suspects inside the store. One officer remained at the front while the second officer went to the rear of the building. Realizing that police had arrived at the scene, both suspects attempted to flee.

One of the males managed to escape; the other male, later identified as Mr. Sean Gill, exited the rear of the store and attempted to jump over a wooden fence. Mr. Gill slipped from the fence landing face first on the ground.

One officer approached Mr. Gill while he was still on the ground and placed him under arrest. Mr. Gill resisted his arrest which resulted in both officers having to take physical control of him. Mr. Gill continued to struggle with officers until they were able to place him in handcuffs.

Mr. Gill complained of a sore left knee and had visible injuries to his facial area. Mr. Gill was transported to hospital by Toronto Paramedic Services. He was diagnosed with a fractured nasal bone, a fractured left orbital bone and a fractured left knee. He was released a short time later and transported to 52 Division where he was investigated and charged.

The S.I.U. was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. designated one officer as subject officer; ten other officers were designated as witness officers.

In a letter to the Service dated March 3, 2016, Director Mr. Tony Loparco of the S.I.U. advised that the investigation was completed, the file has been closed and no further action is contemplated.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation:

Professional Standards Support (P.S.S.) conducted an investigation pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11.

P.S.S examined the use of force in relation to the applicable legislation, service provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.S.S. investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest)
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody)
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies)
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Procedure 13-17 (Memorandum Books and Reports)
- Procedure 15-01 (Use of Force)
- Procedure 15-02 (Injury/Illness Reporting)

The P.S.S. investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Police Services Act* Section 113 (Special Investigations)
- Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 14.2 (Use of Force Qualifications)

The P.S.S. investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with the applied use of force were found to be lawful, in keeping with current legislation and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

February 10, 2017

To: Chair and Members
              Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
              Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Custody Injury of Mr. Satinderpal Banwait.

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is notified of an incident involving serious injury or death, provincial legislation directs that a chief of police shall conduct an administrative investigation.

Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11(1) states:

"The chief of police shall also cause an investigation to be conducted forthwith into any incident with respect to which the S.I.U. has been notified, subject to the S.I.U.'s lead role in investigating the incident."

Section 11(2) of the Regulation states:

"The purpose of the chief of police's investigation is to review the policies of or services provided by the police force and the conduct of its police officers."

Section 11(4) of the Regulation states:

"The chief of police of a municipal police force shall report his or her findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the S.I.U. director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the S.I.U.'s investigation to the Attorney General, and the board may make the chief of police's report available to the public."

Upon conclusion of their investigation, the S.I.U. provides the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) with a letter. The S.I.U. does not provide the T.P.S. with a copy of the report that was provided to the Attorney General.

Discussion:

On June 30, 2015, officers from 31 Division Primary Response Unit (P.R.U.) attended an address on Weston Road to investigate an alleged assault. The officers spoke to the complainant who reported that a male, Mr. Satinderpal Banwait, had been smoking crack cocaine and had ingested a quantity of crystal methamphetamine. The complainant alleged that the male had assaulted her and then fled from the home.

The officers located Mr. Banwait a short distance away. Mr. Banwait was placed under arrest without incident.

The officers transported Mr. Banwait to 31 Division where a Level 3 search was authorized by the Officer-in-Charge of the station.

During the Level 3 search Mr. Banwait became combative. Mr. Banwait was taken to the ground and restrained. When the search was completed, the search officers observed that Mr. Banwait's lip was bleeding. The officers offered to take Mr. Banwait to hospital for medical treatment; Mr. Banwait declined the offer.

On July 1, 2015, Mr. Banwait was transported to Old City Hall Courts for a bail hearing. At court the injury to Mr. Banwait's lip was noted by receiving Court Officers; Mr. Banwait stated he was fit to attend court.

At 1325 hours Mr. Banwait spoke to a supervisor from Court Services and requested medical attention for a headache. Mr. Banwait was transported to Mount Sinai Hospital. He was diagnosed with a fractured left cheek bone; no treatment was required at that time.

The S.I.U. was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. designated one officer as a subject officer; three other officers were designated as witness officers.

In a letter to the T.P.S. dated April 11, 2016, Director Tony Loparco of the S.I.U. advised that this investigation was complete, the file had been closed and no further action was contemplated.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation:

Professional Standards Support (P.S.S.) conducted an investigation pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11.

P.S.S. examined the use of force in relation to the applicable legislation, service provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.S.S. investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest)
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons)
- Procedure 01-02 Appendix D (Handling Items of Religious Significance)
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody)
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies)
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit)

The P.S.S. investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Police Services Act* Section 113 (Special Investigations)
- Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 14.2 (Use of Force Qualifications)

The P.S.S. investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with the applied use of force were found to be lawful, in keeping with current legislation and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

The T.P.S. Court Services Directives were examined and found to be insufficient. The Directives have been modified to ensure compliancy with the T.P.S. Service Procedure 13-16, Special Investigations Unit in dealing with the reporting of injuries that may fall within the mandate of the S.I.U.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

January 13, 2017

To: Chair and Members
Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation: Custody Injury to Mr. Michael Fuentes-Alfaro

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is notified of an incident involving serious injury or death, provincial legislation directs that a chief of police shall conduct an administration investigation.

Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11(1) states:

"The chief of police shall also cause an investigation to be conducted forthwith into any incident with respect to which the S.I.U. has been notified, subject to the S.I.U.'s lead role in investigating the incident."

Section 11(2) of the Regulation states:

"The purpose of the chief of police's investigation is to review the policies of or services provided by the police force and the conduct of its police officers."

Section 11(4) of the Regulation states:

"The chief of police of a municipal police force shall report his or her findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the S.I.U. director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the S.I.U.'s investigation to the Attorney General, and the board may make the chief of police's report available to the public."

Upon conclusion of their investigation, the S.I.U. provides the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) with a letter. The S.I.U. does not provide the T.P.S. with a copy of the report that was provided to the Attorney General.

Discussion:

On June 16, 2015, plainclothes officers from 13 Division were in the area of Oakwood Avenue and Amherst Avenue. The officers were investigating a series of break and enters that appeared to involve a well-resourced, professional criminal group. Over the course of the investigation, several suspects were identified.

Two plainclothes officers recognized two men believed to be suspects leaving a business on Oakwood Avenue. The two suspects recognized the two officers. The suspects suddenly ran north on Oakwood and were pursued by the two officers. One officer caught up to one of the suspects, later identified as Mr. Michael Fuentes-Alfaro.

The officer attempted to arrest Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro and a struggle ensued, resulting in the officer taking Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro to the ground. Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro punched the officer in an effort to escape. The second suspect also punched and kicked the arresting officer in the back of the head allowing Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro to escape.

Both suspects were able to break free and ran east on Amherst Avenue; pursued by the officers. The officers caught up to Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro and after a brief struggle were able to place him under arrest.

Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro was taken to 13 Division and processed. On June 17, 2015, while still in police custody, Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro was taken to hospital due to swelling to the left side of his forehead and eye area.

Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro was diagnosed with a fracture of the left orbital wall. There was no treatment given and Mr. Fuentes-Alfaro was brought back to 13 Division where he was held for a bail hearing.

The S.I.U. was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. designated one officer as the subject officer; seven other officers were designated as witness officers.

In a letter to the T.P.S. dated March 4, 2016, Director Tony Loparco of the S.I.U. advised that this investigation was complete, the file had been closed and no further action was contemplated.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation:

Professional Standards Support (P.S.S.) conducted an investigation pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11.

P.S.S. examined the use of force in relation to the applicable legislation, service provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.S.S. investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 01-01 (Arrest)
- Procedure 01-02 (Search of Persons)
- Procedure 01-03 (Persons in Custody)
- Procedure 04-13 (Foreign Nationals)
- Procedure 05-14 (Immigration Violations)
- Procedure 10-06 (Medical Emergencies)
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Procedure 15-01 (Use of Force)
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System)

The P.S.S. investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Police Services Act* Section 113 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers respecting investigations by the S.I.U.)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 14.2 (Use of Force Qualifications)

The P.S.S. investigation determined that the T.P.S.'s policies and procedures associated with the applied use of force were found to be lawful, in keeping with current legislation and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

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Toronto Police Services Board Report

January 23, 2017

To: Chair and Members
            Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
            Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation into the Alleged Sexual Assault Complainant 2016-B

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is notified of an incident involving serious injury or death, provincial legislation directs that a chief of police shall conduct an administrative investigation.

Ontario Regulation 267/10, section 11(1) states:

"The chief of police shall also cause an investigation to be conducted forthwith into any incident with respect to which the S.I.U. has been notified, subject to the S.I.U.'s lead role in investigating the incident."

Section 11(2) of the Regulation states:

"The purpose of the chief of police's investigation is to review the policies of or services provided by the police force and the conduct of its police officers."

Section 11(4) of the Regulation states:

"The chief of police of a municipal police force shall report his or her findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the S.I.U. director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the S.I.U.'s investigation to the Attorney General, and the board may make the chief of police's report available to the public."

Upon conclusion of its investigation, the S.I.U. provides the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) with a letter. The S.I.U. does not provide the T.P.S. with a copy of the report that was provided to the Attorney General.

Discussion:

On July 11, 2015, at 1504 hours, the complainant in this matter attended 32 Division in the company of her father to report a fraud. A police officer attended the front desk area to take the fraud occurrence.

The officer escorted the complainant, Sexual Assault Complainant 2016-B (2016-B), to a room to take the report; her father waited in the front desk area. 2016-B left the station after speaking with the officer and told her father that the officer who just took the report had sexually assaulted her. 2016-B's father returned to the station to complain about the incident.

The S.I.U. was notified and invoked its mandate.

The S.I.U. designated one officer as a subject officer; three other officers were designated as witness officers.

In a letter to the T.P.S. dated January 29, 2016, Director Tony Loparco of the S.I.U. advised that the investigation was completed, the file has been closed and no further action is contemplated.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation:

Professional Standards Support (P.S.S.) conducted an investigation pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11.

The P.S.S. examined the applied use of force in relation to the applicable legislation, service provided, procedures, and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.S.S. investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 05-05 (Sexual Assault)
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Procedure 13-17 (Memorandum Books and Reports)

The P.S.S. investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Police Services Act* section 113 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 926 section 14.2 (Use of Force Qualifications)

The P.S.S. investigation determined that the T.P.S. policies and procedures associated with the applied use of force were found to be lawful, in keeping with current legislation and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined procedures required modification.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

MS:ao

Filename: siusexualassault2016-Bpublic.docx

Toronto Police Services Board Report

January 23, 2017

To: Chair and Members
            Toronto Police Services Board

From: Mark Saunders
            Chief of Police

Subject: Chief's Administrative Investigation: Alleged Sexual Assault Complainant 2016-D

Recommendation(s):

It is recommended that the Board receive the following report.

Financial Implications:

There are no financial implications relating to the recommendation contained within this report.

Background / Purpose:

Whenever the Special Investigations Unit (S.I.U.) is notified of an incident involving serious injury or death, provincial legislation directs that a chief of police shall conduct an administrative investigation.

Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11(1) states:

"The chief of police shall also cause an investigation to be conducted forthwith into any incident with respect to which the S.I.U. has been notified, subject to the S.I.U.'s lead role in investigating the incident."

Section 11(2) of the Regulation states:

"The purpose of the chief of police's investigation is to review the policies of or services provided by the police force and the conduct of its police officers."

Section 11(4) of the Regulation states:

"The chief of police of a municipal police force shall report his or her findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the S.I.U. director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the S.I.U.'s investigation to the Attorney General, and the board may make the chief of police's report available to the public."

Upon conclusion of their investigation, the S.I.U. provides the Toronto Police Service (T.P.S.) with a letter. The S.I.U. does not provide the T.P.S. with a copy of the report that was provided to the Attorney General.

Discussion:

On September 24, 2015, Sexual Assault Complainant 2016-C reported to the T.P.S. a sexual assault that was alleged to have been committed by a T.P.S. member while on duty and in uniform. The S.I.U. was notified, invoked its mandate and conducted an investigation.

As a result of that investigation, the subject officer, who was assigned to 52 Division, was charged by the S.I.U. on March 2, 2016, with one count of Sexual Assault contrary to the *Criminal Code*, Section 271.

The S.I.U. issued a press release on March 2, 2016, indicating the fact that the subject officer had been charged as a result of the investigation.

The press release stated in part;

"*An S.I.U. investigation found the following:*

- *Shortly before 1:00 a.m. on September 24, 2015, a Toronto police officer, encountered a 27-year-old woman near Wellington Street West and Blue Jays Way.*
- *The woman was driven to her residence by the officer in his police vehicle.*
- *The assault is alleged to have occurred in the vehicle during the drive to the complainant's residence.*"

Based upon her review of the press release, another female, Sexual Assault Complainant 2016-D (2016-D), contacted the S.I.U. directly to report a set of similar facts.

The S.I.U. invoked its mandate and notified the Service of its investigation.

2016-D alleged that on November 1, 2015, she was at the intersection of King Street West and Blue Jays Way in the evening hours and was approached by a uniform officer operating a marked police vehicle. She alleged that the officer offered to drive her

home. She accepted the offer and once at the address he allegedly attempted to place his hand between her legs.

The S.I.U. designated the same member as a subject officer; no other members of the T.P.S. were designated in this matter.

On April 25, 2016, Director Tony Loparco of the S.I.U. caused an information to be sworn against the subject officer for one count of Sexual Assault contrary to the *Criminal Code* section 271. On May 4, 2016, the subject officer surrendered himself to S.I.U. investigators, was processed and placed before the courts.

The matter is still before the courts.

Summary of the Toronto Police Service's Investigation:

Professional Standards Support (P.S.S.) conducted an investigation in conjunction with the Sex Crimes Unit (S.C.U.), pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10, Section 11.

The investigation examined the applied use of force in relation to the applicable legislation, service provided, procedures and the conduct of the involved officers.

The P.S.S. investigation reviewed the following T.P.S. procedures:

- Procedure 05-05 (Sexual Assault)
- Procedure 13-16 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Procedure 13-17 (Memorandum Books and Reports)
- Procedure 15-17 (In-Car Camera System)
- Standards of Conduct Section 2.1.1 (General Responsibilities)

The P.S.S. investigation also reviewed the following legislation:

- *Police Services Act* Section 113 (Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 267/10 (Conduct and Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations by the Special Investigations Unit)
- Ontario Regulation 926 Section 14.2 (Use of Force Qualifications)

The P.S.S. investigation determined that the T.P.S. policies and procedures associated with the applied use of force were found to be lawful, in keeping with current legislation and written in a manner which provided adequate and appropriate guidance to the members. None of the examined policies and procedures required modification.

Acting Deputy Chief Richard Stubbings, Operational Support Command, will be in attendance to answer any questions that the Board members may have regarding this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Saunders, O.O.M.
Chief of Police

MS:ao

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Ministry of
Transportation

Ministère des
Transports

Office of the Minister

Bureau du ministre

Ferguson Block, 3ʳᵈ Floor
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M7A 1Z8
416-327-9200
www.ontario.ca/transportation

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Ontario

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TORONTO POLICE SERVICE BOARD

Mr. Andy Pringle
Chair
Toronto Police Services Board
40 College Street
Toronto ON M5G 2J3

Dear Mr. Pringle:

Thank you for your letter about amending the *Highway Traffic Act* and the Ontario Traffic Manual Book 7 Temporary Conditions. I welcome the opportunity to respond.

The Ministry of Transportation is open to discussions regarding the future of policing with partner ministries such as the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS) and the Ministry of Labour. However, authorizing alternatives to sworn police officers concerning the right to direct traffic in a range of circumstances is primarily a policing issue and does not fall under the ministry's mandate.

MCSCS is currently working on the Strategy for a Safer Ontario which includes looking at what work is currently done by police officers but could be done by other types of positions in the future. We look forward to the release of the strategy and will work with MCSCS and others on moving forward with its recommendations.

Thank you again for writing.

Sincerely,

Steven Del Duca
Minister

c.   Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services
       Ministry of Labour

Next Meeting: Thursday, April 20, 2017
       1:00 PM